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Abstract 
Unsustainable exploitation of the marine fisheries resources in Vietnam was documented 
already in the early the 1990s. In order to address this issue, innovative approaches to 
fisheries management were introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries through pilot projects 
funded by international donors. However, the effectiveness of fisheries management in 
Vietnam has not lead to sustainable marine capture fisheries. The government has been 
unable to control the development of its fisheries (i.e. total landings and fishing effort in terms 
of fishing vessels employed) resulting in depletion of fisheries resources and marine capture 
fisheries has got into a vicious cycle. 
This research sets out to explain the ineffectiveness of the fisheries management system in 
Vietnam with an emphasis on the planning system to provide a more inclusive understanding 
about issues facing the fisheries management system in Vietnam; logics of the fisheries 
development objectives; credibility of the knowledge base used for planning and management 
purposes; co-management arrangements; and unsuccessful implication of innovative 
approaches to improve effectiveness of fisheries management in Vietnam. 
Various approaches and frameworks are used to address research questions of the research. 
The fisheries system approach is used to identify issues facing the fisheries management in 
Vietnam. The triangle paradigm framework is used to understand logics of the fisheries 
development objectives. Eleven conditions for sustainable fisheries co-management have 
been used to understand success and failure of co-management approach in Vietnam. 
This research concludes that: i) the available data in the Vietnamese fisheries draw out a 
contradictory understanding about the natural and human systems, thus management system 
is unable to make effective intervention on the human and natural systems; ii) conflicting 
discourses in planning fisheries result in inconsistent development and management 
decisions on the Vietnamese fisheries; iii) the knowledge base used for planning fisheries in 
Vietnam is incredible; iv) the management tools decided in the fisheries master plan are not 
implemented at local levels and not enforced at the fishing communities, and the Vietnamese 
fisheries are under the open-access regime which fishers are allowed to catch as much as 
they can; and v) unsuccessful implementation of innovative approaches to fisheries 
management in Vietnam is due to a lack of supportive institutional arrangement and without a 
framework for fisheries management.  
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Abstrakt 
Det blev dokumenteret allerede i begyndelsen af 1990'erne.at fiskeressourcerne i Vietnam 
ikke blev bæredygtig udnyttet. I bestræbelserne på at ændre på denne situation blev 
innovative tilgange til fiskeriforvaltning afprøvet gennem internationale donorer finansierede 
pilotprojekter. Effektiviteten af fiskeriforvaltningen i Vietnam er dog ikke blevet forbedret. 
Udviklingen af fiskeriet har reelt været ude af regeringens kontrol og derfor er over-fiskeri i 
kystfiskeriet kun blevet forstærket. 
Denne afhandling analyserer fiskeriforvaltningssystemet i Vietnam og kortlægger et ineffektivt 
system, som er drevet af planøkonomi. Afhandlingen giver en indgående forståelse af de 
problemer, som fiskeriforvaltningssystemet i Vietnam står over dets logik. Den analyserer 
troværdigheden af videns grundlaget for såvel udviklingsplanlægningen som forvaltningen af 
fiskeriet med specielt fokus på implementeringen på lokalt niveau, herunder inddragelsen af 
lokale fiskere fiskeriforvaltningen eller manglen på sammen gennem en analyse af 
praktiserede medforvaltningsmodeller i vietnamesiske fiskeri. 
Forskellige tilgange og analyseværktøjer har været anvendt i forhold til at besvare 
forskningsspørgsmål. Fiskerisystemets tilgang er brugt til at identificere spørgsmål 
vedrørende fiskeriforvaltning i Vietnam. En triangulære paradigme forståelse har været 
anvendt til at forstå logikken i mål og politikker for fiskeriudviklings planerne. Der er taget 
udgangspunkt i 11 faktorer som har stor indflydelse på samarbejde mellem det politiske 
system og lokale fiskerisamfund i bestræbelserne på at skabe en bæredygtigt udvikling af 
fiskeriet i Vietnam.  
Denne afhandling konkluderer, at: i) de data hvorpå forvaltningen af vietnamesisk fiskeri 
bygger på, giver en modstridende forståelse af de naturlige og menneskelige systemer.; ii) 
modstridende diskurser i planlægningen af fiskeriudviklingen har ført til inkonsekvente og 
uhensigtsmæssige beslutninger for de bagvedliggende 5 og 10 årsplaner.; iii) videns 
grundlaget for planapparatet er mangelfuldt; iv) der udarbejdes ikke  fiskeriudviklingsplaner 
på lokalt plan, ligesom plan implementeringen og håndhævelse af fiskeriforvaltningen ikke 
sker på lokalt niveau. Det betyder, at vietnamesiske fiskeri de facto er et klassik open acces 
fiskeri, hvor den enkelte fisker stort set ikke er underlagt nogen form for regulering og v) 
manglende politisk opbakning til innovative tilgange til fiskeriforvaltningen, herunder modstand 
mod at skabe de nødvendige institutionelle forandringer har undermineret at der er indført et 
effektivt fiskeriforvaltningssystem i Vietnam.  
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CHAPER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The marine capture fisheries (hereafter called as fisheries) take an important role in social-
economic development and food security throughout the world, especially in the developing 
countries. According to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in 
2013 fish accounted for about 17% of the global population’s intake of animal protein and 
6.7% of all protein consumed (FAO, 2016). It provided more than 3.1 billion people with 
almost 20% of their average per capita intake of animal protein. It is a vital nutritional source 
for billions of people in least-developed countries where total protein intake level is lower 
than developed nations. In 2014, total number of fishing vessels in the world was about 4.6 
million vessels, of which the fleet in Asia was the largest, consisting of 3.5 million vessels 
accounting for 75% of the global fleet. They provided employment for nearly 38.0 million 
people in the world and produced the total production of 81.5 million tons (FAO, 2016). 
According to FAO (FAO, 2016), the world’s fisheries expanded continuously to a production 
peak of 86.4 million tons in 1996, but have since exhibited a general declining trend to 81.5 
million tons in 2013. In spite of the challenges facing the world’s fisheries, good progress 
is being made to reduce fishing rates and restore overfished fish stocks and marine 
ecosystems through effective management actions in some areas. However, the state of 
the world’s fish stocks has not improved overall. In 2013, most of fish stocks are fully fished 
with no potential for increases in production. Indeed, the number of fish stocks exploited at 
the biologically sustainable level decreased from 90% in 1974 to 68.6% (of these, 58.1% 
of fish stocks were fully fished and only 10.5% of fish stocks were underexploited) and 
31.4% of fish stocks were fished at the biologically unsustainable level in 2013 (FAO, 2016). 
This is one of the main reasons leading to hunger and poverty of more than one billion of 
people in the world. A large rate of people living in poverty and hunger inhabited in most 
developing countries, of which the fishing communities are at the bottom of the socio-
economic ladder. The root causes of this may be associated with the following factors: i) 
unbalance of conservation and production growth objectives in the fisheries policies. Many 
fisheries have been still subsidized to enlarge fishing fleets and increase fishing rates to 
obtain the short-term objectives of providing livelihoods and employment for the local 
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communities (Charles, 2001; European Paliament, 2013; FAO, 2004a), ii) the insufficient 
and distorted knowledge base used within the single species models leads to ineffective 
policy and management decisions (FAO, 2004; Lorenzo & Wilson, 2006; Raakjær, 2009; 
Raakjær et al., 2007), iii) the effectiveness of the fisheries management system has not 
been improved clearly (Lee, 2004; Walters, 2007; Wilson, Raakjaer, & Degnbol, 2003). This 
research takes the Vietnamese fisheries as a case study to explain how these factors 
influencing on the fisheries system in general and the Vietnamese fisheries in particular. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
In Vietnamese context, the term of “fishery sector” is used commonly. It is composed of the 
capture fisheries (including marine capture fisheries and inland capture fisheries), 
aquaculture, processing, and fisheries logistic service. This research only focuses on the 
marine capture fisheries and the term of “fisheries” used in this research means the marine 
capture fisheries only.  
Being with the long coast of over 3,260 kilometers and around 1.0 million square kilometers 
in the economic exclusive zone (EEZ), the fisheries have an important role in the national 
economy regarding in providing foreign exchange, food security, employment, coastal 
livelihoods, and national security (Prime Minister, 2006, 2010a). Vietnam was the seventh 
biggest producer in the fisheries of the world in 2014 (FAO, 2016), its total fish landings 
were over 2.7 million tons. In the last three decades, the fishing effort and total landings of 
the Vietnamese fisheries increased gradually. According to Directorate of Fisheries (D-
Fish, 2017a), the total number of fishing vessels of Vietnam was 110,950 in 2016 (increase 
39.1% times compared to 2000, and decrease 14.1% compared to 20101). They provided 
employment for approx. 764,000 professional fishers and livelihoods for millions of people 
living in 628 communes of the 28 coastal provinces of Vietnam. This fleet produced the 
total landings of 2.876 million tons (1.37 and 2.25 times higher than that in 2010 and in 
2000 respectively), equally over 3.3 billion USD in value in 2016. These figures are closely 
                                         
1 There was a suddenly increase in number of fishing vessels in 2008-2009. It was from 95,609 
vessels in 2007 to 123,609 in 2008 and 131,000 in 2009 due to a subsidy policy of the government. 
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connected with the centrally planned economy which had been operationalized in Vietnam 
before implementing an economic reform in 1986.  
Theoretically, the Vietnamese fisheries are managed under the state planning system 
which are based on the mandate research and operationalized by the government-based 
and top-down mechanism. In this system, the total landings planned for the coming year 
are set higher than that of the previous year; and the estimation of annual fish landings 
always exceeds the total catches planned by the government and even is higher than the 
exploitable potential yields of fisheries resources. This may be a reason leading to the 
gradual increase in fishing effort and total landings of the Vietnamese fisheries in the last 
three decades. By contrast, the degradation of fish stocks and conflicts among fishing 
communities have been commonly seen throughout the country. The catch per unit of effort 
(CPUE) of the most prominent species has gradually decreased at the average rate of 
approx. 5% per annum in 1990-2016, from 0.9 tons/HP/year in 1990 to 0.2 tons/HP/year in 
2016 (D-Fish, 2017a; GSO, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011a, 2016). In addition, conflicts among 
fisheries and destructive fishing activities have become increasingly common throughout 
the country (D-Fish, 2015). Clearly, there is a hidden fact behind figures in the Vietnamese 
fisheries. But, it is an evidence that the fisheries have developed out of control of the state 
fisheries planning system. In other words, the existing fisheries management system in 
Vietnam is ineffective.  
In order to improve effectiveness of the existing management system, the co-management 
and adaptive indicators-based management approaches were imported to Vietnamese 
fisheries. The co-management approach is considered as a useful tool to halt the decline 
of fisheries resources by involving fishers in protecting and managing the natural resources 
(Pinkerton, 1989). It is closely associated with the adaptive management approach to form 
an adaptive co-management framework which can solve the uncertainty and complexity of 
fisheries. This approach, therefore, has been widely introduced into the fisheries in the 
world (FAO, 2005a; Long, 2002). Actually, the co-management approach has been 
introduced into Vietnamese fisheries since 1994. It was officially endorsed by MARD in 
2007 by establishing the Fisheries Co-Management Task Force. Since after that, over 40 
fisheries co-management models have been piloted in the Vietnamese fishing 
communities. However, most of them were not kept going on effectively, even being 
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collapsed after ending external financial supports (Lai, 2008). This approach might be 
impeded by: i) the lack of a clear definition of the management authorities, ii) legitimacy of 
the co-management organization, iii) the unresponsiveness of stakeholders, and iv) heavily 
dependence on the external supports.  
The adaptive indicators-based management structure is to reduce uncertainty of 
management choices (Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986) and provide broader understanding 
about the system being managed (FAO, 1999). This was evaluated as the best choice for 
the existing situation of the Vietnamese fisheries (Kato, 2001; Raakjær, 2004; Raakjær et 
al., 2007). In fact, this structure has successfully introduced into some African and Asian 
fisheries (Garaway & Arthur, 2004; Raakjær, 2009). However, most of case studies on this 
approach have failed in the sense that no experimental management program was ever 
implemented (Walters, 2007). The adaptive indicators-based management structure was 
introduced into Vietnam in 2003 as a working package of a program2 funded by Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA). It was then endorsed officially in 2007 by the 
Minister of MARD (MARD, 2007) establishing the Marine Fisheries Specialist Team. A 
series of activities facilitating the structure had been implemented and supported by the 
program in 2003-2012. Most of these activities emphasized the capacity building for the 
Marine Fisheries Specialist Team and developing a working framework for the structure. 
However, this structure was collapsed after DANIDA ending their support. This frustration 
may result from the poor synergy of actors and their irresponsiveness, without leadership 
to changes, and the lack of political supports. Another reason is that the actors did not play 
their roles as the structure required. Of these, fisheries managers did not make requests to 
Marine Fisheries Specialist Team for advice and maintain the data collection programs and 
other relative researches (Management, 2004). 
1.3 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research is aspired the failure in achieving management objectives of the Vietnamese 
fisheries master plan by 2010. The Decision No. 10/2006/QD-TTg dated 11/01/2006 of the 
Prime Minister (PM) approving the master plan for the Vietnamese fisheries development 
                                         
2 DANIDA funded the Vietnamese fisheries to implement a program of the Fisheries Sector Program 
Support in 1996-2012. 
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by 2010. It adopted strategies to reduce fishing effort from over 90,000 vessels in 2005 to 
50,000 vessels by 2010, and to keep fishing level (total catches) by 2010 at 1.5-1.8 million 
tons. But, in 2010, the number of fishing vessels was 129,376 vessels and total catch was 
2.1 million tons. This means that the Vietnamese fisheries developed out of control of the 
master plan adopted by the government. This research hypothesizes that the failure of the 
master plan resulted from the ineffectiveness of the current fisheries management system 
in Vietnam in both aspects of making and implementing fisheries plans in practice. In terms 
of making fisheries plans, it seems to be a lack of coherent linkage among elements within 
the state planning system i.e. strategies, master plans, five-year plans and annual plan in 
setting the agreed objectives. Moreover, the knowledge base used for planning fisheries is 
implicitly provided by the mandate researches of the governmental institutions, and 
indigenous knowledge and experiences are not taken into account in the fisheries planning 
processes. In terms of implementation, it seems to have a gap between the state planning 
system and the fishing communities. The government cares its planning system through 
making figures; meanwhile the local fishers attempt to maximize their own catches and 
profits.  
This ineffectiveness of the existing management system is not only seen in the Vietnamese 
fisheries, but also found commonly in the global fisheries (FAO, 2004a; Raakjær, 2009). 
Therefore, understanding failures of the Vietnamese fisheries management system will 
contribute to improvement of effectiveness of the fisheries management system in Vietnam 
on one hand, and contribute to the mainstream of the global fisheries management on the 
other hand. 
1.4 THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The Vietnamese fisheries are in crisis that their management objectives are out of control 
of the management system. The fishing effort and fishing level exceeded far from the 
expected levels planned by the government. In a review of the 2010 fisheries master plan, 
Quyen  argued that the failure of the 2010 fisheries master plan in Vietnam is due to two 
main reasons: i) its management objectives (e.g. total catches and number of fishing 
vessels) are unrealistic; and ii) the government did not allocate resources to implement 
investment projects and development programs attached in this master plan (Quyen, 
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2012). In addition to this, innovative fisheries management approaches (i.e. co-
management and adaptive indicators-based management structures) were imported to 
improve the effectiveness of the fisheries management system in Vietnam. However, their 
outcomes and implications are not seen clearly, even were completely failed in practice. 
Therefore, this research aims to explain ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese fisheries 
management system in order to contribute to: i) understanding about unrealities of 
management objectives leading to ineffectiveness of the fisheries management system, 
especially in the developing fisheries, and ii) building more knowledge in fisheries 
management towards an effective and efficient fisheries management system. 
The research is conducted based on the empirical investigations to understand the logics 
of establishing management objectives in the fisheries planning system in Vietnam in five 
aspects: i) identifying issues of the fisheries system, ii) setting management objectives, iii) 
using knowledge base for planning fisheries, iv) planning fisheries at the local communities, 
and v) measures to improve infectiveness of the fisheries planning system. It aims to 
achieve 5 following objectives: 
Objective 1: Provide insights into the fisheries system under lights of the fisheries system 
approach to answer the research question that “What issues are facing the fisheries 
management system in Vietnam?” and sub-questions are: 
i) What is the situation of the natural system (fish stocks and marine biodiversity? 
ii) What is the situation of the fishing industry and the local fishing communities? 
iii) How is the fisheries management system organized? 
Objective 2: Analyze fisheries discourse to address the research question of “How the 
fisheries master plan deals with the issues of the fisheries?”. This will work with the 
following sub-questions: 
i) What is background (i.e. issues facing fisheries management system) to formulating 
the fisheries master plan by 2010? 
ii) How are fisheries discourses emerged and institutionalized into the fisheries master 
plan by 2010? 
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Objective 3: Discuss on the knowledge base used for planning fisheries i.e. the total 
catches (TC) to answer question that “How uncertain are the objectives of the fisheries 
master plan?”. The following sub-questions are addressed: 
i) How was the TC-based management approach conceptualized in the Vietnamese 
fisheries? 
ii) what and how knowledge inputs were used to define TC in Vietnam? 
Objective 4: Explore implementation of the fisheries master plan at the local level and 
fishing behaviours of the fishing communities to answer the question that “How the fisheries 
master plan intervenes the fishing communities?”. This is addressed with the following sub-
questions: 
i) How is the 2010 fisheries master plan implemented at the local level? 
ii) What are preferences and interests of the local fishers? 
iii) What and how are factors influencing on the fishing behaviours of the local fishers? 
Objective 5: Examine application of innovative fisheries management approaches: co-
management and adaptive indicators-based management structure in the Vietnamese 
fisheries to answer the question of “Why were these approaches not successfully 
implemented in the Vietnamese fisheries?”. This addresses the following sub-questions: 
i) How the innovative management approaches were implemented in the Vietnamese 
fisheries? 
ii) Do they improve the effectiveness of the existing fisheries management system in 
Vietnam? 
iii) What are obstacles to implementation of these approaches in the Vietnamese 
fisheries context? 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. Following the introduction chapter (chapter 1) is the 
theoretical perspectives (chapter 2) and chapter 3 presents methodologies of the research. 
In chapter 2, it analyzes literature on the knowledge base for fisheries management and 
the fisheries co-management to learn about the current understanding and their gaps in 
using knowledge for managing fisheries and implementing the fisheries co-management in 
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the world. It also analyzes analytical frameworks of relevant research topics of the thesis. 
In chapter 3, the research methodologies are presented. Firstly, it presents the conceptual 
frameworks connecting with specific research topics to guide relevant data and information 
need to be collected. Secondly, it explains the research methodologies of the thesis. In this 
section, it describes the research approaches and methods used to collect and analyze 
data to provide inputs for arguments. 
Chapter 4 provides insights into the fisheries system under lights of the fisheries system 
approach with emphasis on the deficiencies of the existing management system to guide 
research questions of the following chapters. It analyzes the state of the natural system 
including marine biodiversity and fisheries resources in Vietnamese marine waters. It then 
looks at the fishing fleets and fishing communities to understand about the human system 
in the Vietnamese fisheries. Finally, this chapter examines the fisheries management 
system to understand the ways to manage fishing practice of the human system in Vietnam. 
Chapter 5 analyzes in detail the fisheries master plan by 2010 which used at the key tool 
for planning fisheries in Vietnam. It is commenced with an explanation on the context of the 
political, socio-economic and fisheries influencing on the fisheries master plan by 2010. It 
is followed by an analysis on the policy discourses and actors getting involved into planning 
fisheries to identify the storylines and dynamics of actors. It then analyzes storyline 
discourse coalitions in planning the fisheries to understand the nature of management 
objectives (i.e. total catches and number of fishing vessels) of the fisheries master plan. 
Finally, this chapter identifies a new approach to planning the fisheries and new conflicts 
coherently connected with the planning system in transition. 
Chapter 6 goes deeper to understand the nature of conflicts among actors in planning 
fisheries in Vietnam. Firstly, it explains about the concept of the total catches (TC) in 
Vietnamese context and how the TC-based management approach was introduced into the 
Vietnamese fisheries.  It then examines the knowledge inputs to define the TC to 
understand the nature of the TC figure presented in the fisheries master plan by 2010 in 
Vietnam.  
In chapter 7, two cases of the commune fisheries selected to be analyzed to understand 
planning fisheries at the local fishing communities in practice. It is commenced with an 
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explanation on selecting two cases of the commune fisheries to analyze. It is followed by 
an explanation on how the fisheries master plan by 2010 was implemented in these cases 
to understand the efficiency of the fisheries planning system of the government. It then 
investigates fishing behaviours of the local fishers to understand how they are 
accommodated with the fisheries planning system of the government and the root of the 
ineffectiveness of the existing fisheries management system in Vietnam. 
Chapter 8 explains the introduction and implications of innovative fisheries management 
approaches into Vietnam to draw out lessons learnt in changing a fisheries management 
system. It explores implementation of the co-management and the adaptive indicators-
based management structures in the Vietnamese fisheries. It then examines the 
effectiveness of introducing these structures in the Vietnamese fisheries. Finally, it 
analyzes the main obstacles to implementing successfully the co-management and the 
adaptive indicators-based management structures in the Vietnamese fisheries context.  
Finally, chapter 9 concludes the main findings of the research and provides theoretical 
reflections to scholars of the knowledge base for fisheries management and the fisheries 
co-management. Firstly, it revisits and answers all research questions asked in chapter 1. 
Secondly, it provides contributions to theories of the knowledge base for fisheries 
management and the fisheries co-management. Finally, it defines the limitations of the 
research and suggests future works to the relevant scholars. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is about the effectiveness of fisheries management in Vietnam. It follows the 
definition of fisheries management as: “The integrated process of information gathering, 
analysis, planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources and formulation 
and implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations or rules which govern 
fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and the 
accomplishment of other fisheries objectives” (Cochrane, 2009 p.2). The fisheries 
management can be divided into two main tasks for analysis: i) making management plans; 
and ii) enforcing management plans to control fishing activities in reality of fishing 
communities. Both these tasks contribute to the effectiveness of a fisheries management 
system. This research focuses on the first task of the management process - the making 
management plan including earlier stages (e.g. gathering and analyzing data and 
information, planning, consultation, and adoption of management plan stages). It is 
associated with knowledge used for planning fisheries and institutional arrangements in 
producing knowledge and making decisions. The research also examines implementation 
of the national management plans at local levels and influences of the fisheries planning 
system on the fishing behaviour of the fishing communities. This research hypothesizes 
that the knowledge base used for planning fisheries in Vietnam was problematic. Many 
stakeholders’ knowledge was ignored on one hand, and production of knowledge was not 
communicated transparently among interested groups. Therefore, this research 
emphasizes empirical methods and relates to theories of knowledge base for fisheries 
management and co-management which may contribute to enhancement of the knowledge 
base. This chapter provides a general review of literature on: i) the knowledge base for 
fisheries management; and ii) the co-management approaches as theoretical foundation to 
address the research questions of this research. More detailed perspectives of theory for 
specific research topics may be supplemented in the specific chapters.  
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
The knowledge base for fisheries management may be defined as “biological information 
about fish stocks, economic information about fisheries, and social information about the 
requirements of effective fisheries governance” (Motos & Wilson, 2006 p.1). These types 
of knowledge may be produced and presented in various forms by stakeholders involved 
in the fisheries management. Johannes and Neis classified into two types of the knowledge 
used for fisheries management: the scientific knowledge and the fisher’s knowledge 
(Johannes & Neis, 2007). The scientific knowledge is produced and presented by scientists 
relying on scientific observations (Degnbol, 2005). Meanwhile, the fisher’s knowledge is 
primarily of a qualitative and narrative nature accumulated over time and transmitted within 
specific local fishing communities (Baelde, 2007). It is named differently by authors such 
as indigenous knowledge, traditional knowledge, or local ecological knowledge 
(Doubleday, 1990; Haggan, Neis, & Baird, 2007; Nirmale et al., 2007; Wilson, 1999, 2004). 
2.2.1.1 The scientific knowledge and fisheries management 
Fish stocks may be renewable, but they are not infinite. They may be able to provide 
production and ecosystem services for ever if they are utilized properly, in contrast they will 
be exhausted if they are harvested under an ineffectively managed manner (FAO, 1997). 
In 1883, Huxley recognized threats to the sustainability of the fisheries resources by asking 
that “Whether fisheries are exhaustible; and if so, whether anything can be done to prevent 
their exhaustion?” (Huxley, 1883 p.5). In order to maintain the productivity of fish stocks, 
biologists suggested rules on the size of fish to be caught and number of fish are allowed 
to catch in specific areas to protect and maintain productivity of fish stocks (Russell, 1931; 
Schaefer, 1991). Consequently, the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) has been 
used as tools to control mortality rate of the exploited fish stocks and protect fisheries 
resources. It is defined as “the highest theoretical equilibrium yield that can be continuously 
taken (on average) from a stock under existing (average) environmental conditions without 
affecting significantly the reproduction process” (Cochrane & Garcia, 2009 p. 488). It also 
refers to sometimes as potential yield. This then has been used commonly as the key 
reference points for managing fish stocks in both developed and developing fisheries 
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(Caddy & Mahone, 1995; European Commission, 2011; United Nations, 1982, 1995, 2002). 
It is believed that fishing at the level producing MSYs of fish stocks, and then the fisheries 
will be sustained in a certain period (Cochrane & Garcia, 2009). This guides fisheries 
researches in general and fish stock assessments in particular to provide knowledge for 
fisheries management in over the world (Degnbol, 2004; Raakjær, 2009). In this regime, 
the state of individual species is assessed through biological parameters (e.g. fishing 
mortality, natural death, growth rate, recruitment, etc.) and their MSY is predicted by 
mathematic models (Sparre & Venema, 1998) on an annual basis or multi-annual basis. 
Based on the MSY estimation, the fisheries authorities decide the total allowable catch 
(TAC) of individual fish stocks in metric tons. This TACs are divided as catch quotas and 
allocated to fishers/fishing organizations (hereafter called as the TAC-based management 
regime). This work is implemented and presented systematically and scientifically by 
scientists, therefore it is easier to understand and communicate (Degnbol, 2005; Johannes 
& Neis, 2007). 
In reality, there are interactions among species and cohorts, and between fisheries 
resources and their environment within specific marine ecosystems. These interactions are 
complicated and unpredictable (FAO, 2003). Therefore, predictions the state of fish stocks 
by mathematic models are uncertain and impossible (Larkin, 1977; Sissenwine, 1978). As 
a result, a such knowledge is unable to maintain productivity of the harvested fish stocks 
and variability of fisheries in over the world (Degnbol, 2004; FAO, 2004a; Raakjær, 2009). 
Hilborn & Peterman (Hilborn & Peterman, 1995) identified seven major sources of 
uncertainty in fish stock assessments: i) estimates of fish abundance or other measures of 
the state of the system; ii) model structure; iii) estimated model parameters; iv) response 
of users to regulation; v) future environmental conditions; vi) future social, political and 
economic conditions; and vii) future management objectives. They also suggested two 
main ways to reduce uncertainty in scientific advice for fisheries management: i) do 
sensitivity analyses with quantitative models, and ii) develop more sophisticated 
quantitative methods for estimating components of stock assessments from data sets. 
Addressing this, scientists suggested supplementary modules and principles toward a more 
holistic approach. For instance, introduction of the precautionary approach to fisheries 
management (FAO, 1996a; Garcia, 1995). This approach considers natural ecosystems as 
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a set of complex interactions and feed-back mechanisms among preys and predators. By 
that time, in order to understand complexity of the fisheries, the approach of the fisheries 
system was also suggested (Charles, 1994; 1995). This approach not only considers the 
biological parameters of the harvested fish stocks, but takes into account a broader scale 
of the natural system (i.e. fish stocks, biodiversity, physical environment) also the human 
system and the management system. Another is the introduction of the ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management (FAO, 2003). This confirms that marine ecosystems are 
impacted directly by fisheries on one hand, and are also impacted by other human activities 
on the other hand, so they need to be managed in an ecosystem context. Both of them 
requires broader considerations (e.g. interactions among species in a food web and 
between environment and fish, interactions of fisheries with other industries) are taken into 
account in decision-making process of fisheries management. The sustainablity of fisheries 
is a multi-dimensional issue. It is, therefore, necessary to balance information regarding 
many aspects of fisheries in the process of decicion making (Degnbol, 2004). An 
ecosystem based approach cannot be based on biological science alone, but also other its 
dimensions such as ecological, economic, and social (Berkes, 2012). 
In terms of applied aspects, scientists develop models integrating ecosystem factors to 
provide evaluations of impacts of fisheries and environment processes on marine 
ecosystems. For instance, series of bio-economic analytical model (BEAM) provide the 
analysis of the bio-economic and socio-economic effects of the transition process from a 
poorly managed fishery on investment to a better managed fishery (Sparre & Willmann, 
2001). Another is technical management measures package (TEMAS). It is a fleet-based 
bio-economic software of combining five modules: biological, fishing effort, fleet behaviour, 
catches, and economic to evaluate management strategies accounting for technical 
measures and fleet behaviour in one or several areas (Ulrich et al., 2007). As an expansion 
of TEMAS and earlier models, a bio-economic simulation and optimization model for 
fisheries (FISHRENT) was developed to provide scientific advice for fisheries management 
in EU waters (Salz et al., 2011). This combines six modules: biological, economic, interface, 
market, behaviour, and policy to provide scenarios for fisheries management in particulars 
situations. Another one is ecological/ecosystem modeling software suite (EwE). This 
combines modellings for ecosystem trophic mass balance analysis (called as Ecopath), 
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with a dynamic modeling capability (called as Ecosim) to examine past and future impacts 
of fishing and environmental disturbances on the ecosystems as well as to explore optimal 
fishing policies in specific spaces (Christensen & Walters, 2004). In addition, International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) introduced multi-annual plans to manage the 
depleted fish stocks (European Council, 2004), and the long-term plan for cod stocks and 
the fisheries exploiting those stocks (European Council, 2013) to manage TACs adaptively 
to the practical conditions. 
2.2.1.2 The fishers’ knowledge and fisheries management 
What fishers’ knowledge is 
For many decades, fisheries managers have relied heavily on scientific advice derived from 
fish stock assessments. However, these assessments are costly and normally and do not 
cover all resources or fishing areas of interest (Degnbol, 2004). Therefore, it is important 
to develop management approaches that allow incorporation of alternative information 
sources from stakeholders (e.f. resource users, enviromnetists) into assessment models 
and decision-making processes (FAO, 1995; Garcia, 1995). There are different definitions 
of the fishers’ knowledge. Berkes et al. define fishers’ knowledege that “A cumulative body 
of knowledge, practice and belief evolving by adaptive processes and handed down 
through generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings 
(including humans) with one another and with their environment” (Berkes et al., 2000 
p.1252). Fisher  et al. define that “Fishers’ knowledge comprises the body of experiential 
knowledge including ecological, resource-based, ecosystem, fishing practices, fishing 
communities and livelihoods, governance and markets, and their dynamic relationships. 
This knowledge is developed in a social-cultural and geographical context” (Fischer et al., 
2015 p.4). By that time, Seixas and Veira defined fisher’s knowledge in a broader way as 
“Fishers understanding of biological species (morphology, behavior, growth, feeding habits, 
reproduction, etc.), species interactions, ecosystem dynamics (including terrestrial, 
marine/freshwater and weather dynamics), as well as of social-ecological interactions and 
feedbacks dynamics” (Seixas & Veira, 2015 p.231). 
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How relevant it is 
Throughout the world, local fishers demonstrate a diversed range of knowledge of fish, 
fisheries and marine ecosystems. Saavedra-Díaz et al identified Colombian fishers having 
16 categories of knowledge in various aspects such as social, ecological, biological, 
cultural, economic, fishing techniques, institutional arrangements, marketing, fisher 
organization, national security, natural hazards, etc (Saavedra-Díaz, Rosenberg, & 
Pomeroy, 2015). In terms of fishing techniques, most fishers of small-scale fisheries rely 
extensively on indigenous technical knowledge as oberseved in Canada and Malawi 
(Narcisse, 2007; Nsiku, 2007). Indigenous technical knowledge of local fishers informs 
fishing methods and devices, fishing craft, and it is  transmitted generation by generation 
as cultural values. This fishers’ understanding of events and issues in ecology and climate  
would be applied to fish conservation through mechanisms such as co-management and 
fisheries monitoring schemes. 
In terms of ecology and ecosytems, local fishers demonstrate a wide range of knowledge 
of fish biology, ecology and marine ecosystem. Indeed, fishers in the Philippines have a 
good understanding about seahorses in their traditional waters. They argued that taking of 
pregnant seahorses as the primary cause of population depletion, and that the ensuing lack 
of adults and juveniles will contribute to further decline. They also linked population decline 
directly to habitat destruction (Meeuwig et al., 2007). In addition, local fishers have 
knowledge about target species and show a more detailed ethnotaxonomy for target 
species than for non-target species. They also have knowledge about fish diet and fish 
reproduction. Local fishers also have know well ecological features of target (Begossi, 
2015; Silvano & Begossi, 2012). Silvano and Valbo-Jørgenssen argued that the Brazilian 
coastal fishers exhibit detailed knowledge of fish behavior and ecological factors that 
facilitated complementation of scientific information (Silvano & Valbo-Jørgensen, 2008). In 
fact, fishers in Puerto Rico show extensive knowledge about ecology of adult land crabs 
and conditions that lead to crab spawning aggregations (García-Quijano et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the local fishers have also shown detailed and nuanced knowledge of biological 
and ecological parameters of large juvenile and aldult neils within their traditional waters 
(Forrester et al, 2013). Traditional knowledge of herring stocks in Haida water contributed 
to reassessing reference points for the management of herring in Haida territory (Jones, 
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2007). Local fishers fishing cod within the Gulf of Maine have good understanding about 
distribution of historical spawning grounds seasonally. This may help to define functional 
ecological boundaries for fisheries management areas and to validate survey methods 
used conventionally by scientists (Ames, 2007). 
Local fishers also provide useful knowledge in participatory research programs with the 
scientists. Commercial fishers in Canada have been involved and provided knowledge of 
fish distribution patterns for designing sampling and survey transects to improve quality 
and reliability of fish stock assessments (Stanley & Rice, 2007). In addition, fishers provided 
detailed information on the fishery, navigation, fishing effort distribution, individual species, 
fish behaviour, productivity, seabed biology, geology, and oceanography. This is integrated 
with scientific survey data to illustrate the seacape in a way that would not have been 
possible from scientific data alone (Williams & Bax, 2007). The fishers’s knowledge is an 
important sources of information for fisheries management throughout the world. It may be 
used in combination with scientific knowledge in participatory fisheries management 
arrangements (Pomeroy, Katon, & Harkes, 1998; Raakjær, 2009; Sen & Raakjaer, 1996; 
Wilson, Raakjaer, & Degnbol, 2003), or used solely in autonomous  management 
arrangements (Berkes et al., 2001; Ruddle, 1998; Stobutzki et al., 2006). Satria proves 
clearly that knowledge of fisher in North Lombok, Indonesia assists the local community in 
addressing issues of overexploitation, access rights and lack of enforcement of fishing 
regulations in their nearshore waters effectively (Satria, 2007). Morefover, it is also a viable 
alternative for future resource management and complement the conventionally scientific 
approach. It is a key to bridge two systems of traditional ecological knowledge and scientific 
knowledge.  
How useful it is 
In fact, fishers’ knowledge does not always require scientific validation to be accepted or 
used for fisheries management, and scientific knowledge needs not be the baseline which 
fishers’ knowledge is compared to (Mackinson & Nøttestad, 1998). The quantitative data 
regularly support scientific research, and qualitative information provided by fishers 
regarding changes in environmental factors, abundances of target species or catch size 
have an intrinsic value and therefore they should be used appropriately in decision-making 
process. Similarly, fishers’ knowledge may not necessarily be systematized according to 
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conventionally scientific methods to make a valuable contribution to fisheries management. 
It should be rather to use as substantial and complementary agreement between two 
systems (i.e. fishers’ knowledge and scientific knowledge) (Silvano & Begossi, 2012). In 
another way, scientific analysis is contrasted to make conclusions and apply results to 
decision-making processes (Rivera et al., 2015). In some cases, fishers’ knowledge may 
be only used as a source of available information as defined within the precautionary 
principle that claims to use the best information available to conserve natural resources 
(Garcia, 1995). Fishers’ knowledge is indeed a necessary and irreplaceable data source 
for fisheries management under community-based regime in Brazil and elsewhere, 
especially in fisheries of poor data. However, its approach and assessment is complicated, 
requiring effective and locally elaborated methods and communication skills (Leite & 
Gasalla, 2015). 
However, integration of the fishers’ knowledge and the scientific knowledge to provide the 
best inputs for making decisions is often considered difficult because of the different cultural 
contexts in which knowledge originates, although institutional factors can play a significant 
role (Wilson, 2003). This is because fishers express growing frustration at scientists’ 
inability to make direct use of industry information and views (Baelde, 2007; Smith et.al., 
1999). They also fear that their information would be used against them such as managers 
can close off valuable fishing grounds (Williams & Bax, 2007). The local fishers make 
decisions to increase their catches and also find ways to bypass the management 
regulations to maximize their profits (Charles, 1995; Raakjær & Mathiesen, 2003). Fishers 
have historically been flexible and adaptive partly because they are constantly in a situation 
where they have to adapt to weather conditions, changes in fish prices and migration of the 
fish stocks. Fishers also run their business to compensate economic losses from regulation 
by adapting to the management regulations. In addition, fishers are also forced to make 
long-term strategic decisions in a fundamentally short-term environment (Christensen & 
Raakjær, 2006). The fishers’ fishing behaviours may be different from fishery by fishery 
and those in the developed fisheries must be different the developing fisheries. Therefore, 
managers should assess the full impact of changed regulations. Recognizing fishers’ 
preferences is vital to ensuring a close partnership between fishers and managers so that 
they can share responsibility for fisheries management and development, implementation 
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of community programs and compliance with regulations is improved (Salas & Gaertner, 
2004). A management regime may be undermined by the tactical and strategic adaptation 
by fishers (Christensen & Raakjær, 2006). 
Meanwhile, scientists tend to believe that the usefulness of fishers’ knowledge is limited 
because of the difficulties inherent in quantifying it (Hamilton & Walter, 1999; Holm, 2003). 
In addition, they had unrealistic expectations and a poor understanding about the nature 
and content of fishers’ knowledge and failed to turn the fishers’ knowledge into a useful 
form for scientific knowledge. Therefore, single-species stock assessments and reliance 
on MSY still remain a contention between fishers and scientists (Baelde, 2007). 
The way forward 
FAO stresses in the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995) that 
conservation and fisheries management decisions should take into account traditional 
knowledge of fisheries resources and their habitat. The knowledge and technologies of 
small-scale fisheries should be investigated and documented in order to assess their 
application to the conservation of fisheries resources and habitats as well as to fisheries 
management and development. In addition, the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
emphasizes the need to plan, develop and manage fisheries in a manner that balances 
social needs while preserving the goods and services provided by marine ecosystems 
(FAO, 2003). This means that, the ecosystem-based approach aims to integrate the social, 
economic and environmental aspects of fisheries in a balanced way, highlighting the social 
value of fishing, the central role of the human component (Young et al., 2008). When 
moving towards the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries, it is important to establish the 
institutional arrangements which allow an appropriate science, policy, society interaction 
and facilitate stakeholder involvement in the advisory processes (Fletcher & Bianchi, 2014; 
Pitcher et al., 2009). Stakeholders bring experience-based knowledge and scientific 
knowledge into the process to deal with complex social-ecological enviroments. In which, 
stakeholders balances the push and pull between science and policy within an adaptive 
and iterative process that ensures close cooperation (Watson-wright, 2005). 
In that environment, fishers’ knowledge, in combination with scientific knowledge, has the 
substantial potential to contribute to sustainable development of fisheries. However, this 
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would face but many challenges such as i) dialogue facilitation to bridge knowledge and 
build trust among managers, scientists and fishers; ii) a lack of flexible mechanisms to 
recognize fishers’ knowledge; iii) managers and scientists are usually unskilled in working 
with fishers’ knowledge; iv) adaptation of fishers to formal management arenas; v) group 
heterogeneity is not knowledge homogeneity; vi) moving from extractive use to 
collaborative exchange; vii) capacity building; and viii) connection between participatory 
monitoring and evaluation and management in ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management (Medeiros et al., 2015). 
In order to address the above challenges, a collaborate arrangement should be a way 
forward. Indeed, a partneship framework composed of scientists, fishers, managers, and 
enviromentists was established in Australia. This was an important step toward promoting 
fishers’s involvement in fisheries assessments and management (Smith et al., 1999). This 
partnership between government institutions and resource users may serve to further 
enhance prospects of achieving sustainable use of resources (Phelan, 2007). Based on 
experience, regular collaborative partnerships involving fishers, scientists/technicians and 
managers constitute the most effective way to engage fishers’ knowledge in fisheries 
assessment and management (Orensanz et al., 2015). 
In the Vietnamese fisheries, the knowledge base used for planning fisheries includes official 
statistics, the general socio-economic development strategies, fish stock assessments and 
other relevant information (Government of Vietnam, 2006). However, these data were 
extremely poor and were constrained by the low categorical resolution and the non-
transparent aggregation of data into mere administrative spaces (Zwieten et al., 2002). 
Therefore, they were not suited for planning and managing the fisheries in Vietnam (FAO, 
2004b). 
Small-scale fisheries, especially in the developing countries, represent a diverse and 
dynamic subsector, often characterized by seasonal migration and received less political 
or economic influence than other sectors: tourism, aquaculture, agriculture, energy, mining, 
industry and infrastructure developments. In addition, conflicts with large-scale fishing 
operations are an issue, and there is increasingly high interdependence or competition 
between small-scale fisheries and other sectors. Many small-scale fishers and their 
communities are often vulnerable and marginalized groups. They are directly dependent 
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on access to fishery resources and on the health of aquatic ecosystems and associated 
biodiversity. They are commonly located in remote areas and tend to have limited or 
disadvantaged access to markets, and may have poor access to health, education and 
other social services. They also commonly suffer from unequal power relations. All these 
factors make it difficult for small- scale fishers and their communities to make their voices 
heard, defend their human rights and tenure rights, and secure the sustainable use of the 
fishery resources on which they depend. FAO in 2015, therefore, developed the Voluntary 
Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security 
and Poverty Eradication (SSF) as a complement to the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries to provide complementary guidance with respect to small-scale 
fisheries in support of the overall principles and provisions of the Code. The Guidelines are 
intended to support the visibility, recognition and enhancement of the already important 
role of small-scale fisheries and to contribute to global and national efforts towards the 
eradication of hunger and poverty. The Guidelines have six objectives as follows: i) to 
enhance the contribution of small-scale fisheries to global food security and nutrition and 
to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food; ii) to contribute to the 
equitable development of small-scale fishing communities and poverty eradication and to 
improve the socio-economic situation of fishers and fish workers within the context of 
sustainable fisheries management; iii) to achieve the sustainable utilization, prudent and 
responsible management and conservation of fisheries resources consistent with the Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and related instruments; iv) to promote the 
contribution of small-scale fisheries to an economically, socially and environmentally 
sustainable future for the planet and its people; v) to provide guidance that could be 
considered by states and stakeholders for the development and implementation of 
ecosystem friendly and participatory policies, strategies and legal frameworks for the 
enhancement of responsible and sustainable small-scale fisheries; and vi) to enhance 
public awareness and promote the advancement of knowledge on the culture, role, 
contribution and potential of small-scale fisheries, considering ancestral and traditional 
knowledge, and their related constraints and opportunities (FAO, 2015). Implementation of 
these Guidelines in the world, the integration of ingenious knowledge of local fisheries and 
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their communities into fisheries management decisions would be improved on one hand, 
and the voices of the small-scale fishers would be heard by policy-makers on the other. 
2.2.2 CO-MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR FISHERIES 
Co-management extends to all stages of management, from planning to implementation, 
to evaluation and adaptation in an iteratively ongoing process. When used appropriately, 
involving resource users and stakeholders in natural resource management offers both 
normative and objective benefits. These include improved planning due to incorporation of 
better data and local ecological knowledge as well as more effective and efficient 
enforcement due to increased legitimacy of the management structures (Berkes et al., 
2001; Ebbin, 2009; Pinkerton, 1989; Wilson, Raakjaer, & Degnbol, 2003). Pinkerton 
identified benefits of co-management to enhance the functions of: i) data gathering; ii) 
logistical decisions; iii) allocation decisions; iv) protection of resources from environmental 
damage; v) enforcement of regulations; vi) enhancement of long-term planning; and vii) 
more inclusive decision making (Pinkerton, 1989). Clearly, the co-management 
arrangement enhances collecting, sharing data as well as debating knowledge base for 
planning fisheries which is a topic of this research. 
As a type of the partnership arrangement, the co-management arrangement is expected to 
lead to more appropriate, efficient and equitable management of fisheries (Pinkerton, 
1989). It represents a variety of management arrangements that result in the sharing of 
responsibility and authority for management between resource users and other 
stakeholders and government (Berkes et al., 2001). There are various definitions of co-
management used in fisheries management as in box 2.1. 
The co-management arrangements may be developed for a number of reasons, including 
the recognized failure of centralized arrangements and/or because of economically driven 
reforms and constraints (Wilson et al., 2003). Armitage et al. sees the co-management in 
seven different faces: i) co-management as power sharing; ii) co-management as institution 
building; iii) co-management as trust building; iv) co-management as process; v) co-
management as social learning; vi) problem solving; and vii) co-management as 
governance (Berkes, 2007). According to him, the co-management is as power sharing, as 
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institution building, as trust building, as process, as social learning, as problem solving and 
as governance.  
Box 2.1: Definitions of fisheries co-management 
i) “Communities’ political claim to the right to share management power  and 
responsibility with the state” (McCay & Acheson, 1987 p.1). 
ii) “Government and agencies, though their cooperative organizations, are sharing 
responsibility for management functions” and “the responsibility for initiating 
regulations is shared” (Jentoft, 1989 p.143). 
iii) “The sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local 
resources users” (Berkes, George, & Preston, 1991 p.6). 
iv) “Power-sharing in the exercise of resources management between a 
government agency and a community organization of stakeholders” (Pinkerton, 
1992 p.331). 
v) “The sharing of responsibility and/or authority between the government and local 
resource users/community to manage a fishery resource” (Pomeroy, R.S. 
Williams, 1994 p.7). 
vi) “An arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared 
between the government and user groups” (Sen & Raakjaer, 1996 p.406). 
vii) “The collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making 
among representatives of user-groups, government agencies and research 
institutions” (Jentoft, McCay, & Wilson, 1998 p.423). 
viii) “A situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee 
amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements 
and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources” (Borrini-
feyerabend et al., 2007 p.1). 
At the same time, Ostrom and Pinkerton  identified 11 key conditions for viable fisheries 
co-management: i) clearly defined boundaries, ii) clearly defined membership, iii) group 
cohesion, iv) existing organization, v) benefits exceed costs, vi) participation by those 
affected, vii) management rules enforced, viii) legal rights to organize, iv) cooperation and 
leadership at community, x) decentralization and delegation of authority, xi) coordination 
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between government and community (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Pinkerton, 1989). These 
conditions are further discussed in chapter 8. 
Pinkerton identifies three main benefits of co-management: i) co-management for 
community-based economic and social development; ii) co-management to decentralize 
resources management decisions; and iii) co-management as a mechanism for reducing 
conflicts through participatory democracy (Pinkerton, 1989). She also argued that co-
management may enhance the functions of: i) data gathering; ii) logistic decisions such as 
who and when can harvest; iii) allocation decisions; iv) protection of resources from 
environmental damage; v) enforcement of regulations, vi) enhancement of long-term 
planning; and vii) more inclusive decision-making. In addition, the sufficient participation in 
management by those who are subject to regulations can assist in conflict management 
(Noble, 2000); improve compliance to regulations (Kaplan & McCay, 2004); reduce the 
costs of data collection, monitoring and enforcement; and provide more locally relevant 
management plans (Garaway & Arthur, 2004). In the context of resource depletion and 
conflict among resource user groups are getting worse and the government fails to manage 
natural resources at local level (Pomeroy et al., 2007), then the co-management 
arrangement is supported widely in the global fisheries.  
Although for over three decades of introduction into fisheries, the co-management 
arrangement has encountered many obstacles to implementation in practice. For instance, 
there is a lack of legitimacy of the co-management arrangement and resources to 
coordinate activities (Pomeroy & Williams, 1994); lack of a clear management framework 
(Sen & Raakjaer, 1996). Daniel defined a number of current and future challenges facing 
the co-management practitioners in Viet Nam, including: i) empowering local communities, 
ii) realigning traditional views on hierarchy and power, iii) the lack of an enabling legal 
framework, iv) the lack of understanding of co-management; and v) developing the capacity 
of local communities and authorities (Daniel et al., 2010). Research on the fisheries co-
management in Vietnam shows that the external support initiated and designed the 
fisheries co-management made the co-management system inconsistent and low effective 
(Nga, 2015).  
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Although the fisheries co-management approach has been implemented more than 20 year 
in Vietnam, its implications have been limited (Anon, 2009; VIFEP, 2014). Is the approach 
imported characterized with western culture which far from the Asian culture such as in 
Vietnam? In an Asian context, a type of co-management in Japan is called as the 
community-based fisheries management (CBFM) would be a good reference for the small-
scale fisheries in tropical waters like the Vietnamese fisheries (Makino, 2017). This type of 
management acknowledges local fishers as the primary participants in management with 
the involvement and support of the broader community. Therefore, the transaction costs 
are cut down remarkably (Makino & Matsuda, 2005). It also facilitates the adaptive 
management in response to changes of fish stocks and ecosystem (Makino, 2017). 
The CBFM system comprises three basic components: i) management of fisheries 
resources; ii) fishing efforts; and fishing grounds. Fishers’ groups involved in any of these 
elements with or without written rules (Yamamoto, 1995). When fishers consider fish stocks 
as their property, they adopt a more positive attitude towards conservation and 
management measures. The 1949 fishery law of Japan allows establishment of a fishery 
coordination committee to make democratic and optimum use of fishery resources. A 
fishery coordination committee (FCC) is established for each prefecture (i.e. district level). 
It is a legal organization established based on the law and located in between a prefecture 
government and fishers. FCC is independent of the prefecture government and is not a part 
of the prefecture government. It works on behalf of fishers with six following functions: i) to 
formulate “a plan to make synthetic use of all fishery resources available in a sea area right 
off a prefecture on behalf of fishers, taking into account the conservation of fishery 
resources”. For the establishment of the plan, a fishing right and a fishing license are used 
as its management tool; ii) issue an order to fishers concerned when required for fishery 
management. This may happen after the government issued fishing right and license; iii) 
organizes a public hearing as much as possible to listen the voice of fishers; iv) issue an 
order to regulate fishing operation, whenever necessary; v) amend or adjust the plan in 
accordance with natural change in the type and size of fishery resources in its sea area. 
This is done particularly at the time of the renewal of fishing right and fishing license, which 
is done at an interval of 5 or 10 years (Yamamoto, 2000).  
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This system is developed within two steps. A plan made by FCC is actually a fishery 
management plan in a broad sense as the first step. Using such a plan as a framework, an 
actual fisheries management plan which corresponds to CBFM, has been developed by 
fisheries management organizations (FMO) in fisheries cooperative associations (FCA) as 
the second step. For the establishment of the plan at prefecture level, fishing right and 
fishing license are used as tools. Fishing rights are analogous to territorial use rights for 
fishing (TURFs). Particular feature of these two steps are the fact that both two plans are 
formulated with the ideas of fishers but not from the managers of fisheries resources. 
Therefore, no compliance problem has occurred in the coastal fisheries in Japan. In fact, 
all management decisions made by local fishers (Makino & Matsuda, 2005). For instance, 
a FCC is composed of 9 elected fishers, 4 scientists, and 2 local government officials. It 
decides the allocation of fishing rights and licenses on one hand, and makes regulations of 
fishing restrictions (i.e. the FCC regulations) in areas within their jurisdiction. A FCA 
composed of local fishers decides operational regulations (i.e. the FCA regulations) that 
stipulate gear restrictions, seasonal/area closures of fishing grounds within their own 
waters. The FCA regulations stipulate more detailed fishing restrictions, applicable to local 
conditions, taking into account the restrictions set out in the FCC regulations, but including 
some restrictions that have not been stipulated in the FCC regulations. In the same manner, 
the FMO is allowed to decide their own regulations which are even more detailed, stricter 
than the FCA and FCC regulations. Clearly, in this system, the local fishers are central 
element. They decide management measures themselves with scientific support of 
scientists and administrational support of local government officials. This contributes to 
success implementation of fisheries management in Japan. 
Uchida and Makino explained the success of CBFM system in Japan by four main reasons 
as follows: i) FCAs and TURFs are protected by law. The establishment of a FCC and a 
FCA, by which fishers were fully allowed to participate in the formation of a fishery 
management plan; ii) the closed relationships between scientists, government officials and 
local fishers in FCAs; iii) Japanese fishers have adhered to their co-management regime 
because it served their private interest; and iv) FCAs and TURFs, with their accompanying 
rules and legal authority, function to set boundaries and create exclusion (Uchida & Makino, 
2008). However, the current Japanese co-management system still have two main 
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weaknesses: i) there are discrepancies between the area in which a fish species 
reproduces and migrates and the jurisdictional boundaries assigned to managing FCAs 
and FMOs; ii) scientific information to support co-management is insufficient and 
underutilized (Uchida & Makino, 2008). 
Moving beyond co-management, an adaptive co-management structure combines the 
iterative learning dimension of adaptive management and the linkage dimension of 
collaborative management in which rights and responsibilities and shared jointly (Olsson, 
Folke, & Berkes, 2004). It is a way to reduce uncertainty in natural resource and 
environmental decision making. This approach differs from other management approaches 
by emphasizing the importance of feedbacks from environment in shaping policies and 
followed by further systematic experimentation to shape subsequent policy. This approach 
requires a time-series data collection system and a continuous learning process to adapt 
to specific conditions of fisheries (Garaway & Arthur, 2004). The core concept in adaptive 
management is that policy choices should be treated as deliberate, large-scale experiments 
(Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986). The adaptive management recognizes that management 
decisions are necessary even when all desirable information is not available and when the 
outcomes of management decisions cannot be fully predicted. It considers management 
not only as a way to achieve objectives, but also as a process of learning gradually about 
the system being managed (Raakjær et al., 2007). Walter argued that adaptive 
management has been of little help in dealing with single stock management issue 
(Walters, 2007). Most programs of adaptive management have been less successful than 
their expectation from their intuitive appeal. He recognized three main difficulties in 
adaptive management programs: i) failure of decision makers to understand why they are 
needed; ii) lack of leadership for the complex process of implementing an adaptive 
approach; and iii) inadequate funding for the increased ecological (and often economic) 
monitoring needed to successfully compare the outcomes of alternative policies. 
In order to promote the adaptive co-management, standards of information should be 
defined and agreed by stakeholders. Based on this, stakeholders gather information and 
present their knowledge to make fisheries assessments and management effectively. The 
concept of indicator is used for fisheries assessments and management (FAO, 1999).  
Indicators provide a readily understood tool for describing the state of fisheries resources 
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and fisheries activity and for assessing trends regarding sustainable development 
objectives (FAO, 1999). They are a means to enhance communication, transparency, 
effectiveness and accountability in natural resource management in general, and assist in 
the process of assessing the performance of fisheries policies and management at various 
scales and in facilitate fisheries co-management (Degnbol, 2005). Fisheries management 
based on indicators is suited for tropical fisheries and has fewer economic-costs compared 
to the MSY-based one imported from single species fisheries (Kato, 2001, 2012; Raakjær, 
2004; Wilson et al., 1994). Using indicators may lead to more informed decisions and more 
effective actions by simplifying, clarifying and making aggregated information available to 
policy makers (United Nations, 2007). Raakjær argued that adaptive management might 
be the way forward making fisheries management more robust and less costly (Raakjær, 
2009). Furthermore, Makino  demonstrates its usefulness in Japanese fisheries and argues 
that this approach will be well suited for small-scale fisheries in tropical areas (Makino, 
2017).  
2.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
As mentioned in chapter 1, this research focuses upon fisheries planning system to explain 
the ineffectiveness of the fisheries management in the context of a developing country as 
Vietnam. Therefore, this research should employ an analytical framework which is suited 
for institutional arrangements and all fisheries, including the small-scale fisheries. 
2.3.1 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING FISHERIES 
There are a number of analytical frameworks for analyzing various facets of a fisheries 
system in the world. They emphasize separate aspects (i.e. biology of fish stocks, 
management decision-making, involvement of stakeholders or look at the fisheries in a 
systematically holistic manner). Fisheries can be analyzed by a single-species 
management approach which is typically applied to individual stocks of a wide-spread 
species in temperate fisheries such as Atlantic cod, haddock, etc. (Rothschild, Sharov, & 
Lambert, 1997). Its objective is to specify optimal levels of size specific fishing mortality for 
a particular species. To do this requires one to assess the state of the stock (e.g. size and 
reproductive output). But often this is difficult to do, and different groups may view the same 
information in different ways, because of different assumptions (Starr et al., 1998). The 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
28 
 
single species management approach is based on the assumption that fish stocks can be 
viewed out of the context of their role in the ecosystem, and that if one simply knows enough 
about the vital information of the stock. It does not take into account the role of the fish 
stocks as it interacts with other species or the population dynamical processes. This leads 
to a failure of the single species approach to management of fish stocks (Larkin, 1996) and 
to an alternative one which reflect reality of the fish stocks and their interacts among them 
and between them with their physical environment. 
Ecosystem-based management (EBM) is an integrated management approach that 
recognizes the full array of interactions within an ecosystem, including humans, rather than 
considering single issues, species, or ecosystem services in isolation (Christensen et al., 
1996). This marks a significant broadening beyond the ‘fish stock and fishing fleet’ sense 
of the fishery. Larkin stated that ecosystem management for the marine environment has 
three essential components: i) sustainable yield of products for human consumption and 
animal foods; ii) maintenance of biodiversity; and iii) protection from the effects of pollution 
and habitat degradation (Larkin, 1996). He also argued that these components must be 
reconciled with the social and economic costs involved and to a large extent their 
implementation will reflect the prevailing set of values. The ecosystem-based management 
approach was developed to address deficiencies of the single species MSY approach. It 
looks at fisheries with a broader perspective (Mahon et al., 2009; Sherman, 1994). This 
assesses and monitors the fisheries with five modules: i) productivity: photosynthetic 
activity, zooplankton biomass and biodiversity, oceanographic variability, ichthyoplankton 
biodiversity; ii) pollution and ecosystem health: eutrophication, biotoxins, pathology, 
emerging disease, health indices, multiple marine ecological disturbances; iii) fish and 
fisheries: biodiversity, finfish, shellfish, demersal species, pelagic species; iv) 
socioeconomic: integrated assessments, human forcing, sustainability of long-term 
socioeconomic benefits; and v) governance: stakeholder participation, adaptive 
management. It requires a large range of efforts to collect data, collate information and 
produce knowledge for assessing and managing a large marine ecosystem. Therefore, 
there have been still few case studies illustrating thorough application of this framework for 
assessing the marine ecosystems as well as the fisheries systems in the world (Wasson et 
al., 2015). 
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A ‘bigger picture’ should be needed to deal with inherent linkages between fisheries and 
human activities beyond the fishery system, especially in other coastal and marine sectors 
(e.g. aquaculture, tourism, agriculture, forestry, etc.) and in coastal communities. Moreover, 
as demands for fish, incomes, and livelihoods from fisheries requires attention to all 
elements of the fishery system. This associated with linkages between the fishery itself, 
and the corresponding fishing households and communities, and the broader 
socioeconomic environment surrounding the fishery. This provided a motivation for the 
ecosystem approach on the human side, namely a livelihoods approach. This perspective, 
also referred to as a sustainable livelihoods approach (Allison & Ellis, 2001). The concept 
of the livelihood integrates the critical factors affecting the vulnerability or strengthen of 
individuals or family survival strategies. It comprises three main elements: i) the assets 
possessed by people; ii) the activities in which people engage in order to generate an 
adequate standard of living and satisfy other goals such as risk reduction; and iii) the factors 
facilitating or inhibiting different people from gaining access to assets and activities. Allison 
and Ellis, therefore, defined “A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, 
financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions 
and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or 
household” (Allison & Ellis, 2001 p.379). The key of a livelihoods approach is to broaden 
fishery discussions beyond fishing and ‘fishery jobs’ per se to emphasize the entirety of 
individual, household or community sources of well-being and livelihood, and in particular 
how individuals, households and communities develop ‘portfolios’ of livelihood sources 
(Charles, 2005). Allison and Ellis developed a framework for micro policy analysis of rural 
livelihoods including six elements: i) livelihood platform analyzes five main categories of 
assets: natural captical, physical capital, human capital, financial capital, social capital; ii) 
access modified by social relations, institutions, organizations; iii) in context of tremd, 
shocks; iv) resulting in livelihod strategies; v) composed of natural resource based activities 
and other non-natural resource based activities; and vi) with effects on livelihood security 
and environmental sustainability (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Besides, there are other 
frameworks for analyzing the livelihoods such as framework developed by Chambers and 
Conway in the early 1990s built on participatory research practices and ideas put forward 
by the World Commission on Environment and Development; United Kingdom Department 
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for International Development (DFID) in 1999; The CARE livelihoods framework in 1999; 
The Oxfam livelihoods framework; The UNDP livelihoods framework; Policy Guidelines for 
Integrating Environmental Planning into Land Reform (PGIEP) framework; etc. 
Charles  argued that “We will never achieve fishery sustainability if we restrict attention 
solely to what goes on within the fishery” (Charles, 2005 p.230). Therefore, he proposes 
the fisheries system approach to see a fisheries system as a “bigger picture” in 
understanding and managing fisheries, which looks beyond conventional “fish and fleet” 
thinking. This approach incorporates the ecosystem-based management approach and the 
livelihoods approach (figure 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The fisheries system approach connected with the other approaches (Charles, 
2005 p.225) 
In general, the fisheries system approach allows us to include relevant factors affecting and 
interacting with fishery management from across the fisheries system and beyond. 
According to Charles, a fisheries system can be described by the component based 
approach (Charles, 2005). It is composed of three components coherently connected: i) the 
natural ecosystem covering fish stocks and marine ecosystems; ii) the human system 
where economic and social activities of the fishing sector and local communities take place; 
and iii) the management system where common policies and management decisions are 
produced to influence the socio-economic and the natural systems. 
In applying this approach, a number of fisheries system were analyzed more 
comprehensively (Charles, 2005; Raakjær, 2009). Therefore, issues facing the 
management system have been recognized holistically and profoundly. This contributes to 
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understanding about dilemma situations and vicious cycle of the fisheries in some 
developed fisheries (Barkin & DeSombre, 2013; Raakjær, 2009). Application of this 
approach, Raakjær  provided clear explanation on the key factors for problems facing the 
European Union (EU) fisheries management system including: i) a fragmented fishing 
industry, leading to a fragmented interest structure in the EU fishing industry, ii) lacking 
commitment within the Council of ministers to ensuring sustainable fishing, iii) there is a 
persistent lack of political will in the Council of ministers and the member states to reform 
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), iv) the member states emphasize domestic interests, 
v) there is an inconsistency between structural policy elements and conservation elements 
within the common fisheries policy (CFP), vi) the TAC-based management regime is not 
effective in multi‐species demersal fisheries, vii) there is a clash between the ways 
administrators and fishers view the goals and means of the management regime, viii) 
attempts to introduce elements of “new modes of governance” have not been successful in 
the fisheries domain, and ix) the type of co‐management introduced has not led to 
responsible behaviours (Raakjær, 2009). 
Kooiman et al. define a framework to analyze a fisheries governance system in an 
interactive manner (Kooiman et al.,). They see “governance is the whole of public as well 
as private interactions that are initiated to solve societal problems and create societal 
opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those 
interactions and care for institutions that enable them” (Kooiman et al, 2005 p.17). 
Governance is considered to be the most inclusive term, followed by public policy or politics, 
and by public management or public administration. In the interactive governance 
perspective, governing activities are brought together in three interrelated categories of 
human activities. All three orders of governance are needed for effective and legitimate 
governance of fisheries. This framework for understanding the variety of interactions that 
constitute governance and how they interact with each other. It focuses on the interactions 
among actors in a governance system rather than components of a fisheries system, thus 
it is more suited for examining the developed fisheries where actors and governance 
principles and rules were established in a fisheries system. 
There were analyses on the Vietnamese fisheries. Pomeroy et al. in 2009 reviewed and 
discussed changes in fisheries policy in Vietnam since 1945. They identified many issues 
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facing the Vietnamese fisheries system including: i) the fisheries law has not been adhered 
properly to by fishers on one hand, and not enforced comprehensively by government; ii) 
there is a lack of capacity and resources for government to plan and implement fisheries 
management; iii) the government policies have focused on increasing production output 
rather than on sustainable fisheries management; iv) there have been increasing levels of 
conflicts between small-scale and large-scale fishing vessels; v) the coastal communities 
are confronted with many problems (e.g. overexploitation of fish stocks in the coastal 
waters, using destructive fishing methods, a lack of alternative livelihoods, less 
opportunities to access to credit, etc.). Another research was conducted with application of 
the sustainable fishery framework (Charles, 1994) which is composed of four components: 
i) ecological sustainability involves retaining individual stocks and species at levels that do 
not foreclose future options, and maintaining or enhancing the capacity and quality of the 
environment; ii) socio-economic sustainability focuses on the generation of sustainable net 
benefits, appropriate allocation of these benefits among participants, and maintenance of 
overall viability within local and worldwide economies; iii) community sustainability 
emphasizes maintaining or enhancing the group welfare of participating and affected 
communities; and iv) institutional sustainability is related to the manageability and 
enforceability of fisheries regulations) was made use to examine the effectiveness of the 
formal institutions in managing the fisheries in Vietnam (Dang et al., 2017). This research 
argued that the formal institutions of the Vietnamese fisheries have been ineffective in 
managing the fisheries due to three reasons: i) weak capacity of the government agencies 
and social-political organizations; ii) fishers’ compliance with fisheries regulations is low; 
and iii) the failure of the fisheries policy in practice (Dang et al., 2017). 
FAO identified eight constraints of the Vietnamese fisheries as follows: i) there are too weak 
knowledge base for managing the fisheries; ii) enforcement of fisheries regulations in 
limited; iii) demands for trash fish are increasing and becoming a significant source of 
income for many fishers; iv) overcapitalization is a common feature throughout the waters 
of the country, and it is aggravated by invasion of bigger vessels into shallow-water fishing 
grounds; v) vessels and engine repair, and administration, has not kept pace with the 
development of the offshore fisheries; vi) destructive fishing methods are still used 
commonly; vii) credit for fisheries is limited and difficult for poor fishers to access to credit 
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programs; and viii) coastal aquatic resources in many regions have been overexploited 
(FAO, 2004b). This reflects that the fisheries management system is facing with many 
issues, not only the formal institutions in managing the fisheries as recognized by Dang et 
al.’s research. This research makes use the fisheries system approach based on the 
components of fisheries (i.e. management, human, and natural systems) to explore issues 
facing the fisheries management in Vietnam. This holistic approach is suited for all 
fisheries, including the small-scale fisheries in Vietnam. 
2.3.2 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE LOGIC OF FISHERIES OBJECTIVES 
In order to sustain long-term productivity of the exploited fish stocks, the United Nation 
adopted objective of the global fisheries is to keep the fishing level below the MSY (United 
Nations, 1982). FAO recognized three types of objectives for a fisheries policy: i) 
abundance of fish stocks is remained; ii) economic viability is maintained; and iii) social 
concerns are addressed and equity is ensured (FAO, 1983). These are conflicting with each 
other, for instance, the conservation objective may hinder economic and social aspects due 
to reducing fishing fleets and employments. This was conceptualized as a framework to 
look at conflicts in the fisheries management: conservation paradigm, rationalization 
paradigm, and social/community paradigm – the paradigm triangle (Charles, 1992). The 
conservation paradigm emphasizes taking care of the fish stocks and marine habitats, so 
it imposes direct control of total fishing effort, total landings, and technical measures to 
protect fish stocks and their habitats. Fishers are viewed as components of a predatory 
fleet in which all fishers act in their own self-interest. To save the fish stock, fisheries 
management must directly control the fleet, restricting fishing time, fishing location, total 
effort and/or total catches. 
A key conflict in fisheries management is to balance the two objectives of wealth generation 
and distribution. Society often expresses dual desires to maximize the production created 
in the fisheries, while at the same time achieving a reasonable distribution of the cake, both 
now and in the future. The rationalization paradigm emphasizes the first of these two 
objectives, the pursuit of economic efficiency and increased wealth in the fisheries. The 
rationalization literature typically assumes that society should seek to maximize fishery 
rents, comprising economic benefits over and above payments to fishers and vessels. At 
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the same time, the community paradigm focuses on community welfare, distributional 
equity, and other social and cultural benefits of the fisheries. An emphasis is placed on 
fishers as members of the coastal communities, rather than as components of a fleet as 
considered in the conservation paradigm or as individualistic fishing firms in the 
rationalization paradigm. This paradigm tends to be attractive to fishers’ unions, fishing 
cooperatives, and those living in or involved with fishing communities. However, these 
groups were underrepresented among the staff and in management initiatives of many 
government fishery administrations. More recently, there has been an overwhelming 
interest in this paradigm, and the “advocacy” element in this paradigm is to seek for protect 
the small-scale fishers seen as being buffeted by economic forces beyond their control. 
This has contributed to a better understanding of its policy objectives even at the lower 
levels of the policymaking hierarchy. 
Charles (Charles, 2001) recognizes four principal conflict classes of fisheries management 
as follows: 
i) Fishery jurisdiction: This category lies at the policy and planning level. It deals with 
fundamental and philosophical conflicts over fisheries objectives, who owns the 
fishery, which controls access to it, what is the optimal form of fishery management, 
and what should be the role played by governments in the fishery system. 
ii) Management mechanisms: This includes conflicts at the fisheries management 
level concerning relatively short-term issues arising in the development and 
implementation of fishery management plans, typically involving 
fishers/government conflict over harvest levels, consultative processes and fishery 
enforcement. 
iii) Internal allocation: This arises among the direct participants in the fisheries system 
i.e. fishers and processors and related to differing perceptions of appropriate 
allocation of fisheries access and use rights between different user groups and gear 
types, as well as among fishers, processors and other players. 
iv) External allocation: This incorporates the wide range of conflicts arising between 
internal fisheries players and outside or on the edge of the fisheries system 
including foreign fleets, aquaculture, and non-fisheries industries such as tourism, 
agriculture, forestry, etc. 
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Following this framework, Salayo et al. recognized five categories of conflicts in the 
Southeast Asian fisheries: i) conflicts in use rights and access (i.e. who controls the 
fisheries); ii) enforcement of regulations (i.e. how are the fisheries controlled); iii) fisheries 
group-related disputes (i.e. relations between the fishery users: linguistic, religion, ethnic, 
scale of fishing); (iv) non-fishery use of fishery resources (i.e. relations between fishers and 
other users of the aquatic environment: fishing vs. tourism and similar water resource-
based industries); and v) non-fishery concerns affecting the fisheries (Salayo et al., 2006). 
Muawanah et al. set out a typology of intra-institutional conflict in power relations in fisheries 
management – the fishery village-level conflict (Muawanah et al., 2012). The principal 
actors that interact in the fishery political marketplace are fishers, environmental advocates, 
politicians and officials of government agencies. Some of these groups demand and others 
supply fishery policies and programs. The politico-economic marketplace is biased against 
conservation, and recommends reforms to counter this bias (Muawanah et al., 2012). In 
fact, the objective of conservation is commonly prioritized in the fisheries policy in both the 
developed and developing fisheries (DFO, 2013; European Commission, 2011; Prime 
Minister, 2006). However, the fishing level is often set up higher than the level suggested 
by scientists (Quyen, 2012; Raakjær, 2009). 
For this research, the Vietnamese fisheries are taken as a case study which are developing 
fisheries in transition from a centrally planned system to a market-oriented based system, 
and with a limitation of available data. Therefore, the fisheries system approach is the most 
suited analytical framework for the Vietnamese fisheries. This approach builds on and 
incorporates the fisheries facet of the ecosystem-based management approach and the 
human side of the livelihoods approach. It looks at target fish species and fishing activities 
within the context of the ecosystem, and in an equivalent manner, and looks at human 
element in the fisheries system within a larger context of households, communities and the 
socio-economic environment. Importantly, this approach allows us to encompass relevant 
factors affecting and interacting with fisheries management from across the fishery system 
and beyond (FAO, 2005b). The comprehensive adoption of the fisheries system approach 
will ensure that we take into account impacts of the broader fisheries and coastal system 
on fisheries management on one hand, and also ensure that the broader consequences of 
management actions are assessed on the other hand. It may be an important mechanism 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
36 
 
to move in the direction of improved fishery sustainability and resilience. Following the view 
of seeing the fisheries as a system, the triangle paradigm (Charles, 1992) with three 
conflicting aspects: conservation paradigm, rationalization paradigm, and social/community 
paradigm is used to analyze policy discourses in developing objectives of the Vietnamese 
fisheries. This is further explained in chapter 3. 
In order examine whether the fisheries planning system is implemented at local levels and 
influence the fishing communities, this research uses empirical methods and refers to the 
livelihoods approach to understand fishing behaviour in accommodation with the fisheries 
regulations and plans of the government. This is further presented in chapter 7. In order to 
understand obstacle s and factors leading to failure and success of the fisheries co-
management in Vietnam, this research applies eleven conditions for viable self-managed, 
community-based management institutions and co-management (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; 
Pinkerton, 1989). Also, this research makes use of an approach of three consequent stages 
for evaluation of adaptive management structure which based on the appropriateness and 
feasibility (Rist et al., 2013) to explain the failure of the adaptive indicators-based 
management in the Vietnamese fisheries. These approaches are further illustrated in 
chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES  
As mentioned in chapter 1, this research is to explain the effectiveness of the fisheries 
management system in Vietnam. Its starting point is the 2010 fisheries master plan is not 
implemented in practice. Therefore, this research employs empirical methods based on the 
observation and experience in the Vietnamese fisheries to draw up evidence explaining the 
ineffectiveness of the fisheries management in Vietnam. 
3.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework of this research is modified by the framework developed Charles 
(Charles, 2001) and Raakjær (Raakjær, 2009). This framework is adapted with three main 
components as the framework used by Raakjær (Raakjær, 2009), but elements of each 
component are modified to fit with the Vietnamese context as illustrated in figure 3.1. In this 
framework, three components coherently connected: i) the natural ecosystem covering fish 
stocks and marine biodiversity; ii) the human system where economic and social activities 
of the fishing sector and fishing communities take place; and iii) the management system 
where planning and management decisions of government, based on the information from 
the others, are produced to influence activities of the human system on the natural systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Raakjær 2009 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework to analyze the Vietnamese fisheries system 
The component of the natural system, information on biodiversity of fisheries resources 
such as number of species, species composition of catches and it dynamics are presented 
to understand changes in marine ecosystems (i.e. proportion of species in the food web). 
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It then examines the state of the exploited fish stocks to understand tendency of fishing 
level or effects of human system on the natural system. In the component of the human 
system, human fishing activities are explored to understand dynamics of the fishing 
pressure of the human system on the natural system. The fishing sector is analyzed in 
terms of fishing capacity, fish production, economic performance of fleets and consumption 
of fish production, and the fishing communities are explored through looking at incomes, 
local organization of fishers, and education level of fishers. 
The component of the management system addresses management measures (e.g. 
limitation of catches, limitation of fishing activities, technical measures) imposed on the 
human system to maintain the health of the natural system. In this component, four 
elements: fisheries planning system, fisheries management, fisheries research, and 
institutional arrangements are explored to understand the ways policy and management 
decisions to be made. It provides insights into the fisheries planning system within a general 
socio-economic planning system. It is followed by a description of competent institutions 
who have authority to decide policies and regulations. In the next section, an analysis on 
management measures used for controlling fishing activities in Vietnam is presented. 
Finally, it provides a picture of fisheries research and data collection in Vietnam. Under this 
framework, based on the available information (e.g. legal regulations, fisheries 
administrations reports, fish stock assessments, fisheries planning documents) and a frame 
survey on planning fisheries at the provincial level at 28 coastal provinces, the Vietnamese 
fisheries system is analyzed in chapter 4 to define challenges facing the fisheries 
management system in Vietnam. In addition to available information, in-depth interviews 
with fishers and fisheries managers are also used to clarify the state of fish stocks, fishing 
fleets and fisheries planning system. 
The following chapters will go further to understand the logics of the management 
objectives of fisheries master plan – a planning tool of the Vietnamese fisheries (chapter 
5). In chapter 6, the knowledge inputs to planning fishing level are examined to understand 
uncertainty of management and development objectives of fisheries planning documents. 
Going deeper, chapter 7 explores implementation of the fisheries master plan at the local 
levels, and examines effects of the fisheries planning documents (e.g. fisheries master 
plan) on the fishing behaviours of the local fishers. In chapter 8, it discovers obstacles to 
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implementing innovative approaches (e.g. co-management and adaptive indicator-based 
management) to improve quality of knowledge inputs for planning fisheries as well as policy 
and management decisions. 
In order to understand the logics of the management objectives of fisheries master plan, 
chapter 5 employs a framework (figure 3.2) modified from the paradigm triangle (Charles, 
1992)  to analyze policy discourses emerging in process of making the 2010 fisheries 
master plan in Vietnam. The production-based growth paradigm emphasizes an objective 
of increase in fish landings as well as fishing capacity aligning with general socio-economic 
development strategies adopted by political arenas (e.g. the National Party Progress, 
National Assembly) to generate more economic benefit and job opportunities for society. 
The conservation paradigm advocates protection of fish stocks and marine ecosystems. It 
follows the MSY approach to limit the fishing levels to remain the sustainable capacity of 
fish stocks. This opposes with the production-based growth paradigm when fish stocks 
were fully exploited or overexploited. The community paradigm champions the welfare, 
equity and social and cultural values of fishing communities. Generally, it promotes the 
objectives of generating welfare for society of the production-based growth paradigm. 
However, it tends to protect the traditional small-scale fishing communities who are 
vulnerable to loss livelihoods due to invasion of the larger scale vessels resulting from 
enlarging fishing capacity programs of the production-based growth paradigm. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Charles 1992 
Figure 3.2: The linkages among objective paradigms of a fisheries policy 
In chapter 5, official documents, in combination with manuscripts of in-depth interviews with 
actors taking part in making the 2010 fisheries master plan and direct observation are used 
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to understand policy discourses and logics of management and development objectives of 
the Vietnamese fisheries. 
Analyzing the knowledge inputs used for planning fisheries, chapter 6 follows the 
conceptual framework for assessing knowledge co-production (Enengel et al., 2012) with 
modification to fit with this research. The framework composed of three components (figure 
3.3): i) kinds of knowledge, ii) types of actors, and iii) production of knowledge to analyze 
what types of actors contributed what kind of knowledge for planning fisheries in Vietnam. 
The component of knowledge types addresses three dimensions of knowledge: i) scale 
dimension examines specific context and universal validation of knowledge types used for 
planning fisheries in Vietnam; ii) functional dimension look at capability to explain specific 
phenomena and connect with other elements in a system; and iii) epistemic dimension 
investigates degree that knowledge is validated (i.e. experiential knowledge, scientific 
knowledge).  
The component of actor kinds investigates roles of four categories of actors involving into 
the process of producing knowledge: i) core scientists, who are the main scientific actors 
throughout the course of producing knowledge including collecting, processing, analyzing 
data, presenting and communicating results; ii) scientific consultants, who provide 
consultations for defining the research goals and developing research design, and also 
provide evaluation of the research results; iii) professional experts, who participate in 
formulating research design, selecting methodologies, analyzing data, structuring 
problems, and presenting results; iv) validation actors, who are the leaderships of research 
institutions and/or sectors being accountable for knowledge (i.e. information) under their 
management authority. The component of knowledge production explores 6 main steps of 
producing knowledge including: i) identification of problem; ii) research design and 
selection of methods; iii) data collection; iv) data analysis; v) reflection/interpretation and 
synthesis; vi) consultation and validation of knowledge. 
In this chapter, the following data are used: i) available official documents regulating types 
of knowledge inputs for planning fisheries; ii) research and administration reports related 
to the knowledge types used for planning fisheries; iii) fisheries planning documents; and 
iv) manuscripts of interviews with actors (i.e. fisheries scientists, managers, experts, GSO 
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staff) as well as direct observation of producing knowledge inputs for planning fisheries in 
Vietnam. 
In chapter 7, it investigates implementation of the fisheries master plan (i.e. a planning tool) 
at local levels on one hand, and examines factors influencing on the fishing behaviours of 
the local fishers on the other. Doing this, two communal fisheries are selected as case 
studies to investigate how their fisheries plan is made and how they influence the fishing 
communities. The fishing behaviours of fishers are exhibited by their strategic decisions 
and tactical decisions. The strategic decision is made by the vessel owners related to 
investments in building and repairing vessels, installing electronic and mechanical 
equipment, and fish preservation systems. It comes up with the scale of vessel, gears used, 
fishing zone. Meanwhile, the tactical decisions are often made daily by skippers at sea to 
define places, fishing time, gears used, number of days at seas, etc. to maximize their 
catches. In some cases, the tactical decisions not only are independently made by the 
skippers but also consulted with the vessel owners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Conceptual framework for examining the knowledge inputs for planning 
fisheries in Vietnam 
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Fishing decisions are personally made by fishers (i.e. skippers and/or vessel owners) 
related with their own fishing business such as where and when to go fishing, what species 
would be targeted, which fishing gears would be employed, and what scale of vessel would 
be invested. These decisions often rely on the personal experience, practical conditions on 
resources, weather; market information; fisheries regulations (Christensen & Raakjær, 
2006). Therefore, each fisher may decide differently on the same situation. In order to 
explain this, the following data are used: i) available official documents (e.g. fisheries plans, 
fisheries administration reports, statistic data of two communes selected; ii) manuscripts of 
in-depth/group interviews with local managers and informants and local fishers of two 
communes selected; iii) questionnaires with local fishers of two communes selected. 
Chapter 8 focuses on investigation of implementing the co-management and the adaptive 
indicator-based management structures in the Vietnamese fisheries. For the co-
management arrangement, this research uses 11 key conditions for viable fisheries co-
management defined by Ostrom and Pinkerton (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Pinkerton, 1989) to 
analyze fisheries co-management models in Vietnam (see more detailed in chapter 8). 
To do this, some fisheries co-management models are selected as case studies, and the 
following data are used: i) profile of the selected fisheries co-management models, ii) 
available official documents related to co-management in Vietnam (e.g. legal regulations, 
decisions of local government); iii) research reports and publications on fisheries co-
management in Vietnam; iv) manuscripts of in-depth interviews with fishers, fisheries 
managers and experts; and v) direct observation of implementing fisheries co-management 
at various levels (e.g. formulating regulations, providing consultations, implementing co-
management models in practice). 
For the adaptive indicator-based management structure, this research uses the conceptual 
framework of three aspects (Rist et al., 2013) to understand failure of this structure: i) 
appropriate to reduce ecological uncertainty, ii) feasible to the actual management context, 
and iii) the success of its application. However, this structure has no longer implemented 
in Vietnamese fisheries. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate its appropriateness to 
reduce ecological uncertainty and the success of its application. This research only 
examines the feasibility and the appropriateness in terms of the perspective in order to 
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understand causes of unsuccessful application of this structure into the Vietnamese 
fisheries context. To do this, the following data are used: i) available official documents on 
institutional arrangements of the fisheries administration of Vietnam; ii) research reports in 
fisheries resources and fisheries of Vietnam and international literature on adaptive 
management of fisheries resources; iii) manuscripts of in-depth interviews with fisheries 
managers and scientists who took part in implementing this structure; and iv) direct 
observation of implementing this structure in practice. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLIGY 
This research uses the case study approach in combination with the mixed methodology 
(i.e. qualitative and quantitative methods). The general research methodology of this 
research as shown in figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Research methodologies of this research 
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3.2.1.1 Case study approach 
The case study approach allows intensive description and analysis on both the single units 
and a bounded system (Smith, 1978). In this approach, comments, ideas, perceptions and 
point of views of informants are acknowledged and respected equally. The case study is 
used to describe a process, to explore factors affecting a process and outcomes, and 
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explain causes behind failures of outcomes and a process (Yin, 2009). This approach is 
chosen because the aim of this research is to explore and understand complex system i.e. 
different views of various stakeholders on processes of planning fisheries. This approach 
was used for addressing all research question of this research. 
3.2.1.2 Choosing cases study  
For chapter 4, in order to understand the current situation of the Vietnamese fisheries 
system. Coastal provincial fisheries are selected as case studies with the following criteria: 
i) Having different fishing patterns, customs and diversity of the fisheries e.g. including 
off-shore and coastal fishing fleets, fisheries of catching demersal and pelagic 
species. 
ii) Having different fishing behaviours within different regions e.g. the north, central and 
south regions. 
iii) Having different conditions on natural environment and fisheries resources. 
Based on these criteria, 14/28 coastal provincial fisheries were selected including: Quang 
Ninh, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Thua Thien-Hue, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, 
Binh Thuan, Vung Tau, Tien Giang, Ben Tre, Ca Mau, Kien Giang to explore the current 
situation of the fisheries system. They also were used to examine the state planning system 
in terms of the vertical dimension. Moreover, fisheries managers in these cases were also 
selected to be interviewed within other research questions. 
For chapter 5 and chapter 6, they look at the logics and knowledge inputs for developing 
development and management objectives of the Vietnamese fisheries. The 2010 fisheries 
master plan and fisheries planning documents in 2001-2010 are selected as case study to 
explain the process of planning fisheries and to examine knowledge inputs planning 
fisheries in Vietnam. This was selected because: i) this is the first time the master plan 
introduced into the planning system of government; ii) the 2010 fisheries master plan was 
first time developed in a context of emerging conflicting policy discourses in fisheries; iii) 
the planning circle was ended, so it would enable author to evaluate. 
For chapter 7, it looks at implementing the 2010 fisheries master plan at the local levels. 
Legally, the Vietnamese fisheries administration system is arranged at four levels (i.e. the 
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national, provincial, district, and communal levels). Off these, government at the communal 
level is in charge of implementing and enforcing the fisheries policies and management 
measures decided by the national and provincial levels. According to Chinh (Chinh, 2006), 
there were 628 coastal communes in all 28 coastal provinces where fishing vessels were 
registered. This means that there were 628 communal fisheries existing in Vietnam. 
However, they share the main characteristics of the Vietnamese fisheries as summarized 
in box 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1: The main characteristics of the Vietnamese fisheries 
The Vietnamese fisheries are characterized as the multi-gear and multi-species fisheries. Each 
vessel employs various gears to catch specific species and/or group of species depending on the 
fishing grounds and seasons. The investigation in eight provinces shows that small vessels of less 
than 90 HP in engine capacity are not migratory far from their home port, although they change the 
gears used to catch different species seasonally. Meanwhile, the bigger vessels often migrate 
among fishing grounds and use appropriate gears to catch different species such as tuna, squids, 
demersal fish and pelagic fish. Vessels may change the gears to catch other fish in the same fishing 
grounds or change the gears and move to other fishing grounds to catch other fish. For instance, 
trawlers in the north region use trammel net to catch shrimps and cuttlefish in the Northeast 
monsoon in the same fishing grounds. The tuna long liners in the central region usually use the 
hand line or falling net to catch squids in the south fishing grounds in the Southwest monsoon. 
In fact, a vessel may change the gears to catch other species in the same fishing grounds 
depending on the monsoons. They also change the gears and move to different fishing grounds to 
catch other fish. For instance, a vessel in the central region uses the purse seine net in the 
Northeast monsoon to catch small pelagic fish and uses the bottom gill net in the Southwest 
monsoon to catch the demersal fish. The fishers in this region may use the long line to catch tuna 
in the Northeast moon soon and use hand line to catch squids. A vessel in the south regions uses 
bottom trawl net to catch demersal fish in the Southwest monsoon and uses hand line to catch 
squids. Similarly, in the north region, a vessel uses concurrently the falling net catching squids and 
small pelagic fish and the hand line catching squids and demersal fish. They also employ trawl net 
to catch demersal fish in the Northeast monsoon and use gill net/traps to catch fish, swimming 
crabs, snails, etc. 
In conclusion, the Vietnamese fishing fleets often change their gears appropriately with targeting 
species. They operate within a specific area or move to other areas depending on the size of 
vessels and gears used. The bigger vessels are the more migratory 
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Due to limitation of time and resources, this research selects two communal fisheries as 
the case studies based on the 5 following criteria: 
i) To present the migratory characteristic of fishing vessels. Cases selected include 
fishing vessels which are migratory and non-migratory far from their traditional 
waters/home ports. 
ii)  To present the characteristic of changes in gears to catch alternative species by 
seasons. Cases selected have fishing vessels changing their gears by seasons to 
catch different targeting species. 
iii) To have dominant fishing fleets of the offshore and the coastal vessels. Communes 
selected have different scales of fishing vessels operating in the offshore waters and 
in the coastal waters. 
iv) To have different targeting species/group of species. Cases selected have fishing 
fleets targeting different species/group of species e.g. demersal and pelagic species 
living in coastal and offshore waters. 
v) To have different fishing patterns and customs. Cases should be selected to present 
fishing patterns and customs of various regions e.g. north, central, and the south 
regions. 
Based on these criteria, the communal fisheries of Quynh Lap and the communal fisheries 
of Tam Quan Bac were selected. In Quynh Lap, the trawl fishery is dominant and presents 
for the less migratory fleets of small-scale fisheries operating in the coastal waters. It also 
presents for the fishing patterns and traditional customs in the north. In Tam Quan Bac, the 
tuna line fishery is dominant and presents for the more migratory fleets of lager scale 
fisheries operating in the offshore waters. It also presents for the fishing patterns and 
traditional customs in the south. The background and context of these cases are presented 
in the chapter 7. 
For chapter 8, it explores implementation of innovative management approaches (i.e. co-
management and adaptive indicators-based management structures) in Vietnamese 
fisheries. For the adaptive indicators-based management structure, it only was introduced 
and piloted within a DANIDA project in 2003-2012, and was disappeared after ending the 
project in 2012. Therefore, this research takes this as the case study. For the co-
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management structure, there have been 38 fisheries co-management models implemented 
in Vietnam (Anon, 2009; VIFEP, 2014). All of them have been funded by the international 
donors. Some of them have still existed after ending external supports, but most of them 
were collapsed soon after external supports ended. Cases would be selected based on the 
following criteria: 
i) Being conducted for the marine capture fisheries in different fishing patterns and 
customs e.g. the north, central and south regions. 
ii) Providing different services and livelihoods for the local communities e.g. harvesting 
different species and getting profits from services produced by the models. 
iii) Providing different magnitude of success and failures. Cases have still persisted and 
disappeared after the external supports (e.g. finance and expert supports. 
iv) Being documented or investigated by previous researches and located in place of 
easy to access. 
Based on these criteria, six fisheries co-management models were selected. Their general 
information is shown in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: The general information of fisheries co-management models 
No. 
Location of 
models 
Year of 
establishment 
Objectives Donors Existing situation 
1 
Phu Long in Hai 
Phong city 
1995 
Control access rights to fish in 
the commune waters 
German 
NGO 
Already collapsed 
2 
Quynh Lap in 
Nghe An 
province 
2007 
Control access rights to fish in 
the commune waters 
DANIDA 
Operating under 
funding from WB 
from 2014 
3 
Vinh Giang in 
Thua Thien-Hue 
province 
2007 
Control access rights to fish in 
the commune waters 
DANIDA 
Good (operating 
by Fisheries 
Association) 
4 
Nhon Hai in Binh 
Dinh province 
2007 
Control access rights to fish in 
the commune waters and 
protect lobster stocks 
DANIDA 
Operating under 
funding from WB 
from 2014 
5 
Ran Trao in 
Khanh Hoa 
province 
2000 
Control fishing activities in the 
Ran Trao coral reef to protect 
fisheries resources and sea 
grass 
IMA Good 
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No. 
Location of 
models 
Year of 
establishment 
Objectives Donors Existing situation 
6 
Thanh Phong in 
Ben Tre province 
2007 
Control access rights to 
harvest clam stocks in the 
communal waters 
DANIDA 
Not working 
(access rights are 
not controlled) 
3.2.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Data collection was conducted in two main phases: 2009-2012, and 2013-2017. In the first 
phase, collection of the secondary data, frame surveys and interviews with relevant 
stakeholders were conducted; and in the second phase, some secondary data and 
interviews were updated, verified, supplemented; and interviews with new informants and 
questionnaires were conducted in order to address the research questions after the 
research plan was updated. In addition, the direct observations were also conducted in 
2009-2015, and also recalled since 2003 when consultation meetings for the 2010 fisheries 
master plan had been conducted. 
The sequence of data collection was conducted as follows: 
i) The secondary data was conducted firstly to provide an overview of the fisheries 
system and guide to further sources of data. 
ii) A frame survey at 28 coastal provinces and informal interviews with fisheries 
managers, scientists were carried out to get more detail information about the 
fisheries system at the national and provincial levels. It provides information about 
the fishing industry, fishing communities, management system, planning system at 
the provincial level to design research methods, select methods of collecting data, 
select interviewees, design interview questions. 
iii) Conducting in-depth interviews and group interviews with fisheries managers, 
experts, scientists, local fishers and informants in combination with the direct 
observations to understand points of view of different stakeholders and build more 
knowledge of the research topics. This also provided basis for design 
questionnaires. 
iv) Questionnaires were conducted with local fishers to understand their fishing 
behaviours and rank factors influencing on fishing decisions of the fishers. 
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The survey, interviews and informal talks were conducted face-to-face, email, skype, 
messenger, and telephone. The methods used to collect data and number of interviews, 
surveys, questionnaires for each research questions are presented in the following 
sections. 
3.2.2.1 Secondary data collection 
Two types of secondary data and documents were collected and analyzed to form 
foundations and knowledge for addressing research questions. Firstly, the official 
documents being in effect were collected, including:  
i) Ten political solutions adopted by the National Party Congress; 
ii) The National Constitution 1992, 2013; fisheries laws 2003; and ordinance of 
fisheries resources development and protection adopted by National Assembly in 
1989; 
iii) Eight decrees issued by Government of Vietnam regulating the planning system and 
the fisheries; 
iv) Nineteen decisions and directives made by Prime Minister, Chair of Provincial 
People Committee on planning and managing fisheries at the national and provincial 
levels;  
v) Fourteen circulars, directives, decisions issued by Minister of MOFI/MARD to 
manage the fisheries. 
They are delivered within the administration system of the fisheries as well as uploaded in 
the websites of MOFI/MARD. They were used to analyze structure, institutional 
arrangements, interactions, policy/planning system, regulations, administration, and 
development orientations of the Vietnamese fisheries. 
Secondly, a series of reference documents including: i) journal articles on fisheries 
management; ii) scientific and research reports on Vietnamese fisheries; iii) administrative 
reports of the Vietnamese fisheries administration system; iv) fisheries and socio-economic 
planning documents in 1990-2016 of the national level and in fisheries selected as case 
studies; and v) statistical data in total fish landings, fishing vessels, and fisheries socio-
economic published by GSO. The international journal articles were published in books or 
online, so author can access to in library or electric version from online library of university. 
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For the data in Vietnamese, they are delivered freely in the administration system, or 
downloaded freely from the competence institutions’ websites. 
3.2.2.2 Frame surveys 
The frame surveys were conducted in MARD (DECFIFREP and Planning Department) and 
28 coastal provinces to collect data and information about fisheries management (e.g. 
fishing fleets, total fish landings, fisheries planning documents) at national and provincial 
levels to build up a foundation for further investigations. The frame surveys were also 
conducted in RIMF and VIFEP to combine scientific reports, fish stock assessments, 
fisheries socio-economic data which are the knowledge base for planning fisheries. The 
frame surveys are conducted by telephone and email. The author as a manager in the 
fisheries administration is familiar with the local fisheries managers. Therefore, he is able 
to contact with and ask provincial fisheries managers to provide fisheries planning 
documents as well as fisheries administration reports of the province. 
3.2.2.3 In-depth interview 
In-depth interviews were conducted with fisheries stakeholders. Interviewees (i.e. fisheries 
scientists, managers at national and provincial levels, experts from NGOs, and local 
fishers/informants) were selected including people who were associated with making the 
2010 fisheries master plan; understanding about local fishers’ behaviours and customs; 
implementation of the fisheries co-management models and adaptive indicators-based 
management structure introduced by projects funded by DANINA in 2003-2012.  
Totally, 94 persons (04 scientists from RIMF and VIFEP; 04 managers from MARD; 02 
experts from VINAFISH, Vietnam WWF; 54 fishers and 6 informants in fishing communities; 
04 staff working for GSO at the provincial level; 14 managers from 14 selected provinces) 
were interviewed with the main open-end questions related to process of fisheries 
management. Four scientists and 04 managers from MARD (02 from DECAFIREP and 02 
from Planning Department) selected because they participated directly in making the 2010 
fisheries master plan. An expert from VINAFISH was selected to represent its memberships 
- the fishers, and one from Vietnam WWF to represent environmentalists. Three fishers per 
province were selected by criteria: i) having much experience on his fishing business; ii) 
understanding well about his fishing communities; iii) living in different fishing communities 
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and using different fishing gears. In two communal fisheries of Quynh Lap and Tam Quan 
Bac, twelve fishers (six per each commune) were selected randomly with different ages 
and fishing experience, and six informants (03 per each commune) who have the best 
understanding about their fishing communities in terms of history, traditional values, fishing 
patterns and fishing behaviours were selected to interview. The 14 local managers are the 
head of Sub-DECAFIREP or deputy director of DARD of 14 selected provinces were 
interviewed. And six representatives from 6 fisheries co-management models are 
interviewed. 
For fisheries scientists, experts, managers, the author made an appointment by telephone 
or email first, then came and discussed according to topics prepared in advance. For local 
fishers and informants, they are suggested by 3-4 local fishers with the above criteria. Then 
author visited them at home and made an appointment to conduct interview. Each person 
may be asked more than once at any time to provide their perspectives and discussions on 
specific research topics by face-to-face, telephone, messenger, skype, email. Depending 
on the research topics, interviewees and questions were asked respectively as illustrated 
in appendix 1. 
3.2.2.4 Group interview 
Group interview method was used to investigate perspectives of local fishers’ groups 
related to research topics in chapter 7 and 8. They were conducted after the frame surveys 
and in-depth interviews to refine and deepen information collected individually through 
discussions and interactions among fishers.  
In chapter 7, six group interviews at 6 fishing villages in two communes (Quynh Lap and 
Tam Quan Bac) were conducted.  Each group is composed of 07-12 fishers in the same 
area. These fishers are invited under suggestion of fishers to be a fisher’ house, then author 
guides them to discuss according to topics prepared in advance as follows: 
i) What factors influence the daily decisions on fishing business (when, where, how, 
what species to fish in fishing trips), where they come from? How are they ranked? 
ii) What factors influence the investment decisions on fishing business (targeting 
species, gears used, scale of business, equipment) where they come from? How 
are they ranked? 
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In chapter 8, one group discussion was carried out with 09 representatives from fisheries 
co-management models of Phu Long – Hai Phong, Quynh Lap – Nghe An, Vinh Giang – 
Thua Thien-Hue, Quang Thai – Thua Thien-Hue, Cu Lao Cham – Quang Nam, Nhon Hai – 
Binh Dinh, Ran Trao – Khanh Hoa, Thanh Phong – Ben Tre, Cai Doi Vam – Ca mau to 
identify and compare successful implementation of co-management arrangement in their 
communities. 
i) Why the co-management models were established? 
ii) How are they organized and linked with fisheries authorities and other fisheries 
interest groups? 
iii) What are their objectives? Do they achieve objectives? 
iv) Are they successful or failed? Why? 
v) What are obstacles to implement the co-management in the local context? 
3.2.2.5 Direct observation 
The author used to work as researcher in RIMF from 1997-2004, as a fisheries research 
manager in MOFI/MARD from 2004-2015, and as a fisheries manager in D-Fish since May 
2015. He was also a member of Marine Fisheries Specialist Team to support for the 
adaptive indicators-based management structure and of the team developing the strategy 
of implementing fisheries co-management in Vietnam. Therefore, he has conducted and 
participated directly in meetings, individual talks, and workshops with fishers, fisheries 
managers, and scientists about fishing patterns and fisheries socio-economic conditions at 
local communities. He also took part in committees to evaluate of stock assessments 
results and fisheries research projects; teams of formulating fisheries policies and 
regulations. Especially, he participated directly in working agenda of Marine Fisheries 
Specialist Team such as training courses, preparing multidisciplinary assessments, 
providing technical assistance for provinces of Nghe An and Ben Tre to facilitate the 
adaptive indicators-based management at the provincial level. He also involved in 
analyzing achievements, challenges and suggesting the ways forwards to application of 
fisheries co-management in Vietnam. In addition, he was also invited to provide 
consultations and meetings on developing the 2010 fisheries master plan, to review this 
master plan, and to make the fisheries mater plan by 2020. This gave him continuous 
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storylines and discourses in managing fisheries in Vietnam, and producing knowledge 
inputs for planning and managing fisheries in Vietnam.  
3.2.2.6 Questionnaires 
Questionnaire method was used in chapter 7 to identify and evaluate importance of factors 
influencing on the fishing tactical and strategic decisions of the local fishers. It was carried 
out after the in-depth and group interviews with local fishers completed, when the factors 
influencing on fishers’ decisions were identified and generalized within the communal 
context. The structure of the questionnaires was designed as shown in appendix 2. The 
total vessels registered in Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac communes in 2014 was 1,121 
vessels, among of them, there were 584 tuna long-liners in Tam Quan Bac commune and 
140 trawlers in Quynh Lap commune. This research conducted interviews (through 
questionnaires) with 242 owners/skippers (194 and 48 owners/skippers in Tam Quan Bac 
and Quynh Lap respectively) randomly selected from the list of vessel owners provided by 
the CPC of Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac communes. Nearly a quarter of questionnaires 
were filled up by face-to-face interview between author and fishers, the rest were filled up 
by individual fishers. 
3.2.3 DATA ANALYSIS  
Secondary documents were classified into 6 general folders including: i) legal regulations 
on planning system; ii) legal regulations on managing fisheries; iii) fisheries policies; iv) 
planning documents and fisheries planning reports; v) fisheries research and fish stock 
assessments reports; and iv) statistic data on fisheries. The information from individual 
interviews group discussions were written down according to specific research topics in 
separate notebooks as manuscripts. Information in 242 questionnaires were directly written 
on questionnaires by author or by fishers. Information from all methods was categorized 
into 13 different topics matching with 13 research sub-questions of the research articulated 
in chapter 1. 
The information in questionnaires is encoded into and analyzed by Microsoft Excel to rank 
factors influencing most on the fishing decisions of local fishers. For information form 
secondary documents, they are reviewed to locate data and information related to 13 
research sub-questions. This information then put into the 13 separate folders. 
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For interview data (i.e. group and individual interviews), they are stored separately by 
research questions, then they classified into guidance questions of each research topics 
as shown in appendix 1. For each guidance question, the data are analyzed in 6 steps: i) 
organizing and preparing the data. This involved sorting and arranging the data by source 
of information, and taking note as the headlines; ii) reading through all the data to obtain a 
general sense of the information and reflect on its overall meaning; iii) sorting the data by 
content according to the research conceptual framework; iv) generating a description and 
themes based on research topics sorted; v) presenting the descriptions and findings of 
analysis with illustrations such as quotations, pictures, stories; and vi) interpreting the data 
based on the findings and comparison between findings and literature. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE FISHERIES SYSTEM IN VIETNAM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to identify and understand issues facing the fisheries management system, this 
research uses the fisheries system approach (Charles, 2001) to analyze the Vietnamese 
fisheries system. This approach looks at the fisheries system in three components 
connected coherently: i) the natural ecosystem covering fish stocks and marine 
ecosystems, ii) the human system where economic and social activities of the fishing 
industry and local communities take place, and iii) the management system where the state 
policies/planning and management decisions are produced to influence the human and the 
natural systems. The common policies may help to secure the sustainability of fisheries, 
and balance conflicting biological, social, economic objectives and demands for fish 
consumption of the present and the future generations. In order to contribute to the 
understanding issues of the Vietnamese fisheries, this chapter deals with the following 
questions: i) What is the situation of the natural system (fish stocks and marine biodiversity? 
ii) What is the situation of the fishing industry and the local fishing communities? and iii) 
How is the fisheries management system organized? 
The chapter is composed of four main parts. Firstly, it describes the current understanding 
of the Vietnamese fisheries resources with focusing on the available fish stock 
assessments. Secondly, the fishing industry is depicted based on the available information 
on fishing fleets, fish landings, economic performance of fleets and consumption markets. 
Thirdly, the local fishing communities are described in terms of income, living standard of 
local fishers, and the fishers’ structures at the local communities. Fourthly, it analyses the 
fisheries management system in four main aspects: planning system, rules and legislation, 
decision-making authorities, and fisheries research and data collection in Vietnam. Finally, 
the chapter identifies the main issues facing the fisheries management system in Vietnam. 
4.2 THE NATURAL SYSTEM 
4.2.1 MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN THE VIETNAMESE WATERS 
The Vietnamese marine water are located in the tropical climate zone, coordinates 06000N 
to 21000N and 103000E to 116000E with an area over 1.0 million square kilometers (figure 
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4.1). It is assessed as one of the most abundant biodiversity areas in the world. According 
to scientific surveys in 2011-2015 (RIMF, 2017), 1.081 species were identified in the 
Vietnamese EEZ. There is no remarkable change in number of species in comparison to 
surveys conducted in 1996-2005. The surveys conducted in 1996-2005 by bottom  trawling 
recognized more than 900 species of 10 main ecological groups (Ha et al., 2010) as 
illustrated in table 4.1. Almost all of them are small size, fast growing and have high 
productivity, short lifespan and widespread distribution (Thanh, 2009). Their distribution 
varies among areas and seasons (Ha et al., 2005; RIMF, 2014).  
Fishing activities cause negative impacts on the marine biodiversity and ecosystems 
(Dayton et al., 2002; Jennings & Kaiser, 1998). They create changes in the food-web 
structure and downscale of the trophic level of marine ecosystems. In the last two decades 
Vietnamese fishers have focused on fishing valuable species (e.g. shrimps, squids, 
groupers and snappers) leading to changes in biodiversity in marine waters. Some species 
such as Ilisha elongata, Otholithes biaurius disappeared and others species (e.g. snappers 
and groupers) depleted seriously in the Vietnamese EEZ (Thi, Ha, & Thong, 2005). 
Furthermore, the proportion of shrimp, top predator species, high value species (e.g. 
grouper, shark, squid, mackerel, snapper, etc.) in total catches of the commercial fisheries 
declined critically, while the proportion of low value fish (e.g. ray-finned fishes, pony-fishes 
etc.) increased as observed in 2000-2015 (Ha et al., 2005; RIMF, 2017; Vinh, 2006). The 
number of endangered species seemed to increase gradually from 135 species in 1996 
(Anon, 1996) to 236 species in 2008 (MARD, 2008b). 
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Figure 4.1: For stock assessment, the Vietnamese marine waters are divided into four 
regions: Tonkin Gulf, Central region, Southeast region, and Southwest region. Each region 
is further divided into coastal areas (inshore and coastal routes) and offshore area/routes. 
The stocks of oceanic migration fish were sometimes assessed separately in the oceanic 
regions (RIMF, 2014b). 
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Table 4.1: Number (N) of species caught by bottom trawl surveys in 1996-2005 in 
Vietnamese marine waters (Ha et al., 2010) 
Ecological 
groups 
Tonkin Gulf Central region Southeast 
region 
Southwest 
region 
All regions 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Bathydemersal  5 1.0 18 3.8 16 2.4 2 0.5 24 2.6 
Bathypelagic  2 0.4 5 1.1 4 0.6 1 0.2 5 0.5 
Benthopelagic  30 5.7 33 6.9 40 6.0 32 8.0 62 6.6 
Cephalopods  23 4.4 18 3.8 24 3.6 21 5.2 32 3.4 
Crustaceans 51 9.8 38 8.0 51 7.6 53 13.2 88 9.4 
Demersal  207 39.6 197 41.5 249 37.2 136 33.8 357 38.1 
Horseshoe crab  2 0.4 1 0.2  0.0  0.0 2 0.2 
Mollusks  4 0.8 2 0.4 2 0.3 2 0.5 4 0.4 
Pelagic  63 12.0 40 8.4 72 10.7 53 13.2 101 108 
Coral reef fish 136 26.0 123 25.9 212 31.6 102 25.4 263 28.0 
Total 523 100.0 475 100.0 670 100.0 402 100.0 938 100.0 
In addition to this, the proportion of trash fish (including low value species, small fish and 
juveniles) in the fish landings seemed to increase and accounted for 50-60% of the total 
landings of the commercial fisheries in Vietnam (FAO, 2004b). This proportion was 
particularly high for the shrimp trawl fishery, fish trawl fishery, stow net fishery, push net 
fishery taking at 60-80%, 40-80%, 90% and 90-93% respectively (Cuong, 2006). The rate 
of juvenile and undersized fish caught by commercial fisheries is also high. It accounted for 
about 22.5% of the total landings of commercial fisheries (Lung, 2010). This made a change 
in the population structure of the marine fish stocks in Vietnam. The rate of the demersal 
fish in total standing biomass declined from 37% in 1990 (Chung, 1990) to 30% in 2000-
2005 (Nghia, 2007) and to approx. 14.7% in 2011-2015 (RIMF, 2017). This demonstrates 
that the current fishing patterns make a clear change in fish population and marine 
ecosystem structure in Vietnamese marine waters. The demersal fish stocks having longer 
life span and slow growth have depleted gradually in over the last two decades. 
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4.2.2 FISH STOCKS 
4.2.2.1 State of fisheries resources  
Fish stock assessments are implemented by Research Institute for Marine Fisheries 
(RIMF) in different scales, areas and limitations depending on the purpose of the specific 
investigation. In the assessment process, RIMF has not defined any reference points for 
the biomass of fish stocks or spawning stock biomass or the fishing mortality for particular 
species as done in other fisheries. Instead, fish stock assessments are normally conducted 
to estimate the standing biomass (B) and exploitable potential yield (EPY) for the 
combination of all species within specific regions, exception of specific projects conducting 
for specific species. The B is understood as the total weight in tons of all fisheries resources 
can be caught by fishing gear at a given time, and the EPY is often estimated as approx. 
50 % of the standing biomass and understood as the volume of fish can be available to fish 
(see the way to calculate B and EPY in chapter 6). Consequently, the outputs of the fish 
stock assessments are normally presented in two figures of B and EPY. These figures are 
just the temporary state of combination of all species at the specific surveys. Therefore, 
based on this the fisheries managers may know a general trend of the fisheries resources 
in specific regions, but do not know the real state of individual fish stocks.  
According to RIMF (RIMF, 2017), the standing biomass of fisheries resources in 
Vietnamese marine waters in 2011-2015 was about 4.364 million tons, decreased (nearly 
16%) in comparison to period of 2000-2005 (table 4.2). This is able to provide the EPY of 
around 2.447 million tons per year. Table 4.2. shows that the biomass of most ecological 
groups in 2011-2015 decreased in comparison to period of 2000-2005. In more detail, the 
biomass of demersal fish went down in all regions. However, the biomass of the small 
pelagic fish in 2011-2015 increased in comparison to period of 2000-2005 in Tonkin Gulf, 
Central region and Southeast region. 
However, in a longer time-series data on estimations of the B and the EPY also 
demonstrates an overall trend of increase in the fisheries resource in Vietnamese marine 
waters in period of 1993-2015 (figure 4.2). They increased in 1997-2007 and reached a 
peak in 2007-2010, and then they dropped in 2013 and got a light increase in 2015.  
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Table 4.2: The state of fisheries resources in the Vietnamese marine waters in 2011-2015 
(RIMF, 2017) 
Regions Ecological groups Route 
B (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
EPY (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
B (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
Tonkin Gulf 
Small pelagic fish 
Coastal 172.2 103.3  
Inshore 219.7 131.8  
Offshore 234.2 140.5  
Total 626.0 375.6 433.1 
Demersal fish 
 
Coastal 30.2 15.1  
Inshore 38.5 19.3  
Offshore 41.1 20.5  
Total 109.8 54.9 153.3 
Crustaceans  20.3 10.2  
Coral reef fish  0.7 0.4  
Sub total  756.9 441.0  
Central area 
Small pelagic fish 
Coastal 49.0 29.4  
Inshore 113.1 67.9  
Offshore 454.3 272.6  
Total 616.4 369.9 595.5 
Demersal fish 
 
Coastal 40.1 20.1  
Inshore 92.5 46.3  
Offshore 118.4 59.2  
Total 251.0 125.5 592.2 
Coral reef fish  0.8 0.4  
Sub total  868.2 495.7  
Southeast region 
 
Small pelagic fish 
Coastal 84.2 50.5  
Inshore 193.1 115.9  
Offshore 614.2 368.5  
Total 891.5 534.9 770.8 
Demersal fish 
Coastal 20.4 10.2  
Inshore 46.7 23.3  
Offshore 148.5 74.2  
Total 215.5 107.8 304.8 
Crustaceans  11.3 5.6  
Coral reef fish  0.9 0.5  
Sub total  1119.2 648.7  
Southwest 
region 
Small pelagic fish 
Coastal 70.1 42.1  
Inshore 131.4 78.8  
Offshore 309.0 185.4  
Total 510.5 306.3 945.4 
Demersal fish 
 
Coastal 9.2 4.6  
Inshore 17.3 8.6  
Offshore 40.6 20.3  
Total 67.1 33.5 124 
Crustaceans  6.5 3.3  
Coral reef fish  0.1 0.1  
Sub total  610.0 250.7  
Large pelagic fish  1030.8 515.4  
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Regions Ecological groups Route 
B (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
EPY (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
B (x1000tons) 
in 2000-2005 
Middle East Sea 
(Oceanic region) 
Small pelagic fish  5.0 3.0  
Coral reef fish  0.1 0.1  
Sub total  1036.0 518.5 1156.0 
All regions 
Large pelagic fish  1030.8 514.4 1156.0 
Small pelagic fish  2649.5 1589.7 2744.9 
Demersal fish  643.4 321.7 1174.3 
Crustaceans  38.1 19.0  
Coral reef fish  2.6 1.3  
Gross total 4,364.4 2,447.1 5,075.1 
 
Figure 4.2: Dynamic of B and EPY within Vietnamese marine waters in 1993- 2015 (Chung, 
1997c; Ha et al., 2010; Nghia, 2005, 2007, RIMF, 2014b, 2017; D. M. Son, 2003; Thuoc, 
1993) 
The biomass of fisheries resources estimated in 2013 and 2015 is nearly the same, but 
difference in estimation of EPY due to calculation models used differently. Figure 4.2 shows 
the same trend (parallel lines) of change in B and EPY of fisheries resources in the 
Vietnamese marine waters in 1993-2013, but there was a remarkable change in EPY 
estimation in 2015. This unusual change is explained in more detail in chapter 6. This trend 
may not reflect the real state of the fisheries resources because these estimations were not 
conducted in the same conditions (e.g. difference in the investigation area scale, 
investigation timing, sampling design, etc.). For instance, estimation of B and EPY by 1997 
was implemented within the area of 92,000Km2 and 261,000 km2 in Tonkin gulf and in 
Southeast region respectively (Chung, 1997c); whereas, Son (D. M. Son, 2003) calculated 
within the area of 67,000Km2 and 237,000 km2 in the same regions. Surveys were carried 
out twice a year (i.e. the Northeast monsoon and Southwest monsoon) during investigation 
in 2000-2005, but only one time (alternatively the Northeast monsoon and the Southwest 
monsoon) due to limitation of budget. 
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In the specific regions (figure 4.3), the fisheries resources in the Tokin Gulf in 1997-2013 
were in an almost stable trend. They decreased slightly in 2003 and kept stably in 2003-
2010, and then increased again in 2013. The biomass of fisheries resources in the Central 
region and the Southwest region were in the same trend in 1997-2013. They increased 
in1997- 2007, the kept stable until 2010, then decreased in 2013. The fisheries resources 
in the Southeast region fluctuated during in 1997-2013. They went down from 1997 to 2005, 
then increased gradually and reached a peak in 2010. They dropped sharply (nearly a half) 
from 2010 to 2013.  
 
  
Figure 4.3: Dynamic of B and EPY by specific regions within the Vietnamese marine waters 
in 1997-2013 (Chung, 1997c; Ha, Thi, Nghia, & Thong, 2005, 2010; Nghia, 2007; RIMF, 
2014b; D. M. Son, 2003) 
By contrast, a decline trend in fisheries resources appears clearly when looking at the 
CPUE of the commercial fisheries as well as the catch rate of the scientific surveys vessels. 
According to GSO and Ministry of Fisheries (MOFI) (now is the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MARD)), the average CPUE of the commercial fishing fleets went down 
gradually in over the last two decades, from 0.9 tons/HP/year in 1990 to 0.2 tons/HP/year in 
2016 (figure 4.4). In addition to this, the data from a fisheries enumerator program conducted 
within the Assessment of Living Marine Resources in Vietnam project (ALMRV) funded by 
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DANIDA in 2000-2005 at 77 landing sites in 26/28 coastal provinces also shows a decline 
trend in CPUE of most fishing fleets observed (figure 4.5). The CPUE of most fisheries of 
more than 30 fisheries observed exhibited decline trend in 2000-2005, among them, the 
CPUE of trawl fishery decreased most apparently in throughout regions. Similarly, the catch 
rate of purse seining fishery also in a decrease trend in all regions, except the sudden 
increase in CPUE of this gear in 2004 in the Tonkin Gulf. 
 
Figure 4.4: The trend of the overall catch rate of the Vietnamese fisheries in 1990-2016 
(D-Fish, 2017a; GSO, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011a, 2016) 
 
Source: ALMRV2000-2005 
Figure 4.5: The trend of catch rate by the fisheries in specific regions in 2000 -2005. 
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In the scientific surveys by bottom trawling, the data shows that there was a decrease trend 
in catch rate of the experiment bottom trawl in 1996-2013 in Tonkin Gulf, Southeast and 
Southwest regions (figure 4.6). In the Central region, the fisheries resources were more 
abundant in 1996-2013. They increased gradually in 1996-2005, then went down to the level 
equivalently to the level in 2004 (figure 4.6).  
Unlike the fish stocks in coastal waters, the state of migratory large pelagic species in the 
Oceanic region (e.g. tuna, marlins, swordfish, sharks etc.) seems to be better situation. 
Their biomass and EPY increased gradually in 1997-2005, then remained stably until 2010 
and got a slight decrease in 2013 (figure 4.7). However, there are no reference points for 
managing these stocks. Moreover, these species migrate in a far way and may be caught by 
fishers from other countries. Therefore, these figures would not tell the real state of the fish 
stocks.   
 
Source: MARD/SCAFI 2010 and RIMF, 2014 
Figure 4.6: Dynamic of the combination CPUE of all species by regions 
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Source: RIMF, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2014 
Figure 4.7: Dynamic of B and EPY of the large pelagic species in the Oceanic region 
within the Vietnamese marine waters in 1997-2013 
In terms of commercial fisheries, the catch rate of gill net and long line operating in the 
Oceanic region in 2000-2008 was not in a clear trend. It tends to fluctuate seasonally as 
illustrated in figure 4.8. This could not tell the real state of the fish stocks. In fact, fishers have 
enlarged their fishing effort through improved fishing techniques and lengthening the fishing 
time in order to maximize their catch.  
In summary, the available data exhibit a contradictory trend in dynamic of the fish stocks in 
the Vietnamese marine waters. Fisheries resources seem to be in the fine situation if 
looking at the trend of the biomass and exploitable potential yield in the combination 
manner. Meanwhile, they have been depleted apparently if looking at the CPUE of the 
commercial fishing fleets as well as the catch rate of the scientific surveys by bottom 
trawling. It is evident that the fisheries resources in the traditional fishing grounds and 
regions investigated by bottom trawling in period of 1996-2015 was in a decline trend. The 
migratory large pelagic species in the Oceanic region fluctuated seasonally and remained 
in a stable state in the period of 2000-2008. In general, if taking the EPY as a reference 
point of the fishing mortality of the fish stocks, then the fisheries resources in the 
Vietnamese marine waters have been over-exploited in the last three decades. In fact, the 
total landings have been always 3.0-5.0% higher than the EPY estimation in the fisheries 
planning documents (D-Fish, 2017a; MARD, 2011, 2016, MOFI, 1981, 1986, 1991a, 2001, 
2006a). 
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Source: MARD/SCAFI 2010 
Figure 4.8: Dynamics of CPUE of tuna and other migratory species in the Oceanic region. 
4.3 THE HUMAN SYSTEM 
4.3.1 FISHING FLEETS 
4.3.1.1 Development of fishing fleets 
Generally, the fishing capacity in the number of vessels as well as in engine capacity (HP) 
has increased gradually in 1990-2016 in Vietnam (GSO, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011a, 2016). 
The growth rate of the vessel number was nearly 5% per annum and engine capacity was 
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12.6 % per year (figure 4.9). The figure 4.9 shows a sudden change in the fishing capacity 
in 2008. Nine fisheries managers interviewed from the national and provincial levels 
believed that this increase must be connected with launching a subsidy policy to support 
fishers maintaining the fishing activities on the seas. This policy provides subsidies on 
building offshore vessels, replacing bigger engine capacity, fuel costs, assurance fees and 
administration fees for fishing vessel owners registered at the fisheries authorities (Prime 
Minister, 2008). Therefore, many vessels had been unregistered previously, only officially 
registered with fisheries authorities, in order to receive the subsidy from the government. 
The fisheries managers interviewed argued that the number of vessels registered officially 
in the registration book at the local fisheries authorities increased, but the real number of 
existing vessels did not change in practice. According to D-Fish (D-Fish, 2011), the number 
of vessels registered just accounted for approx. 70% of the existing fishing vessels in 
Vietnam. 
Despite the management measures made to control fishing capacity, changes in the 
numbers of fishing vessels fluctuates naturally and independently of government efforts. 
For instance, the government made plan to reduce the number of fishing vessels 50,000 
vessels by 2010 (Prime Minister, 2006). However, vessel numbers not only decrease, but 
they actually increased by nearly 2.6 times to 129,385 vessels. The number of fishing 
vessels in Vietnam reached a peak in 2009 of 131,000 vessels. It then decreased gradually 
to 104,452 vessels in 2015, but increased to 110,950 vessels by the end of 2016. The 
fishing fleets in Vietnam are dominated by the small-scale vessels (figure 4.10). 
  
Figure 4.9: The number of fishing vessel and total engine capacity (HP) in Vietnam in 
1990-2016 (D-Fish, 2017a; MARD, 2010, 2016, MOFI, 1996, 2001, 2006a) 
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The number of vessels powered with engine capacity less than 20 HP accounts for the 
biggest proportion of over 42%, followed by the fleet of engine capacity of 20-<90HP (26%), 
then the 400-800HP fleet (11%), next to the fleet of 90-<250HP (10%) and fleet of engine 
capacity from 250-<400HP accounts for 9% (table 4.3 and figure 4.10). The number of 
vessels powered with the engine capacity greater than 800 HP accounts for the least 
proportion (2.0%). The decree No.33/2010/ND-CP regulates that the fleet powered <20HP 
is only allowed to fish in the coastal route3 and not allowed to fish in inshore route and 
offshore areas (see further in figure 4.1), and the fleet powered 20-<90HP is only allowed 
to fish in the inshore route and offshore areas. The other fleets are only allowed to fish in 
the offshore areas. Clearly, the fishing fleets in Vietnam are dominated by the small-scale 
vessels, in which, more than two of third (68% of the total vessels) do fishing in the coastal 
and inshore routes. In fact, the circular No.02/2006/TT-BTS prohibits fishing fleets powered 
<30HP to develop since 2006. However, these fleets still dominate in the Vietnamese 
fisheries.  
Table 4.3: The structure of fishing fleets in Vietnam in 2016 (D-Fish, 2017a) 
Engine capacity (HP) 
<20 20-<90 90-<250 250-<400 400-<800 >=800 Total 
Fisheries 
Trawl net4 1,050 6,115 2,747 3,812 5,120 1344 20,188 
Gill net 25,816 8,192 1,656 1,494 1,273 167 38,598 
Purse seine net 160 1,137 1,115 1,458 1,516 296 5,682 
Hook and line 7,111 5,635 2,115 1,592 2,312 194 18,959 
Falling net 70 292 799 352 857 211 2,581 
Others 12,314 7,317 1,817 757 389 14 22,608 
Logistic service 206 18 332 418 716 144 2,334 
Total 46,727 29,206 10,581 9,883 12,183 2,370 110,950 
In Vietnam fishing vessels are categorized into two types: the fishing vessels using gears 
to catch fish and the logistic vessels providing service on buying and transporting catches. 
                                         
3 Decree No. 33/2008/ND-CP defines that the coastal route is limited by the shore and the line of 6 
miles far from the shore, the inshore route is limited by the line of 6 miles far from the shore to the 
line of 24 miles far from the shore, the offshore area stretches from the line of 24 miles far from the 
shore to the outer limit of the Vietnamese EEZ. 
4 There is only bottom trawl fishery (no pelagic trawlers) operating in Vietnam. 
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In 2016, the number of logistic vessels was 2,334 accounting for 2% of the total fishing 
vessels (D-Fish, 2017a). There were 38 categories of fishing gears identified in eight 
provinces in 2014. These gears are named differently among local communities. They 
could be grouped into 5 main fisheries: trawl net, purse seine net, gill net, falling net, hook 
and line (figure 4.10). Of these, the gill net accounts for the biggest proportion of 35%, 
followed by the trawl net (18%), and by the hook and line fishery (17%). The purse seine 
fishery and the falling net account for 5% and 2% respectively. The rest (21%) is other 
gears such as push net, lift net, fyke net, trap, seine net, etc.  
 
Figure 4.10: The structure of fishing fleets in Vietnam in 2016 (D-Fish, 2017a) 
Figure 4.10 and table 4.3 shows that the trawl fishery still takes an important role in the 
Vietnamese fisheries. It dominates in the inshore route and the offshore area. Trawlers 
usually are powered with a big engine capacity and harvest in a huge area of waters and 
may damage the seabed because they operate year-around and their equipment plows the 
seabed to harvest fish, shrimps, clams. In fact, some countries e.g. Indonesia banned the 
trawl fishery in their waters due to its harmful impacts on the fish stocks and marine 
ecosystems. In Vietnam, the circular No.02/2006/TT-BTS prohibits the trawling fleet 
powered <90HP to develop since 2006, but, a large number of the trawlers powered <90HP 
are still used nationwide in Vietnam. According to decree No. 33/2010/ND-CP they are not 
allowed to fish in the inshore and coastal routes, but a number of big trawlers have 
sometimes fished in the prohibition areas as told by fisheries managers in provinces of 
Quang Ninh, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ben Tre, Ca Mau, and Kien Giang. In 
addition to this, a number of gill netters is the biggest, but most of them powered engine 
<90HP and operating the coastal and inshore routes. Among of them, there are a large 
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proportion if the trammel net having a very low selectivity. These fleets are a big threat to 
the fisheries resources and ecosystems in Vietnamese marine waters.   
4.3.1.2 Change in structure of the fishing fleet 
Almost all fishing vessels are privately owned by fishing households. There were about 30 
large-scale tuna long-liners owned by four joint stocks companies (DECAFIREP, 2010b), 
but these companies have gone bankrupt due to economic lost and lack of skilled skippers 
as told by a former director of Bien Dong fishing company. As neither restriction on catch 
quota nor on fishing days are applied in Vietnam, fishers usually change their fishing gears 
and methods to catch different targeting species according to particular seasons and fishing 
grounds in order to maximize their profits. For instance, fishers in Nghe An usually use 
trammel net for catching cuttlefish in the northeast monsoon period (from November in the 
previous year to the April in the following year). They use lift net for catching small pelagic 
fish in the southwest monsoon (from May to October); fishers in Kien Giang usually use gill 
net for catching swimming crabs during the rainy season (from April to November), and 
they use trawl net for catching shrimp and demersal fish in the dry season (from December 
of the previous year to March in the following year).  
In addition, a majority of fishers have changed their fishing strategy to catch valuable 
species for high-end markets and/or to harvest trash fish5 to be used as feed in fish farming. 
As observation in Khanh Hoa, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, many fishers have changed from 
using gill net to using hand line or long line for catching big-eye and yellow-fin tuna; some 
fishers in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An and Ha Tinh intended to use hand line to catch large-head 
hair tail fish; some fishers in Quang Ninh, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Binh Thuan, 
Vung Tau, Tien Giang etc. have concentrated on catching squids for export. Meanwhile, 
other fishers have changed their gear and methods and moved to coastal areas to catch 
the trash fish for farming as observed in Quang Ninh, Hai Phong, Khanh Hoa, Ben Tre, Ca 
Mau and Kien Giang in 2009-2011. Actually, 33/42 (78 %) local fishers interviewed in 2009-
2011 intended to catch the trash fish in coastal waters to reduce variable costs and get 
                                         
5 In Vietnam, trash fish normally includes small fish, juvenile fish, and crushed fish that not being 
used as food for human. 
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more income. The change in the fleet composition of the Vietnamese fisheries in the recent 
years is illustrated in figure 4.11.  
As shown in figure 4.11, the number of vessels within the fleets of <20HP and 20-49HP 
have increased dramatically since 2008, whereas the fishing fleet of 50-89 HP has dropped 
gradually since 2008. The number of the offshore vessels empowered engine capacity ≥ 
90HP has increased gradually, with an average rate of 10.7% per annum in 2000-2013 
from nearly 9,500 vessels in 2000 to over 35,000 vessels in 2006. Similarly, the fishing 
fleets by fisheries also have had a remarkable change in 2000-2013. More vessels were 
using gill nets and lines, whereas trawl nets and purse seines remained nearly the same 
during 2000-2013 as a result of increasing fuel prices and other variable costs such as 
fishing materials, services, food, etc. 
  
Figure 4.11: Structure of fishing fleets by engine capacity (HP) and by groups of the main 
fisheries of the Vietnamese fisheries in 2000-2013 (D-Fish, 2014) 
In short, the number of fishing vessels in Vietnam has increased gradually in the last three 
decades, from 41,266 vessels in 1990 to 110,950 vessels in 2016. It experienced a sudden 
increase in 2008-2009 due to a subsidy policy of the government. Clearly, the number of 
fishing vessels is not controlled effectively by the government. Consequently, the number 
of the fishing vessels in 2010 was almost 2,6 times higher than the figure planned by the 
master plan made by the government. The number of the offshore vessels in 2016 was 
over 35,000 vessels, nearly 1.2 time higher than the level (30,000 vessels) planned by the 
government.  
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4.3.2 FISH LANDINGS 
Legally, the estimation of total fish landings is officially conducted and periodically 
published by the GSO. Besides, the fish landings of the Vietnamese fisheries are 
sometimes estimated by particular projects. The fish landings are presented as below 
based on four available sources: from the GSO system conducted annually, the enumerator 
program conducted by ALMRV in 2000-2005, a research project conducted by RIMF in 
2007-2009 and the production of tuna from a report in 2012. 
The total fish landings of the Vietnamese fisheries in 2016 were 2.876 million tons (D-Fish, 
2017a). It is over 1.3% higher than the level planned by 2020 (2.2 million tons) (Prime 
Minister, 2013a). The total landings of the Vietnamese fisheries have increased stably since 
1990, with an average growth of over 6.0% per annum (see figure 4.12), regardless the 
fluctuation of the fishing capacity. The majority of fish landings (almost 53% of the total 
landings) were harvested in the offshore waters in 2015 (VIFEP, 2017). In 2015, the total 
landings of the offshore fleets were 1.5 million tons and of the inshore and coastal fleets 
were 1.34 million tons (VIFEP, 2017). These figures are higher than figures planned in the 
master plan (Prime Minister, 2013a). This indicates that fisheries resources were 
overexploited in both the coastal and offshore waters. In addition to this, 46/54 (85.2%) 
local fishers interviewed in 2009-2014 told that their catch rate decreased 30-50% in 
comparison to 1980s-1990s; and 8/54 (14.8%) fishers (using luring gears with lamps to 
catch small pelagic species) stated that their catch rate has remained the same over time 
and fluctuated seasonably. 
The fisheries enumerator program conducted by ALMRV in 2000-2005 shows that the total 
fish landings in Vietnamese fisheries fluctuated in in this course (figure 4.13). Importantly, 
it did not increase stably as estimated by the GSO, but fluctuated year by year (from around 
2.0 million tons in 2005 to nearly 3.3 million tons in 2003), and then increased stably in 
2007-2009 estimated by a research project (Khang, 2011). In addition to this, the 
estimations of the GSO are lower than estimations conducted by ALMRV and the research 
project. This implies an incredibility of the estimations of the total fish landings published 
by the GSO (see further in chapter 6). 
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By the fisheries, the total landings of trawl fishery increased in 2000-2009, whereas the 
fish landings of the gill net fishery went down in the same period. The fish landings of the 
other fisheries seemed to be stable in period of 2000-2009 (figure 4.13).  
 
Figure 4.12: The total landings of the Vietnamese fisheries in 1990-2016 (D-Fish, 2017a; 
GSO, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011a, 2016) 
 
Figure 4.13: The total landings by main groups of fisheries in 2000-2009 (Assessment of 
the Living Marine Resources Project Phase II, 2005; Khang, 2011). 
For the tuna fisheries, the West Pacific East Asia Project conducted by the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) has estimated the total landings of tuna 
(skipjack, big-eye, yellow-fin and albacore tuna) and other large pelagic species (e.g. 
marlin, swordfish) of the gill net, purse seine, and line fisheries catching tuna in Vietnam 
since 2008. This project provides estimations of tuna landings in 2008-2015 as illustrated 
in figure 4.14. The figure 4.14 shows that the tuna landings decreased in 2008-2010, the 
increased gradually in 2010-2015. The total tuna landings of Vietnam in 2015 was nearly 
109,478 tons (D-Fish, 2016b); in which, the landings of oceanic tuna (i.e. yellow-fin tuna 
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and big-eye tuna) was 27,324 tons, 1.6 time higher than level planned by 2020 (Prime 
Minister, 2013a). However, fishers interviewed told that their catch was in decline trend, 
especially the rate of fish of bigger sizes (e.g. greater than 40 kg/fish) deceased apparently 
in comparison to the end of 1990s. 
 
Figure 4.14. Total landings of the tuna fisheries in Vietnam in 2008-2015 (D-Fish, 2016b). 
It is evident that the available data present a confused state of the total fishing landings in 
Vietnam. Understanding about fish landings of the Vietnamese fisheries. The officially 
statistical data provided by GSO shows a stable growth in line with the growth rate planned 
by the government, whereas the specific estimations show a fluctuation over time and are 
higher than that conducted by the GSO. 
4.3.3 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF FISHING FLEETS 
There has not been a system to collect regularly data on the economic performance of 
fishing fleets in Vietnam. In fact, the fisheries economic performance may be analyzed by 
particular projects. This research referred to the latest data to provide understanding about 
the economic performance of the fishing fleets in Vietnam. As the above mentioned, most 
Vietnamese fishing vessels are the wooden small-scale vessels. Therefore, the investment 
capital6 (fixed cost) for a vessel is cheaper than that in the developed fisheries. It depends 
on the size of vessel and fishing gear used on board. The investment capital for a motorized 
vessel ranges from 4,000-150,000 USD; the average rate of nearly 80,000 USD/vessel as 
investigated in 2015 (VIFEP, 2017). This investigation pointed that the bigger vessels 
                                         
6The fixed cost includes all costs for property and equipment on board, e.g. vessel, engine, gears, 
taxes, fees and fishing equipment. The variable costs include costs for fuel, ice, food etc. purchased 
for every fishing trip. 
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require higher investment capital (figure 4.15). In the last two years, nearly 300 steel fishing 
vessels have been built with a much higher capital. Each steel vessel costs from 650,000-
800,000 USD as observed in provinces of Quang Ninh, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, etc. 
 
Figure 4.15: The average investment capital (fixed costs) of a fishing vessel in Vietnam 
(Khang, 2011). 
As found during a 4 year (2007-2010) investigation, the variable costs for fishing varied by 
fisheries and size of engine (Khang, 2011). The average level of variable costs ranged from 
10.0-2,000 USD/vessel/day. In which, the trawl fishery paid the highest costs because it 
spent a lot of fuel. According to this investigation, the fuel costs accounted for the biggest 
proportion of the total variable costs. For the offshore fishing fleets, it ranged from 36-92% 
dependently on fisheries, at an average rate of 67% total variable costs in 2005-2007 (Hai, 
2008). The average of the fuel costs of the Vietnamese fishing fleets in 2008-2010 
accounted for approx. 43% (Khang, 2011). This indicates that fishing vessels in Vietnam 
travelled a lot on a hand, and minimized expenditure for preservation, food, safety, labour, 
etc. on the other hand. This may be a reason leading to post-harvest loss is so high (about 
25% as investigation of VIFEP in 2015). In addition to this, in 2009-2014, 54 (100%) fishers 
interviewed claimed that their fishing costs increased dramatically, but the price of fish did 
not increase accordingly. This pushed them to increase fishing power in a trip to maximize 
their catches, as told by fishers. 
Investigation shows that the bigger the vessels, the profit the higher7 for almost all fisheries, 
exception of the line fishery (figure 4.16). For the line fishery, the profit of the fleet of 
>249HP was lower than the fleet of 90-249HP. By contrast, in terms of return of 
                                         
7 Profit is the amount of money from total revenue subtracting all fixed and variable costs. 
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investment8, smaller vessels got higher return than larger vessels as illustrated in figure 
4.17. As show in figure 4.17, the efficiency of investment of bottom long line is highest 
followed by hand line, bottom gill net and surface gill net because their fuel costs were less 
than that of other fisheries. This means that the smaller-scale the vessels, the more efficient 
in the Vietnamese fisheries. 
 
Figure 4.16: The average profit per year of fishing fleets in Vietnam (Khang, 2011) 
 
Figure 4.17: The efficiency of investment of fishing fleets by the main fisheries in Vietnam 
in 2008 -2010 (Khang, 2011) 
In addition, economic performance by the offshore fishing fleets was reduced over the last 
two decades (Hai, 2008). In fact, a part of the fishing vessels has ceased to fish because 
of economic loss. Approx. 10-30% of the total fishing vessels experienced financial losses 
or were not able to cover their variable costs for purchasing fuel, supplementing net and 
                                         
8The efficiency of investment is the proportion of the profit and the investment. I referred to the profit 
and the investment data presented by Khang 2007-2009 (Khang, 2011). 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
<20HP 20-49HP	 50-89HP 90-249HP >249HP
x1000USD
Trawl fishery
Line fishery
Gill net fishery
Purse seine fishery
Others
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
<20HP 20-49HP 50-89HP 90-249HP ≥250HP
%
Bottom	single	trawl
Bottom	pair	trawl
Bottom	long	line
Hand	line
Bottom	gill	net
Surface	gill	net
Purse	sein	with	light
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
77 
 
equipment, food, ice, etc. (Hai, 2008; La, 2007; MOFI, 2003), though the Vietnamese 
government have provided incentives for enhancing the fishing capacity. This may 
generate an overcapacity in the fishing fleets in Vietnam (Anon, 2010) as similarly observed 
in the EU fisheries (Raakjær, 2009). This information indicates that the existence of excess 
fishing capacity in Vietnam is the result of overcapitalization. This would affect the 
sustainability of fisheries, undermining the conservation and management efforts and 
leading to significant economic waste (Gréboval, 1999). 
4.3.4 MARKETS 
Data on consumption of fish landings have not been collected on a regular basis in Vietnam, 
exception of the data on export of fish products. Therefore, this chapter only refers to 
available export data on fishing products and some general information from researches 
and direct observation. The Vietnamese capture fisheries products are consumed in both 
international and domestic markets. A majority (72%) of fish landings were consumed in 
domestic markets, and only 28% of the fish landings were exported to international markets 
(Khang, 2011). 
4.3.4.1 Domestic consumption 
Edible fish landings are often referred to ‘popular fish – Cá chợ’ and sold freshly at the local 
markets or supermarkets as daily food for people. This accounted for around 35% of the 
total landings in 2005-2007 (Hai, 2008). The per capita fish consumption in Vietnam has 
increased, and was 38.3 kg in 2015 (VIFEP, 2017) higher than the global one (around 20 
kg). This would be an advantage for developing the domestic market. Another part of 
landings (25% of total landings) were sold to processing plants to produce various products 
as food for people or as feeds for farming, and the other (often called trash fish) were used 
directly as feeds in fish farming.  
4.3.4.2 International consumption 
There are four main groups of capture fish (e.g. tunas, squids, octopus, crustaceans and 
other fish) exported to international markets. They may be fresh, frozen, dried or in other 
processed products as shown in table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4: Export value (in million USD) of the Vietnamese fisheries products in 2012-
2013 (VASEP, 2014) 
Products 2012 2013 % 
Canned tuna 182.9 199.5 9.1 
Fresh/frozen/dried tuna 159.0 108.1 -32.0 
Other products of tuna 225.5 219.0 -2.9 
Marine fish 616.9 630.1 2.1 
Fried fish and surimi 267.1 234.3 -12.3 
Crab and other crustaceans 115.3 110.5 -4.2 
Squid and octopus 621.3 560.7 -9.8 
Total 2188.0 2062.2 -5.7 
In general, the total export value of fisheries productions in 2013 was nearly 2.1 billion USD, 
decreased 5.7% in comparison to 2012. Only 2/7 products (canned tuna and marine fish) 
got growth in the export value, and 5/7 products got minus growth in export value in 2013 
compared to 2012. In which, the export value of the fresh/frozen/dried tuna products 
dropped most (-32%), followed by the fried fish and surimi products (-12.3%), then followed 
by the squid and octopus products (-9.8%).According to VASEP (VASEP, 2014), tuna 
products were exported to 112 markets, fried fish and surimi to 34 markets, squid and 
octopus to 72 markets in 2013. The main markets were USA, EU, Japan and South Korea. 
The tuna export markets in 2013 is shown in figure 4.18. In addition to this, a part of the 
‘popular fish’ is also exported unofficially to China, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. 
 
Figure 4.18: Export markets for tuna products of Vietnam in 2013 (VASEP, 2014) 
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Clearly, the available information on the market and consumption of fish landings of the 
Vietnamese fisheries are very limited and general. They are insufficient to provide thorough 
understanding about the state and tendency of the demand for and consumption of the 
marine capture production of Vietnam. 
4.3.5 THE LOCAL FISHING COMMUNITIES 
Similar to other fisheries economic information, data on fishing communities have not been 
collected on a regular basis in Vietnam. This chapter tried to draw a picture on the 
Vietnamese fishing communities through available information on living standards, local 
organization and education at the local fishing communities. There were 628 communes 
located along the 28 coastal provinces of Vietnam are associated with fisheries. The 
fisheries provided livelihoods for approx. 1.7 million people (Chinh, 2006). According to 
VIFEP (VIFEP, 2013) the number of fishers had increased steadily with an average rate of 
3.1% per annum in 2000-2010. The number of professional fishers fluctuated year by year. 
It was 750,000 fishers in 2010, 431,764 fishers in 2014 and 763.980 fishers in 2015 (VIFEP, 
2017). 
4.3.5.1 Livelihoods and household incomes 
According to the World Bank (World Bank and Ministry of Fisheries Vietnam, 2005), 
although the living standard of fishing households in Vietnam improved remarkably, fishers 
still lived in poverty, and 88% of the poorest households (with very low income) were fishing 
households. Incomes have improved, however, and this figure was reduced to approx. 44% 
in 2012 (Prime Minister, 2013a). A majority (about 93%) of the total income of the fishing 
vessel owners came from fishing and their living standards were higher than crewmembers 
(Khang, 2011). In 2015, there were over 330,000 fishing households in Vietnam. Each 
possesses from 01 to 17 vessels, many of them possess 03-05 vessels, for instance, there 
are more than 100 households possess more than 04 vessels (VIFEP, 2017). In 2008-2010 
the average property value of a fishing vessel owner was approx. 27,000 USD ( in 2015 
was 80,000USD as investigated by FIFEP) and with an annual income of 8,300 USD per 
household (Khang, 2011). The average income of a fishing vessel owner’s household had 
been improved apparently, from the level was lower than the poverty line in 1995-1997 
(Thong, 1998) to level was higher than the average line of the whole country in 2010 (3,400 
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USD per household per annum) (GSO, 2011b). Similarly, incomes of fishing crew members 
are also higher than the average line of the whole country in 2015, for example, the average 
income of the offshore fishers in 2015 was around 5,053 USD/person/year, whereas, the 
average line was 2,109 USD/person/year (VIFEP, 2017).  
4.3.5.2 Local organization of fishing communities  
In local communities, almost all of fishers are members of one of social and/or socio-
political organizations such as Farmer’s Union, Vietnam Fisheries Association (VINAFISH). 
They also take part informal groups e.g. fishing guilds, fishing groups grouped traditionally 
to assist each other in fishing business. In fact, almost all Vietnamese citizen is deemed to 
be a member of social and socio-political organizations, e.g. Farmers’ Union, Youth’s 
Union, Women’s Union, VINAFISH, Old People’s Association, etc. All of these 
organizations are established by government and operated according to their statutes 
adopted by the government. The Farmer’s Union is a socio-political organization belonging 
to the Vietnam Fatherland Front. It has been established and headed by the Vietnamese 
Communist Party. The VINAFISH is a socio-professional organization established by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. Both organizations’ activities and services are more related to the 
governmental mandates, thus they are not engaged much voluntarily by local fishers. 
Fishers just became honorary members as a citizen’s obligation, but do not receive real 
benefits from these organizations. For instance, 44 (81.5%) local fishers interviewed in 
2009-2014 argued that these organizations did not benefit them; but they became members 
because of the village culture: ‘I did it because my neighbours did so’. 
Commonly, the local fishers get involved voluntarily in the fishing guilds to share fishing 
experiences, information and together solve practical issues at seas and at their own 
communities. Each fishing guild is commonly composed of from 2 to10 vessels of the same 
gears. The vessel owners in a fishing guild have family relationships or very close 
friendship. In 2015, approx. 18,565 fishing vessels and 123,788 fishers were grouped in 
approx. 2,620 guilds in the local fishing communities in Vietnam (VIFEP, 2017). Often, local 
fishers behave as their neighbours do following their own beliefs, moral rules and traditional 
norms. For instance, a lift net fisher in Nghe An told that he used to fish with explosion, but 
he gave up this method last year because his community agreed together to introduce a 
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norm on combating the usage of explosion to fish in their community. At the same time, the 
legal regulation on banning explosion to fish was issued a long time ago in Vietnam. This 
means that the informal norm was complied with strictly rather than the legally formal 
regulations of the government. This custom has occurred long time ago – called “Van Chai” 
system (Ruddle, 1998). Clearly, the Vietnamese fishing communities are organized within 
traditionally informal groups having their own locally hereditary characteristics. The 
traditional values vary among communities (Thong, 2003). For instance, as observation in 
Binh Thuan, the purse seine fishers are not allowed to fish at other fishers’ fish aggregating 
devices, meanwhile they are allowed to do so in Tien Giang.  
In addition, the fisheries middlemen play a very important role in local communities. They 
provide credit and financial services as the ‘black capitalists’ for almost all fishing vessel 
owners (Assessment of the Living Marine Resources Project Phase II (institution), 2005). 
They also take the rights to decide the classification of the catches and fix the price of each 
kind of catches. A majority of vessel owners use financial services of the middlemen. In 
fact, 47/54 (87%) vessel owners interviewed borrowed money from the middlemen to cover 
fishing costs, e.g. fuel, ice, nets, fishing equipment. As an informal rule, these vessel 
owners have to sell their catches to contracted middlemen, who lends money to them as a 
part of their debt payments. They cannot sell their catches to other middlemen even if their 
catches are offered a higher price. Over 90% of the total fish landings of the fisheries in 
Vietnam was sold to the local middlemen in 2010 (VIFEP, 2013). 
4.3.5.3 Education in fishing communities  
Crew members working on fishing vessels have limited education and lower than the 
national line. A majority (50%) of fishers graduates from elementary school, 40% of them 
goes to secondary school, illiteracy (6%), and 4% goes to high school (Khang, 2011). Only 
30% of the captain and chief engineers were trained at the short courses in fishing expertise 
(MARD, 2014). This may be a constraint of transforming occupations and livelihoods for 
local fishers as well as of improving awareness of conservation and sustainable utilization 
of fisheries resources. In fact, they were unable to adapt new livelihoods due to the lack of 
working skills, education and capital (La, 2010). In 2009-2014, 32/54 (59.3%) vessel 
owners were trying to push their children getting better education to get out the fishing 
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business, 24.1% (13/54) of them did not support their children going to school in order to 
help them caring their fishing business, and the rest (16.6%) did not care about education 
for their children and told that they would feed their children if their children want to continue 
going to school. This shows that opportunities for higher education of young generations in 
fishing communities are still a challenge.  
4.4 THE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
This next part of the chapter analyzes the Vietnamese fisheries management system in 
four aspects: the planning system, decision-making process, rules and legislation system, 
and fisheries research. Firstly, it explains the planning system to provide an understanding 
of planning Vietnamese fisheries. It looks at the fisheries legislation and enforcement 
system in order to understand how the Vietnamese fisheries are managed. The decision-
making processes are also described to understand the involvement of stakeholders. 
Finally, the chapter provides information about the fisheries data collection and research to 
investigate what kind of knowledge is available in the Vietnamese fisheries. 
4.4.1 PLANNING SYSTEM 
4.4.1.1 Brief introduction to the planning system in Vietnam 
The planning system for the national economy in Vietnam has changed since 1998 when 
the master plan was added to the planning system (Prime Minister, 1998). This system is 
a dual system: the general socio-economic planning system and the sectoral planning 
system (e.g. fisheries planning system) as basically illustrated in the figure 4.19. The 
general socio-economic planning system addresses all aspects of society (e.g. agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, industry, transportation, infrastructure, culture, health care, education, 
foreign affairs, etc.). The sectoral planning system deals with specific aspects of a particular 
sector. For instance, the fisheries plan may address specific aspects of the marine capture 
fisheries such as planning the total catches, fleet structure, fishing infrastructure, etc. It may 
be included in a plan of the fishery sector including aquaculture, capture fishing, 
processing. 
In each system, there are four components: strategy, master plan, five-year plan and 
annual plan organized hierarchically. The strategy guides the master, the master plan 
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directs the five-year plan and annual plan follows the five-year plan (Prime Minister, 1998). 
Preparation and improvement of these documents are assigned to the governmental 
authorities at national, provincial, district and commune level (Government of Vietnam, 
2006). The strategy is only required at the national level in both systems. The master plan 
is required at three levels: regional, provincial and district levels in the general socio-
economic planning system, while only at two levels: national and provincial in the fishery 
planning system. The five-year plan and the annual plan are elaborated at all levels in the 
general socio-economic system; while the fishery planning system has its own five-year-
plan as well as annual plans at national and provincial levels. At district and commune 
levels, the fishery plans are included in the general socio-economic plans respectively. This 
shows a mismatch between the sectoral and the general socio-economic planning systems 
which may create disturbances in the sectoral planning process. 
 
Figure 4.19: The state planning system is a dual system composed of the general socio-
economic development planning system and the sectoral planning system 
Strategy and master plan provide political directions and development targets of the nation 
and are decided by the Prime Minister or Chair of PPC, and thus are the legal documents 
and referred to as the ‘policy’. The general socio-economic strategies and master plans for 
national and regional levels are prepared by the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), 
and the provincial strategy and master plans are prepared by Department of Planning and 
Investment (DPI). The master plans for the general socio-economic development for the 
district level and the provincial master plan of specific sectors development are decided by 
the Chair of Provincial People Committee (PPC). The sectoral strategy and master plan 
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are developed by the sectoral agents at national level. They are normally approved by the 
minister or sometimes submitted to Prime Minister for approve. The provincial master plan 
for particular sectors are prepared by departments within the PPC and approved by the 
Chair of PPC. Meanwhile, the five-year plan and the annual plans are approved by relevant 
sector departments within the administration system. They are considered as 
administrative documents and referred to as the ‘administrative reports’. Importantly, the 
master plan makes the interplay between political strategies and implementation plans (i.e. 
the five-year plan and the annual plans) in the state planning system. It concretizes the 
broad goals of the development strategies into more specific development objectives of 
particular sectors or specific administration territories. Based on this, investment programs 
and development projects will be defined and implementation plans are made accordingly. 
Moreover, the master plan provides conditions to implement the programs and projects 
planned. Programs and projects not mentioned in the master plans may not be 
implemented (Prime Minister, 1998). 
The five-year plan and the annual plans emphasize the administrative obligations in order 
to undertake their function of managing the sector or general socio-economic development 
according to directions adopted in the corresponding strategies and master plans. The five-
year plan and the annual plans may include operational policies to address the urgent 
issues emerging from practical situations such as security at sea, fishers getting economic 
losses etc. These policies tend to deal with temporary short-term issues or to serve benefits 
of interested parties relevant with the field in question. For instance, a policy on subsidizing 
small-scale vessels was implemented in 2008. The following paragraphs present the main 
contents of the planning documents at the national level. These contents are also illustrated 
in the planning documents at the lower levels (Government of Vietnam, 2006). 
4.4.1.2 The general socio-economic planning system 
The general socio-economic development strategy 
The strategy is a political document adopted by the Party Congress in a ten-year cycle. It 
analyzes all aspects of society of Vietnam and international context as well in order to 
establish strategic long-term goals for the coming ten years and visions for the next 20-30 
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years in relation to economic, social, culture, political and national security. For instance, 
the main goals and targets of the general socio-economic strategy by 2010 were to: 
- Establish a foundation for modernization and industrialization by 2020, 
- Gain political and social stability and being a democratic society, 
- Double the gross domestic product (GDP)compared to 2000, 
- Increase the contribution from the industry and service sectors to GDP to 82-84% 
by 2010, 
- Remain the contribution from agriculture (including forestry, fisheries, animal 
farming, etc.) to GDP to 16-17% by 2010, 
- Increase in total fish landings to be 2.0-2.2 million tons by 2010, 
- Remain the population grow rate of 1.1% per annum, etc. 
It provides directions for the developing sectors and industries such as agriculture, 
aquaculture, forestry, fishery etc. For instance, ensure sustainable exploitation of fisheries 
resources, developing the offshore fishing in combination with maintaining the national 
security and environment protection etc. It also provides implementation solutions and 
plans (National Party Congress IX, 2001b). 
The general socio-economic development master plan 
The master plan is established to operationalize the long-term goals of the strategy in 
specific administrative units, e.g. region, province and district. It provides operational 
objectives in terms of economic, cultural, social, environmental etc. It also provides a list of 
investment projects and solutions to be implemented. For instance, the master plan for the 
social-economic development in the southern region in 2001-2010 (PM, 1998) set up the 
following objectives: 
- Growth rate in GDP to be13.5-14.5% per annum,  
- Growth rate in trading and services to be 13-15% per annum, 
- Increase in contribution from the industry to the regional GDP to be 50.4% by 2010, 
- Enhancing marine fishing capacity and strengthening offshore fishing, 
- Economic development should be connected with protection of the environment and 
enhancing national security, etc. 
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The general socio-economic development five-year plan 
The five-year plan at the national level is established to implement the strategy and master 
plan in each five-year cycle. It provides overall goals such as stabilization of the macro-
economic, building up foundation for industrializing and modernizing the countries, 
maintaining national security, changing the development paradigm and the development 
targets on economic, social and environmental aspects for the five-year term in question. 
For instance, the five-year plan for general socio-economic development in 2001-2005 
(National Assembly, 2001) set the following objectives: 
- Double growth in GDP compared to 1995 and with an annual growth rate of 7.5% 
per annum, 
- Obtain growth rate in industries to be 11% per annum and in agriculture – forestry – 
fishery to be 4.3% per annum,  
- Obtain growth rate in the population to be 1.2% per annum, 
- Provide 1.5 million new jobs per annum, 
- Increase the average life expectancy of Vietnamese people to be 70 years old by 
2010, etc. 
It could be seen that, objectives of the master plan do not match and connect with goals 
and targets presented in the corresponding strategy. It did not provide any specific 
objectives for fisheries as illustrated in the corresponding strategy. This may cause 
difficulties to achieve the targets and objectives adopted by the political strategy. 
The general socio-economic development annual plan 
The annual plan presents the state of society and economy of the nation through the 
officially statistical indexes provided by GSO. Based on this and in combination with the 
objectives planned in the corresponding strategies, master plans and five-year plans, it 
establishes the development targets for the next year. For instance, the annual plan for 
general socio-economic development by 2013 was to achieve the following targets (Prime 
Minister, 2012): 
- Growth in GDP to be at approx. 5.5%, 
- Growth in the export value to be at 10%, 
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- Providing 1.6 million new jobs. 
As above mentioned, the strategy is developed in a political context, especially for the 
general socio-economic development strategies at national scale. It is often prepared by a 
group of experts coming from a wide range of disciplines headed by high-ranking politicians 
of the Communist Party. At the same time, the regional master plan and the five-year plan 
are often prepared by the MPI – a governmental agent. This may lead to disagreements in 
development targets and the objectives between strategy and the plans made by 
government. For instance, by 2010 the growth rate in population was set up at 1.1% in the 
strategy, while five-year plan set at 1.14%; similarly, the contribution from agriculture to the 
GDP was set up 16-17% in the strategy, while five-year plan set at 15-16% (National 
Assembly, 2006; National Party Congress IX, 2001b). 
4.4.1.3 The fisheries planning system 
Actually, the general socio-economic planning system includes all sectors and industries. 
Based on this the sectoral plans are developed in more detail. Therefore, a representative 
of specific sectors is normally invited as a member of the planning group headed by MPI to 
develop the general socio-economic development strategy and plans. The sectoral 
representative is required to draft and submit their sectoral strategy and plan to the MPI, 
so that the MPI (on behalf of the Central Government) compile the general socio-economic 
development strategy/plan and submit to the National Party Congress/National Assembly 
for approve. Accordingly, sectors and industries develop their own strategies/plans in line 
with the corresponsive strategies/plans of the general socio-economic development 
adopted by the National Party Congress/National Assembly.  
The fisheries development strategy 
A development strategy determines the visions for developing the fisheries, overall goals 
and development objectives, primary directions, macro solutions, and crucial projects and 
programs to achieve overall goals and development objectives the fisheries adopted in the 
general socio-economic development strategy/plan in a ten-year cycle. So far, there has 
been only one fisheries strategy elaborated and adopted in Vietnam - the fisheries 
development strategy by 2020. This was adopted by Prime Minister in 2010 (Prime 
Minister, 2010a). It addresses all aspects of the fishery sector (e.g. aquaculture, fish 
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processing, capture fisheries, fishery logistics, etc.). For the fisheries, it defines the 
development visions and objectives by 2020 as follows: 
- Moving from the ‘people’ fisheries (i.e. small-scale fisheries) to the modern and 
industrialized fisheries; 
- Modernizing and industrializing the fishing fleets; 
- Enhancing investigation of the fisheries resources and forecast the fishing grounds 
for fishing practice; 
- Restructuring the fishing fleets commensurately with fisheries resource base and 
natural conditions in specific regions; 
- Establishing fishing corporations and co-operatives to do fishing in the offshore and 
oceanic waters; 
- Strengthening the fisheries inspection to protect fisheries resources and secure 
national sovereign at seas; 
- Total catches to be about 1.8-2.2 million tons; 
- Triple income of fishers in comparison to 2010. 
The strategy proposed a list of projects and programs such as making a master plan, 
developing industry of the fishing vessel engineering, establishment of the fisheries 
surveillance, application of fisheries co-management and transferring new fishing 
techniques. It also suggests solutions and tentative budget to implement this strategy (PM, 
2010). It does not define objectives of the fishing capacity, and not provide solutions and 
measures to control the total catches. 
The fisheries development master plan 
A fisheries development master plan is elaborated based on the corresponsive fisheries 
development strategy and also on the general socio-economic development master plan. 
The master plan defines development objectives, specific targets, development directions 
and solutions to achieve the development objectives and targets. So far, there have been 
two fisheries development master plans (i.e. master plan by 2010 and master plan by 2020) 
adopted in Vietnam. The fisheries development master plan by 2010 (Prime Minister, 2006) 
defined development directions and overall objectives by 2010 as follows: 
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- Developing the sector as a commodity production with high competition and 
prestigious trademark; 
- Growth rate in production to be 3.8% per annum; 
- Enhancing offshore fishing and stabilizing coastal fishing; 
- Total catches to be 1.5-1.8 million tons (Tonkin Gulf: 0.3 million tons, Central region: 
0.4 million tons, Southeast region: 0.7 million tons, Southwest region: 0.2 million tons 
and Oceanic region: 0.3 million tons); 
- Reduction in number of fishing vessels to 50,000 vessels (by specific fleets of engine 
capacity: <20HP: 10,000 vessels, 21-45HP: 20,000 vessels, 46-75HP: 14,000 
vessels and >75HP: 6,000 vessels); 
- Remaining the number of fishers at 500,000 people. 
It also determined the solutions and programs to be done to achieve its objectives and 
targets such as conducting regularly fish stock assessments in specific regions; conducting 
projects on conservation of fisheries resources; mapping fishing grounds to guide 
commercial fishing fleets; transferring destructive fishing methods to more environment-
friendly methods etc. However, a list of projects was not included in the decision on 
approving this plan. This did not meet requirements of the directive No. 32/1998/CT-TTg of 
the Prime Minister and decree No. 92/2006/ND-CP of the government. This may be a 
reason leading to the objectives and targets by 2010 were not accomplished. 
The fisheries development master plan by 2020 (Prime Minister, 2013a) defined 
development directions and overall objectives by 2020 as follows: 
- Total catches to be 2.2 million tons, by regions (Tonkin Gulf: 0.38 million tons, 
Central region: 0.7 million tons, Southeast region: 0.635 million tons, Southwest 
region: 0.485 million tons); by routes (in the coastal and inshore: 0.8 million tons, 
offshore area: 1.4 million tons); by species/groups of species (oceanic tuna: 15,000-
17,000 tons, squids: 200,000 tons, shrimps: 50,000 tons; the rest is the other fish);  
- Reduction in number of fishing vessels to 110,000 vessels and reduction rate of 
1.5% per year.  
- The number of the offshore vessels to be 28,000-30,000 vessels; 
- Triple income of fishers in comparison to 2013; 
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- 50% fishers are trained in fishing techniques and management regulations. 
In general, these objectives are in line with the objectives planned in the fisheries 
development strategy by 2020. They are higher than that planned in the master plan by 
2010. This implies that the Vietnamese fisheries follow the production growth paradigm and 
ignore indications of overexploitation of the fisheries resources. 
The fisheries five-year plan  
A five-year fisheries plan is composed of two main parts: i) evaluation of the last five years, 
lessons learnt and ii) the development plan for the coming five-year period. In the first part, 
it reviews the outcomes and performance of the specific operational objectives and targets 
through development indexes (e.g. total landings, fishing vessels, etc.) and points out 
causalities and lessons learnt in implementing the fisheries policies and plans in the last 
five-year. For instance, the five-plan for 2006-2010 (MOFI, 2005b) evaluated the 
performance of the fisheries for 2001-2005 as follows: 
- Growth rate in total landings was 4.2% per annum, higher than the expected level 
(4.0%); 
- Total landings in 2001-2005 was approx. 7.36 million tons and by 2005 was 1.65 
million tons;  
- 8,680 new motorized vessels were built; 
- Total number of fishing vessels by 2005 was 87,100 vessels, increased 18.3% 
compared with 2000; 
- The credit program for building the offshore vessels was implemented in order to 
build 1,362 vessels; 
- Release fisheries seeds to natural waters to restore fish stocks annually. 
The operational objectives of the fisheries for the coming five-years are planned based on 
the corresponsive strategy and performance of the sector in the previous plan. For the 
fisheries five-year plan of 2006-2010, its objectives were developed based on performance 
of the fisheries in previous periods only, because the cause the fisheries strategy by 2010 
was not developed. The operational objectives of the fisheries five-year plan of 2006-2010 
were set as follows: 
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- Growth rate in total landings to be 0.6% per annum; 
- Total landings for the five-years of 2006-2010 to be 8.9 million tons;  
- Total landings by 2010 to be 1.8 million tons; 
- Reduction of the number of fishing vessel to 50,000 vessels by 2010 (reduction of 
27,100 vessels in comparison to 2005), but the total engine capacity of the fishing 
fleets increases more 90,000 HP. 
It also provided a series of solutions and specific projects need to be done to achieve 
objectives such as: building more fishing ports; increasing number of offshore fishing 
vessels and reducing small-scale vessels; implementing fisheries resources protection 
programs; transforming occupations for local fishing communities; improving techniques 
for catching the high-value species for export and domestic consumption; and secure safety 
at seas. Clearly, these objectives are completely opposite to the outcomes and 
performance of the fisheries in the last periods, but seemed to be in line with the trend of 
the fisheries resources. This created a conflicting policy discourses in the Vietnamese 
fisheries (sea further in chapter 5). 
On other case of the fisheries five-year plan of 2011-2015, its objectives were defined as 
follows: 
- Maintaining a light growth rate in total landings in this period; 
- Total landings by 2015 to be 2.15 million tons; 
- Stabilizing the number of the offshore fishing vessels (about 24,000 vessels) and 
reducing gradually the number of small-scale fishing vessels. 
- Reduction of the number of fishing vessel to 80,000 vessels by 2010 (reduction of 
49,376 vessels), but the total engine capacity of the fishing fleets increases more 
90,000 HP. 
The objective of total landings by 2015 in this plan is agreed with those in the corresponsive 
master (Prime Minister, 2013a), but the objective of the fishing capacity is not in line with 
those in the corresponsive master. 
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The fisheries annual plan 
Similar to the five-year plan, an annual plan of fisheries is also two parts. The first part 
evaluates the outcomes of the fisheries in a current year based on the development indexes 
(e.g. total landings and total number of fishing vessels) and performance of implementing 
fisheries management; and the second part set operational objectives and targets for the 
next year, and an action plan to implement. For instance, the fisheries annual plan in 2009 
evaluated the main aspects as follows: 
- Good weather, so all fishing fleets operating stably and producing the total landings 
of 2.31 million tons (5% higher than the level planned in 2009 and 5% higher than 
the total landings in 2008); 
- The total number of fishing vessels be the end of 2009 was 130,926 vessels; 
- Projects and programs were implemented sufficiently. 
Based on this information, it set operational objectives in 2010 as follows: 
- The total landings to be 2.0 million tons; 
- 99% of the fishing vessels are registered at the fisheries authorities; 
- The technical conditions of 47% of the fishing vessels are checked by the 
competent institutions. 
It also provided solutions and an action plan should be implemented in 2010 such as 
providing fishing grounds forecast to fishers; improving the communication system between 
the management station and fishing vessels; proposing subsidies policy for marine fishing. 
Clearly, the objectives of this plan were not connected with that in the other planning 
documents. The figure of total landings was set higher than that in the master plan and the 
five-year plan(MOFI, 2005b; Prime Minister, 2006). This is the same to the fisheries annual 
plan in 2015. 
4.4.1.4 Implementation of the fisheries planning system in practice 
As a sectoral planning system, the fisheries planning system is required to be implemented 
in a hierarchical order (Prime Minister, 1998). However, in practice this order has been 
sometimes not complied with sufficiently. As above mention, there has had a lack of a 
coherent connection in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. In the horizontal dimension, 
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the fisheries planning system is not aligned with the general socio-economic planning 
system. Similarly, in the vertical dimension, the lower plans (e.g. annual plan, five-year 
plan) are not in line with the higher documents (e.g. strategy, master plan) within the 
fisheries planning system. In addition, specific features of the fisheries such as uncertainty 
and unpredictability of the fisheries resources have not been taken into account in steps of 
planning and making decisions. 
Ignorance of the specific features 
The sectoral planning system is mostly addressed in the normative terms, which the same 
with other sectors, such as growth rate, contribution to GDP etc. The intrinsic characters of 
the specific sector are not taken into account during the planning process. For instance, 
uncertainty and fluctuation of fish stocks have never been analyzed in order to set up the 
catch level. The catch level has primarily been established increasingly based on the 
growth rate given in the general social development plans, without any considerations on 
fishing pressure on the fish stocks. In fact, a majority (19/28) of the coastal provinces did 
not make a fisheries development master plan by 2010 separately, but included within the 
general socio-economic development master plan. Hereby, the sectoral plan was not done 
in accordance with the specific nature of the sector; for instance, the sectors of fisheries, 
mine industry, transportation and construction were decided in a plan (Provincial People 
Communittee of Vinh Phuc, 2010). In other words, at the local levels the fisheries planning 
system was treated the same with and conducted together with other sectors that 
completely different. 
Furthermore, the draft of policy decisions submitted to the Prime Minister (i.e. the strategy 
and master plan) are scrutinized by the MPI in accordance with the normative terms 
emphasizing growth rates, development targets in numeric and budgets requested across 
the sectors9 (Prime Minister, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The specific characteristics of the 
sectors, e.g. gas industry, chemical industry and the fisheries were not reflected into their 
own development policies. This means that the intrinsic characteristics of the fisheries: 
                                         
9The targets in number for the gas industry, chemical industry and marine capture fisheries by 2015 
to be 14 billion m3, volume of NPK by 2015 to be 3.5-4 million tons, total catch of fisheries by 2015 
to be 2.2 million tons respectively.  
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renewability, invisibility, unpredictability, uncertainty and reasonability were not taken into 
account in the planning process.  
Coherence in the vertical dimension 
There is a lack of coherent linkages among fisheries planning documents. At the national 
level, there was no fisheries master plan or a strategy for the fisheries development adopted 
before 2006 and 2010 respectively. At the local levels, only 9/28 coastal provinces (Hai 
Phong, Nghe An, Thua Thien-Hue, Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Ben Tre, Bac 
Lieu and Kien Giang) made their own fisheries master plan separately from the general 
socio-economic master plan in the period 2001-2010. This means that the fisheries five-
year and annual plans in period of 2001-2005 at national level and in period of 2001-2010 
of 21 coastal provinces were made based on inconsistent basis. In addition, adoption of 
the fisheries planning documents was not implemented in a hierarchical order in terms of 
the management level. For instance, the fisheries master plan by 2020 of Nghe An and Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau provinces were adopted before the fisheries master plan at the national level 
decided (Prime Minister, 2013a; Provincial People Committee of Ba Ria - Vung Tau, 2013; 
Provincial People Committee of Nghe An, 2008). In addition, the local fisheries managers 
always intend to set a growth rate in total landings rather than reduction of fishing level for 
conservation purpose. As observation in 2015, provincial fisheries managers in all 28 
coastal provinces set up their total landings for the coming year higher than the total 
landings of the previous year. Fisheries managers in 15 provinces interviewed10 argued 
that the central government had been promoting to enhance fishing at the offshore waters, 
then their offshore fishing fleets were allowed to fish any offshore waters throughout the 
country. This would bring an additional volume of landings to the current total landings of 
the province. 
Furthermore, the five-year and annual plans were far from in accordance with the 
corresponsive fisheries strategy and master plan. For example, the annual plans for 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 were conflicting with the 2006-2010 five-year plan (DECAFIREP, 
                                         
10 They are Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, 
Binh Thuan, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Ben Tre, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau, and Kien Giang. 
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2010a; MOFI, 2005b) and also not in line with the fisheries master plan by 2010 (Prime 
Minister, 2006). In fact, the annual target in total landings of the annual plans was set higher 
than in the five-year plan and the master plan. In addition, the 2011-2015 five-year plan 
and the 2011 annual plan were decided before the master plan and strategy were 
approved. Clearly, the vertical connection among the elements in the fisheries planning 
system has not been addressed sufficiently. This may create disturbances in implementing 
the fisheries policies and management in Vietnam. Consequently, the Vietnamese fisheries 
in the last three decades has been developed in multi-directions, not followed a consistent 
management paradigm as defined by Charles (Charles, 1992). 
Coherence in the horizontal dimension 
Similarly, the linkage between the fisheries planning system and the general socio-
economic planning system was insufficient. Indeed, the development visions and objectives 
of the fisheries stated in the fisheries development master plan by 2010 were disagreed 
with those articulated in the 2001-2010 general socio-economic development plan 
(National Party Congress IX, 2001a; Prime Minister, 2006). The 2001-2010 general socio-
economic development plan intended to improve efficiency of the offshore fishing, while the 
fisheries master plan by 2010 intended to enhance offshore fishing capacity. The 2001-
2010 general socio-economic development plan established the target landings by 2010 at 
2.0-2.2 million tons, meanwhile the fisheries development master plan set at 1.5-1.8 million 
tons. In addition, the national fisheries strategy by 2020 was decided in 2010, but the 
general socio-economic development strategy by 2020 was adopted in 2011. This means 
that the fisheries strategy did not concretize visions and objectives of the general socio-
economic development strategy.  
Furthermore, the fisheries planning system was also conflicting with other sectoral planning 
systems (e.g. transportation, urbanization, education and tourism planning systems). For 
instance, a number of fishing villages and fishing ports in Hai Phong, Quang Ninh, Da Nang, 
Binh Dinh and Kien Giang had to move to other disadvantage places to implement projects 
on transportation, urbanization and tourism. The Nha Trang University of Fisheries was 
changed to the Nha Trang University with no longer emphasis on the fisheries only, but 
offer more disciplines such as land management, social science, information technology, 
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etc. This has generated disadvantages and reduce opportunities for the Vietnamese 
fisheries in the recent years. 
4.4.2 DECISION-MAKING BODIES AND PROCESS 
Generally, the Vietnamese fisheries are managed by policy decisions and legal regulations, 
i.e. laws, ordinances, decrees, circulars and directives (see appendix 3) made by the 
government. The authorities and process of making decisions are articulated clearly in the 
laws (National Assembly, 2003, 2008). Accordingly, the authority to make the fisheries 
policy decisions (i.e. strategies and master plans) is assigned to the national government 
(i.e. the Prime Minister or Minister of MARD) for national level policies, and to the provincial 
government (i.e. the Chair of the PPC) for the provincial level policies (Government of 
Vietnam, 2006). They make decisions within a closed circle operated within the party-state-
bureaucracy system, leaving little room for the participation, consultation and engagement 
of the civil society and non-government organizations (NGOs). In principle, the local fishers 
and relevant NGOs are invited to participate in the decision-making process and consulted 
with the policy and management decisions. However, they were almost not involved in the 
planning process as observed directly during the process of making the fisheries master 
plans by 2010 and by 2020. In fact, a bill of policies or legal documents would be passed 
and decided if it was agreed by relevant agents in that system. 
At national level, a proposal of fisheries policies (i.e. strategies, master plans, and other 
development policies decided by Prime Minister) is prepared by MARD. Other interest 
groups, e.g. scientists, representatives of NGOs may be contracted to prepare some parts 
of ta policy proposal or being invited to provide comments to the drafting process. A 
fisheries policy proposal should be consulted officially with the relevant sectors (e.g. 
resources and environment, finance, science and technology, traffic and transportation 
etc.) and with the provincial government. Based on this, MARD revises the policy proposal 
and submits to MPI for evaluation comments. The MPI, as a ‘gate guard’ for the Prime 
Minister, scrutinizes and provides an evaluation report on the policy proposal. Based on 
this, MARD revises the policy proposal according to the MPI’s evaluation report and 
submits to the Prime Minister for approve. This process is applied at the provincial level. 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) is normally assigned to prepare 
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the fisheries master plan of province. The proposal of the master plan should be consulted 
officially with MARD, the provincially relevant sectors (e.g. resources and environment, 
finance, science and technology, traffic and transportation etc.) and with the district 
government. Then, the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI), as a ‘gate guard’ for 
the Chair of PPC, scrutinizes and provides an evaluation report on the proposal of fisheries 
master plan. Finally, DARD revises the proposal according to the DMI’s assessment report 
and submits it to the Chair of the PPC for approve. 
In terms of the legal regulations, MARD is assigned to prepare the bill of the fisheries law 
and ordinance and to lay the groundwork for making decision by the National Assembly. 
Similarly, MARD is responsible for drafting the bill of decrees on fisheries management and 
laying the groundwork for deciding by the national government of Vietnam. In fact, on behalf 
of MARD, Directorate of Fisheries (D-Fish), a competent agency in fisheries of MARD 
implement relevant works of fisheries. D-Fish also prepares and submits the bill of circulars, 
directives to minister pf MARD for approve. 
At the provincial level, the Chair of PPC has the authority to issue directives and particular 
decisions to manage the fisheries within the provincial ưaters. DARD is in charge of 
preparing the bill of the directives/particular decisions and laying the groundwork for 
deciding by the Chair of PPC. The bill should be consulted with D-Fish/MARD and other 
provincial sectors before deciding by the Chair of PPC. 
4.4.3 RULES AND LEGISLATION 
4.4.3.1 Rules 
The Vietnamese fisheries are managed under the following principles articulated in the 
fisheries law (National Assembly, 2003): 
- The fisheries resources are the common property, owned by the Vietnamese people 
and under the unified management of the government. Individuals and organizations 
have the rights to access and harvest fisheries resources in compliance with the 
annual allowable catches and legal regulations of the government. 
- The government conducts the fisheries surveys and stock assessments and sets up 
the annual allowable catches in specific waters and fishing grounds. 
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- The development of the Fisheries ought to follow the fisheries planning system as 
well as fit the master plan of the socio-economic development at the respective 
scales. 
- Fishing practice has to be combined with maintaining national security, interests and 
sovereignty at seas. 
- The Ministry of MARD is responsible for managing the fisheries in the offshore and 
international waters. The PPC is in charge of managing the fisheries in the coastal 
and inland waters. The DPC and the CPC are decentralized and guided to manage 
the fisheries in their coastal route waters. 
- Individuals and organizations are encouraged to invest in scientific research, 
transferring technology and conservation of resources to develop the fisheries. 
- Local communities are promoted and invited to take part in monitoring, detecting 
and prosecuting any violation of the fisheries regulations. They are also invited to 
participate in the co-management models for managing the fisheries in the coastal 
route waters. 
4.4.3.2 Fisheries legislation 
The fisheries law set up a combination approach (e.g. catch control, fishing effort control 
and technical measures) to manage the Vietnamese fisheries (National Assembly, 2003). 
Accordingly, the total catches are set yearly in the annual plans or periodically (five years, 
ten years) in the five-year plans, master plans. They are defined for specific regions and 
for administrative territories (i.e. national, provincial, district, and commune), but are not 
divided into catch quotas and allocated to the fishing entities, vessels, or individual fishers 
as done in developed fisheries. Finally, the total landings of fishing vessels, fishers have 
not been limited and controlled in practice. The local fishers are allowed to catch as much 
as possible (see further in chapter 7). 
For fishing effort control, the Vietnamese fisheries authorities manage the fishing effort 
through the number of fishing vessels. In fact, the number of fishing vessels are managed 
under the fisheries plans adopted by fisheries authorities. It is calculated for specific regions 
to ensure that the fisheries resources are not overexploited. The provincial fisheries 
authority has the authority to control the number of fishing vessels registered in its 
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territories. However, the number of fishing vessels defined in the fisheries plans is not 
divided and allocated to fisheries authorities, so fisheries authorities do not know the 
number of fishing vessels assigned to control. Therefore, they have no evidence to stop 
issuing the permission for building fishing vessels. In addition, MOFI introduced a regulation 
on banning development of fishing vessels powered with engine capacity less than 30HP 
in 2006 (MOFI, 2006b). However, the number of fishing vessels of this fleets has increased 
since after that (MARD, 2010, 2016). Consequently, the number of fishing vessels is not 
controlled effectively toward the number adopted in the fisheries plans. 
The Vietnamese fisheries also are managed by technical measures. A set of regulations 
on fishing techniques and methods was issued to protect fisheries resources (MARD, 
2008a; MOFI, 2006b). They include regulations of:  
i) Bans on using the fishing gears and methods (e.g. push net, stow net, destructive 
fishing methods of using electricity, poison, explosive);  
ii) Minimum mesh size (e.g. mesh size at cod-end of trawl nets >20mm, purse seines 
>18mm, gill nets >40mm);  
iii) Minimum fish size to be caught (e.g. round scads >120mm, anchovies >50mm, 
frigate mackerel >220mm);  
iv) Closed areas and seasons (e.g. Hon My – Hon Mieu (21018'N - 21024'N;107042'E - 
107050'E) from 15th April to 31st July, Co To island (20056'N - 21006' N; 107040'E - 
107053'E) from 15th February to 15th June), coastal area (from 0 – 5m deep) of Bac 
Lieu, Ca Mau from 1st April to 1st June);  
v) Zoning (e.g. banning trawl nets, fishing with light to fish in the coastal areas).  
In addition, the government also issued regulations on administrative sanctions in the 
fisheries in Vietnam (Government of Vietnam, 2013). The financial sanctions range from 
10-1,000 USD. Other supplementary sanctions such as withdrawing fishing license and 
restoring the origin situation may also be imposed depending on the violation. 
Clearly, the fisheries management rules and legislation of Vietnam are integrated common 
management principles of the international fisheries. However, its effectiveness has limited 
due to the specific characteristics of the small-scale fisheries. The fisheries management 
system in Vietnam has slowly adapted international practice and rules. For instance, the 
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management system of the clam production in Ben Tre was modified to obtain the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, a management plan for tuna fishery was made to 
meet the requirements of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and the 
swimming crab fishery in Kien Giang are in the process of being MSC certificated. 
4.4.3.3 Enforcement and compliance 
Surveillance and enforcement of the fisheries legislation at the local communities are 
mainly mandated to the fisheries inspection force11 at the provincial level. Each province is 
employing 1-2 inspectors on the fisheries and 1-2 fisheries patrol vessels to enforce and 
surveil the fisheries legislation within the provincial territories as investigated in Quang 
Ninh, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Thua Thien- Hue, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, 
Binh Thuan, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Ben Tre, Soc Trang, Ca Mau, Bac Lieu and Kien Giang. 
This means that each fisheries inspector is in charge of surveillance for approx. 2,000 
fishing vessels operating in a wide range of fishing grounds. This means that the fisheries 
inspection force was very weak and could not enforce the fisheries legislation in Vietnam 
(Vinh, 2009).  
In addition, the compliance with fisheries regulations of the local fishers has been very poor. 
As investigation in eight provinces in 2009-2011 shows that 100% of the local fishers 
interviewed just heard about fisheries regulations issued by the fisheries authorities (e.g. 
banning gears and methods, mesh size, fish size, restricted or closed areas). But they did 
not know thoroughly and did not care about these regulations because they did not believe 
that the regulations of the government would maintain their livelihoods. Therefore, they 
were following the traditional customs and indigenous knowledge tested in practice to 
maintain their business.  As a consequence, approx. 70.4 % fishers utilized gears with 
under mesh size (Lung, 2010). In fact, the mesh size of the trawl nets for finfish is required 
to be no smaller than 28 mm, but it ranges from 15-20 mm in practice; the minimum size of 
squid (L. chinensis) allowed to fish is 20 cm in length, but smaller sizes are landed 
commonly. In addition, using destructive fishing methods took place commonly in many 
                                         
11 In addition to this force, the fisheries surveillance at the national and regional levels, coastal guard 
and other public security forces also participate in the supervision of fishing activities in line with 
other regulations or suppression of illegal fishing practice. 
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provinces as reported in Quang Ninh, Hai Phong, Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha 
Tinh, Quang Ngai, Binh Thuan, Ca Mau, Kien Giang in 2009. The infringement of the 
fisheries regulations had increased in the recent years (DECAFIREP, 2010b). This may be 
addressed more effectively if the co-management arrangement are introduced (FAO, 
2005a; Douglas Clyde Wilson et al., 2003). However, implementing this arrangement in the 
Vietnamese fisheries has encountered obstacles (see further in chapter 8). 
4.4.4 RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION 
The fisheries data in Vietnam are collected and stored in separate systems. The GSO 
system collects fisheries data to estimate development indexes of the fisheries such as 
total landings, fishing vessels, and other general indexes (e.g. incomes, genders, 
anthropology, etc.). The data published by GSO are considered as the official information 
of the government. They are the official basis for evaluating, planning the fisheries. The 
other system, the fisheries research collects specialized data in fisheries (e.g. fish stock 
assessments, socio-economic information, analyses on fishing fleets, behaviour and 
livelihoods in local fishing communities). It also collects the same data with the GSO, but 
irregularly. These data and information provided by the research system are just used as 
a reference; they are not accepted as the official basis for evaluating and planning the 
fisheries. 
4.4.4.1 Statistical data collected by GSO 
The total landings are presented in a combination figure for all fisheries and all species in 
specific administrative territories (i.e. commune, district, province, and the whole country) 
that fishing vessels registered as the home port. The estimations of total landings are 
conducted with the sampling method and published regularly (see further in chapter 6). For 
instance, the GSO provided the estimation of total landings of Nghe An province in 2012 
were 55,891 tons, of Kien Giang in 2015 was 463,370 tons, and of the whole country in 
2015 was 2.840 million tons (GSO, 2016). The fish landings are not classified by fisheries, 
or by species/species groups, by fish size to provide understanding about the fishing 
mortality in detail of fish stocks. In addition, they are also not classified by fishing grounds 
or regions as defined in the fish stock assessments. Therefore, these data do not reflect 
the fishing pressure on the specific regions. This means that the data in the fish landings 
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presented by GSO do not provide the thorough understanding about the effects of the 
human system on the natural system. Therefore, managers may not intervene correctly to 
maintain the sustainability of the fisheries system in Vietnam. 
Similarly, the data on the fishing vessels are also reported in fishing fleets (i.e. by fisheries 
and by engine capacity) by administrative territories. These data are provided by the fishing 
vessel registration agencies and published in the yearly basis. In fact, the fishing fleets 
often fluctuate monthly and change year by year as observed in Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, 
Binh Dinh and Ben Tre in 2010-2012. Fishers often change their gears and methods to get 
better catches as analyzed in section 4.3.1.2. Furthermore, the data on the fishing trips of 
the individual vessels have not been collected. Therefore, the real fishing effort (e.g. fishing 
days, number of hauls) pushing on the specific regions/fishing grounds has not been known 
in Vietnam, and managers would not regulate the fishing effort in the place to ensure that 
the fish stocks not being overexploited. 
4.4.4.2 Fisheries research 
The fisheries research has received less attention than other sub-sectors within MARD. 
The annual budget allocated to the fisheries research was approx. 13% of the total budget 
for the scientific research of MARD in 2008-2013. It was less than agricultural research 
(32%), animal research (23%), forestry research (17%) and irrigation research (15%); 
meanwhile, the fisheries sector provided a contribution of nearly 30% to the GDP of the 
agriculture sector. The scientific research on the fisheries focused on improving the fishing 
technologies and fishing patterns. Just a few researches were conducted to provide 
knowledge for restructuring the fishing fleets, dynamics of fish population. The research on 
fisheries biology and ecosystem structures have been implemented rarely in the last five 
decades.  
The fish stock assessments have not been conducted regularly in Vietnam, but 
implemented in the survey programs (box 4.1). Such surveys are often implemented by 
trawl net for demersal fish, by gill net and long line for large pelagic fish and by acoustic 
equipment for small pelagic fish. The main data (e.g. species composition, density 
distribution and length size distribution) are collected to estimate the standing biomass and 
exploitable potential yield in the regions in question. Under this model only aggregated 
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figures of the standing biomass and exploitable potential yield in the specific regions are 
estimated and presented in the stock assessment reports. The biological population 
parameters (e.g. age structure, maturity state, mortality rate and productivity of individual 
fish stocks) are not presented in the stock assessment reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This stock assessment model has been used to provide information for planning the 
Vietnamese fisheries, albeit it is not suitable for the tropical fisheries and cannot help the 
sustainability of fisheries (Raakjær, 2004; Thia-Eng & Pauly, 1989). It is unable to provide 
knowledge for managing the fisheries according to the ecosystem based approach (FAO, 
2004b). In addition, this approach is not suited for the Vietnamese fish stocks because all 
Box 4.1: Fish stock assessments in Vietnamese sea waters since the 1990s 
1992-1993: A survey on high economic value species conducted by RIMF. 
1992-1995: Investigation of the tuna resources in Vietnamese sea waters conducted by RIMF 
and the Halong Fisheries Corporation. 
1993-1997: Integrated survey on fisheries resources and environment of Truong Sa 
archipelago conducted by RIMF. 
1995-1997: Assessment of large pelagic fish stocks in Vietnamese EEZ conducted by RIMF 
with assistance of Japan. 
1996-1998: Assessment of fish stocks in Vietnamese sea waters within the assessment of 
living marine resources in Vietnam – ALMRV/DANIDA. 
1997-2003: Basic survey on fisheries resources and environment of the key coastal areas for 
sustainable development conducted by RIMF. 
1998-2001: Exploration of the marine fisheries resources in the offshore areas conducted by 
RIMF. 
2000-2003: Assessment of oceanic large pelagic fishes in Vietnamese EEZ conducted by 
RIMF. 
2003-2005: Assessment of fish stocks by long line and gill net gears conducted by RIMF within 
the ALMRV II/DANIDA. 
2003-2005: Stock assessment of small pelagic fishes in Vietnamese waters conducted by 
RIMF. 
2010-2020: An integrated marine survey program has been conducted by the Vietnam 
Academy of Science and Technology (RIMF carries out the package of fish stock 
assessments). 
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fish stocks have been exploited at a certain level (Sparre & Venema, 1998). Therefore, this 
approach was criticized by the fisheries managers as its transparency and usefulness for 
planning the fisheries as observed at the MOFI in 2004. The fisheries managers suspected 
the estimation of biomass and exploitable potential yields and called for an alternative 
approach that would be more visible and easier to verify. However, such an approach has 
not been introduced into Vietnam so far. It may be due to the fact that this is not in line with 
the statistical indexes in the Vietnamese fisheries as argued by a planner. 
In addition to stock assessments, researches on economic and socio-economic aspects of 
fisheries have also been conducted to provide insight into the socio-economic system of 
the fisheries and fishing communities. However, the multidisciplinary researches, which 
produce more comprehensive advice for the fisheries management, have not been 
conducted in Vietnam. In 2003, under assistance of the DANIDA project, the Marine 
Fisheries Specialist Team was established to provide multidisciplinary advice for the 
fisheries management in Vietnam. However, it collapsed because it did not receive any 
advice request from the fisheries management authorities (see further in chapter 8). 
Generally, fisheries research and data collection have been conducted by the state 
institutions within the state budget or in collaboration between the state agencies and 
international donors. The private sector and local fishers just take part as owners of the 
equipment or vessels in order to perform the survey cruises at seas or as interviewees. It 
seems that the indigenous knowledge has not been used in the fisheries decision-making 
process in Vietnam. The marine habitats and ecosystems have been known initially and 
qualitatively in Vietnam. The intrinsic nature and causal relationship of the aquatic systems 
have just been described as phenomena. Understandings about the marine ecosystems 
are still limited (Thanh, 2009). 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditionally, Vietnamese fisheries have been described by statistics in three areas: total 
landings, number of fishing vessels published regularly by the GSO and the total biomass 
of fisheries resources produced irregularly by RIMF. These data are neither specific nor 
comprehensive enough for accurate analysis in light of the common analytical frameworks 
for the fisheries in the world. This research points out evidence that these data are 
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uncertain. Therefore, these data should be debated and validated transparently and 
scientifically. 
This research shows that the production of knowledge for planning fisheries is influenced 
by the mandatory growth rate that is decided by politicians. This indicates that management 
of the natural system (i.e. fisheries resources and marine ecosystems) is influenced 
primarily by needs/views of the human system: the economic, social and socio-economic 
aspects, as well as political, cultural aspects, rather than ecological one. 
The Vietnamese fisheries are in a crisis because of having a big gap between the planning 
system and practice. The fisheries planning documents do not reflect the real state of the 
fisheries and do not follow a consistent direction on one hand, and the development of the 
fisheries has not been controlled by the government on the other hand. Fisheries managers 
are in a deadlock situation with dilemmas about how to restructure their fisheries effectively 
and efficiently. The fisheries management system is facing the following issues: 
The fisheries resources are treated as a common pool property and fishing activities 
happen freely as open access throughout the common waters in Vietnam. There is no 
limitation on the volume of fish allocated to fishing entities, though the total allowable 
catches are determined in the state planning system. The local fishers have been 
encouraged to catch as much as they can. 
There is a lack of a thorough and comprehensive understanding about the real status of 
the fisheries system including the management, the natural and the human systems in 
Vietnam. The available data and information in the Vietnamese fisheries provide a 
confused understanding about the fisheries. The fishing capacity would be enlarged if 
taking the estimations of total landings and of the biomass and exploitable yields as the 
basis. Conversely, the fishing capacity should be reduced immediately if taking the 
estimations of the CPUE of the fishing fleets and the catch rate of the scientific surveys. 
This situation has been effecting on the planning fisheries in Vietnam by creating conflicting 
policy decisions. 
The sectoral planning system (e.g. fisheries) are governed within a dual planning system. 
It provides foundation for the general socio-economic planning system, and then the 
general socio-economic planning system directs and provides official development points 
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of views for the sectoral planning system. This arrangement produces complexity and 
overlaps between two systems. It may waste the government resources and generate 
contradictions in development. Moreover, this system is operated in a centralized and 
bureaucratically top-down paradigm within the government system with little legitimacy at 
the local levels. The fisheries planning system is a diminutive part in a complicated planning 
system in Vietnam. The linkages among components within the fisheries planning system 
and between the fisheries planning system and the general socio-economic planning 
system are incoherent. The Vietnamese fisheries are planned in the same approach and 
context as other sectors and industries, and thus their intrinsic features, e.g. diversity, 
complexity, dynamics and multi-scales are not taken into account sufficiently in the planning 
and approving processes. 
The fisheries management decisions and regulations are not enforced efficiently in both 
the governmental agencies and local communities. Regulations on catch control and fishing 
effort control have not been implemented in practice. The fisheries regulations are mainly 
enforced by the governmental agencies leading to a poor compliance with the legal 
regulations at the local fishing communities. Fishers behave accordingly to traditional 
customs rather than legal regulations. 
A majority of the local fishers are honorary members of the associations established by the 
government. But all of them are engaging in a traditional group of fishers. The local fishers 
have limited education and operate their business according to hereditary experience. They 
respect and behave in accordance with their own traditionally informal rules and religious 
beliefs sometimes rather than following the legal regulations of the government. 
Finally, one of the key take-away messages for the fisheries management system involves 
the statistical indexes used in management: the collective number in fish landings and 
number of vessels registered by administrative territories is unable to provide a sufficient 
understanding about the effects of the human system on the natural system. Similarly, fish 
stock assessments are implemented irregularly and incomprehensively in Vietnam, thus 
they cannot provide the real state of fisheries resources stocks and fisheries in practice. 
Thus, the most primary and basic data used in fisheries management around the world 
(e.g. statistics on fish landings and fishing vessels) are uncertain in the Vietnam case. 
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CHAPTER 5: AN ANALYSIS ON A MASTER PLAN AS A PLANNING 
TOOL OF THE FISHERIES IN VIETNAM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As described in chapter 4, the total landings and fishing capacity (published by GSO) of 
Vietnamese fisheries have grown impressively over the last two decades. In this period, a 
more than tenfold increase in fishing effort in term of engine capacity, and a more than 
fourfold increase in total landings could be observed in Vietnamese fisheries (D-Fish, 
2017a; GSO, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2016). This resulted from a range of the subsidy programs 
and investment projects to implement a political goal of modernization and development 
fisheries by 2020. There are, however, indications showing depletion of fish stocks, 
degradation of marine ecosystems and a decline in economic returns of fishing fleets. A 
departure point for this research is the growing evidence of failure of the long-term 
management plan in the 2000s. It has been argued that the fisheries policies in Vietnam 
have performed poorly (Tuan, 2013), and that none of the management objectives of the 
2010 master plan adopted at decision No. 10/2006/QD-TTg were achieved (MARD, 2011; 
Prime Minister, 2006).  
This failure may be due to unrealistic objectives of the 2010 fisheries master plan (Quyen, 
2012). To understand about the logics of planning fisheries, this chapter employs the 
paradigm triangle framework (Charles, 1992) to investigate the development objectives 
planned in the 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam. It will address the following questions: 
i) What was background to the formulation of the 2010 fisheries master plan? and ii) How 
did fisheries policy discourses emerge and institutionalize into the 2010 fisheries master 
plan in Vietnam? The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, the chapter analyses the context 
of formulating the 2010 fisheries master plan to identify the core discourses in the 
Vietnamese fisheries, and roles of actors involving in fisheries planning processes to 
understand their power in deciding the management objectives. Secondly, it structures 
story lines and analyses the discourse coalitions mobilized in fisheries planning processes. 
Thirdly, it examines how story lines are manifested in the master plan to learn rationalities 
of the Vietnamese fisheries master plan by 2010. Finally, it concludes with the key points 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
108 
 
related to the logics of the management objectives of the 2010 fisheries master plan in 
Vietnam. 
5.2 THE CONTEXT OF MAKING THE 2010 FISHERIES MASTER PLAN IN 
VIETNAM 
5.2.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STATE PLANNING SYSTEM 
In 1998, the Prime Minister of Vietnam signed a directive to introduce a new kind of plan – 
the master plan into the state planning system. This directive defines “a master plan for 
socio-economic development is a crucial step in the whole process of planning the national 
economy. It should be linked to the socio-economic development strategy and be used as 
basis for elaborating the five-year plan”  (Prime Minister, 1998 p.1). It provides foundations, 
orientations, spatial organization and allocation of resources for developing socio-
economic development in a circle of ten years and visions to the next 10-20 years. The 
directive required all sectors to develop their own master plan. A process for making a 
master plan should follow three primary principles: i) clarify potentials, conditions, points of 
view, objectives, development directions and implementation mechanism, ii) assess 
sufficiently the reform policy, development strategy in 1990-2000 and five-year plan 1995-
2000 to provide bases for planning in 2001-2010 under guidance of the steering committee 
established by the Central Government, and iii) emphasize marketing, internationalization, 
promotion of the internal resources and maximization of the external resources. The sector 
is actively required to develop efficiently and sustainably according to the overall strategies 
(Prime Minister, 1998). It also required to follow a process of ten stages as illustrated in the 
figure 5.1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The processes of making a master plan for socio-economic development in 
Vietnam. 
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In this process, there are four key steps added into the conventional planning process. The 
master plan would be established based on a sufficient and specific knowledge base which 
published officially by GSO and relevant scientific institutions. Relevant sectors and civil 
organizations will be consulted during the preparation of the plan. Importantly, the plan will 
be scrutinized by Minister of Planning and Investment (MPI) to provide evaluations of 
feasibility in terms of the state resources and avoid conflicts with the development 
orientations of the general socio-economic plans as well as with other sectors. Finally, it 
will be adopted by the Prime Minister, based on his assumption that the master plan 
addressed all comments and requirements provided by MPI. This may challenge sectors 
in developing master plan in terms of using knowledge inputs and debating policy 
discourses in a context of the dual planning system analyzed in chapter 4. 
5.2.2 BACKGROUND OF MAKING THE 2010 FISHERIES MASTER PLAN 
As the first decade of economic transition from the centralized planning economy with 
dependence of Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the National Party Congress 
term VII (National Party Congress VII, 1991) adopted the 1991-2000 general socio-
economic development strategy emphasized on the stabilization of national economy and 
liberating Vietnam from the political crisis in Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. 
In which, the growth rate in total fish landings for the period set to 3-4% per annum. In fact, 
the total landings and number of fishing vessels for the period 1991-1995 increased by 
6.7% and 10.7% per annum respectively (GSO, 1996). This achievement was highly 
appreciated by the political system and the fisheries sector was seen as a sector with high 
development potential by the National Party Congress support term VIII (National Party 
Congress VIII, 1996). This Congress, therefore, in the mainstream of development of the 
national economy and industrialization and modernization of the country, put the fisheries 
as one of three largest sectors and assigned the fisheries a growth rate of total landings at 
4.5-5% per year in period of 1996-2000. The same for the period of 1991-1995, the total 
landings and number of fishing vessels in 1996-2000 increased by over 6.7% and 3.3% per 
annum respectively (GSO, 2001). In addition to this, fisheries biologists at RIMF (Chung, 
1997c) provided figures of biomass (3.5 million tons) and EPY (1.7 million tons) higher than 
those estimated in 1993 (Thuoc, 1993). This indicated that the Vietnamese fisheries were 
developing in a sustainable manner, as the total landings during the period 1991-2000 were 
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below the EPY estimation. It was, therefore, decided to maintain the growth rate of total 
catches as set for the period 2001-2010. 
At the same time, there was a paradox that MOFI conflicted itself to argue that destructive 
fishing methods (e.g. fishing with explosion, poisons) were commonly seen throughout the 
fishing grounds (MOFI, 1996). This was a reason leading to disappearance of some 
species and a dramatic reduction in the catch rate of the coastal fishing fleets as reported 
by MOFI in 1992-1994 (MOFI, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995a). In addition, a decreasing trend 
in catch rate of fishing fleets was continuously documented in the annual reports of MOFI 
in 1996-2000 (MOFI, 2001). Along this finding, Thong12 demonstrated a decline in catch 
rate and incomes of fishing fleets, especially of the small-scale and artisanal vessels 
operating at the traditional fishing grounds (Thong, 1998). Based on these available data, 
he intended to plan the fisheries towards the conservation of the fisheries resources. 
Therefore, there were conflicting perspectives about planning the Vietnamese fisheries by 
2010. One perspective to maintain the growth rate of catches supported by data provided 
by GSO and RIMF, the other follow the conservation objective to reduce fishing effort and 
increase the total catches in a precautionary manner supported by findings provided by 
VIFEP. In other words, the 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam may be made in two 
conflicting paradigms: the production-based growth paradigm or the conservation 
paradigm, dependently on perspectives of politicians and actors involving into planning 
fisheries. One more thing may disturb actors in using knowledge for planning fisheries was 
reliability of the statistics of GSO. Indeed, the total landings in 1997 estimated by GSO was 
1.08 million tons. It only equals to 75.5% of estimation (1.47 million tons) by ALMRV 
project13.  
In addition, illegal foreign fishing vessels came increasingly into the Vietnamese waters 
(MOFI, 1996). This has caused conflicts between Vietnamese and foreign vessels and 
jeopardized sustainability of fisheries resources in the Vietnamese waters. In addition to 
                                         
12 Thong was a former director of VIFEP. He was the head of the team making the 2010 fisheries 
master plan in 1997-2004. 
13 This was estimated by DANIDA project based on the fisheries enumerator program conducted in 
11coastal provinces: Ca Mau, Bac Lieu, Kien Giang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, 
Quang Nam, Da Nang, Nghe An, Hai Phong and Quang Ninh. 
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this, the political resolution for the industrialization and modernization of the country 
provided a basis for developing large-scale and industries vessels in Vietnam. Therefore, 
an argument of building more fishing fleets, especially the bigger vessels operating in the 
offshore waters would be accepted in this situation. At the same time, with assistance from 
DANIDA, a series of investigations on fish stocks as well as fisheries socio-economic were 
conducted in 1995-1997. They provide new knowledge and new approach for planning 
fisheries which follow the precautionary principles rather than support for the production-
based growth paradigm of the existing management regime in Vietnam (VIFEP, 1997). 
In conclusion, the Vietnamese fisheries in this period were faced with four main 
pressures/issues: i) mainstream of a high growth rate of production; ii) overfishing in coastal 
waters; iii) poor livelihoods of the small-scale fishers; iv) popularity of destructive fishing 
practice in coastal waters; and v) illegal fishing in the off-shore waters. This means that the 
master plan in 2001-2010 for the Vietnamese fisheries should address the above issues 
which is summarized into three management paradigms: rationalization, conservation, and 
social/community (Charles, 1992).  
This caused difficulties for formulating a proper policy for the Vietnamese fisheries. To meet 
the production growth objectives, the sector needed to enhance fishing capacity to catch 
more fish and provide more jobs. This storyline was supported by politicians. This would 
put more pressure on the resource base resulting in aggravating depletion of the fisheries 
resources. The conservation objectives are only achieved if the fishing effort was remained 
at a proper level, which is believed one of the third lower than the existing level and/or 
technical measures to protect fish stocks and marine habitats are complied with 
adequately. Doing so, a number of fishing vessels and fishers would get out of fishing 
industry. It would cause substantial economic and job losses for fishing communities. This 
is championed by environmentalists, but may be opposed by politicians who decide 
policies. Balancing these conflicting objectives is still a challenge for any fishery over the 
world (Cochrane, 2009). It would be more problematic for fisheries which lacked reliable 
time-series data as the Vietnamese fisheries. This caused conflicting arguments among 
actors in planning the 2010 objectives of fisheries development in Vietnam. It resulted in a 
paradox that taking more ten years from 1996 to 2006 to make the 2010 fisheries master 
plan in Vietnam. 
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5.2.3 CHANGING IN FISHERIES PLANNING SYSTEM: THE NEW WINE IN THE OLD 
BOTTLE 
5.2.3.1 A fisheries planning system in the centrally planned economy 
The Vietnamese economy was operationalized within the centrally planned economy until 
1981. As a sector in the centrally planned economy, the fisheries planning system defines 
the target of total fish landings and demands for allocating the state resource from the 
central government. Under this regime, the fisheries sector was annually given a volume 
of total fish landings, called as the mandatory target, to meet demands for fish of the 
domestic consumption and export. In order to achieve this target, the sector was allocated 
a correspondent amount of resources. Subsequently, state-ownership fishing companies 
and collective cooperatives were given a targeting volume of catches and allocated an 
amount of resources (e.g. fuel, equipment, workers, materials, etc.) to produce the volume 
of catches given. In term of business, MOFI played roles as a fishing enterprise. All catches 
landed by fishing vessels were controlled strictly and then they are also distributed by the 
state agents (Prime Minister, 1960). For instance, in an annual plan in 1978 articulated that 
“function mandates at local communities (i.e. militia, night-watch) have to work intensively 
to make ensure that all catches landed at their communities must be sold to the state 
agents” (MOFI, 1979 p.14). It must be ensured that the operation of fishing business (e.g. 
purchasing and consuming fishing production, providing fishing costs, managing fishers) 
were executed by the state agents. A mission that “being determined to abolish the clique 
of middlemen in local communities” was assigned to the local government (MOFI, 1979 
p.9). 
In this regime, the state planning system played a critical role for governing the national 
economy in general and the Vietnamese fisheries sector in particular. The fisheries sector 
was linked with the national economy through development directions and mandatory 
production targets (i.e. total landings and GDP contribution). Based on these targets fishery 
managers from MOFI planned the resources allocation including number of vessels, 
workers, amount of fishing costs (fuel, nets, foods, equipment…) to obtain the targets given.  
For instance, the 1975 fisheries plan set out mandatory targets as follows: 
- Total catches: 120,000 tons, 
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- Fish sauces: 38 million litters, 
- Providing 5,000 tons fresh fish for Hanoi citizens, 
- Export value: 4 million VND. 
Based on these mandatory targets, MOFI suggested a corresponding amount of variable 
costs and other fixed costs as follows: 
- Building more 20,000 fishing vessels, 
- Repairing for 13,000 fishing vessels, 
- Installing more 10,680 horse power for fishing vessels, 
- Making 1,500 trawl nets, 300 purse seine nets and lift nets, 
- Wood for building and repairing vessels: 30,000 m3 
- Variable costs/banking loans: 25 million VND. 
After the approval by the central government, the mandatory targets of the sector would be 
allocated to fishing entities as shown in figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: A mechanism for allocating the mandatory targets: catch target and fishing 
costs of the Vietnamese fisheries before 1981. 
As shown in figure 5.2, the mandatory targets of the fisheries were allocated at four levels: 
national, provincial, district and commune levels. In this mechanism, MOFI and lower levels 
connected hierarchically through the mandatory targets: the volume of catches and amount 
of fishing costs. Consequently, these two figures became the cornerstone of the fisheries 
planning system as well as were used to measure performance of the fishing entities. The 
higher administration level allocated the catch target and fishing costs for the lower one. At 
National mandatory targets 
National fishing companies Coastal provinces 
Provincial fishing companies Coastal districts 
District fishing companies Coastal communes 
Collective cooperatives Private sector 
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the communal level, most volume of the catch target and fishing costs are allocated to 
fishing cooperatives, some of catches are allocated to private vessels (a number of vessels 
in the south region had still not collectivized into cooperatives). In this regime, the 
government commonly planned a maximum catch target as they desire to cover demands 
for fish of the domestic consumption and to export. In fact, the total annual catches were 
set increasingly around 7.0% per year in 1961-1980 (MOFI, 1981) to meet increase in 
population and demands for fish. Fishers, are state workers paid by government, are 
encouraged to catch as much as possible and rewarded if their catches exceeded the 
volume given and vice versa. 
5.2.3.2 A fisheries planning system in a market-oriented based economy  
The Vietnamese fisheries sector fell into a hardship by the end of 1970s that the planning 
objectives were not fulfilled at all in 1976-1980 (MOFI, 1981). This was due to the volume 
of catch target was set highly compared to available fishing capacity on one hand, and the 
government could not afford to provide enough fishing costs and facilities for the fisheries 
sector (MOFI, 1980). Thong, a former director of VIFEP argued that this failure of fisheries 
was because of deficiency of the centrally planned economy. He stated that this system 
did not encourage fishers to improve fishing efficiency, fishers – the state workers just 
worked reluctantly to get egalitarian benefit. This was a problem of the centrally planned 
economy (Sloman, 2000). Subsequently, the Vietnamese fisheries sector was piloted with 
the policy which allowed fishers/fishing entities to sell their products to cover fishing costs 
themselves (The State Planning Committee of Vietnam, 1981). From that point, the volume 
of catches was no longer allocated to the fishing entities in practice. Fishers were allowed, 
even were encouraged to catch as much as they could. They were also given rights to land 
and sell their catches freely to markets.  
By the 1980s, the state-owned and collective-owned fishing vessels operated ineffectively 
and almost all collapsed and were privatized by the end of the decade (MOFI, 1993). From 
that point, it could be said that the Vietnamese fisheries are a private sector. In fact, the 
fishing decisions were made by individual fishers, no longer decided by the fisheries 
authorities as under the centrally planned economy. In other words, government no longer 
controlled the fisheries sector through the mandatory catch targets. Instead, fisheries 
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authorities intervened in the fishing industry by management measures as analyzed in 
chapter 7. Besides, the government also encouraged and provided subsidies to enhance 
fishing capacity with focusing on the offshore fishing fleets. This brought tremendous 
growth in both the total landings and fishing capacity of the Vietnamese fisheries in 1986-
1995 (MOFI, 1990b, 1995b).  
However, the state planning system has still remained the same approach over the general 
socio-economic and the sectoral systems as analyzed in the chapter 4. The fisheries sector 
at various levels (i.e. national, provincial, district and communal levels) has still planned 
symbolically an annual volume of catches as the management target. However, no agents 
were obliged to enforce or control fishing entities fishing at the level set in the fisheries 
planning documents of government. In fact, the volume of catches was not recorded by 
fishers or enumerated by fisheries authorities. All fishers asked could not remember the 
volume of catches they landed monthly/yearly and could not estimate their catches for the 
next fishing seasons because it depends on dynamics of fish stocks and weather. This 
means that the total landings of the fisheries have not been controlled in practice, but the 
total catches of fisheries still have been planned based on the total landings provided by 
GSO in Vietnam. 
Clearly, there was a difference in nature between two the fisheries planning regimes in 
Vietnam. In the centrally planned economy regime, the government (i.e. MOFI) played the 
role as a big fishing company. It planned the annual total catches, divided into catch quotas 
and allocated to fishing entities. It provided all fishing costs for fishing vessels and also 
strictly controlled and distributed all fish landings in the country. Whereas, in the market-
oriented based regime, individual fishers were free to decide what species, how many, 
when and how they do fishing to maximize their catches and profits. Their catches were 
not influenced by the state planning system. Two management objectives (e.g. total 
catches and number of vessels) have been planned in the state fisheries planning 
documents and self-assigned symbolically to the collective entities e.g. country, regions, 
provinces, districts, communes, but are not divided into quotas and allocated to concrete 
fishing entities (e.g. vessels, fishers). This means that the current fisheries planning system 
in Vietnam does not intervene the fishing industry, instead of measuring the growth of the 
fisheries sector (Government of Vietnam, 2004). It has no longer provided fishing costs as 
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in the centrally planned economy regime, but provided basis for investment projects and 
development programs to the sector (Prime Minister, 1998).  
A manager from MOFI, who participated directly in the making the fisheries master plan by 
2010 argued that the current fisheries planning system in Vietnam is still operated as the 
centrally planned economy regime, not suited for the current market-oriented fisheries. He 
supplemented that the current planning system requires sectors in general and the fisheries 
in particular to make their development plans, albeit it is believed that these plans would 
not be followed by sectors in practice. As a result, “although a huge number of fisheries 
plans have been made in various scales in the last twenty years, but development of the 
fisheries in practice has not been related to the planning system” (Tuan, 2013 p.47). 
According to him, this was a main reason for Vietnamese government to reject the master 
strategy for the Vietnamese fisheries developed by DANIDA experts in 1997, although this 
strategy was highly appreciated by fisheries stakeholders (e.g. scientists, managers, 
NGOs). 
5.3 POLICY DISCOURSES AND ACTORS INVOLVED IN PLANNING FISHERIES IN 
2001-2010 IN VIETNAM 
5.3.1 PLANNING THE VIETNAMESE FISHERIES IN 2001-2010 
In 1996, VIFEP was assigned to develop the fisheries strategy of Vietnam in 2001-2010. 
This project was supported by DANIDA in 1996-1997. However, this strategy was not 
approved and changed to the fisheries master plan in 2001-2010. The 2010 fisheries 
master plan was adopted by the January 2006. The process of making this master plan is 
summarized as follows: 
5.3.1.1 Collecting data 
Three sources of knowledge were used in this project: i) statistics (e.g. total landings, 
vessels, production value, export value etc.in 1990-1995 published by GSO; ii) fish stock 
assessments provided by RIMF; and fisheries socio-economic investigation conducted in 
1995-1996 by VIFEP. However, these data were presented collectively and insufficiently 
for understanding thoroughly the real state of fisheries resources as well as the fishing 
communities. For instance, there were not data on fishing effort and number of fish caught 
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by areas. There has not been a system to record and monitor the catches of individual 
vessels. In addition, fish stock assessments were not conducted regularly and separately 
by species or group of species, but collectively for all species in specific areas. These data 
are not useful for planning fisheries (Zwieten, Densen, & Thi, 2002). In general, the fisheries 
data in Vietnam seem to be presented in a gradually increasing trend agreeing with the 
politicians’ aspiration. The planners who made the strategy for fisheries development by 
2010 named the data used as the magic numbers. In nature, the planning system in 
Vietnam was still following the central planned economy system used in communist 
countries e.g. Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. In this system, planners have 
used the information passed up through the state agencies from the managers. This system 
encouraged managers to lie. As a result, this planning system based on the woefully 
inadequate information and plans were inconsistent with the facts (Sloman, 2000). In 
addition, the planners also took the political points of view as a basis for establishing 
development objectives. The knowledge base used for making this master plan is 
discussed furthermore in chapter 6. 
5.3.1.2 Establishing the management objectives 
Traditionally, the development of fisheries in Vietnam is measured by two main indexes: 
total annual fish landings and total number of fishing vessels. Therefore, these two figures 
are always established apparently in the fisheries planning documents. The planners 
suggest the catch target of the fisheries based on the growth rate of total landings in the 
previous periods, the growth rate assigned to the fisheries sector in the period in question, 
and state of fisheries resources. Based on the catch target, other social and economic data 
on fishing fleets (e.g. catch rate, incomes, profit), and political points of view for developing 
the fisheries in the period (e.g. enhancing fishing in off-shore waters, limiting fishing in 
coastal waters) the planners determined the structure of fishing fleets (i.e. number of 
vessels by gears, by engine capacity and by regions). They also elaborated plans and 
solutions to achieve the targets planned including a list of investment projects, solutions on 
legislation and policy, finance, investment, science and technology, education and training, 
fisheries extension programs, international cooperation etc. In order to archive these 
targets, the sector would be allocated the correspondent budgets and resources from the 
central government.  
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However, this master plan did not provide management objectives of the fisheries by 2010 
in concrete figures (i.e. volume of catches, number of vessels). Instead, it just provided 
management orientations for the fisheries such as reduction in fishing effort, rationalization 
of the offshore fishing fleets, creating alternative livelihoods for local fishing communities. 
This was one reason leading to the master plan was not approved by MOFI. 
5.3.1.3 Consulting with relevant groups/stakeholders and revising documents 
In 1998, planners conducted consultations with scientists and managers through seminars 
and workshops on planning scenarios, management objectives and other contents of the 
master plan. By that time, the master plan was also consulted with relevant agencies 
including ministries and provincial government. Based on these comments, the planners 
made the first revision of the master plan. One of the most important comments is to define 
clearly the catch target and number of fishing vessels of the Vietnamese fisheries by 2010. 
This was then submitted to MOFI for evaluation. MOFI organized an assessment 
committee including relevant scientists and experts e.g. fisheries biologists, economists, 
planning and financial experts to evaluate the master plan. Based on the evaluation reports, 
the planners made the second revision of the master plan. This version was adopted by 
MOFI and submitted to MPI. MPI established the national assessment committee to 
evaluate the master plan of fisheries prepared by MOFI. MPI made an assessment report 
and sent it to MOFI for considering and revising the master plan. MPI evaluated that the 
master plan’s objectives were not reflected the development orientations of the national 
economy in terms of growth rate and modernization requirements of fisheries. Based on 
this report, MOFI (planners and managers) made the third revision on the planning report 
and made a report on accounting for their acquisition of comments provided by MPI and 
other agencies. A set of documents (i.e. the final planning report, explanation report for 
making the policy, draft of decision on approving the master plan, the report on accounting 
for their acquisition of comments, and comments provided by relevant agencies) was 
submitted to Prime Minister for approve. However, planners were dismissive of and did not 
reflect the stakeholders’ comments into the planning documents. They believed that the 
stakeholders just provided abstract and invalid arguments because they did not possess 
specific knowledge. For instance, the planners did not make an increase in the catch 
objective or ignored a clear explain on realism of downsizing the fishing fleets as some 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
119 
 
stakeholders suggested. They were conservative and believed that the size of the fisheries 
resources in the Vietnamese waters could not be more than 1.4 million tons as proposed 
in the master plan. 
5.3.1.4 Making decisions  
Officials working in the Government Cabinet scrutinized the planning documents submitted 
by MOFI. The master plan had not been accepted until 2004 because it was not supported 
by MPI as a former director of VIFEP – a key planner told. MPI did not agree with mandatory 
targets in numeric e.g. annual total landings, fishing fleets, suggestion on the budget 
allocation, and other instructions of the master plan. Subsequently, MOFI had to revise 
their plan accordingly to the MPI’s comments by setting the higher level of the annual total 
landings by 2010 to 1.8 million tons and removing the list of investment project attached 
with the decision adopted the master plan. Finally, MPI agreed with the revised version of 
the 2010 fisheries master plan and advised Prime Minister to sign on the decision adopted 
this master plan by the January 2006.  
5.3.2 POLICY DISCOURCES 
As the above described, there were three main storylines engaging actors emerged during 
the planning the fisheries in 2001-2010 in Vietnam: the production-based growth storyline, 
the conservation storyline and the community storyline. These storylines were associated 
with the production-based growth coalition, the conservation coalition and the community 
coalition respectively. They cover over narratives and discourses relevant with the above 
five pressures/issues facing the fisheries policy in question. The production-based growth 
storyline focuses on the developing the offshore fishing to remain the economic growth of 
the sector and ensure the national sovereign at seas. The conservation storyline 
emphasizes reduction in fishing effort in the coastal waters and enforces fisheries 
regulations. The community storyline is interested in stabilization of the coastal fisheries 
and welfare of the small-scale fishers. Theses discourses involve various actors. 
5.3.3 INVOLVEMENT OF ACTORS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS 
Ministry of Fisheries (MOFI) was in charge of making the 2010 fisheries master plan. It was 
composed on agencies (i.e. competent departments) and institutions as illustrated in figure 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
120 
 
5.3. In this system, ministerial is composed of minister and deputy ministers to lead over 
the system of two parts. The first part comprises of competent agencies/departments 
implement management tasks (e.g. making, enforcing the fisheries strategies, plans, 
regulations; monitoring and surveilling implementation of strategies, plans, regulations of 
institutions and at the local levels). The second part includes institutions implementing 
specific mandates and providing service such as research, education, training, information, 
publishing, technology transfer, etc. The agencies, on behalf of the ministerial, may direct 
the institutions to provide consultation and advisory services for their tasks such as 
preparing the fisheries plans, providing estimations of fish stocks, etc. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The structure of Ministry of Fisheries of Vietnam before October 2007 
 Some of departments and institutions of MOFI were involved in making the 2010 fisheries 
master plan as actors and stakeholders (figure 5.4). This research distinguished two 
relevant groups participating into the planning processes: actors and stakeholders. The 
actors were the agencies/departments taking roles of drafting, evaluating and deciding the 
master plan including: planners, managers, minister of fisheries, Minister of Planning and 
Investment (MPI), and the Prime Minister. They performed their tasks – planning steps 
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according to their mandate given. For instance, planners were obliged to formulate the 
master plan qualified for Prime Minister approve, MPI was responsible to provide the 
evaluation report for Prime Minister approve or reject the plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Involvement of actors and stakeholders in planning fisheries in 2001-2010 in 
Vietnam. 
The stakeholders included persons, institutions, and organizations related to the fisheries 
(including: Provincial People Committee (PPC) of 28 coastal provinces exception of the 
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social affair, traffic and transportation, and justice; NGOs: Vietnam Fisheries Association 
(VINAFIS), Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP), World 
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would be accepted by actors into the planning report. 
Planners – a group of scientists from VIFEP contracted with the managers in MOFI to 
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carried out gathering, analyzing data, projecting development scenarios and drafting the 
planning report. They also hosted consultation meetings with other actors and stakeholders 
to get comments on the development scenarios and the planning report. In addition, 
planners also laid the groundwork for throughout the planning processes (e.g. acceptance 
by minister of MOFI, adoption by MPI, and decision by the Prime Minister).   
Managers – representatives for the Planning and Finance Department and DECAFIREP 
under MOFI took a role of supervising the planning processes conducted by planners. 
They, on behalf of minister of MOFI, provided budget, legal provisions, planning ideologies, 
political orientations, and available data for planners to plan the fisheries. In the planning 
process, managers supervised the core elements of the master plan (e.g. the development 
directions; growth rates in catches, employment and number of fishing vessels; and 
investment projects). For instance, a former director of the Planning and Finance 
Department under MOFI required planners from VIFEP adjusting the total catches of the 
fisheries by 2010 to 1.8 million tons and putting the growth targets into the master plan. 
They also provided development ideas for the offshore fishing including investment projects 
on infrastructure. Their comments stemmed from the political orientations articulated in the 
general socio-economic development strategy adopted by the National Party Congress. 
They also collaborated with planners to get consultation comments with other actors and 
stakeholders on the planning report and lay the groundwork for adoption by minister of 
MOFI and MPI, and decision by Prime Minister. 
Minister of MOFI took a role of directing the political strategies of the master plan. He 
influenced mainly on the development directions of the plan such as balancing the offshore 
and coastal fisheries development; setting the growth trends of the total catches, of fishing 
capacity, of employments; and the public investment projects. He influenced the 
development targets and management objectives of the master plan directly to planners or 
through his advisers (i.e. managers from Planning and Finance Department of 
DECAFIREP). He asked planners and managers having to establish targets agreeing with 
the development orientations of the general socio-economic plans and keeping the growth 
rates of the previous periods (i.e. in 1996-2005). He requested the growth rate of the total 
catches at around 2.5 – 3.0% per annum in 2006-2010. He checked the development 
directions and targets according to the general socio-economic development plans, and 
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then passed to MPI for evaluation and to PM for decision; or rejected it if it was not fitted to 
the conventional planning system as the case of the master strategy prepared under 
assistance of the DANIDA experts in 1997. 
MPI took a role of making an evaluation report on the master plan prepared by MOFI. A 
planner evaluated that this step was the most important, complicated and sensitive in the 
planning process because this report was the basis for Prime Minister to adopt or refuse 
decision. He argued that getting a favourable evaluation from MPI was difficult, but it was 
easy also. It was difficult because he could not provide scientific evidences fitted to 
arguments on the development directions and targets. As he told, two their versions of plan 
were not accepted in 2001 and 2003 because the development directions14; growth rates15 
and investment projects16 were not agreed with the development directions and growth 
targets established in the general socio-economic strategies and plans; and the master 
plan’s requested budget was beyond the resources capability of the country. Unfortunately, 
the author was not able to access these MPI’s evaluation reports because the planners 
who laid groundwork for that plans no longer worked for VIFEP on one hand, and no current 
staffs in VIFEP knew where or who stored these documents on the other hand. At the same 
time, he argued that getting a favourable evaluation from MPI might be easier if its officials 
were invited to participate into the planning processes and all requests from MPI would be 
satisfied as the case of making the 2005 version of the master plan. MPI officials followed 
closely on revising the 2005 version of fisheries master plan, and then they provided a 
favourable evaluation report quickly. 
Prime Minister signed on the decision approving the fisheries master plan by 2010 prepared 
by MOFI in January 2006. In this step, officials from the Government Cabinet checked the 
                                         
14 Planners intended to develop the offshore fishing fleets in some key provinces having favourable 
conditions in professional fishers, fishing grounds and infrastructure, but MPI intended to develop 
the fishing spread over all coastal provinces. 
15 The catch targets by 2010 set by MOFI did not reflect the growth, so it contradicted with the 
development directions of the general socio-economic development strategy adopted by the 
National Party Congress. 
16 The planners proposed a plan to reduce fishing effort by scrapping and buying back the small-
scale vessels and by creating alternative livelihoods for local fishers. This was not accepted by MPI 
officials.  
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procedure of the planning process and looked through the final set of the planning 
documents attached by the MPI’s evaluation report and comments of other actors and 
stakeholders. This step was performed quickly because these officials connected closely 
with planners and managers in MOFI during revision of the 2005 version of the fisheries 
master plan. 
The local fishers, who would be influenced by the policies of the master plan, were not 
involved directly in the planning processes. However, their interests were supposed to be 
integrated into the master plan indirectly through their delegates: government officials and 
representatives from VINAFIS. 
5.4 STORYLINES AND DISCOURSE COALITIONS IN PLANNING THE 
VIETNAMESE FISHERIES  
This section analyzes storylines within discourse coalitions emerged in the planning 
fisheries in 2001-2010 in Vietnam. It summarizes arguments of discourse coalitions, 
identifies actors and develops storylines to understand conflicts among actors in planning 
the Vietnamese fisheries in 2001-2010.  
5.4.1 THE PRODUCTION-BASED GROWTH DISCOURSE 
This follows the argument of developing the offshore fishing to maintain the growth rate of 
catches and contribute to security of the national sovereign at seas. 
5.4.1.1 The growth storyline 
Any Vietnamese people have been familiar with a movement of ‘emulation of production’ 
to produce more commodities for constructing and protecting the nation. This implied that 
producing the more commodities would provide more contribution to the nation. For the 
fisheries, harvesting the more catches was the better. Therefore, the growth in total catches 
had been an overarching objective of the fisheries. The government mobilized all means to 
maximize the total catches of the fisheries. The annual growth rate of catches was planned 
for every five-year plan in 1991-2005. It was at around 3% per year in 1991-1995, at 5% 
per year in 1996-2000 (MOFI, 1995b, 2000). Obviously, this influenced on planning the 
catch target for 2001-2010. In the first draft of the fisheries master plan for 2001-2010 
submitted 2001, the planners proposed the catch target by 2010 at 1.4 million tons (VIFEP, 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
125 
 
2001); equally the growth rate in catch was about 2.5% compared to 2000. Meanwhile, 
managers in MOFI suggested the total catches by 2010 at 1.8 million tons; equally the 
average growth rate of catches in the period of 1996-2000. 
At the time, a fish stock assessment (Chung, 1997b) reported that the fish stocks were 
exploited below the EPY estimated in 1997. In addition, the previous estimations of 
fisheries resources (Chung, 1990; Phan, 1988) guessed that there may be a potential for 
catching the unfished fish stocks in the offshore waters. This argument was supported by 
the observation in the offshore waters that foreign vessels increasingly were fishing illegally 
in Vietnamese waters (MOFI, 1991b). Since after that, the growth storyline was 
underpinned by the offshore fishing discourse. The government provided incentives (e.g. 
credit and subsidy programs) for enhancing the fishing capacity in the offshore waters. For 
instance, the credit program for developing the fisheries in 1993 (Government of Vietnam, 
1993), exempting tax for the offshore fishing practice since 199317, and other investment 
programs such as the Island and East Sea program, building fishing harbours funded by 
Asian Development Bank (MOFI, 1994, 1995a) contributed to an increase of 400 offshore 
vessels per annum in 1992-1995. Continuously, a credit program18 with the low interest 
was launched in 1997 to build up the offshore fishing vessels. In which, 1,345 new offshore 
fishing vessels powered with the engine capacity of greater than 90 HP were entered into 
the fisheries in 1997-2001 (MOFI, 2003). Unfortunately, the efficiency of this program was 
low and the objectives was not accomplished, an inspection report concluded that “a 
majority of these vessels make low economic profits, a number of vessels could not afford 
fishing or operated in the traditionally coastal waters instead of fishing in the off-shore 
waters. Among 1,345 vessels built within this program, 390 vessels getting economic profit, 
520 vessels getting economic loss, 250 vessels could not operate and the rest vessels 
were sunk or disappeared…” (Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 2005 p.8).  
                                         
17 The Vietnamese government have adopted the tax-exemption policy for fishing at the decision 
No. 400/TTg dated the September 7th 1993, the decision No. 358/TTg dated the May 29th 1997 and 
the circular No. 105/2010/TT-BTC dated the July 23rd 2010. 
18 This program was decided by Prime Minister at decision No. 393/TTg dated on the June 9th, 1997. 
This provided around 103 million USD for building up the new vessels. 
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5.4.1.2 Competing discourse coalitions around the storyline of enhancing the offshore 
fishing capacity 
This storyline was closely connected with the political perspectives in the general socio-
economic development strategies that “… enhance the socio-economic development, 
connect the economic growth with sustainable development, environment protection and 
national security assurance… speed up the growth rate to modernize and industrialize the 
economy and take the country out of the poor country…” (National Party Congress IX, 2001 
p.12; National Party Congress VII, 1991 P.11). Therefore, the growth coalition included 
influential actors and stakeholders who are membership of the Party and must follow the 
resolutions adopted by the National Party Congress. For instance, in a speech at MOFI in 
1997, the Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet said that “Our sea is so huge, we will harvest more 
catches if we have more capital to invest in building vessels and fisheries infrastructure. 
Therefore, fishing is a potential industry to develop” as told by a former chief of a Ministry 
Office. This created an opportunity for the Vietnamese fisheries to develop and was the 
most important basis for planning fisheries in 2001-2010 as told by minister of MOFI. 
These actors – the dominant coalition subscribed the discourse on enhancing fishing 
capacity because this perspective agreed with the political points of view on one hand, and 
it also would deal with almost all the temporary pressures/issues related with the fisheries 
in Vietnam on the other hand. Indeed, managers and officials working in MOFI believed 
that if a high growth rate of the sector would be achieved, then the sector would have a 
bigger allocation of the state resources and vice versa. The bigger allocation of the state 
budgets to the sector would induce enhancing the fishing capacity of the nation. Moreover, 
investment on developing the offshore fishing vessels would accomplish the development 
goals of modernization and industrialization of the fisheries by 2020. Enhancing the 
offshore fishing would provide more employment opportunities and improve social welfare 
of the coastal communities on one hand; it also would contribute to protection of the national 
sovereign at seas on the other hand. In addition, development of offshore fishing would 
attract labour and investment on this, so fishing pressures on the coastal waters would be 
reduced leading to restoration of the fish stocks and marine habitats naturally. More 
importantly, the economic growth relates closely with the state investment and the political 
power of minister and government officials in Vietnam. In fact, the political power of a 
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minister would be strengthened if his/her sector had grown, and then his/her actor would 
be more invested. Therefore, ministers and their juniors desire to get as much investment 
as possible, and the investment was proportional to the growth rate that the sector achieved 
as told by a planner.  
The argument for the growth in total catches was strengthened by the officially statistical 
data. As published by GSO, the annual average growth rate of the total landings and the 
number of fishing vessels were over 6.7% per year and 7.0% per year respectively in 1991-
2000 (GSO, 1996, 2001). In addition, the value of the total landings also grew at an average 
rate of over 7.0% per annum in 1996-2000 (GSO, 2001). Importantly, the total landings of 
the Vietnamese fisheries had grown steadily as the rate planned in the fisheries planning 
system. Based on this, bureaucrats believed that fisheries resources were under-exploited, 
although these data may not reflect the real state of the fisheries as analyzed in chapter 6. 
However, the statistics published by GSO are considered as official data used for planning 
sectors in Vietnam. 
This argument was supported by other stakeholders (e.g. relevant sectors, coastal 
provinces) as their written comments on the planning report stored in VIFEP and directly 
observed by author at consultation meetings in 2003-2005. They agreed with enhancing 
the offshore fishing capacity and suggested MOFI to implement investigation of fisheries 
resources to locate potential fishing grounds, then they would guide their local fishers fish 
effectively. Other stakeholders such as military forces, banking service justified strongly 
development of the offshore fishing because it would strengthen capacity of the sovereign 
protection at seas and increase demands for credit and other banking services. Some 
scientists became important allies in this coalition. They supported development of the 
offshore fishing because it would create more research opportunities for them. In fact, some 
marine biologists argued that the marine fisheries resources in general were not over-
exploited, and the fish stocks in the offshore waters may be a promised potential (Chung, 
1997b; Phan, 1988). In order to enhance the knowledge basis for planning fisheries in 
2001-2010, MOFI asked biologists from RIMF estimating the state of the fisheries 
resources. Consequently, Chung (Chung, 1997b)  proposed the EPY of fisheries resources 
in Vietnamese waters was approx. 1.7 million tons, and in 2001 was over 2.1 million tons 
(D. M. Son, 2001). This storyline was strengthened in 2005 when the tuna stocks in the 
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offshore waters were evaluated as a potential resources with the EPY of 170,000 toms (D. 
M. Son, 2005). This supported strongly for the argument of developing the offshore fishing 
fleets. 
However, this discourse was disagreed by some actors (i.e. planners, managers) and some 
stakeholders (i.e. scientists, experts, fishers) in practice. A planner19 who assigned to head 
making the fisheries master plan criticized strongly perspectives of enhancing fishing 
capacity and growth in catches. He criticized biologists that providing unrealistic figure of 
EPY to meet the growth objectives of bureaucrats. He argued that the estimations of EPY 
produced by RIMF were not meaningful for planning the fisheries because of the three 
following reasons: i) data used for estimating the EPY were not updated and 
incomprehensive because some of them were collected in the 1970s and 1980s; ii) the 
figure of EPY seemed to be distorted accordingly to the politicians’ perspective; iii) the 
methodologies and protocols used for fish stock assessments were not suited for the 
Vietnamese waters, and the coverage of surveys in both temporal and spatial aspects was 
not able to produce credible estimations. He demonstrated that fisheries resources were 
overexploited by providing indications such as reduction of CPUE, decrease in the 
economic performance of fishing fleets, the more the vessels anchored at their home port 
due to economic losses, failure of the offshore fishing programs, the large-scale vessels 
illegally fishing in the coastal waters. In addition, he also distrusted the statistics published 
by GSO. He stated that these data were politically artificial data; they were adjusted by 
political wills. Therefore, they did not reflect the real figures of total landings in practice. 
However, he could not provide solid evidence for this argument. 
In addition, other authors demonstrated that the fisheries resources in Vietnamese waters 
were overexploited (Hai, 2003; Long, 2002). Based on the surplus modellings, a MSY 
estimation in 2003 was 1.3-1.4 million tons (Hai, 2003). This was trusted by the planner 
who submitted the final master plan of fisheries by 2010 to Prime Minister for approve in 
2005. In fact, the EPY estimation was suspected by actors and stakeholders. For instance, 
                                         
19 He is a former director of VIFEP who assigned to planning the fisheries from 1996 to 2004 when 
he retired. But the master plan was not adopted. In 2004, a new director of VIFEP was appointed 
and he took the task to finalize and submit the fisheries master plan to Prime Minister for approve. 
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in 2004 a Vice Minister of MOFI distrusted estimations of B and EPY provided by RIMF and 
asked their advisers to find the ways to validate and verify the findings of fish stock 
assessments in Vietnam. Again, in 2014, another Vice Minister of MARD criticized that 
stock assessments were unrealistic because investigation methodologies and protocols 
used were biased. In addition, some scientists and experts from NGOs such as FAO, WWF 
disagreed with figures of catches and vessels due to lacking a sufficiently scientific 
knowledge basis. Experts from WWF and FAO proved a depletion of the marine habitats, 
increase in endanger species and threats to livelihoods of poor local fishers. This is an 
indication for overexploitation of fisheries resources and marine ecosystems. In addition, a 
fisheries manager from Bac Lieu province complained that the B and EPY estimations were 
unrealistic. He argued that the catch rate of Bac Lieu fishing fleets decreased gradually, 
did not increase as estimated by scientists from RIMF. 
All local fishers (54) interviewed during 2009-2012 complained that there were too many 
vessels fishing in the coastal waters. They disagreed with policies to build more new 
vessels, but a majority (72%) of them subscribed to subsidy programs for building larger 
vessels operating in the offshore waters replacing the existing small-scale vessels. By that 
time, all of them expected the government to subsidize fishing costs (e.g. fuel costs, 
insurance fees, trading tax etc.). However, 15/54 (28%) fishers asked opposed perspective 
of building more offshore vessels. They argued that the existing crew members were 
unable to manage modern and large-scale vessels effectively in the offshore waters, thus 
they would go fishing in the traditional coastal fishing grounds and conflicts with the 
traditional small-scale vessels would escalate. 
5.4.1.3 The institutionalization of the growth discourse 
After ten years of debating policy discourses of fisheries, in order to finalize the work, a 
new head of planning team accepted politicians’ perspectives to set a higher catch target 
by 2010 at 1.5-1.8 million tons with arguments that the extra catches would be contributed 
by fishing in the international waters. The objective of growth in employment and the 
objective of reduction of fishing vessels were remained. However, the objective of reduction 
of fishing capacity was not corrected. Finally, the 2010 fisheries master plan was adopted 
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by January 2006 with an overarching objective of the growth for the Vietnamese fisheries 
as follows (Prime Minister, 2006): 
+ The development goals: 
- The growth rate in total catches is 3.8% per annum, 
- The growth rate in export value is 10.6% per annum, 
- The growth rate in labour is 3.0% per annum. 
+ The operational objectives: 
- Annual total catches in 2006-2010: 1.5-1.8 million tons (the total landings in 2005 was 1.5 
million tons). 
- Reduction of approx. 40,000 fishing vessels (from 90,000 vessels in 2005 to 50,000 
vessels by 2010), 
- Increase more 80,000 fishing employment (from 420,000 fishers in 2004 to 500,000 
fishers by 2010).  
Clearly, the growth objectives of the fisheries were remained in the period of 2006-2010. 
This aligned with the objectives of the general socio-economic development strategy in 
2001-2010 adopted by the National Party Congress (National Party Congress IX, 2001b). 
In addition, this growth rates were also in line with the statistics in 1996-2005 published by 
the GSO.  
Moreover, the discourse of enhancing the offshore fishing fleets was legalized in the 
fisheries laws in 2003, which stipulated that the government provides incentives and 
favourable policies to facilitate developing fishing capacity in the offshore waters. The 
article 12 of the fisheries law articulated that “the state provides comprehensive policies on 
investment, training, information, fishing infrastructure and logistics to encourage 
individuals and organizations to enhance the offshore fishing” (National Assembly, 2003 
p.6). This was also resonated with policies on national security and sovereign in the 
Vietnamese EEZ. The article 4 of the fisheries law specifies that “fishing activities have to 
operate in combination with ensuring the notational security and protecting the national 
sovereigns at seas” (National Assembly, 2003 p.2). Therefore, increasing the offshore 
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fishing capacity has been advocated in Vietnam. It was evident that the perspective of 
dominant discourse coalition composed of the state actors influenced strongly on the 
fisheries policy decisions. This discourse coalition contradicted the conservation and the 
community coalitions around the issues of overexploitation and conflicting with small-scale 
fishing vessels. 
Following this discourse, the government has provided subsidies for the fisheries in 2008 
to remain fishing at seas (Prime Minister, 2008). In this program, government provided 87 
million USD to subsidize fuel costs and insurance fees for 99,601 vessels in 2008 
(DECAFIREP, 2008). The government has subsidized fuel costs and insurance fees for 
offshore fishing since 2010 (Prime Minister, 2010b), and provided credit for building more 
vessels with priority for steel vessels (Government of Vietnam, 2014). This program 
provided approx. 447 million USD to build 1,005 offshore vessels (MARD, 2017). 
Furthermore, the government also provided incentives and favourable policies to improve 
efficiency of the fishing fleets such as delivering freely forecasts of fishing grounds, fisheries 
extension programs on fishing equipment and nets, free to do fishing in the offshore waters 
etc. By these efforts, the fishing capacity of the Vietnamese fisheries has developed 
impressively in term of the statistical index in the last two decades from 41,266vessels in 
1990 to 110,950 vessels in 2016. 
5.4.2 THE CONSERVATION DISCOURSE 
5.4.2.1 Development of the conservation storyline 
Conservation of fisheries resources encompasses limitation on total catches and fishing 
capacity, and reduction of harmful impacts of fishing activities. By the end of 1980s, 
indications of depleting fisheries resources, especially shrimp, squid and high value fish 
(e.g. snappers, groupers, mackerel) were seen apparently in Vietnam. Juveniles of shrimp 
and fish were caught commonly in trawl fishery. This leaded to a reduction of the catch rate 
of fishing fleets (MOFI, 1988). In order to address this problem, technical measures (e.g. 
fishing gears and methods prohibited to use, species prohibited to catch, closed areas and 
seasons, size of fish to be caught) to protect fisheries resources were introduced in the 
Vietnamese fisheries in 1989  (Government of Vietnam, 1990; National Assembly, 1989). 
As a result, the fisheries surveillance system was established over 28 coastal provinces. 
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This system operated 62 fisheries patrol vessels to prevent, deter and eliminate fishers 
from employing destructive fishing gears and methods throughout the national waters. In 
addition, government also did not encourage development of the small-scale fishing fleets 
operating in the coastal waters since 1993 (MOFI, 1994). 
However, this could not help stopping depletion of the harvested fish stocks such as 
shrimps, squids, groupers etc., even became more and more serious in 1990s (MOFI, 
1996). MOFI acknowledged that the marine fisheries resources in the coastal waters were 
overfished seriously inducing fishers applying destructive fishing methods to increase their 
catches and incomes (MOFI, 1995b, 2000). In 2000, MOFI intended to reduce gradually 
the fishing capacity in the coastal waters during the period of 2001-2006 (MOFI, 2000). 
However, a concrete plan of reducing vessels (i.e. number of fishing vessels, timeframe) 
was not defined clearly, so the number of fishing vessel did not decrease in practice. In 
addition, some scientists documented a decline trend of fisheries resources and suggested 
measures to protect and recover fish stocks in Vietnamese waters. For instance, Thuoc 
proved that shrimps in coastal waters along the coast of Quang Ninh – Hai Phong and Minh 
Hai – Kien Giang were depleted seriously and needed to be protected immediately (Thuoc, 
1995). Hai suggested that keeping the fishing level equals to level in 2001: the total catches 
of 1.35 million tons; fishing effort of 79,000 vessels/3.7 million horse powers (Hai, 2003). 
In addition, restoration of fisheries resources had been conducted regularly in Vietnamese 
waters. Fisheries authorities and other organizations had released million seeds of fish and 
shrimp into the sea every year. A number of marine protected areas (MPAs) such as Hon 
Mun, Cu Lao Cham, Ran Trao, Hon Thom etc. were established in Vietnam to protect 
marine habitats, ecosystems, and fisheries resources. 
5.4.2.2 Competing discourse coalitions around the storyline of fisheries resources 
conservation 
In general, this storyline was promoted by all actors and stakeholders participating into 
planning the Vietnamese fisheries in 2001-2010. The conservation perspective was one of 
three primary goals (i.e. high economic growth, social equity, and environmental protection) 
of the general socio-economic development strategy adopted by the National Party 
Congress (National Party Congress IX, 2001b) and strategy for sustainable development 
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in Vietnam - Agenda 21 for Vietnam (Prime Minister, 2004). Fisheries managers in both 
national and provincial levels acknowledged that the fisheries resources in coastal waters 
had been depleting due to rapid increase in fishing vessels, and using destructive fishing 
gears and methods (MOFI, 1985, 1990b, 1995b).  
As mentioned in the growth storyline, fisheries managers (i.e. policy-makers) at the national 
level believed that fisheries resources in the offshore waters are still abundant, and using 
bigger vessels fishing there would reduce fishing pressure in the coastal waters. This is a 
way to recover and protect the fisheries resources in the coastal waters. They were 
reluctant to introduce direct management tools (e.g. reduction in fishing vessels or fishers, 
limitation of fishing days at sea, limitation of catches) in practice. This is because of 
implementing these tools would require high costs and cause economic waste for society 
on one hand, and cause politically sensitive issues as well as disturbance if local fishing 
communities on the other hand as told by a manager in MOFI. 
In addition, fisheries managers at the national level acknowledged that using explosion, 
poison and electricity to fish had been widespread over provinces leading to rapid depletion 
of fisheries resources in over the country such as shrimp in the south regions, squids in the 
Tonkin gulf, coral reef fish in the central region etc. They intended to remain and improve 
the productivity of fish stocks by enforcement of the technical measures (e.g. banning 
destructive fishing gear and methods, minimum mesh size, fish size to be caught, closed 
areas and seasons, releasing seeds of fish and shrimp). They believed that adequate 
enforcement of the technical measures would restore gradually and sustain the fisheries 
resources for a long time. At the same time, the local fisheries managers suspected 
effectiveness of the technical measures to protect fisheries resources. They explained that 
the existing regulations were unable to stop unregulated fishing (e.g. wrong zoning, using 
the banned fishing gears and methods). In fact, 13/14 local fisheries managers evaluated 
that the existing sanctions for violation were not serious enough severe for fishers to stop 
unregulated fishing. Meanwhile, 3/14 of them agreed with this, but supplemented that 
small-scale and artisanal fishers were so poor, who did not have alternative livelihoods and 
did not have enough money to pay the fine. Therefore, they did not punish such poor local 
fishers in practice. 
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In 1997, a strategy master plan for the Vietnamese fisheries was drafted by a group of 
planners in VIFEP under assistance of DANIDA. According to a fisheries manager in MOFI, 
this master strategy introduced a new approach to plan fisheries into Vietnam, which 
emphasizes on sustainable utilization of fisheries resources. It set objectives of maintaining 
the long-term productivity of fisheries resources and controlling the fishing level that 
producing the MSY of fish stocks. However, it did not quantify its objectives (e.g. concrete 
figures of total catches and fishing vessels) as the conventional way of planning fisheries 
in Vietnam. Planners explained that the government just control biological indexes of fish 
stocks (i.e. CPUE, catch rate of fishing fleets) and other socio-economic indexes of 
fisheries (e.g. incomes, profit, labours, etc.), then they would take management actions 
adaptively to the trend of fish stocks. In this approach, the total catches would be fluctuated 
accordingly with the intrinsic nature of fisheries resources. This was somewhat called as 
the adaptive approach to fisheries management. It is advocated by majority of fisheries 
scientists and managers. However, this was disagreed by conservative managers in MOFI 
and conflicted with traditional procedures for planning economics and sectors in Vietnam. 
Therefore, this master strategy was not adopted and required to revise as the conventional 
approach to planning sectors in Vietnam. 
In 2001, based on forecast of the state of the fisheries resources by 2010, planners in 
VIFEP (VIFEP, 2001) proposed a fishing level for the Vietnamese fisheries by 2010 at 1.4 
million tons (0.6 million tons of fishing in the coastal waters, 0.8 million tons of fishing in the 
offshore waters). They supposed that this fishing level equals to level in 1986, then they 
suggested just remaining 50,000 fishing vessels (30,000 small-scale vessels, and 20,000 
offshore vessels). These objectives met sustainable development of fisheries (remaining 
fishing level below MSY), but also met the growth objective of the sector (total catches by 
2010 increase 9.3% compared to 2000). 
Basically, most fisheries scientists and experts from NGOs justified the planners’ views on 
conservation perspectives articulated in the draft of the 2010 fisheries master plan. Some 
biologists from RIMF agreed with the fishing level and number of vessels as proposed by 
planners, because they saw the catch rate (kg/hour) of trawl surveys declined apparently 
in 1997-2000 (D. M. Son, 2001). Similarly, experts from SEFDEC and FAO also showed 
indications of overfishing in the East Sea (Anon, 2001). However, they were not convinced 
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with the concrete figures of total catches and vessels because there were no scientific 
explanations for these figures. Moreover, scientists and managers suspected feasibility of 
the plan to reduce number of vessels proposed by planners because it would be impossible 
for fisheries authorities to implement a dual task either stopping a rapid trend of increase 
in number of vessels (about 7% per annum in 1991-2000), and scrapping approx. 3,000 
vessels per year. International NGOs justified the conservation perspectives. 1n 1995-
1999, they assisted fisheries authorities to establish MPAs such as Cu Lao Cham, Hon 
Mun, Ran Trao, etc. to protect fish stocks and marine habitats and ecosystems. They also 
trained the local fishers on protecting fish stocks and conserving marine habitats and 
ecosystems, and assisted them to get entering non-fishing livelihoods in provinces of 
Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa. 
The local managers believed that dramatic development of fishing capacity exceeded the 
productivity of the fisheries resources in the traditional fishing grounds. Therefore, they 
agreed with the perspective of reduction in small-scale vessels as proposed by planners. 
They acknowledged there were too many vessels, especially the small-scale vessels 
operating in the coastal waters, thus conflicts among fishers and fisheries became 
increasing in practice. They suggested the planners to define clearly the number and types 
of vessels would be scrapped for each province on one hand, and suggested MOFI to 
assist them implementing fish stocks assessments and planning their fisheries on the other 
hand; so that they so that they could define the concrete number of vessels should be 
scrapped.  
Based on official data (e.g. statistics published by GSO and EPY provided by RIMF), 
managers in MOFI disagreed with the total catches proposed by planners. They suggested 
the total catches by 2010 should be 1.8 million tons which either agree with EPY estimation 
(approx. 1.7 million tons) provided by RIMF (Chung, 1997c) and follow the growth rate 
(approx. 4.0% per year) given the sector in period of 2001-2010 (National Assembly, 2001; 
National Party Congress IX, 2001a). Planners disagreed with this suggestion with the 
arguments as above illustrated in the growth storyline, then they did not revise the plan 
accordingly to the perspectives of managers in MOFI. 
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In 2004, the head of planning team in VIFEP retired and a new director appointed and 
assigned heading the team to finalize the fisheries master plan by 2010. The planning team, 
in collaboration with managers in MOFI and officials in MPI and Government Cabinet, 
updated statistics and EPY and revised the planning report. Consequently, comments and 
development perspectives of fisheries managers in MOFI and official in in MPI and 
Government Cabinet were integrated into the planning documents in 2005 (VIFEP, 2005). 
5.4.2.3 The institutionalization of the conservation discourse  
As above analyzed, concerns about depletion of the fisheries resources emerged in 
Vietnam at the end of 1980s. This was legalized in the ordinance on the fisheries resources 
protection and development in 1989 (National Assembly, 1989). This ordinance stipulates 
measures and tools to protect fisheries resources (e.g. closed areas and seasons, gears 
and fishing methods are not allowed to use, species are not allowed to fish, zoning etc.). In 
addition to this, the fisheries law 2003 provides supplementary provisions on fisheries 
resources conservation (National Assembly, 2003). For instance, the article 4 stipulates 
that “ensuring economic efficiency of fishing activities in combination with protection, 
restoration and sustainable development of fisheries resources and bio-diversity...” 
(National Assembly, 2003 p.2) and the article 8 articulates that “individuals and 
organizations are responsible for protecting, conserving, restoring, and developing the 
fisheries resources” (National Assembly, 2003 p.2). Also, the law requires “the government 
to provide policies to ensure sustainable utilization of the fisheries resources” as articulated 
in the article 5 (National Assembly, 2003 p.2), and “to establish marine protected areas to 
conserve and protect fisheries resources” as illustrated in the article 9 (National Assembly, 
2003 p.5). This law also introduces the tool of annual allowable catch in article 11 “… fishing 
operations must not lead to depletion of fisheries resources; shall be done in compliance 
with regulations of annual allowable catch …” (National Assembly, 2003 p.6).  
In 2006, the 2010 fisheries master plan (Prime Minister, 2006) set up a limitation of total 
catches at 1.5-1.8 million tons by 2010 which is commensurate  with EPY of fisheries 
resources, and made plan to remove about 40,000 vessels in 2006-2010 (8,000 vessels 
per year). In this master plan, although the objective of growth in total catches was still 
remained, but its magnitude (< 3.8% per annum compared to 5.5% in period of 2001-2005) 
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was the first time less than the previous periods (MOFI, 2006a). It reflected that the 
conservation discourse was more influential on planning fisheries in Vietnam. By that time, 
MOFI enacted a circular to ban development of fishing vessels powered with engine 
capacity less than 30HP and the trawlers powered with engine capacity less than 90HP 
since 2006 (MOFI, 2006b). However, these targets were not achieved by 2010. In fact, the 
total landings and number of vessels by 2010 were nearly 1.2 times and 2.6 times 
respectively higher than the targets planned in the master plan. Based on this experience, 
the view on the conservation paradigm was reflected in the fisheries policies in 2011-2020 
(Prime Minister, 2010a, 2013a). In these, the growth in total catches was remained at low 
rate of approx. 0.7% per year, and reduction of nearly 2,000 vessels per year. 
In addition to this, a plan to establish 16 MPAs was adopted in 2010 to protect fisheries 
resources and marine habitats in general and conserve species in danger in particular 
(Prime Minister, 2010c). According to this plan, 0.24% of the sea area would be in the MPAs 
by 2015. So far, 15 MPAs were established and run effectively as observed at the annual 
workshop on Vietnamese MPAs network held in Da Nang on July 14th 2017. 
5.4.3 THE COMMUNITY DISCOURSE 
In this study, the community concept encompasses sustainability and social welfare of the 
fishing communities, who are owners and crew members and live dependently on fishing 
in coastal waters by the artisanal boats and the small-scale vessels powered less than 
90HP. This is important for the Vietnamese fisheries because it accounted for approx. 80% 
of total fishing vessels in Vietnam (MOFI, 1998; Thong, 1998). The small-scale fishing 
communities not only had fewer opportunities to access to the public resources, but also 
were vulnerable from depletion of fish stocks and climate change (Thong, 1998, 2003). 
Therefore, sustainable development of these communities was both the objective and also 
the driving force for the Vietnamese fisheries policies (MOFI, 1995b). Alleviation of poverty 
and improvement of living standard of the local fishing communities were always the 
ultimate objectives of the Vietnamese public policies (Tuan, 2013).  
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5.4.3.1 Development of the community storyline  
Social welfare of the local fishing communities has become a policy discourse in Vietnam 
since the early of the 1980s (MOFI, 1980), when the market-oriented economy regime was 
introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries. The fisheries moved from the centrally planned 
economy to the market-oriented economy where fishers are allowed to decide on their 
fishing business. This lead to a gap between small-scale fishers and large-scale fishers. 
The former ones operate small-scale vessels (i.e. artisanal boats and motorized vessels of 
<90 HP) fishing in coastal waters, the later ones operate larger-scale vessels fishing in 
deeper waters. By that time, government the larger fishing fleets to catch fish for export, 
but also advocated small-scale fishing fleets to fish in shallow waters for daily food and 
domestic consumption.  
By 1990s, the small-scale fisheries were discouraged in Vietnam because they were 
accused of causing deletion of fisheries resources by using destructive fishing methods 
(MOFI, 1990). MOFI evaluated that there were excess of fishing capacity in the coastal 
waters in comparison to the size of the fish stocks; therefore, the number of the small-scale 
fishing vessels should be reduced. As a result, discourse on downsizing small-scale 
fisheries emerged at the end of 1990s (MOFI, 1995b). In order to reduce the number of the 
small-scale fishing vessels, the solution of developing larger-scale vessels was selected by 
the national policy-makers. The policy-makers explained that building more offshore 
vessels, then creating more employment for small-scale fishers. The small-scale fishers 
would move out the small-scale fisheries. Therefore, the number of small-scale vessels 
would reduce on one hand, and the incomes and social welfare of the fishing communities 
would be improved. Consequently, subsidy programs to enhance offshore fishing and 
change livelihoods for small-scale fishers were considered a proper solution to improve the 
social welfare of the local fishing communities. It becomes more necessary for poor small-
scale fishing communities such in Vietnam (Tuan, 2013).  
At that time, another discourse on changing livelihoods for the small-scale fishers emerged. 
The small-scale fishers were encouraged to change their business to go fishing in the 
offshore waters or move to other non-fishing livelihoods (Government of Vietnam, 2014; 
Prime Minister, 1997, 2008, 2010b). These programs provide credit for fishers build new 
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offshore vessels, replace with bigger engine, and change to the more selective gears or 
non-fishing livelihoods.  
However, attempts of the Vietnamese fisheries authorities to reduce the small-scale fishing 
vessels had achieved limited outcomes and implications in 1996-2010. The number of the 
small-scale vessels have not reduced as planned in the state fisheries planning documents. 
They still accounted for a majority (nearly 80% of total fishing vessels) in the Vietnamese 
fishing fleets by 2010. Therefore, the discourse of stabilizing the small-scale fisheries in the 
coastal waters was emerged in the course of planning the Vietnamese fisheries in 2011-
2020 because actors acknowledged that the small-scale fisheries taking a central role as 
an intrinsic characteristic of the Vietnamese fisheries. However, the discourse of 
downsizing of the small-scale fishing fleets was still integrated into the fisheries policies of 
Vietnam in 2010-2020 (Prime Minister, 2010a, 2013a). 
5.4.3.2 Competing discourse coalition around the storyline of maintaining the small-scale 
fisheries 
As above analyzed, depletion of fisheries resources in the coastal waters of Vietnam was 
seen at the end of 1980s. The critical reason for this is the fishing practice of the small-
scale vessels including artisanal boats and motorized vessels less than 90 HP. These 
vessels not only fished juveniles and breeding fish in spawning grounds, but also employed 
destructive fishing gears and methods. Since after that, discourse of downsizing the small-
scale fisheries was debated in planning fisheries. MOFI, in its planning system, shows a 
clear strategy of freezing the number of the small-scale fishing vessels during the course 
of 1991-2000 (MOFI, 1990b, 1995b, 1996, 2001). In order to prevent negative impacts of 
this fishing fleets, technical measures were applied (Government of Vietnam, 1990; 
National Assembly, 1989), but there was no policies to reduce number of vessels or fishers 
implemented.  
This was strongly supported by planners in VIFEP who planned the fisheries in 2001-2010. 
The planners not only agreed with these arguments, but they also proposed an objective 
of reduction of a haft (approx. 40,000 vessels) of the existing small-scale fishing vessels in 
Vietnam (VIFEP, 2001). They argued that, toward a sustainable and effective fisheries 
sector should remain the productivity of fisheries in the coastal waters. They said “all fish 
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stocks originate from the shore”, thus they make a plan to protect the fisheries resources 
and marine habitats and ecosystem in the coastal waters. For this purpose, the best way 
to shrink the small-scale fisheries, according to them. They believed that the living standard 
and social welfare of the local fishing communities would be improved if the size of the 
small-scale fisheries had been downsized, and a number of the small-scale fishers should 
be moved out of the fisheries and could live on non-fishing livelihoods. 
In other views, a fisheries policy-maker in MOFI did not distinguish clearly between the 
community storyline and the other storylines in debating policy discourses. He explained 
that the social welfare of the fishing communities is either the objectives and consequences 
of enhancing offshore fishing and conservation of fisheries resources. He meant that 
enhancing offshore fishing would provide more livelihoods and employment for fishing 
communities in general and the small-scale fishing communities in particular. Conservation 
of fisheries resources and marine ecosystem would maintain the productivity of fish stocks, 
then the catch rates and incomes of fishing fleets would be maintained. This argument was 
supported by most actors and stakeholders involving in planning fisheries. Officials in MPI 
and Government Cabinet supported this because it was agreed with the political views of 
modernization and industrialization of fisheries and would contribute to improvement of 
living standard and social welfare of the coastal communities.  
This was also advocated by local fisheries managers. The local fisheries managers 
believed that development of the offshore fishing, and changing livelihoods for local fishers 
would reduce number of the small-scale fishers and fishing pressure in the coastal waters, 
and then fisheries resources there would be restored gradually. A fisheries manager from 
Ben Tre province agreed to reduce the number of small-scale vessels with planners, but 
he suggested planners to define concrete number for each province and polices to buyback 
these vessels as well as provide alternative livelihoods for influenced fishers. 
For scientist and experts from NGOs, they supported for this argument in particular 
aspects. For instance, international NGOs supported establishing MPAs to conserve 
fisheries resources and marine habitats and ecosystems. They argued that this is a way to 
contribute to sustainability and improvement of living standard and livelihoods of the local 
fishers. Therefore, they assisted in planning 16 MPAs and funded establishment of MPAs 
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such as Cu Lao Cham, Hon Mun, Ran Trao, Nui Chua, Ho Bay Canh, etc. along the coast 
of Vietnam. 
However, actors and stakeholders used conflicting arguments to frame their discourses 
overtime. This is perhaps due to there was no clear way to distinguish the small-scale 
fisheries from the larger-scale fisheries in Vietnam. Therefore, there have been specific 
policies for small-scale fisheries, but general polices for both ones in practice. All these 
policies have the same objectives of improving living standard and social welfare of the 
coastal communities in Vietnam (Tuan, 2013). Indeed, they provided credit and incentives 
for coastal fishing communities in general to improve their income and living standard and 
change livelihoods (e.g., tax exemption, credit with low interest, cash, training service). 
Consequently, objectives of policies and management strategies sometimes conflicted 
each other. For instance, MOFI planned to reduce small-scale fishing effort in 1991-2000 
(MOFI, 1990b, 1995b), but government provided incentives for remaining fishing by 
launching a policy on eliminating natural taxes for fishing was adopted in 1993 
(Government of Vietnam, 1993). Prime Minister decided downsizing small-scale fisheries 
in 2006-2010 on one hand (Prime Minister, 2006),  but he also subsidized small-scale 
fisheries to enhance fishing capacity in 2008 (Prime Minister, 2008). In addition to this, 
government has continuously launched subsidy programs on the fisheries to enhance the 
offshore fishing, change livelihoods  (Government of Vietnam, 2014, Prime Minister, 1997, 
2008, 2010). 
However, these programs have a low effectiveness because the conditions for access to 
the credit were beyond the capability of the small-scale fishers as argued by fisheries 
managers in 2009-2012 on one hand, and small-scale fishers lack skills to operate larger-
scale vessels on the other hand. This resulted in many of the offshore fishing vessels built 
under these programs  operating at on economic loses (Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam, 2005). In addition, subsidy programs for changing livelihoods of the small-scale 
fishers were also unsuccessful. Most of fishers supported to change livelihoods returned 
the fisheries due to their inability to adapt to the new careers (La, 2010). 
This argument was criticized by planners and scientists. Planners in VIFEP explained that 
enhancing the offshore fishing will narrow down resources in both human and finance to 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
142 
 
develop the small-scale fisheries. Simultaneously, the space (i.e. fishing grounds) of the 
small-scale fisheries would be shrunk for the offshore vessels. This was supported by local 
fishers interviewed in 2009-2012, who complained that many offshore vessels went into the 
coastal waters to fish. This was also acknowledged by 14 provincial fisheries managers 
interviewed in 2009-2012. Fisheries scientists in RIMF and experts from WWF argued that 
regulations on conservation of fisheries resources have negative impacts on small-scale 
fishers in some extents, especially for the small-scale fishers because most closed areas 
and MPAs located in the coastal waters. For instance, establishment of closed areas and 
MPAs would prevent fishers catching in traditionally productive fishing grounds; or using 
the fine size of mesh size for purse seining, trawling makes catch rates reduced. This was 
agreed by fishers interviewed in 2009-2012. 
5.4.3.3 The institutionalization of the community discourse 
Development of the discourse on the small-scale fisheries has been controversial in 
Vietnam. It has been institutionalized contradictorily in fisheries legislation, policies and 
management plans over the last twenty years. The overarching objective of fisheries 
policies intended to discourage development of the small-scale fisheries, but few specific 
cases, government still subsidized them for short-term purpose of remaining fishing at seas 
and creating incomes for the fishing communities in general.  
In fact, the discourse on downsizing the small-scale fisheries was legalized in fisheries law 
(National Assembly, 2003). The article 13 of the fisheries law articulates that “government 
will provide incentives for small-scale fishers by training and capital support to change their 
business to offshore fishing, or by training, capital support and allocation of land/seas to 
change their business to aquaculture” (National Assembly, 2003 p.7). In addition, the 
circular No. 02/2006/TT-BTS enacted in 2006 bans development of fishing vessels 
powered with engine capacity of less than 30 HP and trawlers powered with engine capacity 
of less than 90 HP.  
This discourse was also institutionalized in the 2010 fisheries master plan which nearly 
40,000 small-scale fishing vessels were planned to scrap in 2006-2010. It was also 
reflected partly in other policies such as remaining fishing at seas (Prime Minister, 2008), 
changing to offshore vessels (Government of Vietnam, 2014; Prime Minister, 2010b). It was 
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institutionalized in the fisheries master plan by 2020 of Vietnam as “reduction of the small-
scale vessels from proportion of 82% in 2013 to <70% in 2020 (Prime Minister, 2013a).  
5.5. CONFLICTS AMONG DISCOURSE COALITIONS IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMY 
5.5.1 IS IT A CONSERVATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM? 
As above analyzed, a new approach to planning fisheries was introduced into Vietnamese 
fisheries. This approach follows the conservation paradigm based on multi-disciplinary 
assessments and the best knowledge base rather than the production-based growth 
paradigm and provides general orientations for developing the fisheries at the macro policy. 
But this was not accepted in reality of the Vietnamese context. This may be due to the 
divergence in development perspectives or somethings beyond that such as applicability 
of the approach, etc. 
In 1995-1997, under an analytical framework provided by this approach, planners in 
VIFEP investigated the fishing communities in some coastal provinces of Vietnam and 
concluded that:  
i) The fisheries resources in the coastal waters were overfished, thus increase in 
fishing pressure would impact negatively on bio-diversity, the size of fish stocks and 
their reproduction in future;  
ii) Fishing efficiency of fishing fleets decreased due to over-investment into fishing 
capacity;  
iii) There was a lack of sufficiently scientific bases for sustainable development the 
offshore fisheries; 
iv) The available information and scientific data were insufficient for making informed 
management decisions; 
v) The objective of growth in catches would be beyond the control of the management 
authorities and spend a considerable amount of social and economic costs. 
In this context, a master strategy for the Vietnamese fisheries was formulated with 
emphasis on the conservation of fish stocks and ecosystems to ensure sustainability of 
fisheries resources and optimize socio-economic profits (VIFEP, 1997), with two pillars: 
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appropriate development of the offshore fishing and reduction of the coastal fishing. This 
master strategy proposed plans to implement: 
i) Ensure that fish stocks remained at the above level providing the MSY. Therefore, 
MOFI needs to develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing data on fisheries and 
fisheries resources to provide scientific advice for making policies and management 
decisions; to define a reference point system for managing fish stocks, fisheries and 
marine ecosystem health; and to establish a fisheries management structure based 
on the adaptive indicator-based regime connected various management levels (i.e. 
national, provincial, district levels); 
ii) Establish a fisheries management regime based on the fishing rights and obligations 
given to the local fishers. This regime would end up the open-access fisheries and 
move to the regulated fisheries based on the fishing rights, catch quotas and 
obligations of resource fishers. 
iii) Introduce an alternative management approach to the Vietnamese fisheries, which 
emphasizes on the fisheries management plans at local scales and involvement of 
the local communities into management processes.  
In fact, this strategy was welcomed and highly appreciated by many scientists and fisheries 
managers. The contemporary director of the Planning and Finance Department of MOFI 
evaluated that “The master strategy was made based on advanced ideologies and the best 
scientific arguments I have ever read”. He believed that this strategy would enable the 
Vietnamese fisheries to develop sustainably if MOFI had been provided enough resources 
to implement. For me, it integrated innovative fisheries management approaches. It also 
met requirements and principles for sustainable management of fisheries resources and 
fisheries adopted by United Nation and FAO. For instance, fishing at the catch level to 
ensure the long-term sustainability  of fish stocks – MSY (United Nations, 1982), making 
fisheries management decisions based on the best available information in a precautionary 
approach (Cochrane, 2009; Garcia, 1995; United Nations, 1992), and implementation of 
the responsible fisheries (FAO, 1995). 
As other developing countries, Vietnam should follow the production-based growth 
paradigm to develop the nation. Furthermore, its fisheries resources in the offshore waters 
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had been almost unexploited. In addition to this, the statistics implies a promising growth 
rate of the catches for the coming years. At the same time, fish stock assessments and 
fisheries socio-economic investigations had not been implemented regularly. Therefore, 
there was no solid evidence showing the real state of the fisheries resources as well as 
socio-economic performance of fishing fleets in the Vietnamese waters. In this context, a 
development plan for the Vietnamese fisheries should be made to show clearly quantitative 
and measureable objectives according to the development indexes of the sector (e.g. total 
catches, fishing vessels, labours) as told by the contemporary director of Planning and 
Finance Department of MOFI. This was the same with the arguments of the officials in MPI 
as told by a planner who prepared the draft of this strategy. 
Consequently, the master strategy for the Vietnamese fisheries by 2010 prepared under 
the new approach imported from western experts was rejected by government of Vietnam. 
Clearly, this was due to the divergence in development perspectives and protocols for 
planning fisheries between the existing management system in Vietnam and western 
fisheries planning system. But, it seems to be also due to somewhat importing developed 
fisheries into developing fisheries. The developed fisheries were often evaluated as single 
species fisheries with a smaller number of large-scale industrialization vessels. By contrast, 
the developing fisheries were often characterized with multi-species species fisheries with 
a greater number of small-scale and artisanal vessels. This caused a reluctant thought to 
apply models and approaches originated from the developed fisheries to the developing 
fisheries at least for the Vietnamese context. As observation in 2003-2005, memberships 
of MFST often debated methodology to define indicators if they made sense of showing the 
state of fish stocks and of fishing fleets or did not. In nature, the existing fisheries planning 
system was based on the EPY (the Vietnamese way to interpret the MSY) which was also 
imported from the developed fisheries (Degnbol, 2004). This was conceptualized in the 
Vietnamese fisheries in the early of 1990s, behind the developed fisheries around 20 years 
(Larkin, 1977). Perhaps, it takes a certain delay for implementing an approach imported 
such as the MSY approach.  
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5.5.2 EMERGENCE OF A NEW CONFLICT IN PLANNING FISHERIES  
In terms of fisheries management, various types of conflicts were documented by Charles 
(Charles, 1992) and Muawanah (Muawanah et al., 2012) as illustrated in chapter 2. 
Different from these conflicts, a kind of conflict between the actors (i.e. the planner who 
planning fisheries and manager who deciding fisheries plans) in planning fisheries was 
documented in the case of Vietnam. Tangibly, the planner strongly opposed the fishing 
level suggested by the manager and vice versa. The planner proposed a figure based on 
projection of the state of the fish stocks which was considered with much uncertainty. This 
projection was made based on the out pf dated data which were collected in 1978-1980 
and a Phan’s speculation in fish stocks by 1988 (Phan, 1988). At the same time, the 
manager suggested another figure based on the official statistics of total ladings and the 
EPY estimation of fisheries resources which were considered as magic and distorted data. 
This conflict was not addressed for a long time, around 5 years from 2001-2006. 
This may be due to various reasons such as personal perception, perspectives, institutional 
arrangements, academic culture, etc. Two main reasons could be observed that: i) different 
perspectives for planning fisheries, and ii) there is a lack of reliable available data. For the 
former one, the managers still seemed to follow the planning principles of the centrally 
planned regime which prioritizes the growth objective and set the mandatory targets for the 
next period based on the growth rates of the previous periods. They expected to enhance 
fishing capacity to catch more fish. In this system, all objectives must be quantified and 
controlled by the government. At the same time, the planners followed the free market-
oriented economy with emphasis on sustainable utilization of fisheries resources and 
advocated the adaptive management regime. They intended to remain the existing fishing 
level and monitor further the state of fishing fleets, fisheries resources and socio-economic 
conditions of the fishing communities, then make management decisions adaptively with 
the actual state of the fisheries and fish stocks. They also intended changing the structure 
of fisheries from the sector of many small-scale vessels owned by separate household to 
the sector of less vessels managed by less skilled owners. This made them conservative 
in setting a low growth rate of catches and reduction of a half of the existing number of 
fishing vessels. For the second reason, both of them knew very well about the nature of 
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knowledge they used for making the numbers. They understood their uncertainty, but they 
could not find a reliable knowledge basis in that context. 
The conflict was only addressed when the planner retired and left the work for another 
planner. The new one wanted to end up all existing projects in VIFEP including the project 
of making the fisheries master plan by 2010. Therefore, he accepted revised the planning 
report according to perspectives and comments of managers. Finally, the master plan was 
adopted by January in 2006. However, the objectives of this master plan were not achieved 
in practice. This may be connected with the conflict in planning fisheries between planner 
and manager. This conflict was not seen in the course of planning the Vietnamese fisheries 
in 2010-2020. Therefore, the conflict between planner and manager in planning fisheries 
may emerge in an economy in transition or in a context of lacking reliable knowledge basis 
for planning fisheries. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam was made in the transition period from the 
centrally planned economy to the market-oriented based economy. In the planning process, 
innovative fisheries management approach (i.e. the multi-disciplinary approach based on 
the best knowledge base) was introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries. This was highly 
appreciated by progressive perspectives and could help fisheries authorities control 
effectively and efficiently their fisheries towards the sustainable development (Raakjær, 
2009). This was endorsed by minister of fisheries in 2001 by establishing a consultation 
structure to providing scientific advices for management decisions. However, this approach 
was not accepted in practice. As a result, the 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam was 
still made following conventional approach which was used within the centrally planned 
system, where the planning targets are set in the centralized and government-based 
paradigm. This leads to conclusion that it was hardly for the multi-disciplinary perspective 
based on the knowledge base to stay within the centralized and government-based 
management system such as in Vietnam. 
In a situation of lacking a line of the knowledge bases for planning fisheries and insufficient 
involvement of interested groups into planning processes, debates and conflicts would be 
associated with the political power and personal interests. The views of the coalition having 
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the strongest political power will dominate the policies, and policy decisions will be 
bypassed scientific and practical arguments. These implications, in combination with the 
poor academic publication as the case of Vietnamese fisheries may appear the conflict 
between planner and manager. This conflict may aggravate in a system in transition, even 
create personal enmity among scientists and scientists with other actors involving in 
planning fisheries.  
The 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam was made within a context of a lack of reliable 
data and without involvement of fishers who decide their catches and fishing capacity. The 
knowledge used for debating was provided by scientists and bureaucrats, and the fishers’ 
knowledge was not discussed in making the 2010 fisheries master plan in Vietnam.  This 
resulted in contradictions among development orientations and operational targets of the 
master plan. And, the legitimacy of the policy decision was low in practice. This shows a 
gap between the rhetoric plan and realistic action in a transition economy regime. 
Paradoxically, the 2010 fisheries master plan was not implemented at all in Vietnam. The 
management objectives (i.e. total catches, number of vessels) were not enforced through 
deciding management measures in practice (see chapter 7). Similarly, no monitoring and 
reviewing programs were not implemented to provide feedbacks from reality of the 
fisheries. This would be a limitation of the existing system in providing opportunities for 
improving the fisheries planning system in Vietnam. It was also a critical reason for the 
Government of Vietnam to refuse the innovative fisheries planning approached introduced 
by the DANIDA project. This may be a typical example for the ineffectiveness of the 
fisheries management system based on the government-based and centrally planned 
regime. It also exposed obstacles in the way of introducing innovative fisheries 
management approaches and implementing the conservation objectives of the fisheries. 
As a result, the fisheries have been seen as a big development project without proper 
acknowledge and concerns to the fact, that the fish resources actually are exhaustible as 
similar understanding was dominating in Europe in the late 1800’s when Huxley proclaimed 
that “… probably all the great sea fisheries are inexhaustible; that is to say that nothing we 
do seriously affects the number of fish…” (Huxley, 1883 p.8). 
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CHAPTER 6: KNOWLEDGE INPUTS TO DEFINE THE TOTAL 
CATCHES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for managing fisheries has increasingly 
gained popularity since 1930s by theory of Russell (Russell, 1931), by the surplus-
production models (Schaefer, 1991) due to its simplicity, understandability and direction of 
management activities (Kesteven, 1997). One of the MSY definition widely used in the 
world is that “MSY is the largest average catch or yield that can be continuously taken from 
a stock under existing environmental conditions” (Ricker, 1975 p.4). Although, the MSY 
concept was refined in comparison with the original meaning (Larkin, 1977), it has still 
remained uncertainties and limitations in sustaining the population of the exploited fish 
stocks. Therefore, the management approach of TAC-based which based on the MSY has 
not help to remain sustainability of fish socks  (FAO, 2004; Raakjær, 2009). In 2002, the 
world leaders acknowledged the vital role of the fisheries to economic viability, food security 
and biodiversity, and made a call for maintaining and restoring fish stocks that can produce 
MSY with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks on an urgent basis and 
where possible not latter 2015 (United Nations, 2002). Evidence that the meaning of the 
MSY was refined towards conservation rather than the potential yield to catch one. In other 
words, fishing at MSY is to ensure the long-term productivity of exploited fish stocks, and 
MSY has commonly used as a tool for managing fisheries in the world (Cochrane, 2009). 
In the Vietnamese fisheries, exploitable potential yield (EPY) interpreted as the MSY and 
standing biomass (B) were used as indicators to assess the health of the fisheries 
resources, and total catches (TC), are the volume of fish to be fished in a specific time, was 
used as a tool (i.e. fishing level) for planning the fisheries. In addition, total fish landings 
(TL), are the volume of fishing production landed at shore, was used as an index to 
measure development of the fisheries. In fact, the figure of TC is the most important 
element of the fisheries planning documents in Vietnam as analyzed in chapter 5. It takes 
a role of the total allowable catch (TAC) used in the management plan of the TAC-based 
management regime as in developed fisheries. The figure of TC is articulated clearly in any 
fisheries plans and administration reports of the fisheries sector in various levels (i.e. 
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communal, district, provincial, and national levels). To define the figure of TC in a fisheries 
master plan, the knowledge inputs should be used including socio-economic development 
strategies, official statistics, fish stock assessments and the relevant available information 
(Government of Vietnam, 2006; Prime Minister, 1998). However, there was no 
standardized frameworks or protocols for defining TC in Vietnam. This chapter examines 
the knowledge inputs for setting the TC in the Vietnamese fisheries plans with emphasis 
on the case of the 2010 fisheries master plan approved by the Prime Minister at the decision 
No. 10/2006/QD-TTg (Prime Minister, 2006). Two main questions raised in this chapter are: 
i) how was the TC-based management approach conceptualized in the Vietnamese 
fisheries? and ii) what and how knowledge inputs were used to define TC in Vietnam?  
6.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE TC-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE 
VIETNAMESE FISHERIES 
6.2.1 WHAT IS THE TC? 
FAO and other fisheries management system distinguished the TL concept from the TC 
concept. FAO defined the TC includes all living biological materials retained or captured by 
fishing gears (including corals, jellyfish, tunicates, sponges and other non-commercial 
organisms) whether brought on board the vessel or not (FAO, 1996b). The TL is defined 
as the portion of the TC brought ashore or transshipped from fishing vessels (Kelleher, 
2005). Based on these definitions, in terms of the weight, the TC reflects the real impacts 
of fishing activities on the resources base and marine ecosystems. It is not less than the 
TL landed at shore after discarding illegal and invaluable productions. Generally, TC is 
interpreted as the TAC in measuring the fishing level of the specific fish stocks in other 
fisheries in Vietnam. The TAC is applied as a tool for managing the exploited fish stocks in 
fisheries called as the output control fisheries management system widespread introduced 
in the global fisheries (Pope, 2009). However, European fishers were for many years, not 
allowed to land undersized fish or species for which they did not have quotas. This lead to 
a large volume of discards in the region (European Commission, 2007). This means that 
the TC would be much higher than TL in practice. This fact would influence the accuracy 
of setting the TAC (European Paliament, 2013). 
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In Vietnamese fisheries, two concepts of the TC and the TL were named the same as “Tổng 
sản lượng”. They were understood in the same meaning as the total productions of the 
fisheries in common contexts. They were either interpreted as the management objective 
or development target in the planning system, and also used as an index to measure the 
performance of the sector. This understanding resulted from the fact that there were almost 
no discards in the Vietnamese fisheries. Though, there has been no systematic 
investigation on discards in the Vietnamese fisheries, one study evaluated that the 
Vietnamese fisheries had insignificant discards (Kelleher, 2004). In addition, though 
investigation (2009-2012) and observations over than 20 years, the Vietnamese fishers 
often landed almost all useable and profitable things remained in their fishing gears. 
However, all fishers interviewed acknowledged that they sometime discard a volume of the 
low value fish. For instance, a purse seine fisher in Khanh Hoa discarded more than three 
tons of the red big-eye fish in a trip, because it was uneconomical to preserve this catch 
onboard in a couple of days. For bottom trawling fishery, fishers assumed that they discard 
a rate of catches mixing into rubbish and waste. Therefore, the volume of the TC must be 
higher than the TL in practice of the Vietnamese fisheries. This means that the real mortality 
rate of fish stocks due to fishing is higher than the TL statistics published by GSO as well 
as in other fisheries documents in Vietnam.  
In an academic context, the TC was sometimes interpreted as the limitation reference point 
in Vietnam. For instance, the head of a planning team argued that he planned the 2010 TC 
of 1.4 million tons was to limit the fishing level for conservation purpose. According to him, 
this level was below the EPY of fisheries resources, but was the maximum economic yield 
of the fisheries. Some other scientists also agreed with this and explained that the TC was 
defined based on the EPY. They believed that fishing at TC, then EPY of the fisheries 
resources would be remained for a long time. In other words, the sustainability of fisheries 
resources would be achieved if the fishing mortality (i.e. TC) was kept not higher than the 
EPY.  
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6.2.2 ADOPTION OF THE TC-BASED APPROACH FOR PLANNING FISHERIES IN 
VIETNAM 
The concept of TC has been used for planning the Vietnamese fisheries for a long time, at 
least since 1960 as the 1960 annual plan stored in VIFEP. Although, the interpretation of 
TC has modified in accordance with changes in the planning system in Vietnam, the TC 
has been the critical element of the fisheries planning system in Vietnam. 
6.2.2.1 The TC-based under the centrally planned regime 
In this period, the TC estimate was set a mandatory target given to the fisheries sector (i.e. 
MOFI) should accomplish in a specific planning period (i.e. yearly, five-year). This was 
defined based on estimation of the total consumption demands for fisheries products and 
the available fishing capacity of the fleets. In this system, government assumed that the 
potential yields of fisheries resources are far from its limitation (Tuan, 2013), hence the 
fishing effort should be enhanced as much as possible to maximize catches. The TC 
estimation was defined in a bottom-up process within the national economy planning 
system from the commune, district, province, to the whole nation. Based on the demand 
for fish of the population in the commune, estimation of demands for fisheries production 
of the commune in the next planning period is defined, then it would be submitted to and 
added up the demands for fisheries production of the district. This is implemented similarly 
for estimating demands for fisheries production of the province and nation level. Based on 
this the central government defines the TC in metric ton for the next planning period. 
This TC is divided into the catch mandatory targets and hierarchically allocated in a top-
down process within the national economy planning system from the nation, province, 
district, to commune as illustrated in chapter 5. The fishing vessels or fishing entities e.g. 
cooperatives, companies, communes, districts, provinces, MOFI have obligations to 
accomplish the catch mandatory targets given by higher management level. They were 
supported and encouraged to maximize and exceed the catch mandatory targets given. 
For instance, MOFI explained that a high rate (17.6% compared to 1974) of increase in TL 
in 1975 was due to the appropriate policy to enhance fishing effort of decree No. 93 
regarding to collectivization of fisheries. Two provinces: Thuan Hai and Kien Giang were 
highly appreciated and rewarded for gaining the highest growth rate of TL. They were 
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praised for their outstanding leadership to achieve the highest TL at the annual meeting of 
the fisheries sector in 1975 (MOFI, 1976). In addition, the 1979 fisheries plan stated that 
the fisheries sector had to mobilize all available resources and work harder to obtain a high 
growth in TL at the rate of 15.5% compared to 1978 (MOFI, 1979). As a result, a growth in 
TC was always set as an overwhelming objective of the fisheries planning system in this 
regime. The TC for the next period was always set higher than the TC as well as TL of the 
previous period to meet increasing demands for fish productions of society as illustrated in 
the annual plan of MOFI in 1960-1980 (MOFI, 1981). Since 1981, the However, the 
annually planned TC was almost not obtained in practice (MOFI, 1990a). This means that 
the annual TL was always lower than the TC planned in the annual fisheries plans. MOFI 
explained that this was due to deficiencies of the existing management system (i.e. 
collectivization of fishing throughout the country) which was unable to mobilize resources 
and operate fishing business effectively (MOFI, 1990a). 
In terms of fisheries research, researches to improve fishing effectiveness were prioritized 
in this period. For instance, researches on implication of electric lamps and fish finders, 
technical improvement of fishing gear system, etc. were carried out. Fisheries resources 
surveys were also conducted in this period, but they were implemented to understand 
distribution patterns and locate potential fishing grounds to guide fishing fleets to come and 
fish. Fish stock assessments to estimate MSY and population dynamics for proper 
utilization of fisheries resources were less prioritized. The fisheries management regime in 
this period may be categorized as the open-access regime leaded by the government. 
6.2.2.2 TC-based in the market-oriented based regime 
As ineffectiveness of the fishing fleets under management of the centrally planned 
economy in 1960-1980, the government piloted a policy on the self-balancing mechanism 
to fishing companies and fishing co-operatives since 1981 (The State Planning Committee 
of Vietnam, 1981). In this policy, fishing fleets were no longer operated by government, but 
do business themselves. This means that government would not provide fishing costs and 
consume the catches; fishers had to make themselves fishing decisions (e.g. what, how, 
when and where to fish) to maximize their benefits. As a result, all fishing vessels were 
privatized and operated by share-stock companies or individual households. Despite, this 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
154 
 
has remained in practice. The TC has still been defined accordingly to the same procedures 
in the fisheries planning system of the government, but it was no longer divided in to the 
catch mandatory targets and allocated to fishing entities as done before. Instead, individual 
fishers were allowed to decide their volume of catches, and choose agents to sell their 
catches (Tuan, 2013). Also, the TL has no longer controlled strictly as in the centrally 
planned regime, but it is regularly estimated by the GSO to measure the development 
performance (i.e. a statistic index) of the fisheries. This was used as an official knowledge 
basis for evaluating and planning the fisheries. 
In this regime, the fisheries planning system in general and the TC in particular are operated 
within the government system, they do not influence on the fishing industry as the centrally 
planned regime. By official statistics of TC, government may image the development and 
scale of fisheries and allocate the state resources (e.g. budgets, human, institutional 
arrangements, etc.) to the fisheries authorities at various levels (e.g. MARD at national 
level, DARD at provincial level). In addition, it was not divided into the catch mandatory 
targets as the centrally planned regime, or into the catch quotas as the TAC-based 
management system in other fisheries (e.g. EU, USA, Canada, New Zealand etc.). Clearly, 
the TC used in the Vietnamese fisheries planning system is a tool for planning the state 
budgets rather than a tool for managing the fisheries. 
6.2.3 INTEGRATION OF THE MSY CONCEPT INTO THE VIETNAMESE FISHERIES  
Conservation of fisheries resources became a policy discourse in the Vietnamese fisheries 
at the end of 1980s when indications of overfishing were documented (Chung, 1998; MOFI, 
1990b; Thong, 1998; Thuoc, 1995; Thuoc & Long, 1997). A gradual decline in catch rate of 
surveys, changes in species composition and disappearance of species were observed in 
scientific surveys in 1990-1998 (Chung, 1998; Thuoc, 1995; Thuoc & Long, 1997). In 
addition, the CPUE of fishing fleets and incomes of fishing communities decreased year by 
year (MOFI, 1990b; Thong, 1998; Thuoc & Long, 1997). Therefore, the MSY concept was 
discussed and introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries, and it was used as a limitation 
reference point for planning the fishing level for the Vietnamese fisheries in 2001-2010. 
However, the MSY is interpreted as the EPY which is understood as the potential yield of 
the fisheries resources as explained in chapter 4. In the Vietnamese context, the EPY is 
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used as the MSY in planning the fisheries. The fishery law (National Assembly, 2003) 
defines the TC as the volume of catches being allowed to catch in specific areas. This 
means that the TC concept being used in the Vietnamese fisheries is interpreted as the 
concept of TAC used under the output control regime (i.e. the TC-based management 
system) being widespread used in the world fisheries (Pomeroy, Anh, & Thong, 2009). 
Similar to the TAC-based system, based on the EPY estimation of fisheries resources, 
annual TL and other considerations, the TC is planned in the fisheries planning system in 
Vietnam. It is believed that fishing at the TC, the fisheries resources would be maintained 
in a long term. 
However, the TC is collectively estimated for all species in specific areas, not for separate 
species as done in the TAC-based management system used in other fisheries. In addition, 
it is not divided into catch quotas and allocated to fishing vessels, and TL of fishing vessels 
is not enumerated in practice of Vietnam. This is named as the TC-based management 
system for the Vietnamese fisheries. It is still fit for the conventional approach to planning 
the fisheries due to taking the development rate of the TL as a basis on one hand, it also 
is suited with the conservation paradigm which based on the MSY on the other hand. 
6.3 THE KNOWLEDGE INPUTS FOR PLANNING THE TC 
As mentioned above, the fisheries planning process relies on the four main inputs as 
follows: i) official statistics; ii) fish stock assessments; iii) socio-economic development 
strategies; and iv) other relevant available information published by the mandate institutions 
(Government of Vietnam, 2006; Prime Minister, 1998). The official statistics are composed 
of annual TL and other statistical data related to fisheries such as fishing vessels, fisheries 
labour, fisheries households, etc. published regularly by GSO. The fish stock assessments 
are often conducted by RIMF to provide estimations of B and EPY for planning the TC. The 
economic development strategies provide political development views and orientations 
such as growth rates in TC, income and employment. The other relevant information 
includes a range of information such as export rate, climate change, urbanization, security 
at seas, etc. However, as illustrated in the chapter 4, the TC is defined primarily based on 
the official statistics of TL and the EPY estimation, and chapter 5 presents a general 
procedure for making the 2010 fisheries master plan including arguments for planning the 
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TC. Therefore, this chapter goes further into the concrete steps of producing knowledge 
(i.e. TL and EPY) for planning TC with emphasis on the TC of the 2010 fisheries master 
plan in Vietnam. 
The investigation shows that the annual TL from 1996-2004 and EPY estimated in 1997 
and in 2003 were used as the knowledge inputs for planning TC of the 2010 fisheries 
master plan. These knowledge inputs were produced and validated internally by the 
governmental institutions and agencies (i.e. RIMF for EPY, and GSO for TL). Figure 6.1 
shows the interaction and process for producing the knowledge inputs (i.e. TL, EPY) to plan 
the TC of the 2010 fisheries master plan in Vietnam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Producing knowledge used for planning TC of the 2010 Vietnamese fisheries 
master plan. 
As shown in figure 6.1, the TC and its knowledge bases were just interplay within the 
government system. The GSO (a competent department of MPI) and RIMF (a research 
institution of MOFI) are mandated to produce knowledge inputs: the TL of the fisheries and 
EPY of fisheries resources for planning the TC of the fisheries planning system. As a routine 
work, GSO conducted and publicized the TL figure twice a year (i.e. the first 6-month, the 
second 6-month as well as the whole year). The knowledge inputs and methodology for 
estimating TL are analyzed in detail in the next paragraphs. Meanwhile, the EPY was 
estimated by RIMF as irregular projects assigned by MOFI or contracted with other 
governmental agencies. This process presented clearly that the TC did not influence the 
human and the natural systems as shown in figure 6.1. 
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6.3.1 ESTIMATION OF THE TL 
6.3.1.1 estimation of TL at provincial level 
Legally, the TL estimation is conducted and published officially for each 6-month and for 
the whole year by the GSO system in two scales: the provincial and the national scales 
(Government of Vietnam, 2004). The TL estimation at the provincial scale is implemented 
firstly. The TL of the whole country is then calculated by summing up all the provincial TL 
figures. Although, the TL estimation of the district and commune scales is not required, but 
it is implemented in fact for evaluating the production of these scale20. The provincial TL is 
estimated by the sampling-based method and calculated by the equation 6.1. As illustrated 
in equation 6.1, the accuracy of TL estimation depends on the CPUE estimation of fishing 
fleets and defining the number of vessels by fishing fleets. 
 TL = 	 (C' ∗ N*)   (6.1) 
 C' 	= 	
,-./
0
             (6.2) 
Where, 𝐶2 is the mean CPUE of the sampling vessels of the gear i, calculated as by the 
equation 6.2, Ci is the landing of vessel i, n is the number vessels sampled; 𝑁4 is the 
number of fishing vessels of the gear i registered in the province. 
As investigation, although the CPUE is estimated by the random sampling method, but the 
number and the protocol for selecting the landing samples are not specified explicitly 
throughout the system. According to FAO, the accuracy of TL estimation depends on the 
size of sample (Stamatopoulos, 2002). The sample size is defined by on the population 
size for landings in a month. This was not implemented in Vietnam. Instead, the number of 
landing samples was decided dependently on the annual budget allocated to the provincial 
GSO. It was taken at 7.0-7.5% of the total vessels registered in each province as 
investigated in Quang Ninh, Binh Dinh, Thanh Hoa and Kien Giang provinces. This size 
was much lower than the size to achieve the accuracy or 90% as the FAO’s guidebook. 
                                         
20 The TL statistics at the district scale are estimated by the provincial GSO staffs and the TL 
statistics of the commune scale are estimated by the district GSO staffs as told by GSO staff in 4 
provinces under investigation. 
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For instance, according to FAO’s guidebook, in order to achieve the accuracy of TL 
estimation at 90% in Binh Dinh province by 2012, the size of landing samples was 9,60021, 
but just only 1,100 landing samples were taken to calculate CPUE in practice. This means 
that the size of landing samples for estimating CPUE was not at the safe level to achieve 
a desired accuracy.  
In terms of sample distribution, in sampling principles, landing samples should be taken 
representatively from all landings of various fishing fleets in all landing sites in specific time. 
In fact, the landing samples was personally decided by the GSO individual staffs. The GSO 
staffs intend to sample landings with the bigger and accessible vessels in concentration 
landing sites, with vessels having good catches, rather than sample at smaller landing sites 
with vessels having less landings. In addition to this, the landing samples were not taken 
with the coverage of all fishing fleets in both dimensions: the engine power segments and 
specific fisheries. The fishing vessels were not stratified into specific fleets such as trawl 
net for fish, trawl net for shrimp, gill net for squid, gill net for mackerels, instead into 
collective trawl net, gill net. But, their landings differed considerably from each other. For 
instance, the average CPUE of the 20-89HP drift gill netters was 259.0kg/100m/day, 12.7 
times higher than that of 20-89HP bottom gill netters (20.4kg/100m/day) as the estimation 
of the landing enumerator program conducted in 2001-2003 in Da Nang landing sites. 
They were also not stratified into segments of different engine capacity such as trawl net 
of <30HP, of 30-89HP, of 90-149HP, etc. The investigation shows that around 10% of 
landing samples were taken with the fishing fleet of engine power <30HP, whereas, this 
fleet accounted for approx. 80% of fishing vessels in Vietnam. In fact, the landings of 
smaller vessels are often lower than that of the bigger vessels in the same fishery. For 
instance, the CPUE of the trawl net fleet with engine capacity >90HP was 6.6 times higher 
than that of the 20-50HP trawl net fleet. Meanwhile, the number of the trawlers with engine 
power of >90HP was 5.3 times less than that of the 20-50HP trawlers as investigated in 
Quang Ninh province in 2009.  
                                         
21 In 2012 there was approx. 8,000 fishing vessels registered in Binh Dinh, equally 25 fishing fleets. 
Each fleet took more than 2,000 fishing trips in a year. 
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In terms of sampling time, FAO suggests landings should be sampled monthly with 
coverage of fluctuation of landings according to natural characteristics of fish stocks (e.g. 
the moon phases). The TL is estimated twice a year by the first six-month and the second 
six-month, then the landings were sampled twice a year in May and November in practice. 
The GSO staffs sampled landings by interviewing fishers on their volume of landings in 
each month. However, fishers often did not record their landings monthly, but accounted 
for every fishing trip in practice. Therefore, they were unable to remember landings they 
landed in each month as told by fishers in provinces under investigation. In fact, fishers 
implemented a couple of fishing trips in each month depending on gear used and the size 
of vessels. Normally, the small-scale vessels operating in the coastal waters landed their 
catches at least 4 times in a month, even they landed their catches every day, and the 
larger vessels landed their catches 1-2 times in a month. At the same time, many bigger 
vessels made a fishing trip with a couple of months. In addition, fishers told that they were 
reluctant to tell their real volume of landings because they did not want people knowing 
their business on one hand, and avoid from paying more fees and taxes on the other hand. 
This means that, the accuracy of CPUE estimation for calculating TL was problematic, it 
would be verified and validated scientifically to provide more realistic estimation of impacts 
on fishing communities on the fish stocks. 
For the number of fishing vessels, this should be defined in each period of time that reflects 
fishing patterns of fishing fleets (i.e. changes in gears used, in targeting species, in fishing 
grounds). Record of fishing vessels should be provided by the fame surveys before 
implementing the landings surveys (Stamatopoulos, 2002). However, the record of fishing 
vessels for the TL estimation by GSO is the record of fishing vessels provided by the fishing 
vessels registration presented collectively in the 5 main groups of fisheries (i.e. trawl 
fishery, purse seine fishery, gill net fishery, hook and line fishery and other fisheries). It is 
reported yearly, not monthly or six-month, albeit the fishing fleets are changeable in fact in 
Vietnam as analyzed in chapter 4 and chapter 7.  
Furthermore, the number of fishing vessels registered or licensed is often less than the 
number vessels operating in practice because the motorized vessels of <20 HP are not 
required to register at the fisheries authorities. For instance, the number of fishing vessels 
reported in the vessel registration system and in the licensing system was 113,724 and 
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117,345 respectively in 2014 (D-Fish, 2015). In addition, the number of vessels licensed is 
lower than the number of fishing vessels operating in practice. For instance, the number of 
vessels licensed in 2011 only accounted for 70.5% of the total number of vessels fishing in 
practice (D-Fish, 2011). At the provincial level, the proportion of vessels licensed is often 
low in some provinces. For instance, there was 6,727 fishing vessels in Ba Ria – Vung Tau 
province in 2011, but only about 2.0% of fishing vessels were licensed (Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of Baria-Vungtau, 2011). This means that there are 
three different number of fishing vessels available to use in the fisheries system of Vietnam. 
But, there is no standardized guidance on using which number to estimate the TL by the 
equation 6.1. In fact, the provincial GSO staffs told that they used the number of vessels 
provided by the provincial fisheries authority to calculate the TL, but they did not show these 
numbers in detailed. This may leave a room for the provincial GSO to choose the most 
optimum one to produce the TL estimation which supportive the political wills. This may be 
the main reason causing controversial figures of TL estimations between GSO and fisheries 
authorities as observed in 4 provinces of investigation. 
In addition, under assumption that there are no changes in the structure of the fishing fleets 
year by year, the record of fishing vessels reported in the previous year is used to calculate 
the TL of the next year. However, there are considerable changes in the fishing fleet 
structure in practice depending on individual fishers’ experience. For instance, as 
investigation in 2012, nearly 240 squid stick-falling netters in Thanh Hoa province 
transferred to the hand line fishery catching large-head hair-tail fish; nearly two of the third 
gill netters in Binh Dinh province changed to the tuna hand line fishery.  
Besides, it also assumes that all vessels are active and having a volume of landings in 
every month of a year. As illustrated in equation 6.1, the active possibility (boat active 
coefficient) of all vessels is the same in any month. However, many vessels are not active 
for a couple of months or do not have landings due to private reasons (e.g. breaking down 
engine or fishing equipment, lacking crew members or variable costs). In fact, approx. 5% 
of the total fishing vessels did not fish in the whole year of 2009 as investigated in Bac Lieu 
and Quang Ninh. In addition, the active coefficient is also different among fishing vessels. 
A survey shows that the boat active coefficient of fishing fleets in 2003-2004 was from 0.3-
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0.6 (Hai, 2004). This reflects that only 30-60% of total vessels do fishing on any day during 
a month.  
At the same time, the provincial TL was also estimated by the fishery authority – Sub-
DECAFIREP at the provincial level. Some provinces apply the equation 6.3 to estimate the 
TL. This methodology is advised to be used in small-scale and dispersed fisheries such the 
Vietnamese fisheries (Stamatopoulos, 2002)  
 TL = 	 (CPUE' ∗ F* ∗ A ∗ BAC)   (6.3) 
Where, 𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸2 is the mean CPUE of the sampling vessels of the fleet i in a moth; 𝐹4 is the 
potential number of fishing vessels of the fleet i to operate in a month; A is the potential 
days in a month that any individual vessels of the fleet are able to do fishing; BAC is the 
probability that a fishing vessel of a given fleet will be active on any day during a month. 
Within this methodology, the fisheries data (i.e. catch rate, fishing effort, number of potential 
days to fish and active possibility of each fishing fleets) are collected monthly. This 
methodology developed by FAO (Stamatopoulos, 2002) was introduced into and carried 
out in Vietnamese fisheries from 1996-2005 under a project funded by DANIDA. It is more 
advanced than the conventional methodologies used to estimate TL in Vietnam as told by 
a senior official working in the GSO of Vietnam. Application of this methodology, the 
provincial Sub-DECAFIREPs provided different figures of TL estimation in comparison with 
figures produced by the GSO system at the same scales (see chapter 4). However, the 
figures provided by the provincial Sub-DECAFIREP were not accepted as the official 
knowledge for planning the fisheries in Vietnam. In fact, they were just used as a reference 
to verify the figures of TL estimated by GSO before the Chairman of the PPC approving the 
official TL figures in some the provinces. 
6.3.1.2 Decision of TL at provincial level 
The Chairman of the Provincial People Committee (PPC) is in charge of deciding the TL 
estimation of the province. As investigation in 14 provinces, he/she relied on the growth 
rate of ladings adopted in the general socio-economic development plan of the province 
and other consideration to decide the TL figure submitted by the provincial GSO. In fact, 
figure of TL estimation was set no less than to the growth rate of landings planned in the 
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general socio-economic development plans of the province. The GSO staffs and fisheries 
managers shared the same explanation that this is to demonstrate efficiency of the 
administration system and support political power for local fisheries managers as well as 
the provincial politicians. This figure reflects capability of the administration system in terms 
of planning and controlling the fisheries development under the plan of the government.  
Adoption of the statistics in general and the TL estimation in particular is implemented within 
a strict and systematic, but sensitive process as told by GSO staffs interviewed. It is either 
required to meet a proper rate of growth, and also to follow the statistical principles. The 
GSO staffs in Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa and Kien Giang provinces told that, the statistical 
indexes should be varied in a range of ± 7% compared to the previous year figures. If the 
growth rate was set out of this range, then an inspection of collecting and analyzing data 
may be implemented. If do this, the situation would be complicated and concerned with 
many staffs, officials, institutions, even politicians. Therefore, figures of the statistical 
indexes are normally decided in an acceptable range to avoid complications. Consequently, 
the existing management system seemed to accept living with the distorted figures for 
manage their business and sector. For instance, the case of the rice field area in the My 
An commune - An Giang province in 2011, the provincial GSO estimated a figure of 280 
hectares by conventional method, meanwhile a scientist22 estimated a figure of only 30 
hectares by the remote sensing system. The provincial GSO staffs recognized their 
systematic mistakes, but they refused the figure measured by the scientist. One GSO staff 
in An Giang explained that the procedure for verifying the statistical data is very 
complicated, so he and his system just received the scientist’s comments and would 
address the problem if there would be convenient conditions. Similarly, the Thanh Hoa 
GSO was unwilling to decide the area of the tiger shrimp ponds (200 hectares) in 2012 
although they believed that the real figure (estimated about 20 hectares) as told by a 
fisheries manager in Thanh Hoa.  
However, some exceptions were observed in the estimation of annual TL at some 
provinces to pursuit other purposes. For instance, the TL of Thai Binh province and the 
                                         
22Dr. Nguyen Dang Vi used the remote sensing techniques to measure the real-time figure of the 
area of the rice field in My An – An Giang in 2011. 
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tuna TL of Khanh Hoa province were estimated extremely high in 2014. The fisheries 
managers there explained that they did so because they need official basis for facilitating 
the projects of building up the regional fishing ports and fisheries infrastructure in their 
provinces. In another case of Quang Ninh province in 2009, the growth rate of TL seems 
to be relevant with the political agenda. The TL of was set near 30% higher than the figure 
suggested by the provincial GSO to strengthen the political power of a fisheries manager 
as explained by a fisheries staff in Quang Ninh. Similarly, the growth rate of TL in Thanh 
Hoa province in 2009 was also set 14% (nearly twice) higher than the rate adopted in the 
general socio-economic development plan to advocate political influence of a fisheries 
manager. The head of the Thanh Hoa Sub-DECAFIREP told that the leadership pf province 
suspected this suddenly increase in TL on one hand, and wondered that estimating such a 
high TL would damage the provincial economic balances, especially overloading the 
fisheries infrastructure. Then he suggested a rate equal to the one adopted in the general 
socio-economic development plan. However, he accepted the rate of 14% when his junior 
staff advised that the real TL must be higher than that rate in practice. This high rate of TL 
contributed partly to the promotion of a fisheries manager as told by a fisheries manager in 
Thanh Hoa province. It is evident that the TL estimation at the provincial level is influenced 
by human interests. This makes TL estimation distorted accordingly to political interests 
leading to a continuously steady trend of increase in TL regardless fluctuation of the fishing 
effort and fish stocks in Vietnam since 1980 (D-Fish, 2017a; GSO, 2016; Tuan, 2013). 
It is evident the credibility of the TL estimation is problematic. Dr. Vinh, a former deputy 
director of Directorate of Fisheries named the TL estimations by GSO as the “magic 
numbers”. He claimed that these numbers were artificially made according to political 
interests. The GSO staffs in Thanh Hoa and Kien Giang provinces believed that their real 
TL figures would be much higher, at least double the figures published by GSO. They 
argued that fishing at the TL estimation by GSO would see fishing fleets operating at 
economic losses and would be unable to remain fishing ongoing as in reality in Vietnam. 
They believed that the TL estimation by DANIDA project in 2003 that the TL estimation of 
3.3 million (Marine Fisheries Specialist Team, 2004), 2.3 time higher than the estimation 
by GSO (only 1.43 million tons) was more accurate. 
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Moreover, the TL estimation is calculated for aggregation groups (i.e. fish, squid, shrimp 
and others), not classified by species or by categories of fisheries. It is also calculated by 
administration territories i.e. commune, district, province and the whole nation, not by 
fishing grounds/regions. In fact, fishing vessels are allowed to fish and land their catches 
in any provinces, but they are considered as a component to calculate the TL of its home 
province. In other words, fishing vessels do not fish in their provincial waters, but their 
landings are calculated inclusively into the TL of their home province. This means that the 
figures of the TL estimation of a province does not reflect the fishing pressure on the 
provincial waters. In conclusion, the current methodology used by the GSO system in 
Vietnam to produce inaccurate and incompatible estimations of TL for fisheries 
management. These estimations do not reflect the real fishing mortality of fish stocks in 
specific waters on one hand, they also not presented in suitable forms for assessing and 
projecting dynamics of fish stocks on the other hand. Based on these estimations, fisheries 
managers do not know where and what species being overexploited or underexploited, 
thus they cannot decide informed management actions to utilize the fisheries resources 
effectively and sustainably. 
6.3.2 ESTIMATION OF THE EXPLOITATABLE POTENTIAL YIELD 
According to FAO, the main purpose of fish stock assessments is to predict what will 
happen to state of the fish stocks (e.g. level of yields and biomass) in the future (Sparre & 
Venema, 1998). From this, the maximum sustainable yield and other factors associated 
with it (e.g. spawning stock biomass (SSB), fishing mortality) are estimated to provide 
knowledge for making fisheries management decisions (Caddy & Mahone, 1995). MSY 
estimation of fish stocks can be conducted by holistic models or analytical models (Sparre 
& Venema, 1998).  
The holistic models may provide standing biomass and potential yield of demersal and 
pelagic fish stocks by using the bottom trawling or the acoustic techniques. Among of these 
models, some scholars such as Gulland, Cadima proposed empirical formulas to estimate 
the MSY of specific species or for a whole stock unit. When time-series data on the landings 
and fishing effort are available, then the MSY may be estimated by the surplus production 
models (e.g. Schaefer model, Fox model). According to Sparre and Venema (Sparre & 
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Venema, 1998), the holistic models need generic and less complex data of fish stocks and 
fisheries. They do not take the biological parameters of landings such as age and length 
structure into account; hence they are often applied in poor data fisheries where fisheries 
data collection system is often not established systematically. 
For analytical models, they may provide fairly reliable assessments of fish stocks. They, 
therefore, require more specific and sophisticated data (e.g. age-based, length-based data) 
of landings. For instance, the Beverton and Holt model requires data on age structure of 
specific species; their mean weight, annual catch, total mortality by the age groups in a 
time-series manner to predict MSY, spawning stock biomass (SSB) and other biological 
parameters for managing the exploited fish stocks (Sparre & Venema, 1998). 
The fisheries resources surveys have been conducted in Vietnamese since 1960s with 
assistance from the Soviet Union, Germany, China to locate fishing grounds and 
understand distribution patterns for improving the fishing efficiency of fishing fleets. But, 
from the beginning of 1990s, fish stock assessments have been taken into account in 
Vietnam to estimate the size of fisheries resources (i.e. standing biomass, exploitable 
potential yield) for the purpose of proper exploitation and conservation of fisheries 
resources. These have been conducted by using the swept area method (i.e. bottom 
trawling) and by the acoustic method to estimate B and EPY of demersal and pelagic fish 
in specific areas. Sparre and Venema advised that the swept area method should be 
applied for cases of the virgin stocks and hitherto unexploited resources. It is not suited for 
exploited fish stocks (Sparre & Venema, 1998). This method can tell fisheries managers 
about distribution pattern and density of fisheries resources for estimating the B and EPY 
of fisheries resources. Based on these outcomes managers would make fishing plans to 
maximize the catches. It seems to be suited for the Vietnamese fisheries before 1990s 
when fish stocks distributed in offshore waters were not exploited. Thanks to policies of 
developing the offshore fishing since 199223, most fish stocks in Vietnamese waters have 
been exploited, even overexploited in many cases (e.g. snappers, groupers, slender shad, 
                                         
23 When fishers in central provinces e.g. Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan were encouraged to 
build larger vessels to fish in the offshore waters. Since after, some new species e.g. oceanic tuna, 
deep sea snappers became the targets of fishing fleets.  
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silver pomfret, etc.). Theoretically, the swept area method, therefore, is no longer suited for 
the fish stocks in the Vietnamese waters. However, it has still been employed to estimate 
the EPY of fisheries resources in reality of Vietnam. As mentioned above, this EPY concept 
is understood as the MSY and used as a knowledge input for estimating the TC in the 
fisheries plans of Vietnam. 
Consequently, application of the swept area method has been obviously accepted as a 
standardized method to estimate EPY of fisheries resources in Vietnam. The EPY is often 
estimated by the swept area method as the Gulland’s formula 6.4 below (Gulland, 1983).  
EPY = 0.5 * M * Bv   (6.4) 
Where, M is the natural mortality rate of fish stocks, Bv is the virgin biomass of fish 
stocks. 
Bv = ,@/B ∗C
DE
    (6.5) 
Where, Cw is the mean catch in weight of a haul (kg), a is the swept area of the gear (km2); 
a = v * t * D; v is the velocity of the trawl over the ground when trawling, t is the time spent 
trawling, D is the ‘wing spread’ of the trawl when trawling (D = h*X2, h is the length of the 
head-rope and X2 is the empirical coefficient), A is the total size of the area under 
investigation (km2), and X1 is the catchability coefficient of the gear (fraction of the biomass 
is retained by trawl). 
In principle, EPY should be estimated by species based on its natural mortality rate (M) 
and virgin biomass. In order to estimate EPY, estimations of M and Bv for specific species 
are needed. This requires a lot of information and data. However, estimations of M and Bv 
by individual were not conducted in Vietnam, and the standing biomass (B) was used 
instead of the virgin biomass (Bv). This assumption is not the case for fish stocks in the 
Vietnamese waters because most fish stocks were exploited.  
In addition, B was estimated collectively for all species in the area under investigation. 
Similarly, EPY was also calculated in the same manner with B. This means that the M 
estimation of a combination of many species living in the area under investigation needs to 
be defined. Unfortunately, there were no available method for such estimation in fisheries 
science. In fact, natural mortality rate differs species from species dependently on biological 
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characteristics of the species and its environment. In order to address this, Vietnamese 
biologists took a collective value of M for all species based on their own experience. This 
estimation was not relied on a standardized method and there is no reference point for 
verifying and validating the estimation of M in the Vietnamese fisheries. As a result, the M 
estimation for calculating EPY was manipulated differently among biologists. For instance, 
the M was taken at 0.65 (Phan, 1988), at 0.8 (Chung, 1991, 1997), or at 1.0 (Duong, 2012). 
As a result, using the same B estimation, then EPY estimation may be manipulated at 
different values according to equation 6.4 to meet various interests of the biologists. If 
taking M equals to 0.65-1.0, then the fishing level (according to formula 6.4) would be 0.33-
0.5. This is much higher than level (0.15) which ICES advised for the herring fisheries in 
European waters (ICES, 2017). 
Moreover, for the swept area method, biologists rely on the density called as the catch per 
unit of area (CPUA) measured in kg/km2 to calculate the B by multiplying CPUA with the 
area of the water under investigation. The CPUA is estimated by the bottom trawl surveys. 
Due to limitation of budgets, the bottom trawl surveys have not been conducted regularly 
(personal interview with a former director of RIMF). Normally, one or two surveys were 
conducted in April and/or October24 in specific areas designed by specific projects. 
Moreover, the estimations of B and EPY were made in a particular time. They reflect the 
state of fisheries resources in the past, but they have been used for planning fisheries in 
the future. Even, estimation of EPY is sometimes used data collected in a long time ago. 
For instance, the EPY used for planning the TC in the 2010 fisheries master plan (VIFEP, 
2005) was estimated based on some data collected in1978-1980 (see table 6.1). Similarly, 
the TC in the 2020 fisheries master plan was also planned based on the EPY estimation 
calculated from data collected in 2000-2006 (VIFEP, 2013). These knowledge inputs are 
uncertain and cause high risk for the fisheries resources. 
                                         
24 Bottom trawl surveys are often conducted in April and/or October because the weather is good for 
working at sea in these months. 
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Apart from the swept area method, the surplus production model (the Schaefer and Fox 
surplus production models) illustrated in equations 6.6 and 6.7 (Sparre & Venema, 1998) 
was also applied to estimate MSY of fisheries resources in Vietnam (Hai, 2003; Son, 2011).  
Y(i)/f(i) = a + b*f(i)   (6.6) 
Y(i)/f(i) = exp(c + d*f(i))   (6.7) 
Where, Y(i) is the yield (catch in weight) in year i,f(i) is the effort in year i, i = 1,2,...,n 
Table 6.1: Estimations of B and EPY used for planning the TC by 2010 (VIFEP, 2005). 
Regions Fish stocks B 
(Tons) 
EPY 
(Tons) 
Notices 
 
Gulf of 
Tonkin 
Small pelagic fish 
390,000 156,000 
Based on the acoustic 
surveys in 1978-1980  
Demersal fish 
291,166 116,467 
Based on the bottom trawl 
survey in 1996-1997 
Total 681,166 272,467  
 
Central 
region 
Small pelagic fish 
500,000 200,000 
Based on the acoustic 
surveys in 1978-1980  
Demersal fish 
106,399 42,560 
Based on the bottom trawl 
survey in 1996-1997 
Total 606,399 242,560  
 
Southeast 
region 
Small pelagic fish 
524,000 209,600 
Based on the acoustic 
surveys in 1978-1980  
Demersal fish 
1,551,889 620,856 
Based on the bottom trawl 
survey in 1996-1997 
Total 2,075,889 830,456  
Southwest 
region 
Small pelagic fish 
316,000 126,000 
Based on the acoustic 
surveys in 1978-1980  
Demersal fish 
190,670 76,272 
Based on the bottom trawl 
survey in 1996-1997 
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Regions Fish stocks B 
(Tons) 
EPY 
(Tons) 
Notices 
Total 506,679 202,272  
Submerge 
knolls 
Small pelagic fish 
10,000 2,500 
Based on the acoustic 
surveys in 1978-1980  
 
All regions 
Small pelagic fish 1,740,000 694,100  
Demersal fish 2,140,133 855,885  
Oceanic pelagic fish  
300,000 120,000 
Based on fish landings of 
neighbour countries 
Gross total 4,180,133 1,669,985  
This method requires the time-series data on TL and fishing effort in a long enough period. 
However, this system is not available in Vietnam. Instead, only the number of fishing 
vessels is collectively reported in the administration system. It does not provide in detail of 
number of fishing days, fishing trips, number of fishing hours. Similarly, as above analyzed, 
the TL estimation by GSO is incredible and unspecific for these models. When discussing 
on the MSY estimation made in 2003, a former director of DECAFREP stated that those 
MSY estimation was not believable because it relied on the distorted data. Therefore, this 
estimation has not been accepted officially for planning the fisheries in Vietnam. However, 
this method has been advocated by planners and scientists because it is able to provide 
the figure of fishing effort that cannot be provided by the swept area method. The question 
for establishing a fisheries data collection system has been raised continuously since the 
end of 1990s when a new approach to planning fisheries introduced into Vietnam (see 
chapter 5).  
In order to address this issue, an alternative approach was discussed in Vietnamese 
fisheries management system in the beginning of the 2000s – the adaptive indicators-based 
management (Anon, 2001; Management, 2004; Raakjær, 2004; Raakjær et al., 2007). A 
management structure for marine capture fisheries was endorsed by a Minister of MARD’s 
decision establishing a specialist team to support the new management structure (MARD, 
2007). In addition, a comprehensive program of collecting fisheries data to run this 
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management structure was designed. However, the fisheries data collection program has 
not been implemented and therefore the management structure has been also not put into 
effect. 
Clearly, the estimations of B and EPY to provide knowledge inputs for planning fisheries is 
problematic in Vietnam. Deficiencies of the swept area method were documented and this 
method provides the EPY estimations distrusted commonly as analyzed in chapter 5. 
However, it has been still employed in the Vietnamese fisheries. This paradox may be 
explained by three reasons according to a former vice director of Directorate of fisheries as 
follows: i) the swept area method can provide figures of B and EPY that are easy to 
understand, then are accepted by senior fisheries managers and politicians; ii) the 
traditional thoughts that fish stocks are the common pool resources, so these resources 
should be harvested before they move to other countries’ waters. Therefore, the validity of 
fish stock assessments for sustainable management was not taken into account; and iii) 
the new management approach may require high human and financial costs. In addition, 
the fisheries data collection (i.e. estimation of total fish landings) is mandated to the GSO 
system. It is beyond the capability of MOFI to change. 
For me, through direct observation in managing projects of fish stock assessments in 
Vietnam, there are three main thoughts supporting for the conventional approach to 
assessing the fish stocks as follows:  
i) The legitimacy of the fisheries planning system is low. There is no mechanism to 
enforce the fisheries planning documents in fishing communities. In fact, the catch 
landed by individual vessels are not defined and controlled in practice, albeit the TC 
is planned in the fisheries planning documents. Therefore, the magnitude of the TC 
in fisheries plans is not meaningful for regulating fishing practice. In other words, the 
management decisions on TC do not influence on the fishing practice if the stock 
assessments would be conducted more systematically, comprehensively and 
expensively. This reflects bureaucracy of the current fisheries management system 
in Vietnam. 
ii) The current institutional arrangements may not be suited for a new approach 
supporting for adaptive learning by doing. It seems to have a normatively fixed 
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biomass of the fish stocks in Vietnamese waters of around 4.0-4.5 million tons. 
Estimations differing from this figure are hardly accepted. Indeed, a biomass 
estimation made by RIMF in 2005 was not accepted because it provided a figure 
that higher than the normative figure. This estimation, then, had to be revised to a 
figure close to the normative figure (Nghia, 2007). In another case, the catch rate of 
research vessel by 2011 (RIMF, 2014b) remarkably declined compared to 2005 (Ha 
et al., 2005), but the biomass and EPY was estimated nearly the same. This means 
that variation in the biomass and EPY estimations of fish stocks should be kept in a 
acceptable range defined empirically. 
iii)  The swept area method seems to support for the current bureaucrat management 
system. Indeed, this method may leave a room for manipulating the figure of 
biomass and EPY estimations accordingly to political interests. In fact, the volumes 
of B and EPY would be adjusted if empirical coefficients used to calculate the B and 
EPY are selected properly in equations of 6.4 and 6.525. For instance, a fish stock 
assessment conducted in 2011-2014 provided B estimation of 4.25 million tons and 
EPY estimation of 1.75 million tons (RIMF, 2014a). This was assessed by a 
committee but was not accepted by MARD due to the EPY estimation was incredible 
(i.e. this was less than the TL in 2014). It then revised in 2017 (D-Fish, 2017b) with 
B estimation of 4.36 million tons and EPY estimation of 2.45 million tons. 
In summary, the swept area method is employed to estimate the state (i.e. B and EPY) of 
the fisheries resources in Vietnam, albeit it is not suited for exploited fish stocks as in the 
Vietnamese waters. This just provides the standing state of B and EPY in a particular time, 
it cannot inform the state of fish stocks in the future. In addition to this, they are estimated 
by the specific areas/fishing grounds (see chapter 4); meanwhile the TL estimation is 
conducted by the administration territories (e.g. provincial, district). Therefore, these data 
are not compatible for assessing the fishing pressure on the fisheries resources in specific 
                                         
25 In fact, biologists calculate the biomass with using different values of X1 and X2 to meet the 
normative preferences. In fact, X1 may be ranged from 0.5 to 1.0 depending on the biological 
features of the species under investigation and the biologists’ experience, and X2 may be ranged 
from 0.4 to 0.66 depending on the biologists’ experience.  
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areas. In other words, they are not useful for making informed fisheries management 
decisions.  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
Exploitation of fisheries resources in Vietnamese waters is planned based on the TC-based 
approach. This has originated in the centrally planned regime taking growth in catches as 
the overwhelming objective of the fisheries. It is connected with the exploitable potential 
yield (EPY) estimation of fisheries resources which was interpreted as the MSY in recent 
years to imply the conservation purpose of the fisheries plans in Vietnam. In terms of the 
concept, the TC-based approach was modified compared to the centrally planned regime, 
but its nature and knowledge inputs used for planning are still the same. Though it may be 
easier to be accepted by stakeholders, it requires a lot of data and information due to it 
manage the fisheries through manage fisheries resources. This is not suited for the small-
scale and coastal fisheries in the tropical waters on one hand (Kato, 2012), but also requires 
high costs for collecting data, monitoring and enforcing in practice on the other hand 
(Raakjær, 2004; Wilson et al., 1994). 
Planning total catches of the Vietnamese fisheries relied on the knowledge inputs of 
estimations of annual total fish landings and exploitable potential yield of fisheries 
resources. This research argued that these estimations were poor accuracy. They did not 
reflect the real volume of the total fish landings as well as the state of the exploited fish 
stocks. This was clearly seen through the methodologies employed and the data collection 
system conducted. The methodology for estimating total fish landings is not compatible 
with the small-scale fisheries as advised by FAO, and the sampling protocols were not 
coverage over the spectrum of fishing fleets and fisheries. Similarly, the methodology for 
fish stock assessments was employed incorrectly. It is just used for the unexploited fish 
stocks, whereas almost fish stocks in the Vietnamese fisheries were exploited and 
overexploited. The empirical coefficients for estimate standing biomass and exploitable 
potential yield were also not defined with a scientific manner. In addition, the data collection 
programs for fish stock assessments were not conducted systematically in a time-series 
manner. 
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This research also found that collecting fisheries data in Vietnam was not connected with 
implementing the fisheries plans. It is conducted as a mandate of competent institutions 
given by government, and no data collection programs were conducted to monitor and 
review the effects of the fisheries plans on reality of the fishing fleets as well as the state of 
fisheries resources. Actually, these data are very useful for reviewing and adjusting the 
management plans to adapt to changes of the system being managed. Unfortunately, the 
fisheries plan has not implemented in practice as argued in chapter 7. 
To some extent the MSY-based fisheries management approach, in the case the EPY 
interpreted as the MSY, is well supporting the production-based growth paradigm of 
fisheries management. In this paradigm, the EPY may be manipulated accordingly to the 
dominant actors’ interests. The interpretation of the EPY as the MSY seems to be 
championed by politicians and senior fisheries managers. In order to operate this paradigm, 
empirical formulas and distorted data were used to produce knowledge inputs within the 
internal processes for planning the fisheries. These knowledge inputs reflected the political 
wills rather than the dynamics of the exploited fish stocks and fisheries. This may 
undermine legitimacy of the fisheries plans as well as the effectiveness of the management 
system. The TC-based fisheries planning approach was operationalized rhetorically within 
the government system, did not intend to control fishing practices in Vietnam. 
This research found that the knowledge inputs (i.e. TL and EPY) used for planning total 
catches (TC) of the 2010 fisheries master plan was incredible. The EPY estimation relied 
on data collected in nearly 30 years before. Similarly, the total fish landings (TL) estimations 
were conducted by improper methodology, so these estimations are unrealistic and do not 
reflect the real fishing mortality of fish stocks in specific areas. Therefore, the TC made in 
the 2010 fisheries master plan are much uncertain and causes high risk for managing 
fisheries resources in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 7: CHALLENGES TO FIT FISHERIES PLANS INTO THE 
REALITY OF FISHERIES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As analyzed in chapter 4, the Vietnamese fisheries are managed under a hierarchical 
fisheries planning system (i.e. strategy, master plan, five-year plan, annual plan) within an 
administration mechanism of four levels (i.e. national, provincial, district, and communal 
levels). The fisheries strategies and master plans are made at the national and provincial 
levels to manage their fisheries in the long-term, then they are implemented by the five-
year and annual plans at four administration levels. In this system, the lowest administration 
level is the communal one which connects and executes fisheries management decisions 
at the local fishing communities. This means that, the annual plan of the coastal communes 
is a tool of the management system influencing the fishing behaviour of the local fishing 
communities in Vietnam. 
As analyzed in chapter 5, the Vietnamese fisheries planning fisheries system relies on two 
pillars: total catches (TC) and number of fishing vessels. Therefore, these figures of TC 
and number of fishing vessels are always defined clearly as the management objectives of 
the fisheries plans. Chapter 4 demonstrates that development of fisheries in the last three 
decades, especially in 2006-2010 have been out of control of the fisheries planning system 
of the government in practice. This means that the existing fisheries management system 
in Vietnam was ineffective, it was unable to control its fisheries toward the desired 
outcomes. One reason for this may be a gap between the management decisions of 
government and fishing decisions of local fishers. In fact, the local fishers make decisions 
to increase their catches and also find ways to bypass the management regulations to 
maximize their profits (Charles, 1995; Raakjær & Mathiesen, 2003). Therefore, 
understanding fishers’ behaviour would improve effectiveness of the fisheries management 
decisions (Salas & Gaertner, 2004). 
The Vietnamese fisheries are characterized with complicated attributes of the small-scale, 
multi-species and multi-gears fisheries (see chapter 4). Their fishing patterns are diverse 
and changeable depending on fisheries, targeted species and customs of the fishing 
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communities. This chapter takes two cases of communal fisheries (the trawl net fishery in 
Quynh Lap commune of Nghe An province and the tuna line fishery in Tam Quan Bac 
commune of Binh Dinh province) to understand intervention of fisheries planning system of 
government in the fishing communities. It answers three following questions: i) How was 
the 2010 fisheries master plan implemented at the local level? ii) What are the preferences 
and interests of the local fishers? and iii) What factors and how are they influencing fishing 
behaviour of the local fishers? 
This chapter explains intervention of fisheries planning system of government in the fishing 
communities. It, firstly, introduces two selected cases of communal fisheries. Secondly, it 
examines implementation of the 2010 fisheries master plan at the communal level to 
understand the ways that the fisheries planning system influences on the fishing 
communities in practice. Thirdly, it identifies preferences and interests of the local fishers 
to understand their dynamics and motivations in fishing business. Fourthly, it analyses 
factors that influence on the local fishers’ fishing decisions to understand the impacts of the 
fisheries management decisions on the fishers’ fishing decisions. Finally, the chapter points 
out the gaps between the fisheries planning system government and the local fishers’ 
fishing decisions in practice to understand ineffectiveness of the fisheries planning system 
in Vietnam. 
7.2 TWO CASE STUDIES OF FISHERIES 
Two communal fisheries are in Quynh Lap commune in the north and Tam Quan Bac in 
the south of Vietnam are selected as case studies. Their location is shown in Figure 7.1. 
7.2.1 THE TRAWL FISHERY IN QUYNH LAP 
7.2.1.1 General information of Quynh Lap commune 
Quynh Lap is a coastal commune of Hoang Mai town, Nghe An province with a coastline 
of 12km. Its area is about 2,208 hectares and situated at 8.3km from the town centre and 
7.5 km from the 1A national highway. It is bordered by Thanh Hoa province in the north, by 
the Hoang Mai river in the south, by Quynh Phuong commune and Hoang Mai town in the 
west, and by the East Sea in the east (figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1: Location of Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac communes 
According to the 2014 yearbook (Hoang Mai Sub-GSO, 2014), the income per capita 
reached 1.658 million VND (approx. 80 USD) per month. There were 2,377 households 
with a total of 10,667 people living in Quynh Lap. Among them, there were 826 households 
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living on the capture fisheries, 702 households doing other fisheries service 
(middlemen/middlewomen, seafood processing, net weaving and mending), and the rest 
living on other industries and services such as forestry, agriculture, livestock, aquaculture, 
etc. There were 225 vessels registered in Quynh Lap, and the total landings of the 
commune fisheries was 20,500 tons in 2014. 
7.2.1.2 The trawl fishery profile 
Fisheries resources 
The coastal water of Quynh Lap commune is defined in an area of approx. 115 square 
kilometers, along the coast of 12 km and the width of 18 km from the shore. Quynh Lap 
waters located in the coastal waters of Nghe An province where were composed of 121 
species including 20 species of pelagic fish and 101 species of demersal fish, crustacean 
and mollusks (Vinh University, 2014). It is also located in the shrimp ground of Lach Bang 
– Lach Quen with the standing biomass estimation of nearly 300 tons26 with 20 species of 
high valued shrimp such as prawns, lobsters, yellow shrimp, iron shrimp, giant tiger shrimp, 
etc. (Vinh, 2006). In addition, there are coral reefs distributed along the coast. These 
provide good habitat for many of valuable species (e.g. groupers, snappers, threadfin 
breams, shrimps, snails, squids, etc.). There are also pelagic fish migrating through Quynh 
Lap waters between January and April.  
The fishing community 
In 2014, there were 140/225 small-scale fishing vessels (62.2% of total vessels) powered 
engine of less than 50HP. They employ trawl fishery targeting demersal fish and shrimps 
as the main fishery and also use concurrently other gears such as gill nets, traps, beach 
seine nets, push nets in other seasons depending on the targeting species appeared in 
their fishing grounds. These vessels provide employment for 422 people and livelihoods 
for 678 people in 136 households in three villages of Tan Minh, Dong Minh, Dong Thanh 
of the commune. Of these, there were 19 households living solely on fishing. The rest of 
                                         
26 This figure was estimated by empirical formulas using the bottom trawling method (chapter 6). 
This was made in a contract between RIMF and Nghe An province to provide knowledge base for 
planning fisheries in Nghe An waters. 
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households (i.e. 117 households), in addition to receiving their main income from fishing, 
also got income from agriculture. The average household income of a household was 1,100 
USD per year (Hoang Mai Sub-GSO, 2014). As investigation in 2014, the investment capital 
for each vessel was about 1,000-4,000 USD and total variable cost for each trip of 1-2 days 
was 50-100 USD. The average turnover of a vessel was around 80 USD per day and the 
average salary of a crew member was around 10 USD per day. The catches were landed 
in local landing sites and mainly sold at local markets as daily food. A part of landings was 
also processed into various products such as dried fish, boiled fish, grilled, fish sauce, etc. 
These productions may be sold in neighbouring communes, districts, provinces, even 
exported to Laos, Thailand, and China. 
Fisheries management arrangements 
Legally, the small-scale trawl fishery of Quynh Lap commune is managed by the fisheries 
planning documents and fisheries regulations issued by the government. The fishing 
behaviours are also impacted by the informal norms identified traditionally by the local 
fishing communities. The fisheries development orientations of the commune are 
established in the annual and the five-year plans based on the development orientations 
adopted by the higher fisheries authorities (i.e. the district and provincial levels). The core 
elements of these plans are the estimations of the TC and number of fishing vessels for 
the coming year based on their growth rates of the TL of previous years. 
In terms of administration, the Communal People Committee (CPC) is not authorized to 
implement fisheries management within the communal territories. It is just suggested to 
support and facilitate the higher fisheries authorities to execute fisheries management in 
its territories. One staff who is the chairman of the Communal Farmer Union was appointed 
to take care the fisheries management in the commune. The main task of him was to collect 
information and produce reports on total landings, number of vessels, number of fishers, 
conflicts among fishers, etc. He also executed some other services and contracts such as 
registration and licensing for local vessels, collecting data for statistics, insurance, 
facilitators for implementing fisheries projects in the commune. He was also the head of the 
fishery co-management board supported by external sponsors (e.g. DANIDA, World Bank). 
A fishery co-management structure joined by the head of villages and local fishers since 
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2008 was established in 2008 and funded by a DANIDA project to improve effectiveness 
of the fisheries management in the commune in terms of enforcing fisheries regulations 
and eliminating destructive fishing methods in the communal waters. 
The co-management structure was established jointly with three fishing villages of the 
commune. A core group composed of 31 members (7 staff of communal government; 03 
head of 03 villages; and 21 fishers of 03 villages) was established to execute action plan. 
The project funded for core group to help local fishers to change into marine aquaculture 
on one hand, and to protect fisheries resources on the other. Two fishing households were 
equipped with the cases for farming cobia and groupers in 2009. These farms disappeared 
in 2013 due to economic losses. Their products were sold with so low price that their 
revenue was below the farming costs as these farmers told in 2014. In addition, the natural 
conditions of the local waters were not suited for marine culture due to pollution by fishing 
activities and very rough in the southeast monsoon as told by three informants in Quynh 
Lap in 2014. 
For protecting fisheries resources in the local waters, project funded for campaign 
programs of protecting fisheries resources (e.g. promulgation of fisheries regulations, 
propagation of harmful effects of destructive fishing practices; etc.) at the local 
communities. The core group was also equipped with a canoe to patrol the local waters to 
prevent destructive fishing practice over the communal waters. This group no longer 
worked in 2011 when project ended funding. In 2013, this group was re-established within 
a project funded by World Bank. As the chairman related, the co-management model was 
designed nearly the same with the one designed by DANIDA project. He guessed this 
model would achieve limitation results as the model implemented by DANIDA project. He 
explained that this limitation was due to the low legitimacy of the co-management structure 
and a lack of necessary means of operation. It faced many difficulties once external funding 
ended. 
7.2.2 THE TUNA LINE FISHERY IN TAM QUAN BAC 
The tuna line fishery was imported into Binh Dinh at beginning of 2000s behind in Phu Yen 
and Khanh Hoa. But it has developed dramatically in recent years and become the most 
important fishery of the province and the largest fishery in the region. 
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7.2.2.1 General information of Tam Quan Bac commune 
Tam Quan Bac is a coastal commune of Hoai Nhon district, Binh Dinh province with the 
coastline of about 3.0 km. Its area is around 100 hectares and situated at 60 km from the 
provincial centre. It is bordered by Quang Ngai province and Hoai Chau commune in the 
north, by the Tam Quan Nam commune in the south, by the 1A national highway in the 
west, and by the East Sea in the east (see figure 7.1). 
According to the 2014 yearbook (Hoai Nhon Sub-GSO, 2014), there were 4,360 
households with a total of 18,500 people, nearly 60% of them live dependently on marine 
fishing in Tam Quan Bac commune. The fisheries of Tam Quan Bac were composed of 
896 vessels and of 9,500 professional fishers in 2014. The total landings in 2014 was 9,950 
tons equivalent of 34.7 million USD. There were 22 bases of trading and processing 
fisheries products such as tuna, dried squids, fish sauce; 27 bases of producing ice for 
fishing industry, 7 shipyards and other bases of providing nets, fishing materials, fuels, and 
other services for fishing. 
7.2.2.2 The tuna line fishery profile 
The tuna resources 
The main targets of the tuna liners in Tam Quan Bac are oceanic tunas (i.e. big-eye tuna 
and yellow-fin tuna) distributed in the Oceanic region (see figure 4.2). According to local 
fishers’ experience, oceanic tunas appear in the Vietnamese waters from October to May. 
They are schooled and move from the north to the southward during the time they appear 
in Vietnamese waters. The exploitable potential yield of the oceanic tunas in this region 
was estimated  (2002-2004) to about 17,000 tons (Son, 2005). Marlin, shark, sword, and 
mackerel are also caught by the tuna long-liners of Tam Quan Bac.  
The fishing community 
By 2014, there were 584 tuna liners accounting for over 65% of total fishing vessels 
registered in Tam Quan Bac. These vessels were powered engine with capacity of 150-
750 HP per vessel. They equipped the long-line to catch the oceanic tunas as the main 
fishing gear. Each vessel may carry out 5-7 fishing trips with long-line or hand-line for 
catching the tuna from the October of the previous year to the May of the next year. The 
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rest time, many fishers change gears and migrate fishing grounds to catch other species 
by seasonally. For instance, some fishers employed hand-line for catching the squids in 
south regions; others used gillnet catching the flying fish; others used hand-line for catching 
the oceanic tunas dependently on their own experience. In recent years, fishers tended 
using the hand-line for catching tuna rather than the long-line to increase fishing effort and 
catch rate of the vessels. However, the quality and price of tuna caught by the hand-liners 
were lower than those of the long-liners. Therefore, a part (25% of vessel’s owners 
interviewed) of tuna long-liners were still reluctant to change to the hand-line fishery for 
catching tuna to remain the high-ranking products in the high-end markets of tuna such as 
fresh tuna for sashimi in Japan. 
The tuna fishery of the commune provided employment for about 4,700 professional fishers 
and more 10,000 of labours working in fishing service bases such as processing, trading, 
making ice, repairing the gear and vessels. Most vessel owners only live on the fishing, 
and some of them have additional incomes from providing services for fishing vessels such 
as selling fishing equipment, trading fishing products, etc. A part of the crew members 
working on vessels come from inland communes whose family have other livelihoods such 
as agriculture, livestock, construction, etc. 
As investigation on the tuna line fishery in 2014, the investment capital for each vessel 
varied by the size of vessels and capacity of engine ranging from 35,000-350,000 USD per 
vessel. A fishing trip lasted from 20-30 days. The total variable cost for each trip was from 
5,000-7,000 USD. The average landing of a vessel was from 2-3 tons per trip with the 
turnover was from 1,000-1,200 USD per trip and the average salary of a crew member was 
around 200 USD per month. For months of operating the squid hand-line fishery or gill net 
for flying fish, the income of fishers was less than the tuna fishery as told by fishers 
interviewed. The total landings of tuna of the commune in 2014 was estimated over 5,850 
tons. 
Caught tuna are often preserved with ice on board. They are often landed at the home ports 
and sold to companies for fresh tuna, and processing as canned and frozen tuna and other 
products. Just around 10% of tuna met the fresh standard for sashimi, sushi of the 
Japanese market as told by a tuna exporter in 2014. Majority of tuna products were 
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exported to international markets such as USA, EU, Japan, etc. Unlike tuna products, other 
productions of this fleets were processed by the traditional ways and consumed in domestic 
markets or exported to international markets such as China, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, 
etc. For instance, squids were often dried by the sun on board, and landed, sold in southern 
provinces such as: Ba Ria – Vung Tau, Tien Giang, Ca Mau, etc.; flying fish and other fish 
were preserved with ice for consumers in local markets. 
Fisheries management arrangements 
Although the tuna line fishery in Tam Quan Bac is larger compared to the trawl fishery in 
Quynh Lap, it is also managed under the same regime as the trawl fishery in Quynh Lap. 
Traditionally, fishers are grouped into fishing groups or fishing guilds. They share and 
exchange information and experience on fishing operations. They also collaborate during 
fishing at sea in terms of security, catch transshipment, exchange information on the fishing 
grounds, fish price, etc. to improve their fishing effectiveness and secure safety at seas. 
They respect and behave according to the informal norms and rules identified traditionally 
by their own local communities. 
7.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AT LOCAL LEVELS 
The fisheries law (National Assembly, 2003) recognizes that the Vietnamese fisheries are 
regulated by limiting the TC, number of vessels, and technical measures to protect fisheries 
resources. Therefore, the TC and number of fishing vessels are defined annually in the 
fisheries planning system in the fisheries administration system; and the technical 
measures are formulated in the legislation system such as law, decrees, circular 
management decisions of the government at national and provincial levels. At the same 
time, the local fishers in the fishing communities are organized traditionally into fishing 
groups or fishing guilds. In such organizations, local fishers commit themselves to following 
the informal rules accepted commonly and traditionally as the ethnic norms. The contents 
of rules and norms may vary by local communities, fishing patterns, fishing customs, 
fisheries and vessel scales. Therefore, the fishing behaviour of fishers is often influenced 
by both the formal regulations of the management authorities and the informal rules of the 
fishing communities. This chapter explores how the fishing practices are managed at local 
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levels through looking at the management of the trawl fishery in Quynh Lap commune and 
the tuna line fishery in Tam Quan Bac commune.  
The fisheries law (National Assembly, 2003) requires fisheries management authorities, 
based on the available knowledge, to define the level of TC and number of vessels allowed 
to fish in specific areas to ensure fish stocks are not overfished. According to decree No. 
33/2010/ND-CP (Government of Vietnam, 2010), the provincial government (PPC) is 
empowered to manage the fisheries within the coastal waters including the inshore and 
coastal routes (see figure 4.1). They are allowed to empower their lower government levels 
(i.e. district, communal levels) to manage fisheries in particular waters. But, the coastal 
waters were just demarcated by provincial level, and demarcation of the seas among 
districts and communes were not conducted as discussion in the meeting of fisheries held 
in Binh Dinh October 2015. This means that the district and communal governments are 
not empowered to manage the fisheries in concrete waters, instead they are invited to 
manage fisheries in term of monitoring and enforcement of fisheries management and 
development decisions of the higher fisheries authorities. 
7.3.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGING THE TC 
As investigation in two communal fisheries in 2014, the TC was planned in the bottom-up 
mechanism in the annual plans of the local fisheries management plans. This means that 
the annual TC at the communal level was defined first, then the district level was summed 
up by the communal TC under of the district, and the provincial level was summed by district 
TC of the province. However, the growth rate of TC was decided in the top-down 
mechanism. Fisheries staffs interviewed in Binh Dinh and Nghe An explained that based 
on fishing fleets and development of the national level (e.g. fisheries master plan, 
management directives), the provincial authorities suggested the growth rate of TC for 
specific district fisheries. For instance, the TL by 2010 of Tam Quan Bac was 9,320 tons, 
and it was planned at 9,700 ton by 2011 with the growth rate of approx. 4% per year given 
by higher authorities as told by the fisheries staff in Tam Quan Bac commune (CPC of Tam 
Quan Bac, 2011). This was also implemented in Quynh Lap fisheries, its TL by 2010 was 
19,140 tons, and was planned at 19,720 ton by 2011 with the growth rate of approx. 3% 
per year given by higher authorities as told by the fisheries staff in Quynh Lap commune 
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(CPC of Quynh Lap, 2011). This procedure of planning the annual TC at the communal 
level was the conventional approach in Tam Quan Bac and Quynh Lap communes as told 
by their fisheries staffs in 2014. Based on this, the TC at the higher levels (i.e. district and 
provincial levels) were defined in their annual plans.  
Aside to the annual TL, the TC for the next year was also defined in the annual fisheries 
plans by administration territories (i.e. communal, district, provincial levels), but not planned 
by fishing grounds or specific waters. It was also not divided and allocated to the higher 
levels as the mandatory targets in the centrally planned system or as catch quotas in the 
TAC-based management regime in other developed fisheries. At the lowest level (i.e. 
communal level), the TC was planned for the fisheries of the commune in the planning 
system of the government. It was not divided into catch quotas and allocated to concrete 
vessels or fishing guilds. The volume of catches of vessels was not limited by the fisheries 
planning plans or management regulations of the government in practice. The local fishers 
are allowed to catch as much as possible provided that they comply with technical 
measures adopted by the fisheries authorities as told by all fisheries managers interviewed. 
When ending a year, the TC planned in the previous year was evaluated by comparing the 
difference between the TL estimation by the GSO and TC planned by the fisheries 
management system. Clearly, the TC-based management regime was just operated in the 
planning system of government, it was not enforced in reality at the local fishing 
communities in Vietnam. In other words, the fishing level (i.e. total catches) objective of the 
fisheries plans was not controlled in practice. The volume of catches of fishers or vessels 
was not controlled and enumerated by the fisheries authorities in reality of Vietnam. 
According to fisheries regulations (MARD, 2013), fishers are required to submit 
logbook/fishing report to the fisheries authorities, so that local fisheries managers can 
estimate the TL within their administration territories. However, no fishers in these 
communal fisheries complied with this regulation. Fishers in Quynh Lap argued that they 
did not receive any requirements and guidance about writing and submitting fishing logbook 
and reports from the government. For tuna line fishers in Tam Quan Bac, they were not 
required to submit the fishing logbook to the fisheries authorities, but they were encouraged 
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to contract with research programs27 to provide their fishing logbook as told by tuna fishers 
in Tam Quan Bac. Furthermore, local fishers are not required to land their catches at any 
particular ports. They are allowed to land and sell their catches anywhere, and no agents 
enumerated their volume of catches as investigation in 2014. This means that the TL of 
fisheries at the communal levels was also not monitored in practice. 
7.3.2 CONTROL OF FISHING EFFORT 
Similar to the TC management, the number of fishing vessels is required to define 
congruently with the size of fish stocks in the fisheries annual plans (National Assembly, 
2003). However, the number of vessels was planned differently from the TC. The higher 
authorities did not influence on planning the number of vessels in detail (i.e. giving the 
growth rate) at the communal levels, but gave the general development trend (e.g. increase 
or decrease of specific fleets) as argued by the fisheries staffs in Quynh Lap and Tam Quan 
Bac communes. For instance, there was 688 vessels in Tam Quan Bac in 2010, and the 
plan by 2011 was to increase 8-10 offshore vessels as well as advise and warn fishers not 
to build more fishing vessels (CPC of Tam Quan Bac, 2011). Unlike to Tam Quan Bac, 
Quynh Lap had 274 vessels in 2010 and the plan by 2011 was to remain this number and 
advise fishers not to build or purchase more vessels to protect fisheries resources in the 
local waters28 (CPC of Quynh Lap, 2011). However, they did not provide a detail and 
concrete plan for controlling the number of fishing vessels within their fishing communities. 
As a result, their fishing vessels increased gradually as argued by the fisheries staffs in 
these communes. The number of fishing vessels of Tam Quan Bac and Quynh Lap was 
705 vessels and 293 vessels respectively in 2012 (CPC of Quynh Lap, 2013; CPC of Tam 
Quan Bac, 2013).  
                                         
27 The tuna fishers in Tam Quan Bac and other communities contracted with research programs to 
collect fisheries data (e.g. fishing logbook, accepted for fisheries observers, providing environmental 
data). They may be paid for this work. 
28 Quynh Lap commune was empowered to surveil fishing activities in the local waters by the PPC 
at the decision No. 63/2010/QD-UBND of the chairman of the Provincial People Committee in 2010 
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According to decree No. 66/2005/ND-CP (Government of Vietnam, 2005), building and 
modifying fishing vessels are the mandate of the provincial fisheries authority Department 
of Fisheries (DARD). Any fisher must get permission from DARD before building up a new 
vessel or modifying an old vessel. This means that communal government is not authorized 
to control the number of fishing vessels in its territories, albeit it plans the number of vessels 
in its fisheries plan. Getting a permission for building or modifying fishing vessels from 
DARD is easy. The fisheries staff in Tam Quan Bac told that all applications for building or 
modifying the tuna liners vessels were approved by DARD. He explained that this is 
because the tuna liners are considered as offshore vessels which are encouraged to 
develop. At the same time, the fisheries staff in Quynh Lap argued that all applications for 
building new trawlers of less than 90 HP in engine capacity were rejected since 2006 when 
MOFI issued the circular No.02/2006/TT-BTS (MOFI, 2006b). However, the number of 
trawlers in the commune increased gradually from 87 vessels in 2006 to 140 vessels in 
2014. This is, according to the local informants, because of two main reasons: i) fishers 
applied for other fisheries such as gill net, lift net, falling net; then they use trawl net 
concurrently, ii) a number of the trawlers installing engine capacity of less than 90 HP were 
built without permission. Consequently, the trawlers had increased gradually in Quynh Lap 
in practice. Clearly, the number of fishing vessels is also not under control of the fisheries 
planning system of government. 
7.3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL MEASURES 
The circular No.02/2006/TT-BTS (MOFI, 2006b) and decree No. 33/2010/ND-CP 
(Government of Vietnam, 2010) recognizes technical measures (e.g. mesh size, zoning, 
closed areas and time, species and size of fish to be allowed to catch, destructive gears 
and fishing methods banned to use) to protect fisheries resources. They assign provincial 
fisheries authorities (i.e. fisheries inspection department, sub-department of capture 
fisheries and aquatic resources protection) to enforce these regulations in the waters they 
are empowered to manage. This means that the communal government is not authorized 
to enforce the technical measures within their fishing communities. They are just required 
to collaborate with the competent authorities of the provincial government to propagandize 
regulations, to patrol at seas and inspect violations of the fisheries regulations within their 
territories. 
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Investigation in Quynh Lap in 2014 show that 100% trawlers used the mesh size at the cod 
end of 10-15mm less than the fine one (20mm); 40% of them used electric fishing method; 
and all of them operated year around, albeit their fishing grounds are closed from the first 
of March to thirty of April. The volume of undersized fish took a considerable proportion, for 
instance, 60% of squids caught (from 12-17cm in length) was undersized (20cm in length 
as regulated in circular No. 02/2006/TT-BTS). Moreover, the local informants argued that 
violations of technical measures such as dynamite and electric fishing, and fishing at wrong 
zones were commonly observed in the local fishing communities. The offshore vessels 
fishing in the coastal zone were commonly seen as told by the local fishers. For tuna liners 
in Tam Quan Bac, fishers are not required to comply with any technical measures to protect 
the oceanic tunas. They just caught the undersized squids with the length of <20cm when 
they used the hand line alternatively. However, this volume was very small, just <1% of the 
total landings as told local fishers. 
In terms of the traditional communities, the informal rules are recognized and enforced by 
the fishing communities such as: access right to fishing spots, ethical and religious values. 
As investigation in two communal fisheries, fishers in both communes agreed that the 
fishing spots belong to the fisher coming first and the fishers coming later are not allowed 
to set their gears in the front of the coming first fishers’ gears. The coming later fishers also 
have to set their gears far enough to the gear of the coming first fishers. For instance, the 
coming later trawlers are required to set their nets not crossing and greater than >300 
meters from the towing direction of the coming first trawlers; the coming later tuna liners 
should set their gears greater than >30 miles from the coming first ones and not crossing 
their drifting ways. Both small-scale and larger-scale fishers were committed and willing to 
follow these rules as a religious and ethical values as told by local informants and local 
fishers. In addition, the local fishers recognized that employing destructive fishing gears 
and methods (e.g. harvesting juvenile fish, catching whale, fishing with electricity and 
explosives) is unrighteous and unethical. All fishing villages in two communes having their 
own temples to worship the Whale God called as ‘Ong Nam Hai’. All the local informants 
interviewed told that local fishers bring sacrifices to the Whale God temples to show their 
loyalty and honesty once or twice in a year. They supplemented that in front of the God, 
the local fishers pray and aspire to safety at seas and getting more catches. The local 
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fishers also swear that they would not do unrighteous and unethical things to the marine 
creatures and fisheries resources as told by the local informants.  
The six informants and all fishers asked in Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac communes 
acknowledged that the informal rules and traditional norms used to be strongly influential 
on the fishers’ behavior, even more than the formal regulations enacted by the fisheries 
authorities. They explained that these traditionally informal rules and norms are complied 
with among fishing communities because they were made up from traditional experience 
of many generations. These rules provide realistic bases and ethical principles to address 
disputes and conflicts among fishers in their communities. However, these rules and norms 
have been undermined; even some of informal rules were no longer in effect such as 
definition of fishing territories among communities, allocation of fishing rights and fishing 
spots, taxation of volume of catches etc. as illustrated by scholars (Nguyen & Ruddle, 
2010). The six local informants and fishers argued that this is due to introduction of the 
market-oriented based economy and privatization of the fisheries in Vietnam. In addition, 
the government policies for encouraging the offshore fishing also erode the traditional rules. 
In this process, fishers have invested more in their business and ignored informal rules to 
maximize their share of catches as observe by three informants in Quynh Lap. This is a 
reason for degrading the social and moral sanctions, and as a result, the mechanism for 
enforcing fisheries regulations and eliminating violations at the local fishing communities 
has become less effective as argued by three informants in Quynh Lap. Two of three local 
informants in Tam Quan Bac argued that introduction of informal rules would improve 
effectiveness and efficiency of fisheries management system. 
7.3.4 PREFERENCES AND INTERESTS OF THE LOCAL FISHERS 
7.3.4.1 Preference of the local fishers 
La argued that most fishing vessel owners are unable or do not want to give up their fishing 
business in order to change to a new job (La, 2010). He pointed out that all fishers were 
subsidized to move to other non-fishing jobs returned to the fishing. As investigation in 2014 
in Tam Quan Bac and Quynh Lap communes, all fishing vessel owners asked said that 
they preferred the fishing job to other jobs because it was easy to get on one hand, and 
provided higher income compared to other available jobs at their local communities (e.g. 
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construction, fisheries logistics, small retailers, agriculture, etc.). Answering to the question 
that what will they do if they have more money? 148/154 (96%) vessel owners in Tam Quan 
Bac wanted to remain and enhance their fishing business because they did not have 
property and capital on one hand, and they did not have experience as well skills for doing 
other businesses on the other hand. In Quynh Lap commune, 72/88 (approx. 82%) vessel 
owners said that they would upgrade their vessels and business to be able to operate at 
farther waters with longer fishing trips, and the rest answered that they would build more 
vessels to enlarge their business. For 242 crew members asked in two communes in 2012, 
177 crew members (73%) said that they would possess or purchase shares in a vessel to 
go fishing as the vessel owners. They believed that fishing not only feed their family, but 
also enrich themselves and make their life wealthier. This type of fishers was born in the 
fishing families or lived in fishing communities and on fishing from their childhood. They 
had almost no skills and education for non-fishing jobs. 22% of crew members stated they 
would start up a non-fishing business such as retailers, farming, motorbike transportation, 
etc. These fishers originate from non-fishing families and their families had the main income 
from the non-fishing livelihoods. In general, they intended to enlarge their current business. 
The rest of crew members (5%) wanted to repair their house and continue with fishing job 
to feed their family, to give their children to high schools and universities, to go abroad for 
working. Most of these fishers want to change to the non-fishing livelihoods. 
7.3.4.2 Interests of the local fishers 
All fishers interviewed in two communes have been striving to enhance and improve fishing 
business to maximize their benefits. In fact, local fishers allied each other to learn and share 
experience, provided mutual assistance to upgrade vessels and fishing gears and methods 
as well as other businesses. They also sought for the subsidy programs of government for 
fisheries such as credit for building and upgrading vessels, subsidies on fishing costs and 
installing fishing equipment in order to upgrade and enlarge their business for getting more 
profits. It was evident that the most important interest of fishers in two communal fisheries 
under investigation was the maximization of the catches and profits. In order to obtain this, 
vessel owners were interested in modernizing their business (i.e. vessel, gears, 
equipment); managing better skippers and crew members; reducing fishing costs; and 
selling their catches with the highest fish price.  
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As a traditional pattern in the Vietnamese fishing communities, fishing vessels were 
maintained, upgraded periodically and left for the next generation as the inheritance. As 
observation of the Vietnamese fisheries over the last twenty years and as told by six local 
informants in two communes, the local fishers began their own business with a small-scale 
vessel or shared with others. They then would enlarge their business gradually by 
upgrading their vessel or getting more shares of a vessel. These fishers’ families live 
dependently on the fishing and are referred to as fishers of “fishing to live”. They have 
intended to invest more in fishing to get better business, so they possess the large-scale 
vessels that can make longer fishing trips in the offshore waters. They possess around 
32,000 offshore vessels accounting for approx. 29% of total fishing vessel owners of 
Vietnam. 
Another type of fisher is dominating in the fishing communities of Vietnam: small-scale 
fishers. They have got involved in fishing industry for a long time ago and worked as vessel 
owners, skippers, and also crew members. These fishers possess a small-scale vessel or 
share a vessel with others operating in the coastal waters with short fishing trips <10 days 
at sea. Most (82%) of them intended to expand their business to be fishers of the “fishing 
to live”. The others, whose family has incomes from non-fishing business, just remain the 
small-scale vessels to get supplementary incomes for covering their family’s daily costs 
and preparing the non-fishing livelihoods for their children. They have an overarching 
objective to get out of the small-scale fisheries to be the large-scale fishers or to be no 
longer a professional fisher. I name them as the fishers of “fishing for changing life”. This 
type of fishers accounted for about 68% of total fishing vessel owners of Vietnam. 
The other type of fisher has just appeared since the government launched its subsidy 
programs for developing the offshore fishing. They do not have much experience in the 
fishing business, but they entered the fishing industry to achieve subsidies from the 
government and do business with fishing. These fishers just invested their business (i.e. 
vessel, gear, fishing equipment) as the template terms approved by the local government 
(i.e. Provincial People Committee), but did not intend to enlarge their business as the 
professional fishers of the “fishing to live”. I name them as the fishers of “fishing of 
opportunists”. This type of fisher accounts for a very small proportion in the Vietnamese 
fishing communities. 
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Although all Vietnamese fishers share the same interest of maximizing their benefits, but 
they pursuit different tactics and strategies for their business. Based on actual conditions 
of weather, finance, experience, markets, fish stocks, etc., individual fishers may behave 
differently from each other in the long-term as well as in the short-term decisions. For 
instance, fishers of “fishing to live” may invest in cooling system to reduce loss of post-
harvest for long fishing trips, meanwhile the others may not because their catches are fine 
by preserving with ice in short fishing trips. Similarly, the fishers of “fishing to live” would 
not go fishing if the weather would be bad, but fishers of “fishing for changing life” and 
“fishing of opportunists” would go because they often operate in coastal fishing grounds, 
then they come back their homeport easily. The fishers of “fishing of opportunists” would 
not go fishing because of lacking crew members, but the others do not get that trouble 
because they often provide stable salary and working conditions for crew members. 
7.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING FISHING DECISIONS OF THE LOCAL FISHERS  
As analysis in chapter 3, the fishing behaviours of the local fishers are presented into the 
strategic decisions and tactical decisions. In general, the strategic decisions are usually 
made by the vessel owners related to long-term investments in building and repairing 
vessels, installing electronic and mechanical equipment, and fish preservation systems. 
The tactical decisions are often made in short-term by skippers to define fishing positions, 
fishing time, gears used, number of days at sea, etc. to maximize their catches. 
7.4.1 STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
A fishing vessel is means providing livelihoods for fishers and their family. It is often used 
over several generations. As an obligation, previous generations preserve and upgrade 
their fishing business for the next generations as told by six local informants in Quynh Lap 
and Tam Quan Bac communes. Vessel owners may replace bigger engine, install more 
fishing and preservation equipment, or build new vessels to improve fishing effectiveness 
and maximize their profits. Often, they will leave their business for their children when they 
get old and cannot manage their business. They only stop fishing and sell their vessels if 
they and their children would not manage their fishing business effectively in cases of 
lacking people managing daily fishing business, impossibility to upgrade or repair vessel 
and fishing equipment. 
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This research found seven factors influencing and driving the local fishers’ strategic 
decisions including i) fisheries management regulations; ii) subsidy policies; iii) the financial 
status of family; iv) management capacity; v) the livelihood opportunity of the coming 
generation; vi) labour availability; and vii) individual experience. The influence degree of 
these factors varies by the types of fishers and the practical situations. 
7.4.1.1 Type 1: fishers of “fishing to live” 
Most (145/148) of these fishers were born in a professional fishing household and have 
been familiar with fishing business since their childhoods as investigation in Tam Quan Bac 
tuna line fishery in 2014. Their family life depends totally on the fishing. They got a low 
education and often stopped going to school and entering the fishing business at age of 
15-18 years old. They started their fishing job by working as crew members in their vessels 
and gradually accumulated experience in managing fishing business and skills for 
operating fishing vessel as a skipper under supervision of their farther or brother. They 
would become a skipper when their family having a new fishing vessel or their farther, 
brother no longer working onboard.  
These fishers worked for the objective to make money to feed and enrich their family, and 
facilitate their children’s life. They possess larger scale vessels called as the offshore 
vessels operating widely in the offshore waters far from the homeports. They were willing 
to make long fishing trips to harvest as many catches as possible. They spent over 200 
days for fishing at seas in a year, more than the other fishers. They were often gathered 
into groups of skippers and vessel owners to share information about fishing business such 
as fishing grounds, security at seas, weather, post-harvest technologies, installing and 
operating electronic and mechanical equipment, fish price and landing sites, etc.  
This type of fisher was often imitated by and competed with other fishers to get higher 
profitability. They are innovative, learning and developing new fishing technologies, 
methods of catch handling and preservation systems to reduce loss of post-harvest and to 
improve economic efficiency. They often moved in a huge range of fishing grounds and 
change fishing gears and methods accordingly to characteristics of the target species (e.g. 
long line, hand line for catching tuna, gill net for flying fish, etc.). Their fishing grounds are 
the offshore waters; thus, these fishers have been encouraged and subsidized for stronger 
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development to contribute to the growth rate of the sector as well as protection of the 
national sovereign at seas. In addition, the offshore fishing activities in general and tuna 
line fishery in particular, are not restricted much by fisheries regulations. This means that 
the tuna line fishery in Vietnam is regulated neither by limitation of catches nor in number 
of vessels, it just is not allowed to catch dolphins and the narrow-barred Spanish mackerel 
of <730cm in length as regulated by circular No.62/2008/TT-BNNPTNT. Therefore, this 
type of fisher would be a big threat to the oceanic tuna stocks and marine ecosystem in the 
offshore waters of Vietnam. All fishers interviewed told that they have intended to make 
more investments to increase fishing capacity (i.e. catch rate, catches) and reduce the post-
harvest losses. Of these, 27/148 (18%) of fishers would enlarge their business with building 
more modern and bigger vessels. They believed that the available fisheries resources are 
still abundant to ensure the viability of their fishing business. The other 121/148 (82%) 
fishers want to upgrade their fishing business. Among them, 44/121 (36%) of fishers 
intended to replace with a bigger engine, 58/121 (48%) of them intended to improve the 
fish preservation and handling systems, and 19/121 (16%) of them intended to replace the 
current vessel by a bigger and more modern vessel respectively. 
The investigation shows that most 78/148 (53%) fishers argued that the subsidy programs 
were an important factor stimulating them investing on building more new vessels, 
upgrading the existing vessels, replacing bigger engine, replacing fishing gears, improving 
fish preservation onboard. In fact, the subsidy programs of the government provided credit 
for building and upgrading vessels resulting in a dramatic increase in fishing effort in the 
last five years, especially in the offshore waters (from 23,445 vessels in 2011 to 35,009 
vessels in 2016) on one hand. These programs also provided subsidies for fishing costs 
for fishers remaining fishing activities at seas, especially at the overlap and disputed waters 
between Vietnam and other neighbouring countries on the other hand. This was evaluated 
as the most important successfulness of the Vietnamese fisheries policies; the subsidy 
programs were the trigger for increasing in fishing capacity as evaluated by Directorate of 
Fisheries “…in the last five years, government just provided around 123 million USD 
subsidizing for vessels, then fishers were stimulated to invest themselves much bigger 
(about 2,045 million USD) into building new vessels and upgrading fishing vessels and 
handling technologies…” (D-Fish, 2016a p.4). However, 63.7% fishers interviewed in Tam 
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Quan Bac argued that the offshore fishing fleets were overcapitalized due to subsidy 
programs of the government. They believed that the existing fishing effort was over the size 
and productivity of the tuna stocks and 22.4% of them claimed that their economic 
performance was so low that they would cease their fishing business if government stopped 
subsidies on fishing costs. By that time, 100% fishers and three local informants 
interviewed in Quynh Lap argued that the subsidy programs are necessary for developing 
the offshore fisheries, but many of vessel owners were selected wrongly with less 
experience and fishing skills in offshore waters. This was the main reason for the low 
efficiency of the offshore vessels as well as common operation of the offshore vessels in 
the coastal waters as explained by fishers in Quynh Lap. 
The investigation also shows that 32.2% of fishers considered their financial status as the 
first priority factor influencing on their investment decisions. Over than 9% of them took 
their coming generation’s livelihood as the first priority factor; 5.0% of them evaluated the 
management capacity is the most priority factor; and only 0.8% of them considered the 
fisheries resource (i.e. individual experience) as the most important factor influencing on 
their investment decisions. Meanwhile, most fishers (96.3%) did not care or considered the 
fisheries management regulations as the less important factor. Only 11/148 fishers asked 
mentioned about regulations on the mesh size to be used having influence on their decision 
in buying the nets. These fishers told that they just asked the retailer that whether the nets 
were compatible with the regulations or not, but they bought because many neighbours 
also these nets for fishing in practice.  
In terms of fisheries management, there have been contradictory policies for developing 
the fisheries in Vietnam as analyzed in chapter 5. Both the 2010 fisheries master plan and 
the 2020 fisheries master plan intend to reduce fishing vessels, meanwhile subsidy 
programs encourage fishers to build more bigger vessels and enhance fishing capacity 
have been also implemented in last twenty years. In fact, measures and plans to reduce 
fishing vessels were not made and enforced in practice because of lacking resources on 
one hand, and also due to a lack of support by the existing management system as thought 
by a former deputy director of D-Fish. He explained that fisheries managers have no valid 
and credible evidence for making a convincingly informed plan to reduce fishing vessels 
(i.e. how many vessels, what gears, how to address livelihoods for fishers, etc.). By 
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contrast, he argued that proposals and implementation of subsidy programs for fishing 
vessels were widely supported by policy-makers and politicians in both national and 
provincial levels. According to him, the subsidy programs bought happiness and benefits 
for all concerned parties. For instance, bureaucrats (i.e. politicians and managers) would 
be evaluated as facilitators of developing fisheries and of improving fishing communities; 
fishers would have more resources to enlarge and enhance fishing capacity. However, the 
disadvantages of these programs were commonly ignored or not documented convincingly. 
For instance, depletion of fisheries resources, decrease in catch rates and economic 
viability of fishing fleets, invasion of offshore vessels in the coastal waters, etc. were 
demonstrated in the Vietnamese fisheries as analyzed in chapter 4 and chapter 5. This 
would have negative implications of the fisheries resources and of the following generations 
of fishers on one hand (FAO, 1995), and also waste financial and social resources of the 
existing generation.  
7.4.1.2 Type 2: fishers of “fishing of opportunists” 
This type of fisher has appeared since the end 1990s when the government’s subsidy 
programs were launched to encourage the off-shore fishing development. From 
observations in Vietnamese fisheries over the last twenty years, these fishers were not 
professional fishers and did not originate in fishing households, but they are inhabited or 
relatively connected with the fishing communities. They were retailers, retired officials, 
fisheries traders or non-professional fishers before becoming fishers, but they had good 
relationship with the governmental agencies or familiar with the procedures for accessing 
to the governmental policies. They also had higher graduation rates than the professional 
fishers. This may make them easier to get the loan credit from government’s subsidy 
programs to build a new vessel as argued by six local informants in two communes. 
The government subsidy programs provided the opportunity for these people to become 
fishers. They entered into the fishing because they were attracted by the credit with low 
interest and other favours from the government’s subsidy programs as told by 10/14 local 
fisheries managers. As told by two tuna line fishers in Tam Quan Bac and three fishers in 
Khanh Hoa and one fisher in Thanh Hoa 2014, they believed that they would get higher 
benefits from fishing business the local fishers got because they would manage fishing 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
196 
 
business better than the lower education fishers. In addition, the subsidy programs also 
offered favourable conditions to get credit from the bank. Off these, fishers were not 
required to provide a deposit, and were allowed to use the vessel built collateral for the 
mortgage at the bank. This was understood commonly that fishers would operate a new 
vessel to get profits from fishing, and they would return the vessel to the bank if they failed 
to earn profits and wanted to leave fishing industry. In fact, these fishers did not take care 
their vessels and fishing business in comparison to the other types of fisher. This was a 
reason for the failure of the offshore fishing program by the decision No. 393/TTg in 1997-
2001 as argued by a former director of Planning Department of MOFI. 
Unlike to professional fishers, the fishers of “fishing of opportunists” did not possess much 
knowledge or skills about fishing vessels, gear system, and fishing technologies onboard. 
Therefore, they intended to minimize their investments and costs on their fishing business. 
Consequently, their fishing business (i.e. vessel, fishing equipment and gear systems) were 
invested as the template designed by the government agencies within the protocol of the 
subsidy programs. This template was not qualified for effectiveness and safety of fishing at 
seas in practice as argued by three skippers, used to work on these vessels, interviewed 
in Khanh Hoa in 2014. According to these skippers, this type of fishers also often ignored 
the skipper’s proposals on installing the new fishing technologies and equipment; on 
repairing and maintaining vessel, engine, gears, equipment; and improving the working 
conditions onboard. They intended to use concurrently the other gears with the main gears 
to maximize productivity of crew members hired onboard. For instance, crew members 
were required to use hand line on the long liners for catching tuna in the spare time as told 
by two crew members interviewed in Tam Quan Bac in 2014. 
In addition, in order to minimize costs, these fishers often required the hired skipper and 
crew members taking care carefully their vessel and fishing equipment, but with lower 
bonus than that of the type 1 of fishers. This lead to failure of this type of fisher in Vietnam. 
In fact, 4/6 fishers went bankrupt and returned the vessels to the bank due to economic 
losses; and 2/6 fishers still operated their fishing business because they had to change to 
better relationships and behaviours with the skipper and crew members hired. These two 
fishers had closely connected with skippers to manage their fishing business. They were 
willing to invest to upgrade their vessels, fishing equipment, gears and handling system as 
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suggested by skippers to improve their catch rates and reduce the post-harvest losses as 
observed in Tam Quan Bac in 2014. These fishers would become the professional fishers 
of “fishing to live”. However, they did not want to invest in building more vessels, just try to 
operate the existing vessel effectively by upgrading fishing gears and handling systems, 
equipment. These two fishers took their financial status as the most important factor 
influencing on their investment decisions. They argued that the government’s subsidy 
programs are very important to them, but they would not be allowed to get more because 
they got already and remained in debt to the bank. The second important factor influencing 
their strategic decisions were their own experience and consultation with their skipper. They 
observed their neighbouring fishers’ business (e.g. preservation system, fishing gears and 
handling systems), then they consulted with their skipper to invest. The third one was the 
labour available. These fishers argued that the crew members for tuna line fishery were 
scarce in Binh Dinh, so contracting with skilled crew members is hard for the tuna liner 
owners in general, but is harder for them because they did not have close relationships 
with the local fishing communities as the fishers of type 1 – “fishing to live” as explained by 
these two fishers. These other factors did not influence on their strategic fishing decisions 
in practice. 
In term of fisheries management, the number of the fishers of “fishing of opportunists” was 
very small compared to the other type of fishers in Vietnam. They just existed along with 
the government’s subsidy programs on fisheries, and may move to the community of the 
professional fishers as the type 1 of “fishing to live”. The added fishing pressure from these 
fishers were not much, unless these fishers become the type 1 of fishers. This means that 
theses fishers would cause depletion of fish stocks, even more than the fishers of type 1 
because they fished in the coastal waters rather than fishers of type 1 did as told by 
informants in Quynh Lap. These fishers would be reduced if government would remove 
their subsidy programs or would implement a fair process of choosing borrowers at the 
local communities. Getting these fishers out of fisheries may be easier than other fishers 
because they have other livelihoods and incomes to live. 
In addition, appearance of these fishers in local fishing communities has caused negative 
thoughts that erode the trust of fishing communities to the government as claimed by 
traditional fishers (i.e. type 1 - “fishing to live”, and type 3 - “fishing for changing life”) in 
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Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac. The fishers of type 3 claimed that these fishers - “fishing 
of opportunists” had exacerbated the overexploitation of fisheries resources and they have 
been treated unfairly as fishers of type 2 – “fishing of opportunists”. They asked themselves 
that why government provided subsidies for building more vessels while there have been 
so many vessels chasing depleting fish stocks in their traditional fishing grounds. They 
expected that government should subsidy them with a small amount of money to upgrade 
their vessels, engine, fishing equipment, fish handling system, etc. to improve the catch 
rates of the existing fishing fleets. 
7.4.1.3 Type 3: fishers of “fishing for changing life” 
This type of fisher accounted for the largest proportion in the Vietnamese fishing 
communities. These fishers were the core element of the fisheries development policies in 
Vietnam. They provide social welfares (e.g. employment, incomes, culture) for the coastal 
communities. They also were the key producers of the marine fish for domestic 
consumption and export. They lived dependently on the fisheries sources and their 
livelihoods vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters; but they were also known as a 
cause of depleting fisheries resources and degrading marine ecosystems in the coastal 
waters of Vietnam. These fishers have lived within the fishing communities for many of 
generations. They coexisted with and are precursors of the fishers of type 1, but they were 
also poor in comparison to the fishers of type 1 – fishers of “fishing to live”. Therefore, they 
tried to work hard and fish as much as possible to get the highest profits. Their objective 
was to seek for opportunities to change their life as fishers of type 1 or getting non-fishing 
careers as told by most of fishers interviewed in Quynh Lap in 2014. 
These fishers have intended to keep fishing costs at the lowest level and expected the 
highest economic efficiency. Therefore, they have to come up with solutions to save 
investment costs and to maximize landings of having good price as argued by all fishers 
asked in Quynh Lap in 2014. In fact, they just operated fishing within the traditional fishing 
grounds and use a wide range of fishing gears and methods to catch any species coming 
seasonably based on their experience. They did not pay for services, but did the works of 
assembling and repairing fishing gears, maintenance of vessel and fishing equipment by 
themselves to minimize their costs. They considered deliberately and carefully about 
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application and installment of new technologies and equipment. They often waited and 
observed their neighbors doing first in couple of fishing seasons, and then they would 
imitate if the efficiency of the new technologies was seen clearly.  
As this type of fishers want to change their life, most of them (73/88 fishers approx. 83%) 
asked in Quynh Lap wanted upgrading their existing fishing business to improve their 
catches and economic efficiency. Of these, 66.2% of them want to build a more modern 
and bigger vessel to become the fisher of type 1; 24.3% of them wanted to replace a new 
and bigger engine so that they could sail faster from homeport to fishing grounds and do 
fishing more easily; and 9.5% of them wanted to make their gears bigger and improve fish 
handling system such as keeping their catches (i.e. fish, crabs, snails, etc.) live or at good 
quality to sell with the higher price. All of them agreed that they needed government’s 
subsidy to invest in their business, but they just borrow a small amount (e.g. around 
100,000 USD for building new offshore vessels, 35,000 USD for replacing bigger engine, 
15,000 for investing fishing gears and handling systems), not as big as the template 
package offered by the government. The second factor influencing on their investment 
decisions were the fishers’ financial status. They explained that they would not borrow all 
capital to invest in their business, but just around 50-70% of the property. The remaining 
part would be contributed by themselves or by co-owners of vessels. The most third factor 
influencing on their investment decisions was the livelihoods for their children as ranked by 
37 (50.7%) fishers. They explained that getting non-fishing jobs for their children would be 
difficult because their children did not get good education on one hand, and they seemed 
to be familiar with fishing job. Some other fishers (23/73) evaluated the labour available 
was the most third factor effecting on their investment decisions, and the rest (13/73) 
argued that their own experience was the most third factor they would rely on to decide 
investments on their fishing business. The most fourth factor influencing on the investment 
decisions of 48/73 fishers were the fisheries regulations. These fishers explained that they 
would not invest in electric system or strong light for fishing because these are banned by 
the fisheries regulations. At the same time, 25/73 fishers took the management capacity as 
the most fourth factor impacting on their investment. They explained that they would not 
invest in their fishing business if they and crew members would not use and operate the 
property effectively. 
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Meanwhile, only 15/88 (17%) fishers would remain at their current level of fishing business. 
These fishers explained that they did not want to expand their business because the two 
following reasons: i) the fisheries resources in the traditional waters had become more and 
more scarce, ii) economic pressure on fishing had no longer been urgent because their 
children had their own career and other incomes from non-fishing business had been better 
and more stable. They told that they would get out of fishing when they got old or their 
vessel was sold at a reasonable price. 
In term of fisheries management, the objective of the fisheries management plans is to 
reduce the number of these fishers, who operate the small-scale fisheries in the coastal 
waters, for conservation of fish stocks. However, this type of fisher has still developed 
dominantly in Vietnam in the last three decades. This was explained by two main reasons 
according to this type of fishers – the fishers of “fishing to changing life” as follows: 
i) They (i.e. fishers of type 3) could not jump immediately from operating the current 
small-scale vessels fishing in coastal waters to the bigger vessels in the offshore 
waters as offered in the government’s subsidy programs. They just wanted to 
upgrade their existing business gradually, but they could not because their business 
efficiency had become lower and lower on a hand, this strategy had not supported 
by the subsidy programs of government on the other hand. 
ii) Although government had provided credit and offered training for setting up the 
alternative livelihoods, this was difficult for them to access and not enough for them 
to settle in a new career feeding their family. Therefore, the solution would be to 
launch policies to provide education and non-fishing job opportunities for their 
children, so that the number of this type of fishers would decrease gradually. 
7.4.2 TACTICAL DECISIONS 
As analyzed in section of 7.3, the Vietnamese fishers are not limited by catch quotas or 
number of fishing days. Therefore, they are allowed to catch as much as they can at any 
time of the year. Fishers including vessel owners, skippers and crew members are not 
graduated in the fisheries schools, but skippers are required to take part a short course of 
2-3 days on basic knowledge about safety at seas, operating fishing vessels, and fisheries 
regulations. In fact, skippers have got immense experience and knowledge of operating the 
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fishing business from previous generations and their neighbours. They were innovative in 
modifying and changing gears and fishing methods to improve their catches and economic 
efficiency adapting to the practical situations (e.g. fluctuation of market, distribution patterns 
of fish, weather, fishing ground conditions, etc.). This study pointed out eight factors 
influencing on the tactical decisions as illustrated in table 7.1. Fishers make themselves 
tactical decisions daily based on their own experience and practical conditions at seas or 
consultation with the vessel owners and/or skippers. The importance of factors influencing 
on the tactical decisions varies by type of fishers (table 7.1 and figure 7.1). 
Table 7.1: The importance of factors influencing on the fishers’ tactical decisions 
Fishers 
Season Market Weather 
Experie-
nce 
Informa-
tion 
Inform
al rules 
Labour 
Regula
-tions 
Type 1: Fishers of 
“Fishing to live” 
N = 148 
3.94 3.08 3.53 2.98 2.02 1.93 1.02 0.24 
Type 2: Fishers of 
“Fishing of 
opportunists” 
N = 06 
3.50 3.33 2.83 3.17 1.67 1.33 1.33 0.33 
Type 3: Fishers of 
“Fishing for changing 
life” 
N = 88 
3.66 3.15 2.19 2.18 2.36 2.22 0.80 0.58 
 
Investigation on three types of fishers in Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac shows that 5/8 
factors influence on the tactical decisions of all 242 fishers interviewed, the factor of 
informal rules are not taken into account by two fishers of type 1; and 2/8 factors (i.e. labour 
and regulations) are not cared by many fishers when they decide daily fishing activities.  
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Figure 7.2: The importance of factors influencing on the fishers’ tactical decisions 
As shown in figure 7.2, the season is the most important factor for all types of fishers to 
make their tactical decisions. Fishers interviewed argued that the distribution patterns of 
the targeting species adapt to the two prevailing monsoons: the Southwest and the 
Northeast in the year. In each season, the specific species appear dominantly in the 
traditional fishing grounds. Based on this immense experience and the previous trips, 
fishers would forecast the distribution patterns of fish (e.g. where they school, what 
direction they migrate, when they sleep, etc.), then they decide which gears to be used and 
when they set nets to harvest the biggest volume of catches. For instance, in months of 
October to May, the type 1 and type 2 of fishers often use the long line and hand line for 
catching oceanic tunas; in the other months, they often use gill net for catching flying fish, 
or for tuna and mackerel, or use hand line for squids depending on personal experience 
and market condition as told by fishers in Tam Quan Bac. For the fishers of type 3, who is 
less moved to outside their provincially traditional waters, change their tactical decisions 
more flexibly and frequently than the other types of fishers. For instance, in the winter time 
(from October to the March), most targeted species (e.g. groupers, shrimps, squids, 
demersal fish, etc.) tend to migrate to the bottom then fishers use the bottom trawl nets or 
push nets; they change to use the traps to harvest snails in April and May; from June to 
September when squids, small pelagic fish, swimming crabs, etc. appear in the surface 
layers, fishers may change to use gill nets, lift nets, hand line, falling nets to minimize the 
fishing costs. They also use seine nets or push nets some time to harvest Acetes spp. in 
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nearshore waters in the summer time. This reflects that the Vietnamese fishers understand 
very well about the distribution patterns of targeting species. They know clearly what 
species appear when and where, even the life cycle of the targeting species.  
The second most important factor influencing on the fishers’ tactical decisions is not the 
same among types of fishers. Weather is the second most important factor for the fishers 
of type 1 – fishers of “fishing to live”. Most (98/148) of these fishers acknowledged the 
weather is the critical factor for them to decide whether to go fishing or not. They argued 
that the bad weather conditions of rough seas may make their catch rate lower and cause 
high risks for their property and crew members. Based on this, vessel owners and skippers 
often stayed at shore until it has improved. At the same time, the type 2 of fishers – “fishing 
of opportunists” took experience of skippers as the second most important factor for 
deciding where to go fishing. In a certain season, the vessel owners decided what gears to 
be used, but the skippers decided where to go to fish. Based on the immense experience, 
the skippers often fished in the fishing grounds where the non-targeting species inhabit to 
increase income of individuals of crew members. This was because of the informal rules 
that crew members were allowed to used their own gears (e.g. hand line) to fish, and these 
catches belong to them. In fact, there have been cases that the income of crew members 
from their own catches was greater than the salary paid by the vessel owner. For the type 
3 of fishers – “fishing for changing life”, they took the market as the second most important 
factor to make their static decisions.  Based on the price and consumption demands, these 
fishers would decide what species they should prioritize to catch to maximize their 
economic efficiency. The fishers in Quynh Lap argued that they would not go fishing, if they 
imaged that they would have catches of so low quality (e.g. dominance of trash fish and 
juvenile) that the revenue could not cover their fishing costs. This suggests the introduction 
of the financial tools for managing the fishing activities so that fishers should stop fishing at 
the time of appearance of juvenile for conservation objectives. 
There was the same choice for the third most important factor for the fishers of type 1 and 
type 2 to make the tactical decisions. They based on the market situation to decide using 
the long line or hand line for catching the oceanic tunas. They also based on consumption 
demands to decide which species they would catch in the months beyond the season for 
catching oceanic tunas (i.e. from May to September). Meanwhile, the type 3 of fishers 
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considered the information from other fishers as the third most important factor when 
making decisions where to fish, what species to catch and which gears should be used. 
They believed that the appearance of targeting species is uncertain factor. In addition, the 
price of fish has been fluctuated depend on the available of production and local 
consumption. Therefore, they often got information on fishing grounds and market from 
other fishers to decide which species to target and when to fish. They also imitated others 
to maximize their economic efficiency. This was a typical character of the type 3 of fishers. 
There was a difference among three types of fishers to rank the fourth most important factor 
influencing on their tactical decisions. The fishers of “fishing to live” took the experience as 
the fourth most important factor influencing on their tactical decisions. They thought this 
factor is not important as factors of season, market and weather because most of them 
understood very well about distribution patterns of the targeting species, exception of the 
younger fishers. Furthermore, because they often went fishing in the offshore waters which 
are very far from their homeports, so they should go together in a group. They then can 
help each other to make tactic decisions at sea. At the same time, the type 2 of fishers – 
“fishing of opportunists” took the weather as the fourth most important factor impacting on 
their tactic decisions. They argued that they went fishing unless there is storm coming. 
They should stay at sea and stop fishing for the very rough days to minimize fuel costs, 
and continue to catch fish before others coming to fish. By that time, the type 3 of fishers – 
“fishing for changing life” took the informal rules into account as the fourth most important 
when they decided where to fish. They respected implicit rules that who come first have all 
rights to fish. When they fish in the same fishing grounds, the coming later fishers should 
set their nets under the current to the coming first ones. They acknowledged that the 
informal rules impact on their decisions stronger than the formal regulations enforced by 
fisheries authorities. 
The factor of information from other fishers was used as the fifth most important one for 
deciding daily fishing tactics by the type 1 and type 2 of fishers. This was important for them 
because the skippers often shared information (e.g. fish grounds, kinds of species, size of 
fish, fish behaviours, market, currents, security at sea) with other skippers and vessel 
owners. At the same time, the type 3 of fishers used the weather as the fifth most important 
factor to decide fishing or not fishing. They told that the weather is not very important to 
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them because they just operated in the coastal areas that were close to their homeport. 
They just stopped fishing in days of the storms, heavy rain, and very rough sea.  
The fishers of type 1 and type 2 were the same interested in the informal rules in the 
process of the tactical decision-making. They used this factor as the sixth priority basis for 
deciding where they should set their nets and hooks. They should set their hooks and nets 
at a place that do not harm property and catch rate of the fishers coming first. At the same 
time, experience was used as the fifth most important factor by the type 3 of fishers. These 
fishers explained that this is not very important for them because they have known very 
well about their business and natural conditions of their traditional fishing grounds. In fact, 
they have just caught the same species in the same fishing spots for long time because 
the traditional fishing spots have been nearly the implicit ownership of the defined fishers 
as told by fishers in Quynh Lap. This suggests the application of the fishing rights regime 
for this type of fishers to reduce overfishing and conflicts among the local fishers should 
improve effectiveness of the existing fisheries management system in Vietnam. 
In recent years, due to a dramatic increase in number of fishing vessels in combination with 
industrialization and urbanization of coastal areas, the labour entering the fishing industry 
has been less and less. The local people have tended to work in the factories and get other 
non-fishing jobs. Consequently, the number of fishing vessels having to cease fishing due 
to lacking crew members have become more and more throughout the country as 
observation in 2009-2014 at local fishing communities of Vietnam. Therefore, most of 
fishers took the labour into account when making their tactical decisions, although it was 
not very much important – the seventh priority among eight factors influencing on their 
decisions. But, this factor seemed to become more and more important for fishers to make 
both the strategic and tactical decisions on fishing business. Except a part of the type 3 of 
fishers who hold stakes of fishing vessels – the co-owners of vessels. They often worked 
stably together onboard as crew members and shared their fishing costs and incomes. In 
the fisheries management perspective, reduction in fishing labour is a promising tendency 
for reducing pressure on the natural resources and is a good opportunity for restructuring 
the fisheries towards avoiding overcapacity of fishing fleets. 
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It was a worse situation for the Vietnamese fisheries because all fishers do not care about 
or disregard the management regulations when they make daily fishing decisions on where, 
when to go fishing and what species to target. In fact, 19% of fishers did not take regulations 
into account when making their tactical decisions. They explained that they did not 
understand well about the fisheries regulations enacted by government. These regulations 
were unrealistic and may impact negatively on their catches and incomes as told by fishers 
in Quynh Lap. For instance, fishers could not use the mesh size of trawl net cod-end of 
30mm because most of fish would be gilled in the net. This would cause difficulty for collect 
them and reduce the fishing efficiency. They argued that they imitated the fishing 
techniques of other fishers to increase the efficiency of their business, even that techniques 
are prohibited by management regulations. These fishers also explained that their catches 
and incomes would be less than whose use the destructive methods. They also concerned 
that in the trend of depletion of fisheries resources, they have been intensively trapped in 
a race for employing destructive methods to catch the last fish. This has become more and 
more serious because there has nearly no competent authorities enforcing regulations and 
fisheries surveillance at sea as observation in the Vietnamese fisheries since 2005 when 
the fisheries inspection replaced the fisheries surveillance. Usage of destructive methods 
(e.g. fishing with electricity, dynamite, undersized mesh size, etc.) has been so common in 
the communal waters that the local fishers have to stop fishing at days the fisheries 
inspection force appear in the local waters as told by three informants in Quynh Lap. This 
implies that fishers did not dare to violate regulations if competent authorities perform their 
missions adequately at the local waters.  
Besides the above eight factors, the fishing tactics of many fishers were also impacted by 
the government’s subsidies. At the time of investigation, government was running a subsidy 
program that each offshore vessel may be subsidized the fuel costs for four fishing trips 
per year. Approx. 22.5% of the fishers of type 1 – “fishing to live” and type 2 – “fishing of 
opportunists” acknowledged that they would not go fishing if they had not been provided 
subsidies on fuel costs from the government. They explained that the increase in fuel price 
and decrease in catch rate made their fishing costs higher than their revenue, so they had 
to consider whether cease to fishing. In fact, a majority of vessels were unable to remain in 
business when fuel price increased and the government subsidy on fuel costs was not 
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delivered as told by three local informants in Tam Quan Bac in 2014. This would make it 
seem that then fishing business was only viable when it was subsidized by the government. 
It seems to be the Vietnamese fisheries were in the vicious cycle that government subsidize 
fisheries, then fisheries are viable, and government subsidize fisheries again. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This search argued that the management tools (e.g. limitation of TC and reduction of fishing 
vessels) planned in the 2010 fisheries master plan were not enforced in reality of the 
Vietnamese fisheries. They not only were not implemented at the fishing communities, but 
also not followed by the lower planning system at the provincial, district and communal 
levels. The TC and number of fishing vessels at the communal level were just articulated 
symbolically in the state planning system of the government, but not used to control the 
fishing activities in the reality of fishing communities. This reconfirmed that the fisheries 
planning system was just operationalized within the government system, it was not used to 
manage the fisheries in Vietnam. In other words, the Vietnamese fisheries are under a 
‘open-access’ regime. This resulted in a recommendation from the European Commission 
that “i) The draft fisheries law submitted by Vietnam in April present significant loopholes 
and fails to incorporate basic principles and elements of the International Law of the Sea; 
ii) It will likely require urgent measures to address overcapacity (i.e. adopting a new strategy 
within the national plan of action with clear targets at short-term for reduction of the number 
of fishing vessels, with focus on the offshore fleets; iii) ….that monitoring, control and 
surveillance tools developed by Vietnam continue to be insufficient to ensure flag State 
responsibility over a fleet of more than 100,000 fishing vessels.….” (European Commission, 
2017 p.2-3). Based on this, the European Commission warned the Vietnamese fisheries 
authorities formally by the ‘yellow card’ on the 23 October 2017. 
The research also shows that the communal government, who is the closest with the fishing 
communities, was not empowered to manage and to enforce management decisions in 
Vietnam. There is no authority at local level which ensure the fisheries master plan (i.e. 
management tools) is implemented at fishing communities. This may be a critical reason 
for ineffectiveness of the existing fisheries management in Vietnam in which no one is 
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responsible for overcapacity of fishing fleets as well as overexploitation of fisheries 
resources. 
The study distinguishes three types of fishers according to their preferences and interests: 
i) fishers of “fishing to live”; ii) fishers of fishing for changing life”; and iii) fishers of “fishing 
of opportunists”. In general, all types of fishers kept tendency to expand and upgrade their 
fishing business in the long-term investment strategies. They were, under the open-access 
fisheries with no limitations of fishing effort and catch quotas, also in a race of developing 
the fishing tactics to maximize their individual catches and fishing efficiency. However, each 
type of fishers followed their own strategies in fact. The first type of fisher followed the goal 
of living and enriching by fishing through enhancing gradually their fishing capacity. The 
second one entered the fishing industry as an opportunity to get benefits from the 
government’s subsidy policies. And the last type of fisher was the traditional fishers who 
dominate in the fishing communities of Vietnam. They either have tried to increase their 
catches to upgrade their business as big as the one of the first type of fishers on one hand, 
or to get out fishing industry when they have sustainably alternative livelihoods on the other 
hand. 
This research found seven factors influencing on the long-term (i.e. investment) decisions 
of the Vietnamese fishers: i) fisheries management regulations; ii) subsidy programs; iii) 
the financial status of family; iv) management capacity; v) the livelihood opportunity of the 
coming generation; vi) labour availability; and vii) individual experience. Of these, the 
government’s subsidy programs were taken as the most important basis for making the 
long-term decisions of a majority of the Vietnamese fishers. This may provide the short-
term economic profits for individual fishers (Duy, 2016), but it would cause overcapacity of 
fishing fleets and depletion of fish stocks in the long-term for the whole fisheries (Raakjær, 
2009). As a consequence, the vicious cycle has clearly seen since the end of 2000s in 
Vietnam. The most second important factor influencing the investment decisions of most 
fishers was their own financial status. The others were changeably ranked by individual 
fishers. 
This research also pointed out eight factors influencing on the short-term (i.e. daily tactics) 
decisions of the Vietnamese fishers: i) season; ii) market; iii) weather; iv) experience; v) 
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information; vi) informal rules; vii) labour; and viii) regulations. Among them, the season 
factor (i.e. fishing time in specific months in a year) was the most important factor for all 
fishers to decide their daily fishing tactics (e.g. where, when, how to fish). The other factors 
were evaluated differently by type of fishers and even by fishers in the same type. The 
factor of fisheries regulations was ignored or less considered by all fishers asked in Quynh 
Lap and Tam Quan Bac communes in 2014.  
In addition, subsidy programs were also a factor influencing on the tactical decisions of the 
fishers of type 1 (i.e. fishers of “fishing to live”) and type 2 of fisher (i.e. fishers of “fishing of 
opportunists”). It is evident that the financial factors (i.e. credit, fuel costs, insurance fees 
in subsidy programs and fish price) were the most important drives influencing on the 
fisher’s fishing behaviours (e.g. investment and tactical decisions). This implies that the 
financial policy would be an effective tool for managing the fisheries in Vietnam. For 
instance, government would remove subsidy programs, then fishers would have to 
rationalize their investment decisions and fishing tactics to optimize their capitals. This 
would result in removing type 2 of fisher, reduction of fishers of type 1, and lessening type 
3 of fishers (i.e. fishers of “fishing for changing life”). 
This research also identified two intrinsic characteristics of the Vietnamese fishers: i) local 
fishers are grouped into fishing groups or fishing guilds to share social values and fishing 
information; and ii) respect to the traditionally informal norms. Therefore, in order to improve 
compliance with fisheries regulations, this research suggests an alternative management 
regime which involves the communal government and local fishers in planning fisheries as 
well as in enforcing management plans within their local waters. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE 
VIETNAMESE FISHERIES  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sustainable utilization of fisheries resources has been in the policy discourse of the 
Vietnamese fisheries since the beginning of the 1990s. By that time, the introduction of 
alternative approaches to improve effectiveness of the fisheries management system in 
Vietnam was highlighted by the government as well as international sponsors. 
Consequently, the co-management and adaptive indicator-based management structures 
(AIBM) were introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries. From that point, these structures 
have been implemented in to enhance conservation of fisheries in parallel with the 
conventional paradigm which follows production-based growth perspective in the 
Vietnamese fisheries. This clash of perspectives may result in implications and effects of 
the co-management approach have been limited (Anon, 2009), and the AIBM structure 
never really took off in managing fisheries in Vietnam. 
This chapter explores implications of implementing the co-management and AIBM 
structures to explain their failures in the Vietnamese fisheries. It addresses three following 
research questions: i) How the innovative management approaches were implemented in 
the Vietnamese fisheries? ii) Do they improve the effectiveness of the existing fisheries 
management system in Vietnam? and iii) What are obstacles to implementation of these 
approaches in the Vietnamese fisheries context? This chapter is composed of two main 
parts. Firstly, it analyzes implementation of the co-management structure in the 
Vietnamese fisheries in four main aspects: i) the background of introduction; ii) results of 
implementing fisheries co-management models; iii) obstacles to implementation of the 
fisheries co-management models; and iv) conditions for successful implementation of the 
fisheries co-management models in Vietnam. Secondly, this chapter explores 
implementation of the AIBM structure in the Vietnamese fisheries in two main aspects: i) 
analyzing application of the AIBM structure; and ii) explaining reasons leading to its failures. 
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8.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
8.2.1 INTRODUCTION OF FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT INTO VIETNAM 
The traditionally informal rules used to play an important role in the Vietnamese fisheries 
management process before 1945 (Nguyen & Ruddle, 2010; Ruddle, 1998). They were 
adopted to regulate fishing rights, fishing spots, fishing time and gears used to fish within 
their waters given by the dynasty. They were also used to solve conflicts among fishers 
within their communities and address the external relationships with the dynasty and other 
fishing communities. Under that fisheries management regime, all fishing practices are 
controlled by the management council elected by the local communities as told by Dr. 
Binh29 in an interview conducted in 2011. He considered this is somewhat of the 
community-based fisheries management. However, this regime was replaced by the 
centrally planned regime when collectivization was implemented in Vietnam. In this regime, 
all fishing vessels are grouped into the state-owned fishing co-operatives and companies. 
These co-operatives and companies are hierarchically managed by government through 
the mandatory target of catches. This regime seemed to take place the end of 1950s and 
beginning of 1960s in the North and in 1976 in the South of Vietnam. Under this system, 
the fishing communities are a management object rather than a subject of the management 
process as they were before 1945 when many communities were empowered to manage 
fishing activities within their local waters as told by Dr. Binh in 2012. 
The concept of co-management was firstly introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries in 1994 
along with the mainstream of the fisheries management in the world, by an international 
project implemented in Vietnam by the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management (ICLARM) (now World Fish). This project was to explore the prospects for 
successful implementation of fisheries co-management strategy in several Asian and 
African countries (Pomeroy et al., 1996). This was the first study making use of the co-
management approach to look at the fisheries and fishing communities in Vietnam. It 
demonstrated that there were favourable conditions in political, cultural, social and 
                                         
29 Dr. Nguyen Quang Vinh Binh is the director of the Sub-department of Capture Fisheries and 
Fisheries Resources Protection of Thua Thien – Hue province who conducted researches and 
promoted the fisheries co-management in his province. 
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biological aspects to implement the fisheries co-management structure in Vietnam 
(Pomeroy, 1995; Pomeroy et al., 1996). Based on this research, the former minister of 
MOFI endorsed the concept of co-management and supported its introduction into the 
Vietnamese fisheries. He argued that the local fishing communities having a long traditional 
history of the autonomous fisheries as the ‘vạn chài’30. Moreover, the political system also 
advocated the participatory approach to manage natural resources in general and fisheries 
resources in particular. He acknowledged that “The co-management approach involves the 
local fishers in fisheries management process, and then the fisheries development policies 
and regulations would be enforced more effectively in practice”31. This was considered as 
a valid foundation and political commitment of the Vietnamese government, so that 
international sponsors have continued to provide financial and technical assistances for 
implementing the co-management structure in the Vietnamese fisheries.  
Since 1994, about 40 fisheries co-management models were piloted in Vietnam. All of them 
were supported and funded by international sponsors (Anon, 2009; VIFEP, 2014). Of these, 
there were 22 models of marine capture fisheries, thus this research only focuses on these 
22 models (appendix 4). Besides implementation of the co-management models at pilot 
sites, international sponsors also have supported research activities, capacity building, and 
policy-making for the Vietnamese fishery sector.  For instance, one DANIDA project 
conducted training on making policies to promote and apply the co-management approach 
into the Vietnamese fisheries and supported for operation of the Task Force for fisheries 
co-management in 2005-2010. The Coastal Resources for Sustainable Development 
Project funded by World Bank has promoted implementation of the co-management to help 
enforce regulations and improve sustainability of nearshore fisheries in eight pilot provinces 
(i.e. Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Soc Trang, and Ca 
Mau) since 2012. 
                                         
30 ‘Vạn chài’ means a fishing village interpreted from the Ancient Vietnamese script. It is often used 
in the ancient documents written before 1945. It is not used nowadys in Vietnam. 
31 The minister of MOFI said at the final assessment of the project in 1996 as told by a researcher 
in VIFEP who conducted the first project on fisheries co-management in Vietnam 
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8.2.2 ACHIVEMENTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT IN 
VIETNAM 
After more than twenty years of implementation, with assistance from the international 
sponsors, the fisheries co-management arrangement in Vietnam has achieved significant 
progress in various aspects, especially in institutional arrangements and human resources. 
The legal framework supporting the fisheries co-management was formulated in the decree 
No. 33/2010/ND-CP. The article 12 of this decree promoted Provincial People Committee 
developing management models of fisheries resources with participation of the local 
communities: “Provincial People Committee is in charge of managing fishing activities in 
coastal and inshore areas, decentralization and guiding management of coastal areas for 
district and communal levels, and develop models for the fisheries resources management 
with participation of local communities in coastal areas” (Government of Vietnam, 2010 p. 
9). In addition to this, a handbook on implementing the fisheries co-management was also 
published to guide managing the fisheries co-management models. A large number of 
governmental officials at various levels, representatives of NGOs, local fishers and other 
relevant stakeholders have been educated and trained on knowledge and skills to 
implement the fisheries co-management models in the last two decades. 
In terms of practical implications, some fisheries co-management models have obtained 
positive results. They remain functioning even after external assistance ended (e.g. the 
fisheries co-management models in Tam Giang lagoon – Thua Thien – Hue province, the 
fisheries resources protection model at the Ran Trao – Khanh Khoa province). Others have 
remained symbolically after external support ended. This means that the management 
board established by local government is still in effect, but its mechanism no longer works 
(e.g. Thanh Phong in Ben Tre province, Quynh Lap in Nghe An province). The others were 
dismissed soon after the external supports ended such as Phu Long in Hai Phong, and 
Khanh Hoi in Ca Mau. Based on the investigation of 22 fisheries co-management in 2009, 
three main results of the fisheries co-management models in Vietnam are summarized as 
follows: 
Firstly, the co-management approach has been applied into the Vietnamese fisheries at 
instructive or consultative levels (Sen & Raakjaer, 1996). Investigation of 22 fisheries co-
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management models in Vietnam shows that 16/22 models are categorized at the instructive 
stage where the local fishing communities were informed policies and regulations by the 
governmental agencies; 6/22 models (i.e. Vinh Giang, Quang Thai, Dien Hai in Thua Thien 
Hue, Cu Lao Cham in Quang Nam, Nhon Hai in Binh Dinh, and Ran Trao in Khanh Hoa) 
are categorized as the consultative stage where government agencies consult local fishers 
before making management decisions. However, these decisions were not in regards to 
the legal regulations nor the state planning system, just action plans to solve particular 
issues such as establishment of conservation areas for stone crab in Cu Lao Cham, 
enlarging the area of the Ran Trao protected area, coercing exceed set nets in waters given 
to fishing communities in Vinh Giang. The interviewees argued that the management board, 
which is composed of representative of communal government, leadership of village, and 
selected fishers, established in the fisheries co-management models was considered as a 
means supporting for the fisheries authorities to enforce and surveil fisheries regulations at 
the traditional local waters.  
Secondly, the fisheries co-management models have created positive impacts in political, 
cultural, social, ecological and economic aspects at the local communities where the 
models were applied. This is clearly seen in the four consultative fisheries co-management 
models. The fisheries management process was implemented more transparently and 
democratically. For instance, the fishers in Vinh Giang suggested the number of set nets 
being allowed to operate in the local waters to the district government; fishers in Nhon Hai 
recommended the number of traps for catching lobster fingerlings within the waters given 
to the communal government. According to representatives of these models interviewed, 
the fishing communities became more unified, organized and responsive than before the 
establishment of co-management. The harmful and destructive fishing practices, 
degradation of marine habitats and conflicts among local fishers within the local 
communities were reduced gradually. Therefore, livelihoods and living standard of the local 
communities had been somewhat improved. 
Thirdly, the social values had been mobilized effectively. Four interviewees acknowledged 
that traditionally informal norms, religious and cultural values of the families and of the local 
communities have oriented the fishing behaviours of the local fishers toward more 
responsible manner. For instance, local fishers in Nhon Hai and Ran Trao did not trap the 
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lobster fingerlings at the early stages when they are still so small as explained by 
interviewees in Nhon Hai and Ran Trao in 2009. Moreover, the participatory approach had 
been made use popularly to address management issues and make collective decisions in 
the governmental agencies where the fisheries co-management concept introduced as 
observation in D-Fish, provincial level and communal level in recent years. 
Based on practical observation of implementing the fisheries co-management models in 
Tam Giang lagoon, Dr. Binh argued that the co-management arrangement had contributed 
to improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the fisheries management system in 
Thua Thien – Hue province, especially in eliminating the destructive fishing methods in the 
lagoon waters. He explained that the management board of the fisheries co-management 
in collaboration with the local police more effectively controlled fishing with explosives in 
local community waters than the expenditure for fisheries surveillance and inspection of the 
provincial fisheries authorities. He believed that this approach would be a means for closing 
the current open-access fisheries in Vietnam in the future.   
8.2.3 OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
Most (15/22) of the fisheries co-management models collapsed or remained symbolically 
only, not working in practice after the external supports ended. According to representatives 
of these models, the co-management board no longer worked because they did not have 
budgets and means to perform action plans. In addition, they also were not required to do 
anything form the local government, thus the management board were not necessary 
anymore. Participants attended workshop on assessment of the coastal fisheries 
management and implementation of fisheries co-management organized by Directorate of 
Fisheries in Hanoi in December 2014 identified three critical obstacles to implementing the 
co-management in the Vietnamese fisheries as follows:  
Firstly, there was a lack of a valid legal framework promoting the co-management 
arrangement in the Vietnamese fisheries. Sen and Raakjaer argued that the bottom line of 
the co-management arrangement is sharing powers and responsibilities between 
government and resources users to implement the fisheries management process 
including: policy formulation, resources assessment, access rights, harvesting regulations, 
monitoring and surveillance, control and enforcement (Sen & Raakjaer, 1996). However, 
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the fisheries regulations and fisheries planning system are decided within the government 
system. The local fishers did not participate in formulating legal regulations adopted by 
decision makers as analyzed in chapter 4 and in planning fisheries as illustrated in chapter 
5. In fact, fisheries co-management models had their own action plan to achieve objectives 
suggested and suited with the resources provided by external sponsors. These plans often 
focused on protecting fisheries resources and marine habitats; combating illegal and 
destructives fishing; reduction of social conflicts among fishers and fishers with other 
industries; providing alternative livelihoods and career training (e.g. establishment of Ran 
Trao marine protected area to protect marine habitats for lobster, coral reefs; increasing 
surveillance over the waters given to reduce destructive fishing practice in Quynh Lap, in 
Vinh Giang; communication programs to raise awareness of fisheries resources protection, 
creating alternative livelihoods in Cu Lao Cham, Hon Mun, Nhon Hai, My Thang, etc.). The 
objectives of the fisheries co-management models were often aligned with strategies, thus 
were supported by fisheries authorities. Therefore, the fisheries authorities usually 
collaborated with the fisheries co-management models to enforce the fisheries 
management plans and regulations at the local communities by carrying out communication 
programs to raise awareness of fisheries resources protection and implementing petrol and 
inspection over the local waters. For instance, the management board of all models was 
invited to perform the patrol and inspection over the waters given to deter the illegal and 
destructive fishing practices in My Thang, Nhon Hai in Binh Dinh, Vinh Giang in Thua Thien 
– Hue, and Quynh Lap in Nghe An. However, they were not invited to plan their fisheries to 
determine the total catches and number of fishing vessels allowed to operate in their local 
waters. Indeed, all (11) representatives of the fisheries co-management interviewed in 2014 
told that they were not invited to plan the total catches and number of fishing vessels (i.e. 
making annual fisheries plans) of the commune, district or province. This means that the 
memberships of the fisheries co-management models at the local communities were not 
involved in planning their fisheries, but the government did it for them. The action plan of 
the fisheries co-management models was just a tool supporting fisheries authorities in the 
enforcement of fisheries regulations, but not in managing the local fisheries in terms of 
controlling the total catches or fishing capacity.  
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Secondly, there was a lack of the legitimacy of the co-management arrangement in 
Vietnam. Pomeroy and Williams described that the enabling legislation to define and clarify 
responsibility and authority of the local communities is a key condition for successful 
implementation of the fisheries co-management (Pomeroy & Williams, 1994). The national 
constitution of Vietnam, at article 28, articulates that “Citizens have rights to participate in 
the management process, discuss and make recommendations to government agencies 
on the management issues at local and national levels. The government shall provide 
favourable conditions for citizens to participate in the management process, and make 
public and transparent in receiving and response to comments and suggestions by citizens” 
(National Assemply, 2013 p.11). However, a fisheries co-management structure or its 
management board was not considered as an official actor to perform fisheries 
management process in Vietnam in practice. Indeed, a management board (some cases 
named as a core group) was established by the communal government to implement action 
plan of the fisheries co-management model. It was not given powers and rights to make or 
execute fisheries management decisions in practice. For instance, in terms of planning 
fisheries, the management board of fisheries co-management models were not given 
powers to decide the number of fishing units adaptive in their waters given as told by the 
head of the Vinh Giang Fisheries Association, instead they just recommended to the 
government agencies for consideration. In terms of enforcement, the management board 
had not authorized to extract the external fishers fishing in their waters given. It also had 
no rights to impose a sanction on the violations of fisheries regulations and rules within 
their waters, instead it had to report to the competent agent of the government for further 
prosecution. The management board was requested to collaborate with the local fisheries 
in implementing management tasks such as collecting data, promulgation and enforcement 
of fisheries regulations at the local communities as observed in all 22 fisheries co-
management under investigation.  
Thirdly, there was a lack of resources to coordinate activities in the fisheries co-
management models. Although the management board, who takes the leadership 
responsibility for fisheries co-management models, was established by the government 
agencies, but it was not considered as an agency of the administrative system. Therefore, 
it was not provided or allocated financial and human resources and equipped with 
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necessary means to perform action plans. In fact, all (22) fisheries co-management models 
were funded by international sponsors during the course of implementing projects in 2-3 
years. This fund would be ended when the projects finished. In some specific models (e.g. 
Phu Long, Quynh Lap and Nhon Ly models), the management board were paid allowance 
for the days of conducting patrol at sea and enforcing fisheries regulations in the local 
communities organized by the competent authorities. For the Vinh Giang, Quang Thai, Dien 
Hai models in Thua Thien-Hue province, the management board was the committee of the 
Local Fisheries Association. Therefore, they have a stable budget from the annual 
membership fee. This was the critical factor enabling remain the contribution of fisheries 
co-management models as personally interviewed with 11 representatives in 2014. 
8.2.4 REFLECTING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FISHERIES COM-MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
Investigation of 22 fisheries co-management models in Vietnam shows that the structure 
and objectives were set up differently among fisheries co-management models. Therefore, 
their outcomes were also at different magnitude of success.  Some models were 
successful, other were limited, and the others were failed in practice. This research made 
use of 11 key conditions for viable self-managed, community-based management 
institutions and co-management (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Pinkerton, 1989) to look at six 
fisheries co-management models (i.e. Phu Long in Hai Phong, Quynh Lap in Nghe An, Vinh 
Giang in Thua Thien-Hue, Nhon Hai in Binh Dinh, Ran Trao in Khanh Hoa, and Thanh 
Phong in Ben Tre) which achieved different level of success.  
i) Clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of the area to be managed should be 
distinct so that the fishers can have accurate knowledge of them. The research found 
that clear definition of the waters’ boundaries to be managed is the highly important 
to success of the fisheries co-management models. For instance, the Vinh Giang 
model’s area is bordered by the concrete piles, and the Ran Trao model’s area is 
bordered by buoys as the fence preventing outsiders from entering to harvest without 
permission of the management board. The fence also allows community members 
to monitor their waters more easily. This was more successful in comparison with 
the other models of whose boundaries were not defined clearly (e.g. Phu Long in 
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Hai Phong, Thanh Phu in Ben Tre; Nhon Hai in Binh Dinh). This means that the clear 
definition of boundaries is the reason leading to success of the fisheries co-
management models in Vietnam and vice versa. 
ii) Clearly defined membership. The individuals or groups of local fishers keeping rights 
to fish in and having management responsibility for the waters of model should be 
defined clearly and transparently. This was well done in Vinh Giang model. They are 
the residence living in the commune. Therefore, disputes and conflicts in fishing 
spots is minimized and addressed easily. Meanwhile, the rest models could not 
define clearly who have rights to fish and to enforce management measures in the 
waters mandated. The clear definition of membership is highly important and is a 
key factor leading to successful implementation of the fisheries co-management 
models and vice versa.  
iii) Group cohesion. There is a high degree of homogeneity, in terms of kinship, 
ethnicity, religion or fishing gear type, among the local fisher groups and relevant 
stakeholders. This research found that the fishing behaviours of local fishers were 
not much influenced by ethnicity, religion and kinship. The local fishers, regardless 
of ethnicity and religion argued that the homogeneity of fishing gears used to fish 
was a favourable condition for implementing co-management successfully such as 
in Vinh Giang, Nhon Ly and Ran Trao models; but was not leading to success such 
as in Thanh Phong, Quynh Lap models. Conversely, the heterogeneity of fishing 
gears used contributed to the failure of implementing the fisheries co-management 
model such as in Phu Long.  
iv) Existing organization. The local fishers have some prior experience with traditional 
community-based systems and with organizations, where they are representatives 
of all resource users and stakeholders interested in fisheries management. This is 
important for the successful implementation in terms of setting up management 
objectives and compliance with collective decisions. Most fishers living in Vinh Giang 
commune were taught or experienced the community-based management regime in 
the past, so they participated into the co-management arrangement more easily and 
effectively rather than the rest models. And they also made their co-management 
model more effective and successful in practice. 
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v) Benefits exceed costs. Individuals have an expectation that the benefits to be 
derived from participation in and compliance with co-management model will exceed 
the costs of investments in such activities. This is highly important to the success of 
the model. For instance, fisher participating in Vinh Giang co-management model 
told that their benefits exceeded the membership fee that they had to pay, thus they 
were willing to be a membership of the fisheries co-management model. They 
believed that the fisheries co-management would maintain the productivity of fish 
stocks and remain their fishing rights in their local waters. For the other models, local 
fishers, who were familiar with the free access regime, did not believe their benefits 
would be higher if they would participate in and comply with the co-management 
arrangement rules. In fact, they did not have to pay any fees for catching. Therefore, 
they distrusted the co-management arrangement and did not support this institution. 
This lead to unsuccessfulness of models such as in Phu Long, Thanh Phong, and 
Quynh Lap. 
vi) Participation by those affected. Most individuals affected by the management 
arrangements are included in the group that makes and can change the 
arrangements. The same people that collect information on the fisheries make 
decisions about management arrangements. This contributes to sustainability of the 
fisheries co-management models. For instance, the voice of all members was heard 
equally such as in the Vinh Giang model. In fact, all fishers had the equal rights to 
vote in making decisions on collective issues of the community. However, the voice 
of the fisheries co-management was not as much power as expectation in the 
fisheries management process headed by government. Therefore, this condition 
was not very important to success of the fisheries co-management models such as 
at the beginning stages (i.e. instructive and consultative) in Vietnam. 
vii) Management rules enforced. The management rules are simple. Monitoring and 
enforcement are able to be affected and shared by all fishers. The fishers 
participating in the Vinh Giang and Ran Trao models, acknowledged that 
enforcement of management rules was very important for their success. All of them 
participated in making management decisions and had equal responsibility for 
enforcing the management measures agreed within the community. They monitored 
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effects of management actions on fisheries resources and habitats, and asked 
competent agencies to enforce the management decisions and regulations within 
their local waters. This was a very important condition leading success and 
sustainability of the fisheries co-management models such as in Vinh Giang and 
Ran Trao models. 
viii) Legal rights to organize. The fisher groups or organizations have the legal rights to 
organize and make arrangements related to their needs. There is enabling 
legislation from the government defining and clarifying local responsibility and 
authority. This is not relevant with the Vietnamese case. All organizations or groups 
must be accepted by the state competent authorities. NGOs are only allowed to 
assist fisher groups or organizations if they are approved by the competent 
agencies. This may be a factor causing failure of some fisheries co-management 
models as told by a consultant conducting an assessment of the fisheries co-
management models in Vietnam in 2009. This was reflected clearly in all fisheries 
co-management models in Vietnam.  Though, the management board was 
established by the local government, they had not authorized to enforce fisheries 
regulations and rules in their local waters. 
ix) Cooperation and leadership at community level. There is an incentive and 
willingness on the part of fishers to actively participate, with time, effort and money, 
in fisheries management. There is an individual or core group who takes 
responsibility for the management process. This research found that the local 
leadership was the critical condition for success of the fisheries co-management 
models. For instance, the Vinh Giang and Ran Trao models achieved success in 
implementing management tasks because they had been led by exemplary, 
prestigious and influential individuals as told by local fishers. These individuals not 
only had much experience and knowledge of fishing business within the local waters, 
but also understood profoundly fishing behaviours of the local fishers. For other 
models, the management board was nominated by the communal government with 
some individuals were not respected by the local fishers. Therefore, they were 
constrained in coordination of their action plans in their local communities. This was 
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a condition leading to failure of the fisheries co-management models as argued by 
representative of Thanh Phong, Phu Long models. 
x) Decentralization and delegation of authority. The government has established formal 
policy and/or laws for decentralization of administrative functions and delegation of 
management responsibility and/or authority to local government and local group 
organization levels. This was very important for success of the fisheries co-
management models in Vietnam. Indeed, in Thua Thien-Hue province, the district 
government has been decentralized to manage fishing activities taking place in the 
district waters as told by a provincial fisheries manager. This made the Vinh Giang 
co-management model more successful and more sustainable than others where 
authority was mandated at the provincial level, not decentralized to the lower levels. 
The authority for the Vietnamese fisheries management has not delegated to local 
communities yet. This was a reason leading to all fisheries co-management in 
Vietnam just were at the instructive or consultative degree. 
xi) Coordination between government and community. A coordinating body is 
established, external to the local group or organization and with representation from 
the fisher groups or organizations and government, to monitor the local management 
arrangements, resolve conflicts, and reinforce local rule enforcement. This was 
important for sustainability of the fisheries co-management models in Vietnam. A 
management board composed of government staffs and local fishers, was 
established for all fisheries co-management in Vietnam. It coordinated to implement 
action plans adopted by sponsors as well as management tasks of the fisheries 
authorities at the local levels. 
This research concludes that six of eleven key conditions were highly important (i.e. 
conditions of the clearly defined boundaries, of the clearly defined membership, of the 
decentralization and delegation of authority, of the cooperation and leadership at 
community level, of the management rules enforced, and of the benefits exceed costs);  
three of them were important (i.e. conditions of the coordination between government and 
community, of the participation by those affected, and of the existing organization); one of 
them was low important (i.e. condition of the group cohesion); and one of them was not 
relevant (i.e. condition of the legal rights to organize) to success of the fisheries co-
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management models in Vietnam. This research also found three key conditions (i.e. 
conditions of cooperation and leadership at community level, of the legal rights to organize, 
and of the benefits exceed costs) causing failure of the co-management arrangement in a 
centralized institutions and government-based management regime such as in the 
Vietnamese fisheries. This research also concludes that all fisheries co-management in 
Vietnam were initiated and funded by international sponsors. In fact, fisheries co-
management models in Quynh Lap, Nhon Hai, Nhon Ly stopped working when DANIDA 
ended funding in 2010, and worked again in 2013 when they were funded by World Bank 
project. This means that the international fund was the key condition for sustainability of 
the fisheries co-management in Vietnam. 
8.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADAPTIVE INDICATORS-BASED MANAGEENT 
STRUCTURE IN VIETNAM 
The adaptive indicators-based management (AIBM) structure was introduced into the 
Vietnamese fisheries in 2003 by a project funded by DANIDA. Technical advisers 
developed a framework of indicators and structure to provide multi-disciplinary 
assessments and advice for making management decisions in Ministry of Fisheries of 
Vietnam. This structure was operationalized during the pilot phase of the project and was 
not in use after the project ended in 2012. The following sections will explain the context 
that the structure was introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries and uncover reasons 
leading to the failure of the structure. 
8.3.1 INTRODUCTION OF THE AIBM STRUCTURE INTO VIETNAM 
Theoretically, the Vietnamese fisheries are managed based on the estimations of the 
fisheries resources (i.e. the standing biomass and the potential exploitable yield of fisheries 
resources as analyzed in chapter 6). It is underpinned by the total catches (TC), which is 
somewhat the same with the total allowable catches (TAC) in the developed fisheries. The 
process of estimating the TC based on the models for single species as used in the 
temperate fisheries. This approach is not suited and ineffective for the tropical developing 
fisheries due to complexity of the resource base and small-scale fisheries (Kato, 2001; 
Thia-Eng & Pauly, 1989). In addition, a fisheries management regime relied on the stock 
assessment-driven (i.e. based on the resource management) may require a high-cost 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
224 
 
administration for the management system (Raakjær et al., 2001). Therefore, there were 
demands for introducing an alternative management approach which is suited with the 
multi-species, multi-gears and multi-fleets fisheries and limited resources of the 
management system into the Vietnamese fisheries. 
Raakjær et al. identified the objectives of fisheries management in the world have changed 
emphasis on from the optimization based on single species indicators to the risk 
management and hazard control based on precautionary approach and maintenance of 
healthy ecosystems (Raakjær et al., 2001). The Regional Technical Consultation (RTC) on 
Indicators for Sustainable Fisheries Management in ASEAN Region was held in Haiphong, 
Vietnam in 2001 agreed to call for follow-up activities on the application of indicators to the 
regional fisheries management program. This provided favourable conditions to apply the 
AIBM structure into the Vietnamese fisheries. 
Consequently, 18 researchers from RIMF and VIFEP were grouped the Marine Fisheries 
Specialists Team (MFST) working within a project funded by DANIDA in 2003. The MFST’s 
terms of reference were to provide multi-disciplinary assessments and make 
recommendations for sustainable management and development of marine capture 
fisheries based on requests of Ministry of Fisheries (MOFI) at the national level and 
Department of Fisheries (DOFI) at provincial level (Management, 2004). In order to 
institutionalize the multi-disciplinary approach into Vietnam, a seminar participated by very 
experienced experts involved in high level management decision-making in EU, ICES, 
Danish fisheries authorities, leaderships of MOFI and some key DOFI of Vietnam. At this 
seminar, the high-ranking decision-makers of the Vietnamese fisheries were taught the way 
to operationalize the multi-disciplinary approach and the AIBM structure (figure 8.1). 
The MFST is the core element of the structure. It is in charge of; i) analyzing commercial 
catch data, resources data, biological indicators, fishery fleet data and economical and 
socio-economic data, ii) giving recommendations on sampling programs necessary for 
assessment reports of resources and commercial catch, iii) providing multi-disciplinary 
assessments on fisheries based on sustainable fishery indicators, and iv) giving 
assessments and recommendations on fisheries on ad hoc requests from MOFI 
(Management, 2004). This structure assumed that: i) all data on fisheries and fish stocks 
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must be available, ii) there are enough resources for MFST to work, iii) the fisheries 
managers (i.e. MOFI, DOFI) make requests for consultation to MFST. These conditions 
were provided sufficiently within the project funded by DANIDA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The AIBM structure for the Vietnamese fisheries (Raakjær et al., 2007). 
In order to enable MFST to perform its tasks, the project conducted a series of training 
courses on information technology, statistical analysis, fisheries assessment 
methodologies, specialized courses on specific expertise (e.g. fisheries social and 
economic science, fisheries biology and marine ecology, etc.) and skills in language, 
scientific presentation, reporting, publishing, etc. Furthermore, the MFST members were 
also coached by experienced experts in computerized techniques, data analysis, 
estimating and interpreting indicators, making assessment reports and presenting research 
results. Therefore, research capacity and skills of the MFST members were improved 
remarkably. They were able to provide the multi-disciplinary assessments and 
recommendations for fisheries management. Based on the available data, the MFST 
produced a series of multi-disciplinary assessments and advice for fisheries management 
according to general perspectives rather than specific requests from MOFI or DOFI in the 
pilot phase 2003-2005 of the project.  
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In 2005, Minister of MOFI issued a directive No. 08/2005/CT-BTS to institutionalize the 
AIBM structure into the MOFI administration (MOFI, 2005a). This assigned the National 
Department of Aquatic Resources Exploitation and Protection (NADAREP) receiving and 
maintaining the AIBM structure including the data collecting system and the management 
structure for the Vietnamese fisheries. It also assigned DOFI of 28 coastal provinces 
carrying out the routine data collection programs. Until 2007 when Ministry of Fisheries 
merged with Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the MFST was 
consolidated and endorsed by Minister of MARD. Accordingly, the MFST was composed 
of 14 members who from NADAREP, RIMF, VIFEP and other relevant departments of 
MARD. 
In 2006, the DANIDA project ended funding for collecting data in provinces. Most provinces 
stopped collecting data because of lacking human and financial resources on one hand, 
and its efficiency was not demonstrated clearly on the other hand. Only 6 provinces: Binh 
Dinh, Tien Giang, Tra Vinh, Soc Trang, Ben Tre, Bac Lieu had still remained collecting data 
until 2007. As a component of the project, the MFST was supposed to meet twice a year 
to implement analysis on the fisheries and fish stocks based on the available data collected 
by provinces. However, the MFST nearly disbanded itself in 2009 because the available 
data become poorer and poorer on one hand, and because they did not receive any 
requests for advice from NADAREP or Minister of MARD on the other. Until 2010, the 
project received a request from DOFI of Nghe An to assist them in developing a fisheries 
data collection project and of Ben Tre to assist them in analyzing the data collected. The 
MFST funded by DANIDA sent experts to Nghe An and Ben Tre provinces to provide advice 
in 2010. After that, the MFST did not work and the AIBM structure was not in use in the 
Vietnamese fisheries. 
8.3.2 AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE AIBM STRUCTURE IN VIETNAM  
As analyzed in chapter 4, the Vietnamese fisheries are managed by the fisheries planning 
system (i.e. strategy, master plan, five-year plan and annual plan). In which, the master 
plan is considered as a tool of planning the fisheries in Vietnam because it provides 
management objectives of fishing level and fishing capacity in the five-years and ten-years 
cycles. Theoretically, this should rely on the multi-disciplinary assessments provided by the 
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MFST. As analyzed in chapter 5, the multi-disciplinary approach to plan the fisheries was 
highly appreciated by many scientists and planners. In this agenda, not only conventional 
knowledge base (i.e. statistics on fish landings; exploitable potential yield estimation) was 
used, but other data were also referred to plan the fisheries 2001-2010. These data include 
socio-economic investigation of the fishing fleets and fishing communities (e.g. incomes, 
profits, catch rates, employment, livelihoods, etc.) and abundance of fisheries resources 
(e.g. catches per experiment fishing hour, species composition, etc.) collected by surveys 
in 1995-1997 funded by DANIDA. These data indicate a depletion of fisheries resources in 
comparison to previous surveys, and a decrease in catch rates as well as in revenue of 
fishing fleets. This created a new perspective in planning the fisheries in Vietnam. 
In addition, four data collection programs were conducted in the Vietnamese fisheries within 
projects funded by DANIDA in 1996-2005. The first program was scientific surveys with 
research vessels for assessing the state of fisheries resources at experiment fishing 
stations throughout the Vietnamese waters. This program provided data on biological 
aspects of fish stocks (e.g. density, catch rates, and distribution patterns by species; 
species composition; size structure by species; etc.) for stock assessments. The second 
program was fisheries enumeration at landing sites. This program provided data on fish 
landings and fishing operation of fleets (e.g. landing by species/groups of species; value of 
fish landings; fishing costs; gears used; fishing grounds; number of fishing days; crew 
members; etc.) for estimating total landings and socio-economic aspects of fishing fleets. 
The third program was to estimate the fishing effort. This program provided updated data 
on number of fishing vessels by gear categories at provinces for estimating the total 
landings as well as fishing pressure on fisheries resources at specific waters. The fourth 
program was observation on the fishing vessels. This program provided data on fisheries 
resources as well as on fishing operations (e.g. density, catch rates, and distribution 
patterns by species; species composition; size structure by species; discards, number of 
fishing days; landings, value of landings; fishing costs; etc.) to cross check and supplement 
data for stock assessment and socio-economic research.  These data were evaluated as 
the best set of fisheries data in Vietnam. They were also analyzed and interpreted into 
management advice by the best experts by the time of making the 2010 fisheries master 
plan. However, this was not used as a knowledge base for planning the Vietnamese 
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fisheries in 2001-2010, instead the official statistics on total fish landings estimated by GSO 
and exploitable potential yield provided officially by RIMF were used as knowledge base 
for planning the Vietnamese fisheries in 2001-2010 as the conventional approach. This was 
a paradox of the fisheries planning system in Vietnam. The following sections try to explain 
this paradox. 
8.3.2.1 Is the AIBM structure feasible for the Vietnamese fisheries context? 
The feasibility of a management approach is influenced by two key factors (Rist et al., 
2013): i) compatibility with the existing system (e.g. the complexity of the social, political 
and institutional context of management encompasses stakeholder engagement, 
institutional arrangement, management paradigm and relevance with management 
objectives). Issues such as institutional fragmentation, lack of leadership or conflict 
between stakeholders may make adaptive management infeasible; and ii) management 
resource availability includes finance to support system, expertise and capacity for analysis 
and monitoring. The adaptive management may be possible to reduce uncertainty, the 
benefit of doing so may be outweighed by the cost of performing the required experiments 
or may be unrealistic given the resources at a manager’s disposal. 
Based on the direct observation of operationalizing the MFST in 2003-2012, the application 
of the AIBM structure seemed to be not feasible for the existing context of the Vietnamese 
fisheries due to incompatibility with the existing institutional arrangements and without the 
management resource availability as analyzed below. 
Compatibility with the existing system 
The AIBM structure was infeasible for the Vietnamese fisheries because of conflicting with 
the existing institutional arrangements. The existing institutional arrangements caused 
three main constraints on implementing the AIBM structure in the Vietnamese fisheries. 
Firstly, the existing fisheries management in Vietnam followed the production-based growth 
paradigm as analyzed in chapter 5. It employed the TC-based approach to plan its fisheries. 
This approach took the estimations of total landings and exploitable potential yield as the 
knowledge inputs. These knowledge inputs were estimated by empirical formulas, they thus 
were easily manipulated to meet political preferences by changing the value of empirical 
coefficients as analyzed in chapter 6. By using these empirical formulas, specific figures 
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(i.e. total landings, and exploitable potential yield) used for planning fisheries were 
calculated simply and easily. However, this was much uncertain and high risk for 
sustainable utilization of fisheries resources as analyzed in chapter 6. It was commonly 
said that “birds in the sky, fish in the water” in Vietnam. This means that the fish would be 
never depleted, as they recruit naturally. Agreed with this, a former director of RIMF 
acknowledged that they did not know the recruitments of fish stocks, but let fishers fish as 
long as their business remained viable. In line with this perspective, a deputy director of 
RIMF also added that they could be allowed to fish at a level of catches higher than the 
standing biomass estimation. This means that the existing management system accepted 
uncertainties in assessing the fish stocks and fisheries to plan a desirable growth rate of 
catches. 
Clearly, the existing fisheries management system in Vietnam followed the production-
based growth paradigm rather than the conservation one. It was favoring short-term 
economic growth at the expense of long-term sustainability. It was a paradox that managers 
endorsed application of the AIBM to reduce uncertainties in assessing the state of fish 
stocks, fisheries ecosystem, and fishing fleets. The AIBM structure is broader and more 
comprehensive than the TC-based approach. It advocates the conservation perspective 
and sustainable utilization of fisheries resources rather than the production-based growth 
paradigm. It takes into account the state and changes of core components in a whole 
ecosystem and their interactions through a set of indicators to understand best about the 
system being managed. Based on this, in combination with the precautionary principles, 
managers decide management measures with the lowest level of uncertainties and risks 
for the fisheries resources and ecosystem. Clearly, the AIBM structure did not support for 
the existing approach to management of the Vietnamese fisheries.  
Secondly, in terms of engaging stakeholders, the AIBM structure provides platform for 
fisheries stakeholders to interact and share information in an agreed format – the indicators. 
The indicators present the links between visions and objectives and actions in the 
management process (FAO, 2003). In this structure, fisheries stakeholders are invited to 
share information and experience to reduce uncertainties. Fishers often see ecosystem 
changes and follow interests different from scientists and managers. Therefore, they are 
required to share understanding of the system and translate their knowledge into mutually 
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agreed indicators to establish collective actions (Degnbol, 2005). Meanwhile, the 
knowledge inputs for planning the fisheries were estimations of total landings and 
exploitation potential yield produced implicitly as mandate by the government institutions 
(see chapter 6). The other stakeholders’ knowledge was just considered as reference 
according legal regulations (Government of Vietnam, 2006; Prime Minister, 1998), and 
most of them did not have any specific knowledge to share and debate in planning fisheries 
because they did not have a data collection system or relevant information as the personal 
observation in planning the fisheries in Vietnam. They are volunteer organizations and not 
allocated resources nor mandated any fisheries management related tasks. This meant 
that the existing system did not provide favourable conditions for stakeholders to involve in 
the fisheries management process in Vietnam. This would reduce effectiveness of the 
AIBM structure. 
Thirdly, the existing organizational arrangements were also an obstacle to implementing 
the AIBM structure in Vietnam. Actually, any fisheries management related tasks (e.g. 
routine works, projects, management tasks, research services, etc.) were assigned to 
institutions accordingly to their functions and responsibilities adopted by the government. 
An institution was allowed to provide services (i.e. fisheries research, education and 
training, consultation, management advice, investigation, etc.) if it had legal status, bank 
account and seal. For instance, the project of making the 2010 fisheries master plan was 
assigned to VIFEP, but not allowed to give the MFST because MFST was not recognized 
as a legally official body in practice. This meant that the MFST – a core element of the 
AIBM structure was not a legal body to provide any fisheries management related tasks as 
other institutions of MOFI on one hand, it was also not provided any budgets to work on 
the other since after the DANIDA project ended funding. Consequently, it had never been 
asked for advice by minister or managers of MOFI. In addition, MFST was not an official 
body, it just worked with support and used data collected from DANIDA project. It was not 
allowed to access to data collected from other sources (i.e. anchovies stock assessment 
project; small pelagic fish stock assessment project; fleet data from provincial fisheries; 
etc.). It may be different from other fisheries that data and information related to fisheries 
management such as stock assessments, scientific surveys, fishing effort, socio-economic 
information of fishing fleets, etc. seem to be private assets in Vietnam, they are not shared 
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widely within the fisheries communities as in EU fisheries. This means that the MFST did 
not have recourses as well as mandate to work after DANINA ended funding. 
Management resource availability 
In terms of the financial costs to the AIBM structure, fisheries management in Vietnam 
relied on two knowledge inputs of the fish stock assessments and the total fish landings 
(see chapter 6). The government gave a mandate to RIMF to provide the stock 
assessments and to GSO to conduct statistics of total fish landings. The costs for this 
structure was not evaluated, but they were annually allocated as the administration costs 
based on the number of staffs and funded by specific projects. In fact, managers thought 
that for the operationalization of the AIBM structure, the government would pay an annual 
additional budget equal to the amount of money funded by DANIDA to maintain the data 
enumerator programs. This was not possible for the Vietnamese government as argued by 
the former of Department of Planning and Financial of MOFI. MOFI was also unable to 
convince the Prime Minister to disband the GSO and establish the fisheries data collection 
system at the local level. This was proved by the failure of the directive No.08/2005/CT-
BTS on request the provincial government to maintaining the fisheries data collection 
system established and funded by the DANIDA project in 1996-2005. In fact, all (28) coastal 
provinces stopped fisheries data collection in 2007 because the financial and human 
resources were not allocated. The fisheries data were collected by the GSO to estimate the 
conventional indexes of total landings and number of vessels. Therefore, the fisheries data 
collection system of the AIBM structure was not maintained when DANIDA ended funding 
in 2005. 
In terms of expertise, all Vietnamese fisheries researchers and managers were educated 
in fisheries management based on the stock assessment models (i.e. mathematic models 
to estimate standing biomass, exploitable potential yield, MSY, recruitment yield). This was 
suited with the conventional approach, in which managers need estimations of the standing 
biomass and the exploitable potential yield to plan their fisheries. Therefore, fisheries 
researchers used the stock assessment models to answer the questions asked often by 
the fisheries managers (i.e. how many fish we have in the seas, and how many fish we can 
catch from the seas). Any approach that did not answer these questions would not be 
accepted by the existing fisheries managers. In fact, a Vice Minister (at a meeting in 2016) 
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refused a report of a stock assessment provided by RIMF because it did not provide the 
estimation of the exploitable potential yield of the fisheries resources in the Vietnamese 
waters. This was an obstacle to implementing the AIBM structure because this structure 
based on the adaptive indicators rather than the projection of the state of the fish stocks in 
the future used in the conventional approach.  
In addition, the AIBM structure recognizes the realistic fluctuations of the fish stocks and 
fisheries to make adaptive management actions in response to changes of the system 
under management. It was absolutely new to the fisheries researchers and managers in 
Vietnam. This was such a complicated process and requires much more data than the 
empirical formulas as evaluated by the head of the MFST. Indeed, interpretation of 
indicators into the fisheries management plans were so complicated and hard for the 
Vietnamese fisheries scientists as observation in 2003-2005. The MFST were unable to 
define the fishing mortality of fish stocks as well as the fishing effort for a fisheries 
management plan. This made managers susceptible of the feasibility of the AIBM structure 
would help them managing their fisheries better.  
Another reason leading to impossibility of AIBM structure in Vietnam may be the scientific 
reputation of the MFST. Though most of them were young and have good skills in computer 
and language, but with less practical experience in doing research. A former vice director 
of NADAREP evaluated that the MFST members were just suited for working as the project 
staff rather than scientists to provide management advice. In addition, the existing 
management system were not capable to implement policy experiments and learning 
process because all fisheries planning decisions were not implemented as analyzed in 
chapter 7. A monitoring and analysis system to evaluate and review the indicators was also 
not available in Vietnam.  
8.3.2.2 Is the AIBM structure appropriate to Vietnamese fisheries? 
In the conventional approach to planning fisheries in Vietnam, the numeric objectives (i.e. 
total catches, number of fishing vessels) by specific year must be determined clearly. This 
approach took the estimation of exploitable potential yield as a knowledge input, which is 
obvious intuition, and more easily accepted by managers and other stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the exploitable potential yield is calculated clearly by empirical formulas (see 
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chapter 6) which was popularly used as told by scientists from RIMF. A former director of 
RIMF believed that the ecological uncertainties were addressed in empirical coefficients. 
Therefore, managers also believed this was the case. They were also convinced with clear 
number which made them easier to communicate as well to calculate other resources 
allocations within the planning system of the government as told by a former director of 
Planning and Financial Department of MOFI in 2012. However, it is not the case in fact. 
The empirical formulas to assess fish stock assessments were almost not used in global 
fisheries because it is not suited with the exploited fish stocks (Sparre & Venema, 1998) on 
one hand, and is highly uncertain as a single species approach (Kesteven, 1997; Larkin, 
1977, 1996; Sissenwine, 1978). 
Meanwhile, the adaptive management acknowledges uncertainty and in which managers 
may make decisions as experiments within appropriate scales to probe responses of 
ecosystem changes, even in cases of poor information (Lee, 2004; Raakjær et al., 2007; 
Walters, 1986). This was strange concept to the Vietnamese fisheries managers and 
researchers as observed at the MFST discussions in 2003-2005. Decision-makers are not 
allowed to experiment with a national policy and livelihoods of millions of people as noticed 
by a former director of Planning and Finance Department of MOFI. He argued that the 
government should not change its policies adaptively in a short time. For instance, the 
property of fishers (e.g. vessels, gears, fishing equipment, etc.) would be wasteful if the 
government decided to reduce fishing effort for conservation purpose. Therefore, the 
adaptive management was not appropriate to the existing perception of majority of the 
Vietnamese fisheries managers and scientists who seemed to accept the uncertain 
numbers, but clear rather than the unquantified objectives, but within a precautionary 
manner as my personal observation in the Vietnamese fisheries. 
In addition, it is almost impossible to define appropriate scales to apply the adaptive 
management in the Vietnamese fisheries. In fact, the Vietnamese fisheries were 
complicated, characterized with multi-species, multi-gears and multi-fleets. Characteristics 
of resource base and fisheries were seasonally changeable. Most pelagic fish stocks 
(accounted for 70% total fish biomass) migrated from the shore to deeper waters and from 
the north to the south between the Southeast monsoon to the Northeast monsoon and vice 
versa (Chung, 1997a). Accordingly, the fishing fleets were also movable or changed the 
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gears to maximize their catches (see chapter 7). In addition to this, the coastal waters were 
divided into 28 sections under authority of 28 coastal provinces. Therefore, it was almost 
impossible to define a scale where its dimensions were nearly the same so that design an 
appropriate monitoring plan to evaluate impacts of the management decisions in reality of 
the Vietnamese fisheries as argued by Mr. Dinh - a very experienced scientist from RIMF 
in 2005. 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS OF INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN THE 
VIETNAMESE FISHERIES 
As analyzed above, both the co-management and adaptive indicators-based management 
structures were welcomed and endorsed by high-ranking leaderships of the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Fisheries. This was really curious for international sponsors to assist the 
Vietnamese fisheries to improve. An apparent evidence for that is the World Bank project 
which has supported the fisheries co-management arrangement in 8 pilot coastal provinces 
in 2012-2018. As personal observation, the most important result of introducing the co-
management arrangement into Vietnam was the improved perception of the Vietnamese 
fisheries stakeholders on the importance of conservation of the fisheries resources and 
marine habitats, especially the local communities. Similarly, for the AIBM structure, 
perception and understanding about using knowledge bases for assessing, planning 
fisheries of the fisheries managers and scientists were enhanced. These should be a solid 
foundation for the Vietnamese fisheries to move forwards to the better regulated fisheries 
if obstacles in the institutional arrangements are addressed accordingly. In a system where 
the fisheries management plans are implemented to control the fishing activities in practice, 
then these structures would be useful. 
For the co-management arrangement, investigation in three models (i.e. Quang Thai, Vinh 
Giang, and Dien Hai) in province of Thua Thien Hue shows that they were very close to the 
community-based management as done in Japan as illustrated by Yamamoto (Yamamoto, 
2000). These models were under management of the Fisheries Association (FA) is the 
same with the Fisheries Cooperative Association (FCA) in the Japanese models. The 
difference was the body decided fisheries management plan is the district government, was 
not the Fisheries Coordination Committee (FCC) who is legally established the fisheries 
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law in Japan, is not a part of prefecture government and work on behalf of the local fishers 
(Yamamoto, 2000). The fishing licenses was used as a management tool in these models. 
Only fishers were given a fishing license were allowed to fish in the local waters. Although, 
the FAs were not authorized to extract non-licensing fishers or punish sanctions with illegal 
fishers, but violations of the fisheries regulation in these communities have reduced 
apparently as argued by the head of the provincial fisheries authorities. He believed that 
effectiveness of fisheries management would be better if the government shared power in 
deciding management plans and enforcing fisheries regulations with the fishing 
communities as the FCC and FCA established in Japan. This should be further examined 
to understand the profound constraints in sharing power and responsibilities for managing 
fisheries to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the fisheries management system 
in Vietnam. 
The failure of the adaptive indicators-based management structure introduced by DANIDA 
was just a special context where its institutional arrangements and human capacity did not 
enable the structure to work properly. In fact, this structure was revisited in recent years in 
Vietnam when managers were confronted with the question of how many vessels would be 
reduced in the waters of the Vietnam-China Fishery Agreement and other specific waters. 
Many fisheries managers and scientists were convinced by the AIBM structure. Actually, 
the AIBM structure was interpreted as a system having two elements: i) a monitoring 
system to measure fishing effort and landings to estimate the current status of the fish 
stocks and its underlying production relationships; and ii) a response system that enables 
managers to increase or decrease fishing effort as required to track the moving biological 
indicators and economic variables (Hilborn & Sibert, 1988). Therefore, the fisheries data 
collection programs (i.e. scientific survey program, onboard observer program, landings 
enumerator program, and fishing effort program) were implemented systematically in 22/28 
coastal provinces since the end of 2016 within the project of comprehensive investigation 
of the marine environment and resources in 2011-2020. Moreover, in a personal discussion 
with a deputy director of RIMF and director of Conservation of Fisheries Resources – D-
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Fish32, both of them acknowledged that the AIBM structure introduced by DANIDA project 
(Management, 2004) would be re-introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries and they 
advocated the MFST to work again to provide multi-disciplinary assessments and 
management advice for D-Fish. However, operationalization of the structure is still moving 
forward. It may be successful or may not as it was in the DANIDA project in 2003-2012. It 
is evident that acceptance of a new management approach from the developed fisheries 
to developing fisheries took a certain delay, nearly 20 years. This is nearly the same with 
the introduction of the MSY concept to the Vietnamese fisheries. This concept was used 
commonly in the world in 1970s, but it was just conceptualized in the Vietnamese fisheries 
in 1990s.  
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In the 1990s, indications of a depletion of fisheries resources and reduction of viability of 
the fishing fleets became apparent in the Vietnam. This was valued as a result from the 
open-access regime and development policies of the production-based growth paradigm 
in the past. This situation, in combination with the context of international integration policy, 
created favourable conditions to introduce alternative fisheries management approaches 
into Vietnam. Alignment with the mainstream of the global fisheries management, the co-
management and the adaptive indicators-based management approaches were introduced 
into Vietnam by that time. These approaches were evaluated appropriately with the 
Vietnamese fisheries and welcomed and endorsed by the high-ranking leadership of the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Fisheries. Therefore, they were applied in Vietnamese fisheries as 
the pilot projects funded by foreign sponsors. However, policy-makers still remained the 
conventional approach which prioritize the high growth rates of catches and fishing capacity 
rather than the conservation of fisheries resources for sustainable development of the 
fisheries. This was the biggest constraint on successful implication of the co-management 
and the adaptive indicators-based management structures in the Vietnamese fisheries.  
                                         
32 The former one is conducting fisheries data collection programs; and the later one decides 
research design, provides budgets and use the data for managing fisheries. Both of them used to 
be a membership of MFST who were trained to operate the AIBM structure. 
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Although implementation of these approaches was not very successful, it resulted in certain 
implications for the Vietnamese fisheries. The perception of the Vietnamese fisheries 
stakeholders was improved in terms of using knowledge bases for assessing and planning 
fisheries, and participatory mechanism to enforce fisheries management actions at the local 
communities. By participating in the fisheries co-management models, awareness of the 
local fishers on the conservation of fisheries resources and marine habitats was enhanced. 
Therefore, compliance with fisheries regulations of the local fishers was improved, using 
destructive fishing gears and methods was also reduced in many coastal waters. 
This research argues that the fisheries co-management arrangement in Vietnam was at the 
early stages (i.e. instructive, consultative stages) of the spectrum of the co-management 
arrangements defined by Sen & Raakjaer (Sen & Raakjaer, 1996). Most of fisheries co-
management models (16/22) implemented in Vietnam were classified as the instructive 
level of the co-management where the government informs regulations and policies, and 
local communities participate in enforcing the regulations and policies within their 
communities. Only 6/22 models were classified as the consultative level of co-management 
where the local communities are consulted before government deciding management 
measures. Implementation of the fisheries co-management models contributed to 
enhancement of compliance with the fisheries regulations of the local fishing communities 
and reduction of management costs of the fisheries authorities. This research also found 
that the community-based management seemed to be suited for managing the coastal 
fisheries in Vietnam, if the government shared management authorities with the fishing 
communities.  
The adaptive indicators-based management structure never moved from a pilot project to 
implementation in Vietnam due to a lack of supportive institutional arrangements in the 
existing management system in 2003-2012. This structure was refined and re-introduced 
into the Vietnamese fisheries to design the fisheries data collection programs (i.e. scientific 
surveys of fisheries resources; fisheries enumeration at landing sites; structure of fishing 
fleets at provinces; and observer program on fishing vessels) and to provide multi-
disciplinary assessments of the fish stocks as well as socio-economic aspects of fishing 
fleets in period 2016-2020. 
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This research found two key constraints on supporting alternative approaches to fisheries 
management in Vietnam: i) the existing institutional arrangements; and ii) a fisheries 
management framework. The existing institutional arrangements are designed to 
implement the centrally planned regime which the government control management 
authorities with little rooms for the NGOs and local fishers to share power in deciding 
fisheries management measures. The existing institutions were also inflexible to promote 
changes and innovation. It took a delay time of around 20 years to adapt to the innovation. 
The existing management framework in the Vietnamese fisheries just emphasized the 
stage of making plans. The other stages of the management process (e.g. implementing 
management plan, monitoring effects, responding to changes, etc.) were ignored or less 
taken into account. This was the main reason leading to unsuccessful implementation of 
the co-management and adaptive indicators-based management structures in Vietnam. 
This research also found that the international sponsors took the critical role in initiating 
and remaining the models of application of new approaches (i.e. co-management, AIBM 
structures). Most of models would collapse if the international sponsors ended their funding. 
This research also pointed out a paradox that the competent agencies of the government 
advocated introduction of new approaches, but they were reluctant to change and promote 
implementation of these approaches in practice. This attitude would change if the fisheries 
management plans are enforced in practice under the pressure of the international 
relationships such as implementing the fisheries management plans in the waters of the 
Vietnam - China Fishery Agreement or the formal warn of the European Commission of the 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The Vietnam-China Fishery Agreement 
requires to determine the number of fishing vessels of each side are licensed to fish in the 
agreement waters. This pushed the Vietnamese government to implement the agreed 
management plans and monitor their outcomes for negotiating with China to make 
management plans to control fishing activities in the agreement waters. The European 
Commission warned officially the government of Vietnam for its ineffectiveness to combat 
IUU in 23 October 2017. This causes difficulties for exporting the Vietnamese fisheries 
products into the European markets. In order to remove this, the Vietnamese fisheries 
authorities should implement their management plans to control fishing activities effectively 
as advised by the European Commission. Not only European Commission, but also other 
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markets such as United State coerce Vietnam into the conservation paradigm, if Vietnam 
would remain access to important export markets. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research examines the effectiveness of a fisheries management system in a 
developing context as the Vietnamese fisheries. It reveals that a symbolic planning system 
underpinned by an economic growth-based regime makes the management system 
ineffective and leads to the fisheries in a crisis. In this regime, a fisheries system is 
presented in a contradictory manner which creates ambiguous backgrounds for making 
inconsistent policies. Its findings contribute to understanding about ineffectiveness of a 
fisheries management system in the developing context like Vietnam. It also provides 
implications and lessons learnt for implementing innovative management approaches to 
improve effectiveness of a fisheries management system. 
Following the research questions, below sections reflect the main findings and theoretical 
reflections related to five research questions asked in chapter 1. Finally, it suggests future 
researches to improve effectiveness of a fisheries management system Vietnam. 
9.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What are challenges facing the fisheries 
management system in Vietnam?  
i) What is the situation of the natural system (fish stocks and marine biodiversity? 
ii) What is the situation of the fishing industry and the local fishing communities? 
iii) How is the fisheries management system organized? 
This research shows that the fisheries system of Vietnam is in a crisis and reflected in three 
facets: i) these available data provide a contradictory understanding about fish stocks and 
their ecosystems; ii) fishing is considered as a means for providing livelihoods and 
employment for coastal communities and for ensuring national security at sea; and iii) 
management tools are established in the planning system of government, but not enforced 
in practice. These facets of a fisheries system are coexisted and closely associated with 
each other. They are both a cause, but also is a consequence of each other and vice versa.  
This research confirms that the fisheries system approach enables managers to 
understand the dialectical relationship among three components of a fishery system in 
general and the small-scale fisheries in developing fisheries like Vietnam: i) the 
management system; ii) the human system; and iii) the natural system. Base on this 
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approach, this is the first time that the Vietnamese fisheries are analyzed comprehensively 
and inclusively. This reflects that the fisheries system approach is suited for analyzing the 
small-scale and dispersed fisheries in tropical waters like Vietnam. 
The natural system (i.e. fish stocks and marine biodiversity) in the Vietnamese fisheries 
context is reflected through collective numbers of the standing biomass and exploitable 
potential yield estimated by mandated research. Accordingly, the volume of these numbers 
seemed to increase in the last two decades from 3.1 million tons of standing biomass and 
1.3 million tons of exploitable potential yield in 1993 to 4.4 million tons to 2.5 million ton in 
2015. These numbers do not tell anything about the state of the fisheries resources 
because they hid the actual facts such as the area and time of investigation, data sources 
and methodology used to calculate, etc. However, they were accepted and guaranteed as 
an official knowledge base for assessing and planning the fisheries in Vietnam. At the same 
time, a depletion trend of fisheries resources was documented by a decline in catch rates 
of experiment fishing in scientific surveys as well as of commercial fishing fleets in the same 
course. In addition, ecological changes were also observed in recent years. Many species 
disappeared, the proportion of long-lived fish in total landings became less and less, 
whereas the ratio of trash fish became more and more. Clearly, these data provide a 
contradictory understanding about the fisheries resources and marine biology in Vietnam. 
Based on this, the state of fisheries resources can be interpreted into different portraits to 
guide policy accordingly to political aspirations. This is strongly supported by a government-
based management regime which the knowledge base for managing fisheries was 
constructed by mandate researches. It is connected with a management system which 
follows the short-term economic growth paradigm over the sustainable utilization of 
fisheries resources one. 
Recent research investigation shows that incomes of local fishers have increased and living 
standard of fishing communities have improved. However, some other researches provided 
the total fish landings estimation which much higher than that published by GSO. They also 
documented that many fishing vessels in some provinces did not maintain fishing operation 
due to economic loss, this pushed government launching subsidy programs. It is evident 
that these available data also provided confusing understanding about situation of the 
fishing industry and fishing communities in Vietnam. In one way, policies to encourage 
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fishing communities to enhance fishing capacity would be made if policy-makers take 
official statistics as a knowledge basis. This way was adopted for the Vietnamese fisheries 
and government have subsidized fisheries since beginning of the 1990s. This is a cause 
resulting in overcapitalization and overcapacity of fishing fleets and put the fisheries in a 
vicious cycle (Raakjær, 2009). Overcapitalization of fishing fleets was a reason leading to 
collapse fisheyes in the world (Charles, 2001; Raakjær, 2009). In order to address this 
issue, government may introduce precautionary principles into its policy that freeze the 
existing fishing effort until having more knowledge in fisheries system (FAO, 1996a; 
González-Laxe, 2005). 
In the management facet, the fisheries law 2003 assigned the central government (Ministry 
of Fisheries, nowadays Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) manage fishing 
activities at the offshore waters (i.e. beyond the line 24 miles far from the shore to the 
limitation of the Vietnamese EEZ), and the provincial manage fishing activities at the 
coastal waters (i.e. within the shore to the line 24 miles far from the shore). It also states 
that fishing activities are managed by a combination regime of limitation of total catches 
that ensure sustainability of fisheries resources (outputs control), of limitation of fishing 
effort that commensurate with productivity of fisheries resources (inputs control), and 
compliance with technical measures. The first two tools are established in a dual planning 
system nested by the general socio-economic planning system and the fisheries planning 
system the fisheries planning system operated in four levels of the government (i.e. 
national, provincial, district, and communal levels). However, there is a lack of mechanism 
to implement these management tools in practice of the Vietnamese fisheries. The 
technical measures such as mesh size, gear categories, fish size to be caught, fishing 
zones, etc. are regulated in decrees, directives and decisions adopted by the Prime 
Minister; circulars, directives and decisions of Minister of Fisheries; decisions and directives 
of Chairman/Chairwoman of the Provincial People Committee. This system is supported by 
mandate research and management tasks such as fish stock assessments and fish 
landings statistics. This research reconfirmed that the existing fisheries management 
system is not effective due to a weakness of the formal institutions (Dang et al., 2017) and 
poor compliance with the fisheries law (Pomeroy et al., 2009), but also found that it is a 
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lack of mechanism to enforce the management tools established in the fisheries planning 
system of the government. 
This research argued that the government (i.e. Ministry of Fisheries) stay in a paradox. On 
one hand, it tried to show a growth in total fish landings to prove its achievements. It also 
presented indications of overexploitation of fisheries resources and unstainable 
development of fisheries. This resulted in a contradictory understanding about the existing 
state of fisheries and confusing polices for the coming planning periods. 
9.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: How the fisheries master plan deals with the 
issues of the fisheries in Vietnam?  
i) What is background (i.e. issues facing fisheries management system) to formulating 
the 2010 fisheries master plan? 
ii) How are fisheries discourses emerged and institutionalized into the 2010 fisheries 
master plan? 
A master plan was introduced into the planning system of the government in 1998 for 
planning economy and sectors. It takes a role of connections between political strategies 
and operational plans (i.e. the five-year plan, and the annual plan) in the planning system 
of the government. The master plan provides development and management objectives of 
economy or sectors by the coming five or ten years. By this time, the national economy in 
general and fisheries in particular were implementing the reform policy. This means that 
the fisheries master plan in 2001-2010 was developed in a transition from the centrally 
planned regime to the market-oriented based regime. It was, therefore, strongly influenced 
by the production-based growth paradigm in the centrally planned regime on one hand; but 
also, by demands for conservation of fisheries resources to deal with depletion of many fish 
stocks in traditional waters and sustainable development perspective of the international 
fisheries management mainstream. 
This research found that there were three fisheries discourses debated during the course 
(1997-2005) of making the 2010 fisheries master plan in Vietnam. The government (i.e. 
Ministry of Fisheries) contradicted themselves to advocate the production-based growth 
paradigm on one hand, but also to support conservation perspective on the other. In annual 
reports, MOFI presented its achievements of steady increase in total fish landings and 
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fishing capacity in 1990-2005. This was a basis advocating the production-based growth 
paradigm. In those reports, MOFI also stated the fisheries resources were overfished and 
destructive fishing methods were employed commonly. This suggested to plan fisheries 
toward conservation paradigm. Whereas, the scientists who were contracted to make the 
2010 fisheries master plan consisted with conservation paradigm. The policy-makers view 
the fisheries as other sectors which make a contribution to the growth rate of the national 
economy, and disagreed the conservation perspective of the planners. This category of 
conflict may emerge in a context of poor fisheries data and of knowledge communication 
in an implicit manner. In such a context, policies may be decided consistently. As a 
consequence, the 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam was decided contrastingly. The 
total catches by 2010 was set increasingly and higher than the exploitable potential yield, 
but the fishing vessels were planned to reduce by nearly 50% of the figure in 2005. And 
there were no action plans nor programs to implement this master plan in Vietnam. 
The research adds a new type of conflict among actors – conflict between planners and 
policy-makers in planning fisheries to a range of fisheries conflicts identified by previous 
researches (Charles, 1992; Muawanah et al., 2012; Salayo et al., 2006). This type of 
conflict may emerge in a context of the fisheries: i) in transition period between the centrally 
planned economy and the market-oriented based economy; and ii) of poor available 
fisheries data and less explicit mechanism to validate and communicate knowledge in 
planning fisheries. 
9.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: How uncertain are the objectives of the fisheries 
master plan? 
i) How was the TC-based management approach conceptualized in the Vietnamese 
fisheries? 
ii) What and how knowledge inputs were used to define total catches (TC) in Vietnam? 
Although the fisheries planning system was changed from the centrally planned regime to 
the market-oriented based regime, the TC-based approach has been used for planning the 
fisheries in Vietnam. The TC-based approach takes the volume of total catches as the 
overarching objective. In nature, this approach is to draw out a promising potential for 
enlarging the fisheries to meet increasing demands of people. Therefore, this used to 
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support well the production-based growth paradigm under the centrally planned fisheries 
of Vietnam. This approach created an open-assess fisheries regime in Vietnam and 
resulted in overexploitation of fisheries resources in the 1990s. In order to address this 
issue, concept of TC was re-defined as the total allowable catch in the fisheries law 2013. 
The TC, therefore, should be established based on the stock assessments to ensure 
sustainability of the fisheries resources on one hand, but it also should be compatible with 
the growth rate of total fish landings of the previous periods. 
This research recognized that the TC-based (i.e. output control) approach which based on 
the exploitable potential yield (EPY) interpreted as the MSY and the statistics of fish 
landings support well the production-based growth paradigm which follows the objective of 
increase in catches. In this approach, the EPY may be estimated by empirical formulas 
using empirical coefficients and statistics of fish landings which may be easily manipulated 
to meet political interests. Therefore, the EPY estimations and statistics of fish landings are 
often adjusted toward a figure that guarantees the growth rate of catches would be 
acceptable.   
The TC-based approach takes the outcomes of fish stock assessments and statistics in 
fish landings as the knowledge base. Fish stock assessments provided a death figure of 
total exploitable potential yield (EPY) of all species in specific waters. Statistics also present 
a death figure of total fish landings of all species and of all fishing fleets in administrational 
territories of the whole country and of the province. These figures do not reflect the real 
state of the exploited fish stocks in terms of the biomass, age structure, recruitments, 
natural mortality, etc.; nor the fishing pressure on the fisheries resources and ecosystem in 
terms of fishing mortality by species in specific areas, changes in species composition, the 
size of caught fish, etc. Clearly, these data are unspecific to draw out an informed and 
meaningful understanding about the state of fisheries resources and fisheries. 
Furthermore, this research argued that the estimations of EPY and total fish landings used 
for planning the TC of the 2010 fisheries master plan are incredible. The EPY was 
estimated based on the out of date data on one hand, and by incompatible method on the 
other. The total fish landings were estimated influentially by the political perspective and 
controlled within a limitation range. It seemed to be manipulated to fit to the growth rates 
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adopted by political solutions and a normative rate of less than 5% in comparison to the 
previous year. In addition, the methodologies used for these estimations are empirical 
formulas which use empirical coefficients. The validation and communication of these 
estimations are also conducted implicitly within normative protocols adopted by competent 
institutions of the government. By this way, it is easier to adjust to meet the political 
aspirations. Therefore, the TC-based approach has still been use to plan the fisheries in 
Vietnam and also in other fisheries in the world (which called as the TAC-based approach). 
This approach support and is associated with the production-based growth paradigm. 
In terms of knowledge base used for managing fisheries, this research goes further 
previous researches (Haggan et al., 2007; Motos & Wilson, 2006) to conclude that the 
fishers’ knowledge is not used for planning the fisheries and making fisheries regulations 
in a government-based fisheries management system like Vietnam. This research also 
identified a new type of knowledge – the statistics of fish landings which is not the scientific 
knowledge produced by scientists nor indigenous knowledge produced by fishers as 
defined by previous research (Degnbol, 2005; Haggan et al., 2007; Motos & Wilson, 2006). 
This knowledge produced by government officials in a hierarchically administrational 
system of the General Statistics Office which is not an expertise institution of fisheries. It 
may be distorted and adjusted to meet political interests. This may undermine the trust of 
local fishers to the fisheries management system operated by the government. As a result, 
the gap between the state planning system within the government system and reality of 
fishing communities is deepened. The legitimacy and compliance of the local fishing 
communities with fisheries management decisions become lower and lower. Ultimately, 
this type of fisheries management is not implemented effectively as clearly seen in the 
Vietnamese fisheries.  
This research argued that the government-based planning system originated from the 
centrally planned fisheries no longer fit with the existing market-oriented based fisheries in 
Vietnam. In addition, the TC-based planning system was not suited for the small-scale 
fisheries with dispersed fishing fleets as Vietnam. It failed in Vietnam, albeit it was operated 
in the centrally planned regime which all fishing vessels are collectivized and possessed 
by government and all landings are enumerated by state agencies in the 1970s-1980s. In 
such fisheries, the government could not provide resources to control a huge range of 
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landing sites and all landings of every vessels on one hand. The other hand, the 
government cannot provide resources to collect data and operate complicated system in 
assessing and projecting the state of fish sock in the future. Instead, empirical formulas are 
used to produce incredible knowledge with much uncertainty. This reconfirm arguments of 
previous researches (Kato, 2001, 2012; Raakjær, 2004; Thia-Eng & Pauly, 1989; Wilson 
et al., 1994) that the fisheries management approach based on the resources management 
like the TC-based approach is not suited for the small-scale and dispersed fisheries in the 
tropical waters. 
9.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 4: How the fisheries master plan intervenes the fishing 
communities in Vietnam? 
i) How are the 2010 fisheries master plan was implemented at the local level? 
ii) What are preferences and interests of the local fishers? 
iii) What and how are factors influencing on the fishing behaviours of the local fishers? 
Although the management tools (i.e. total catches and number of fishing vessels) were 
established in the 2010 fisheries master plan of Vietnam, they were not enforced at the 
fishing communities in practice. The total catches were not divided into catch quotas and 
allocated to fishing vessels. As a result, the volume of catches of fishing vessels in Vietnam 
are not limited, it is decided by fishers in practice. Similarly, the number of fishing vessels 
was just planned in the master plan at the national level. It was not allocated to lower levels 
(i.e. provincial, district, communal levels) to control in practice. Consequently, fisheries 
authorities are free to issue permission to build more fishing vessels. This means that the 
existing fisheries in Vietnam are under the open-access regime which fishers are free to 
catch as much as they can. 
This research supplemented that the ineffectiveness of the fisheries management system 
in Vietnam is not only due to the weakness of the informal institutions (Dang et al., 2017), 
and due to a poor compliance with the fisheries law (Pomeroy et al., 2009); but also due to 
the management tools planned in the fisheries planning system are not enforced in 
practice. In fact, the management tools (i.e. total catches, and number of fishing vessels) 
are decided in the fisheries planning documents of the government in four levels (i.e. 
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national, provincial, district, and communal levels), but they are not enforced at the fishing 
communities in practice. 
Under this regime, fishers tried to maximize their catches and profits. This research found 
that a majority of local fishers do not get out fishing industry. Many of them intend to 
enhance their business to improve the catch rate and the catch quality, the others intend 
to enlarge their business to increase total catches and profits. The local fishers imitate each 
other to improve their fishing gears and equipment to increase fishing efficiency, and also 
collaborate each other to reduce fishing costs and increase profits. All fishers in Vietnam 
are interested in the subsidy programs of the government. They always call for and expect 
subsidies from the government to reduce fishing costs and upgrade, enhance their fishing 
business. 
This research identified three categories of fishers who have different fishing behaviour (i.e. 
making strategic decisions, and tactical decisions). The fishers of “fishing to live” whose 
family live dependently on the fishing, and they intend to invest more in fishing to enhance 
and enlarge their business. This type of fisher accounts for around 30% of total fishers, and 
is increasing in Vietnam. The fishers of “fishing for changing life” who want to change their 
business to be the large-scale fishers or to be no longer professional fishers. This type of 
fisher accounts for more than 60% and is decreasing in Vietnam. The other type of fisher 
is the fishers of “fishing of opportunists” who entered the fishing industry to get subsidies 
from government. They do not have much experience in fishing and do not intend to live 
with fishing for a long time. The number of this type of fisher accounts for a very small ratio 
in comparison to the other types of fishers in Vietnam. 
This research identified seven factors influencing the strategic decisions of the Vietnamese 
fishers, including: i) fisheries regulations; ii) subsidy policies; iii) personal financial status; 
iv) management capacity; v) livelihoods of fishers’ children; vi) labour availability; and vii) 
individual experience. Among them, the government’s subsidies were the most important 
factor influencing the investment decisions (i.e. strategic decisions) of a majority of the 
Vietnamese fishers. They were not only the key motivation for all types of fishers to make 
strategic decisions to change, enlarge and upgrade their fishing business, but also were a 
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motive for the fishers to maintain daily fishing activities at seas. The next factor was their 
own financial status. The others were ranked changeably by individual fishers. 
This research found that there were eight factors influencing the tactical decisions of 
fishers, including: i) fishing season; ii) market; iii) weather; iv) personal experience; v) 
information; vi) informal rules; vii) fishing labour/crew members; and viii) fisheries 
regulations. Of these, the fishing season was the most important factor for all fishers to 
decide their daily fishing tactics. The other factors were ranked differently fisher by fisher 
in practice. This research also observed that the government’s subsidies also influence the 
tactical decisions of many fishers of type 1 (i.e. fishers of “fishing to live”). Many of them in 
Tam Quan Bac went fishing to get the subsidies from the government. 
This research found that all type of fishers ignored or less referred the fisheries regulations 
when they make both strategic and tactical decisions. Therefore, it argued that compliance 
with the fisheries regulations of the Vietnamese fishing communities is very poor. 
This research identifies a new factor - the government subsidy influencing strongly and 
driving the local fishers’ fishing behaviours that was not included in previous researches 
(Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; Salas & Gaertner, 2004). This research identified that the 
government’s subsidy influence most the fishing behaviour of a majority of fishers in 
Vietnam. It encouraged fishers invest and enhance their fishing capacity in the long-term 
decisions on one hand, but also encouraged them to go fishing in the short-term decisions. 
A majority of the Vietnamese fishers enhanced their fishing business and remained their 
fishing activities thanks to the government’s subsidies. This may be an indication of the 
vicious circle in the fisheries. This suggests that the financial policies would be an effective 
tool for controlling the fishing behaviour in Vietnam. For instance, government would 
remove subsidy programs, then fishers would have to rationalize their investment decisions 
and fishing tactics to optimize their capitals. This would result in removing type 2 of fisher 
(i.e. fishers of “fishing of opportunists”), and reducing number of fishers of type 1 (i.e. fishers 
of “Fishing to live”, and lessening type 3 of fishers (i.e. fishers of “fishing for changing life”). 
Lessons learnt from subsidies leading to overcapacity were documented in some fisheries 
in the world (European Parliament, 2013; Gréboval, 1999; Raakjær, 2009). The existing 
situation of the Vietnamese fisheries seems to be the same fisheries in other countries (e.g. 
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European Union, Norway, United States, Canada, etc.) in 1970s-1980s. These countries 
used to subsidize their fisheries to enhance fishing fleets and enlarge fishing business. 
Consequently, the fish effort exceeded the productivity of fish stocks and fishing fleets were 
not viable. The government had to launch the buy-back programs. This is a lesson learnt 
for the Vietnamese fisheries. In fact, the Vietnamese fisheries have got into the vicious 
cycle where fishers get economic loss, then government subsidize to enhance fishing effort, 
then the size of fish stocks becomes smaller and smaller, and then the fishers’ economic 
viable would decrease. This cycle has been iterating in the Vietnamese fisheries. This 
suggests that government should stop subsidy programs to prevent the fishing 
overcapacity and fisheries collapse as taken place in other countries in the past. If no, the 
costs for resolving overcapacity and recovering fisheries resources would be much higher 
than the budget subsidized the fisheries. 
9.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 5: Why were innovative approaches not successfully 
implemented in the Vietnamese fisheries? 
i) How the innovative management approaches were implemented in the Vietnamese 
fisheries? 
ii) Do they improve the effectiveness of the existing fisheries management system in 
Vietnam? 
iii) What are obstacles to implementation of these approaches in the Vietnamese 
fisheries context? 
Two innovative management approaches: i) co-management, and ii) adaptive indicators-
based management (AIBM) structures were introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries in the 
1990s-2000s. Both of them are to improve effectiveness of the fisheries management 
system toward sustainable utilization of fisheries resources, thus they could help to address 
the existing issues of the Vietnamese fisheries (i.e. overexploitation of fisheries resources, 
and commonly using destructive fishing gears and methods). Therefore, these structures 
were welcomed and endorsed by Minister of Fisheries to implement in Vietnam. 
Consequently, the co-management structure and the AIBM structure were implemented in 
pilot projects funded by foreign donors in 1994 and 2003 respectively. These structures 
were designed, initiated and implemented by international experts within the pilot projects 
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and with involvement of relevant fisheries stakeholders as departments of MOFI, research 
institutions, local fisheries authorities, and local communities. In general, this research 
concludes that the concept of the co-management and adaptive indicators-based 
management were introduced successfully into the Vietnamese fisheries. Most of fisheries 
managers, staffs, researchers, NGOs, and local fishers have learned about basic 
understanding about operating structures of co-management and AIBM to manage the 
fisheries. Perception on fisheries data and scientific knowledge for managing fisheries of 
fisheries managers in MOFI and local levels, of researchers was improved clearly. 
Therefore, fisheries data collection programs have been conducted throughout coastal 
provinces in Vietnam. Enforcement and compliance with fisheries regulations as well as 
awareness of the local users on fisheries resources protection were improved. Using 
destructive fishing gears and methods has reduced recent years. 
This research found that the co-management structure was implemented in Vietnam at the 
beginning levels – the instructive and consultative levels which involvement of local fishers 
in fisheries management is limited. The local fishing communities were not shared 
management power in making and enforcing management decisions, instead, they were 
invited to assist local fisheries authorities in enforcing fisheries regulations within the 
community’s waters. Local communities were not authorized to control fishing activities or 
manage fisheries resources within their local waters. They have also no rights to extract 
and arrest fishers who fish illegally in their local waters. At this point, this research observed 
that the international donors emphasized the involvement of local communities in enforcing 
fisheries regulations rather than building a legal framework supporting collaboration 
between government and local communities in fisheries management. 
This research also observed that fisheries co-management models in the lagoon waters in 
Thua Thien- Hue province were more sustainable than other models in elsewhere. These 
models were designed and operated based on the Fisheries Association established by the 
Provincial Fisheries Association. This type of model is nearly the same with the community-
based fisheries management in Japan. In these models, boundaries of the communal 
waters were defined and marked apparently with other communes and fishing rights were 
issued and protected by the district government. The local fishers were invited to participate 
in defining number of gears allowed to operate and in patrol fishing activities over the 
FISHERIES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM 
 
252 
 
communal waters. They also submitted an annual fee to be a membership of the Fisheries 
Association. 
This research pointed out two main obstacles: i) lacking the supportive institutional 
arrangements; and ii) lacking a fisheries management framework to implementation of the 
co-management and the AIBM structures in the Vietnamese fisheries. Firstly, the existing 
institutional arrangements have not provided favourable conditions for implementing the 
co-management and the AIBM structures in Vietnam in terms of legislation and 
management framework. Both fisheries co-management and the AIBM structure were not 
codified into fisheries law, then the local fishing communities and the Marine Fisheries 
Specialists Team (MFST) were not recognized as legal bodies in administration system. 
Therefore, the they were not protected by laws and allocated resources to work. The local 
fishing communities were also not authorized to extract fishers who fish illegally within their 
local waters. The MFST was mandated to implement tasks and assignments related to 
fisheries management. Secondly, there has been no fisheries management framework 
adopted in Vietnam. Although the management measures are decided by government in 
the fisheries planning system, they are not implemented in practice. Therefore, the local 
fishing communities and MFST could not make their agenda to involve in the process of 
the fisheries management in Vietnam. This research argued that the existing institutional 
arrangements were designed to implement the centrally planned regime which the 
government controls management authorities over the fisheries with no rooms for the 
NGOs and local fishers to share power in deciding fisheries management measures. The 
existing institutional arrangements were also inflexible to promote changes and innovation. 
The research recognized that the existing fisheries management system in Vietnam 
emphasized the stage of making plans. It ignored or less taken into account the other 
stages of the management process (e.g. implementing management plan, monitoring 
effects, responding to changes, etc.). Therefore, the fisheries authorities have not 
recognized shortcomings as well as deficiencies of the existing fisheries management 
system. As a result, they have not identified benefits and advantages of applying of the co-
management and the AIBM structures to improve effectiveness and efficiency of fisheries 
management. This is the critical factor leading to unsuccessful implementation of the co-
management and adaptive indicators-based management structures in Vietnam. 
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Furthermore, these structures are to support the sustainable utilization and conservation of 
fisheries resources, meanwhile, the existing management system followed the economic 
growth in short term. This may also be a constraint to implementing the co-management 
and adaptive indicators-based management structures in Vietnam. 
This research argued that the international sponsors took the key role in initiating and 
remaining operation of the co-management and AIBM structure in the Vietnamese 
fisheries. Their funding was the critical condition for sustainability of the fisheries co-
management models and the AIBM structure. The AIBM and most fisheries co-
management models were dysfunctional after the foreign donors ended funding. Therefore, 
this research adds one more condition – the international sponsors that influences the 
viability of fisheries self-managed, community-based management institutions and co-
management (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Pinkerton, 1989). The international sponsors took a 
critical role in implementing the fisheries co-management in Vietnam. They not only funded, 
initiated, but also remain function of the fisheries co-management models. This also found 
that the international sponsors intend to implement responsibility of the local fishers in 
compliance with management measures rather than sharing management power between 
government and local fishers when they implement fisheries co-management projects in 
the developing fisheries like Vietnam. 
This research presents a paradox in the Vietnamese fisheries that the fisheries authorities 
advocated introduction of new approaches on one hand, but they were also reluctant to 
change and support implementation of these approaches in practice. This paradox made 
its management system ineffective and warned officially by European Commission in 2017. 
Under this pressure, the fisheries management system in Vietnam is changed towards 
more sustainable and responsible fisheries to meet the European Commission’s 
requirements, so that it would remain the export markets at least the EU market in the 
future. 
9.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on these findings, this research suggests two following researches should be 
implemented in future to improve effective of fisheries management in Vietnam: 
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i) Application of the adaptive indicators-based management structure to plan fisheries 
and implement management plan in practice in Vietnam based on the data collected 
in the project of comprehensive investigation of the marine fisheries resources and 
environment in Vietnam 2011-2020. In this work, multi-disciplinary assessments 
would be made based on a set of indicators to provide the best understanding about 
the fish stocks, fisheries, and marine ecosystems. Based on this, a management plan 
is made with long-term goals of the sustainable utilization of fisheries resources and 
operational objectives to guide implementation process. An implementation plan with 
an iterative learning cycle of monitoring, reviewing and assessment, making 
decisions. 
ii) A further research on the community-based fisheries management connected with 
the Fisheries Association at the local communities should be conducted to 
understand assets of the local communities in fisheries management and roles of 
government and scientists enable local communities to manage fisheries within their 
local waters. In this research, the adaptive indicators-based management structure 
should be elaborated as the management framework for fisheries management at 
the local level, so that it can help local communities to adapt to changes in fish stocks 
and environment. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONS ASKED FOR RESEARCH TOPICS  
Chapter 4: To understand challenges are facing the management system in Vietnam, the 
main following questions asked 04 scientists from RIMF and VIFEP; 02 managers from 
DECAFIREP of MARD; expert from VINAFISH; 14 managers and 56 fishers from 14 
selected provinces: 
i) How fish stocks and marine ecosystems have changed in recent years? Are they 
over-utilized or under-utilized? 
ii) How fishing effort and fishing fleets have been developed in recent years? Are they 
over-capacity or not? 
iii) Is life standard of fishing communities improved or not? What reasons for that? 
iv) Is the existing fisheries management system effective? What challenges facing the 
existing management system? How does it connect with tendency of fisheries 
resources, fishing activities, and society of the fishing communities? 
Chapter 5: To understand the role of fisheries master plan by 2010 in Vietnam, 22 
interviewees (04 scientists from RIMF and VIFEP; 04 managers from DECAFIREP and 
Planning Department of MARD; 14 managers from 14 selected provinces) were asked with 
the following questions: 
i) Why is the master plan needed for fisheries?  
ii) Which and how factors influencing on the goals and objectives when planning the 
fisheries by 2010? 
iii) How are the goals and objectives of the master plan realistic? Why? 
iv) What are your perspectives on objectives of fisheries by 2010? Why? And how were 
they institutionalized into the master plan? 
For 56 fishers from 14 selected provinces to be asked with the following questions: 
i) Do you know about the fisheries master plan by 2010 or any plan for managing the 
volume of catches, number of fishing vessels? 
ii) For three objectives of fisheries master plan, which do you prioritize? Why? 
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Chapter 6: To understand the nature of information and data used for planning the fisheries 
by 2010, 04 scientists from RIMF and VIFEP; 04 staff from GSO of provinces: Quang Ninh, 
Thanh Hoa, Binh Dinh and Kien Giang; 14 managers from 14 selected provinces were 
interviewed with the following questions: 
For 02 scientists from VIFEP who are the main authors of the fisheries master plan by 
2010: 
i)  Why the TC was selected as the management tool for the Vietnamese fisheries? 
ii) What types of knowledge base were used for planning the fisheries by 2010? How 
did they collect, analyze and incorporate into the plan? 
iii) How are they valid and reliable? 
iv) Was there any implicitly political will influencing on the planning objectives (e.g. 
growth rate)?  
For 02 scientists from RIMF who participated into planning fisheries by 2010 and provided 
data on fish stocks i.e. B and EPY for setting TC of the master plan. 
i) How stock assessment works have been conducted? What are the main outputs? 
ii) How the EPY used for setting TC of master plan by 2010 was produced? How is it 
valid? 
For 04 staff of GSO and 14 fisheries managers who made estimation of the TL of the 
province 
i) What are types of data used to estimate TL? 
ii) How is the TL estimated and published? 
iii) How is the TL estimation reliable, valid and compared to estimation of DARD/GSO? 
iv) What is the TL used for? 
Chapter 7: To understand fishing patterns and behaviours of the local fishers, six 
informants and 12 fishers from two communes of Quynh Lap and Tam Quan Bac, were 
interviewed with the following questions: 
For informants who know best about fishing patterns and behaviours of the fishers in their 
communities: 
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i) How long have the fisheries developed in the community? 
ii) Are there any traditional values, norms, informal rules, religious that local fishers 
inspecting to? 
iii) What are interests and preferences that the local fishers pursuing? 
iv) What are the fishing customs and patterns existing in the community? 
v) What and how are factors influencing on the fishing behaviours (long-term and short-
term decision) of the local fishers? 
For fishers 
i) When did you enter the fisheries? Why? 
ii) What are your interests and preferences in the fisheries? 
iii) What factors/information and how they influence your investment decision in the 
business? 
iv) What factors/information and how they influence your daily decisions to 
operationalize the fishing business? 
Chapter 8: To understand implications of implementing the co-management, 02 experts of 
the best experience in fisheries co-management in Vietnam and 06 representatives from 
six fisheries management models in Hai Phong, Nghe An, Thua Thien-Hue, Binh Dinh, 
Khanh Hoa and Ben Tre were interviewed with the following questions: 
For experts: 
i) How and when the co-management approach was introduced into the Vietnamese 
fisheries? 
ii) How is it suited for the Vietnamese context? What are advantages and 
disadvantages? 
iii) What factors influencing on the successful implementation and failure of this 
approach? 
iv) What are obstacles to implement this approach in the Vietnamese context? 
For representatives from fisheries co-management models: 
i) When and why the co-management model was established? 
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ii) How is it organized and linked with fisheries authorities and other fisheries interest 
groups? 
iii) Does it help to address management issues and problems? What are its 
achievements and failures 
iv) What factors influencing on the successful implementation/failure of the models? 
v) What are obstacles to implement the co-management in the local context? 
To understand results of implementing the AIBM structure in the Vietnamese fisheries, 08 
persons (02 managers from RECAFIREP and 04 scientists from RIMF and VIFEP who are 
members of MFST, 02 managers from the Planning system who control the fisheries 
planning system) were interviewed the following questions: 
i) When and how the AIBM structure was introduced into the Vietnamese fisheries? 
ii) How is it suited for the Vietnamese context? What are advantages and 
disadvantages? 
iii) How is it successful? Why? 
iv) What are obstacles to implement this approach in the Vietnamese context? 
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APPENDIX 2: IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE FACTORS INFLUENCING FISHING 
BEHAVIOURS 
Name of interviewee:      date: 
Address: 
 
PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Person-
ality  
Age (years):  Experience (years):  
Education (grade):  Marital status (S,M):  
Family members (people):  Property value (Mil.VND):  
Income per month/year (Mil.VND)  Ration from fishing (%):  
Vessels Vessel size (L/HP):  Age (years):  
Crew members (people):  Total capital (Mi. VND):  
Ownership:         Shared,             Self-owned,                      Other . . . . . . . .  
Fishing 
practice 
Duration (days):  Productions (tons):  
Revenue (Mil. VND):  Variable costs (Mil. VND):  
Fishing model:       separate,        in group (……. Boats) 
Number of days at sea/year:  . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . .   . . . . .    
Fisheries:       Single gear: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .;  .    Multi-gears: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Landing sites:       homeport ,           changeable,        at sea,          all of above 
PART II: TACTICAL DECISIONS 
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No. Factors Ranking 
0 = not related, 1 = less 
important, 2 = important, 3 = 
very important, 4 = critical 
factor 
1 Market (e.g. fish price)  
2 Information (e.g. fishing spots, targeting species)  
3  Labours (e.g. enough or not)  
4  Weather (e.g. bed weather, storm, rainy)  
5 Experience (e.g. targeting fish, catch rate, fish size)  
6 Season (e.g. targeting fish, gear used)  
7 
Regulations (e.g. zoning, closed areas and seasons, 
gears banned, mesh size) 
 
8 
Informal rules (e.g. cease fishing, access rights, 
destructive fishing) 
 
9 Others:   
PART III: STRATEGICAL DECISIONS 
No. Factors How important 
0 = not related, 1 = less important, 2 
= important, 3 = very important, 4 = 
critical factor 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
    0    1    2    3    4 
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1 Regulations and policies (e.g. gears banned, 
size of vessels) 
 
2 Subsidy programs (e.g. credit loans, 
subsidizing for fuel price, operating offshore 
waters) 
 
3 Financial status (e.g. available money)   
4 Management capacity (e.g. managing fishing 
business and crew members) 
 
5 Demands of the next generations (e.g. 
livelihoods and jobs of fishers’ children) 
 
6 Labour availability (e.g. availability of crew 
members to employ) 
 
7 Individual experience (e.g. potential of 
generating profits) 
 
8 Others:  
Other comments and perspectives: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
   0    1    2    3    4 
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APPENDIX 3: A BRIEF DEFINITION OF THE LEGAL REGULATIONS IN 
VIETNAM  
The law provides the primary and basic issues in the areas of domestic arrangements, 
foreign relationships, socio-economic tasks, national defence, national security, the major 
principles for organization and operation of the state apparatus, social relationships and 
activities of citizens. 
The ordinance provisions on matters assigned by the NA, after a period of implementation, 
it should submit to the NA to consider and decide to enact into a law. 
The decree of the Central Government is promulgated to: 1) guide to implement the law, 
resolution of the National Assembly as well as ordinance and resolution of the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly; 2) regulate strategies and solutions to fulfil policies 
on economic, society, security, national defence, finance, currency, budget, tax, ethnic 
group, religion, culture, education, public health care, science, technology, environment, 
foreign affair, operation and organization of the state mechanism, public service, official, 
civil servant, rights and obligations of citizen and others which are under the Government 
authority; 3) stipulate functions and authorities and organization of ministries, ministry-like 
institutions, institutions being under the Government and Government authority; and 4) 
regulate necessary matters being not commensurate with formulating laws or ordinances. 
It must be agreed by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly.  
The decision of the Prime Minister is promulgated to regulate: 1) governance and 
leadership methods of the Government and the state administration system from central to 
local levels; working regulations with the Governmental Member, The Chairman of the PPC 
and others being under the Prime Minister authority, and 2) steering measures and 
collaboration between the Governmental Members, inspection of performance of 
ministries, ministry-like institutions, institutions being under the Government, People’s 
Committee at various levels of implementing the state strategic policies, laws and 
regulations. 
The Minister promulgates circular to: 1) guide to implement the law, resolution of the 
National Assembly as well as ordinance and resolution of the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly and decree of the Government and the decision of the Prime Minister, 
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2) stipulate technological processes and regulations, techno-economic norms of sectors 
mandated, and 3) stipulate regulations to execute management functions and authorities 
of ministry and others assigned by the government. 
The decision of the Provincial People Committee is promulgated to implement policies on 
economic sectors and services, culture, environment and natural resources, defence, 
security, ethnic group, religion, education, execution of regulations, development of local 
governments and management of the provincially administrative border within the province.  
The directive of the Provincial People Committee is promulgated to regulate methods of 
steering, collaboration, supervision and inspection of performance of institutions directly 
under provincial departments, districts, and implement nationally legal regulations and the 
same level People’s Council and its decisions. 
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APPENDIX 4: MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT MODELS 
IMPLEMENTED IN VIETNAM 
No. Models Address 
Time of 
establishment 
Sponsors 
 
Status in 2014 
 
1 
Fisheries resources 
conservation Group 
in Phu Hai 
Phu Hai 
commune, Hai 
Ha Dist. - 
Quang Ninh 
province 
2007 DANIDA Collapsed 
2 
Fisheries co-
management in 
Phu Long 
Phu Long 
commune, Cat 
Hai Dist. – Hai 
Phong city 
1995 German NGO Collapsed 
3 
Fisheries co-
management in 
Quynh Lap 
Quynh Lap 
commune, 
Hoang Mai 
Dist. – Nghe An 
province 
2007 DANIDA 
Funded by 
World Bank from 
2014 
4 
Fisheries resources 
management based 
on the Fisheries 
Association in 
Quang Thai  
Quang Thai 
commune, 
Quang Dien 
Dist. – Thua 
Thien-Hue 
province 
1997 FAO 
Managed by 
Fisheries 
Association 
5 
Fisheries resources 
management based 
on the Fisheries 
Association in Dien 
Hai  
Dien Hai 
commune, 
Phong Dien 
Dist. – Thua 
Thien-Hue 
province 
1997 FAO 
Managed by 
Fisheries 
Association 
6 
Fisheries resources 
management based 
on the Fisheries 
Vinh Giang 
commune, 
Phong Dien 
Dist. – Thua 
2007 DANIDA 
Managed by 
Fisheries 
Association 
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No. Models Address 
Time of 
establishment 
Sponsors 
 
Status in 2014 
 
Association in Vinh 
Giang  
Thien-Hue 
province 
7 
Fisheries resources 
conservation Group 
in Tho Quang 
Tho Quang 
ward, Son Tra 
Dist. Da Nang 
city 
2007  Not working 
8 
Management board 
of marine protected 
area in Cu Lao 
Cham 
Tan Hiep 
commune, Hoi 
An town – 
Quang Nam 
province 
2001 DANIDA 
Working with 
funded by GEF 
9 
Capture fisheries 
and fisheries 
resources 
conservation model 
in Tam Hai 
Tam Hai 
commune, Nui 
Thanh Dist. – 
Quang Nam 
province 
2008 NOAA Not working 
10 
Group for fisheries 
resources 
conservation in My 
Thang  
My Thang 
commune, Phu 
My Dist. – Binh 
Dinh province 
2007 DANIDA 
Funded by 
World bank from 
2014 
11 
Group for fisheries 
resources 
conservation in 
Nhon Hai 
Nhon Hai 
commune, Quy 
Nhon town – 
Binh Dinh 
province 
2007 DANIDA 
Funded by 
World bank from 
2014 
12 
Group for fisheries 
resources 
conservation in 
Nhon Ly 
Nhon Ly 
commune, Quy 
Nhon town – 
Binh Dinh 
province 
2007 DANIDA 
Funded by 
World bank from 
2014 
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No. Models Address 
Time of 
establishment 
Sponsors 
 
Status in 2014 
 
13 
Co-management 
board in Ran Trao 
marine protected 
area 
Van Hung 
commune, Van 
Ninh Dist. – 
Khanh Hoa 
province 
2000 IMA 
Funded by IUCN 
and other 
sponsors 
14 
Fisheries resources 
conservation based 
on the community 
in Nha Phu lagoon 
Ninh Ich 
commune, 
Ninh Hoa Dist. 
– Khanh Hoa 
province 
2001 GiZ Not working 
15 
Co-management 
board in Hon Mun 
marine protected 
area  
 
Tri Nguyen 
commune, Nha 
Trang town – 
Khanh Hoa 
province 
2001 DANIDA Not working 
16 
Co-management 
board of Coral reef 
protection model in 
My Hiep 
Thanh Hai 
commune, 
Ninh Hai Dist. – 
Ninh Thuan 
province 
2008 NOAA Not working 
17 
Capture fisheries 
and fisheries 
resources 
conservation model 
in Thoi Thuan 
Thoi Thuan 
commune, Binh 
Dai Dist. – Ben 
Tre province 
2007 DANIDA Not working 
18 
Capture fisheries 
and fisheries 
resources 
conservation model 
in Thanh Phong 
Thanh Phong 
commune, 
Thanh Phu 
Dist. – Ben Tre 
province 
2007 DANIDA Not working 
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No. Models Address 
Time of 
establishment 
Sponsors 
 
Status in 2014 
 
19 
Fisheries co-
management in Au 
Tho B  
Vinh Hai 
commune, Vinh 
Chau – Soc 
Trang province 
2001 GiZ Not working 
20 
Management of 
clam ground in 
Khanh Hoi 
Khanh Hoi 
commune, U 
Minh Dist. – Ca 
Mau province 
2007 DANIDA Not working 
21 
Management of the 
stow nets in Cai Doi 
Vam  
Cai Doi Vam 
commune, Phu 
Tan Dist. – Ca 
Mau province 
2007 DANIDA Not working 
22 
Co-management 
board in Hon Thom 
marine protected 
area 
Hon Thom 
commune, Phu 
Quoc Dist. – 
Kien Giang 
province 
2001 DANIDA Not working 
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